ORDER Deepak Verma, J. 1. This petition has been preferred Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, by Decree-Holders, against the Order dated 29-4-1992, passed by Shri R. G. Ghatiya, IInd Additional District Judge, Ujjain, in Civil Revision No. 69/1980, whereby the Revision filed by Respondent No. 1/Judgment-debtor, has been allowed, consequently the Execution, filed by Petitioners has been rejected. 2. While considering the facts of this case, I am reminded of a judgment of Privy Council, reported in Volume-XIV-1871-2-Moores Indian Appeals, Page-605, The General Manager of Raj Darbhanga v. Maharaja Coomar Ramput Singh in which, Their Lordships have held that "these proceedings certainly illustrate, what was said by Mr. Doyne, and what has been often stated before that the difficulties of a litigant in India begin, when, he has obtained a decree". The said observation made way back in the Year 1872 by the Privy Council has fully come true to the facts of the instant case. 3. Similarly, Lahore High Court, while considering the observation of Privy Council, has held elegantly in its judgment reported in AIR 1926 Lahore 110, Hargobind Kishan Chand v. Hakim Singh & Co. "Experience amply proves that the epigram of their Lordships of the Privy Council in General Manager of the Raj Darbhanga v. Maharaja Coomar Ramput Singh, reposes upon a wide foundation of fact. The judgment-debtor in this country as a rule is either frankly recalcitrant or averse from suffering the inconvenience of finding the decretal sum, and execution against his estate is almost invariably opposed by means of objections, generally without foundation, and more often than not, brought at his instigation in order to secure delay in the execution of the decree. The result is that the proverbial law's delay is more frequently and strikingly exemplified in execution proceedings than even in the initial dispute. In these circumstances any tenderness towards the judgment-debtor on the part of the executing Court is not only entirely misplaced but is entirely opposed to the law." 4. In the light of the aforesaid observations, I proceed to decide the case in hand. 5. Factual matrix is as given below; On 17-7-1964, elder brother of petitioners Nos. In these circumstances any tenderness towards the judgment-debtor on the part of the executing Court is not only entirely misplaced but is entirely opposed to the law." 4. In the light of the aforesaid observations, I proceed to decide the case in hand. 5. Factual matrix is as given below; On 17-7-1964, elder brother of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and father of Petitioner No. 3-Shri Jawaharalal (since dead), acting as KARTA of Hindu Joint Family, Ramlal Jawaharlal, filed a suit for eviction against Respondent No. 1-Darbarilal, one Fatelal and Vasudeo Punjabi, on the ground that Respondent No. 1 was the original tenant of suit-accommodation and he had parted with the possession of a part of the said accommodation in favour of defendant-Vasudeo, therefore, has created Sub-tenancy, and on another ground of inconsistent user of the suit accommodation. Fatelal, another defendant of the suit was impleaded, only with an intention to overcome any further legal objection, as he happens to be real brother of Respondent No. 1. 6. On such a suit being filed, defendant No. 1, i.e. the present Respondent No. 1, filed his written-statement. In the same, it was clearly mentioned, that Fatelal had nothing to do with the suit-house and has been impleaded wrongly as a party. Ownership of the plaintiff was admitted; grounds of subletting and inconsistent user were denied. The suit was contested on merits only by Respondent No. 1, whereas, other defendants of the suit remained absent. Consequently, they were proceeded ex parte. 7. The learned Trial Court, after framing of issues, gave an opportunity to parties to lead evidence. The trial Court, then, on the basis of material available with it, decreed the suit of plaintiff-Jawaharlal (since dead), against defendants Nos. 1 and 3, but, dismissed it against defendant No. 2 i.e. Fatelal, on the ground that no relief has been claimed against him. Defendant No. 1 (Respondent No. 1) Darbarilal alone preferred First Appeal before the District Judge, Ujjain. The First Appeal was also dismissed on merits and the judgment and decree of the trial Court was affirmed. 8. Not being satisfied, Respondent No. 1, preferred Second Appeal, in the High Court of M.P., Indore Bench, which was registered as S.A. No. 64/66. During the pendency of Second Appeal, the original plaintiff-Jawaharlal expired on 3-5-1974. The First Appeal was also dismissed on merits and the judgment and decree of the trial Court was affirmed. 8. Not being satisfied, Respondent No. 1, preferred Second Appeal, in the High Court of M.P., Indore Bench, which was registered as S.A. No. 64/66. During the pendency of Second Appeal, the original plaintiff-Jawaharlal expired on 3-5-1974. Since, the Respondent No. 1, appellant of the said Appeal, had taken no steps to bring his L.Rs. on record, the said Second Appeal was dismissed as having been abated, by this High Court, on 11-8-1976. 9. Narration of these facts would indicate that the Judgment and decree of the trial Court was finally confirmed. I have been informed that against the said dismissal of the appeal of Respondent No. 1, he had preferred Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court, but, the same also came to be rejected. 10. After rejection of the Appeal from all Courts, and confirmation of the Judgment and decree in favour of Petitioners, they got the opportunity of filing execution, so as to get the fruits of decree. Then, came spate of objections, raised by Respondent No. 1 from time to time. Against the adverse Orders, both parties preferred various Appeals and Revisions in the District Court and in the High Court. Then, in C.R. No. 69/1980, Respondent No. 1 was finally successful in convincing the Court of IInd Additional District Judge, Ujjain, that the execution filed by Petitioners was not maintainable, thereby, allowing the Revision of Respondent No. 1, dismissing the Execution of Petitioners. Though between the period, the Petitioners had filed their execution and till passing of the Impugned Order, by the learned IInd Additional, District Judge, Ujjain, as mentioned above, several appeals and Revisions have been preferred by the parties, but, at this stage, it is really not necessary to make a detailed mention of all those litigations which has travelled during the said period, between the two parties. 11. At the time of filing of Execution by the Petitioners, the original Judgment-debtors-Fatelal and Vasudeo, both had expired. Respondent No. 4 Dharampal Malik of this petition, is the L.R. of original defendant-Vasudeo. 12. 11. At the time of filing of Execution by the Petitioners, the original Judgment-debtors-Fatelal and Vasudeo, both had expired. Respondent No. 4 Dharampal Malik of this petition, is the L.R. of original defendant-Vasudeo. 12. Taking advantage of the provisions, as mentioned in Order XXI, Rule 22 of Civil Procedure Code, Respondent No. 1 filed objections with regard to the maintainability of execution on the ground, that execution has not been filed by L.R. of Jawaharlal, instead the same has been signed by Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2, brothers of deceased Jawaharlal and Petitioner No. 3, who happens to be an adopted son of original plaintiff Jawaharlal, therefore, the same cannot be executed. Petitioners filed their reply to the said objections. 13. After consideration of the objections, the learned Executing Court dismissed the said objections on 1-4-1977 and directed issuance of warrant of possession. Against this Order, Respondent No. 1 preferred Civil Revision No. 240/1977 in the High Court, but, the same was withdrawn by him on 10-12-1979. However, he preferred an Appeal before the appropriate Appellate Court, against the said Order and also filed an application Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, praying for condonation of delay. 14. On 3-8-1977, Respondent No. 1 filed fresh objections Under Order XXI, Rules 22 and 23 of Civil Procedure Code raising the following objections : (i) That there has been a partition between the Petitioners' joint family properties, therefore, the execution in the present form is not maintainable. (ii) Judgment-debtor No. 2 having expired on 20-11-1976, in absence of his L.Rs. being brought on record, Executing Court cannot proceed in the matter. 15. Faced with fresh objections, Petitioners filed their reply to the same. Once again, the Executing Court rejected those objections on 18-4-1979. On matter being agitated further, by Respondent No. 1, both the Appeals being Nos. 69/1980 and 70/1980, were heard and disposed of by a common Order dated 18-7-1981, by IInd Addl. District Judge, Ujjain, dismissing the same. 16. In the said Order, in para 7, it has been held that the execution has been filed by L.Rs. of original-plaintiff and, therefore, the decree is executable in the existing form against Respondent No. 1. Reference was made to Rules 15 and 16 of Order XXI of Civil Procedure Code. District Judge, Ujjain, dismissing the same. 16. In the said Order, in para 7, it has been held that the execution has been filed by L.Rs. of original-plaintiff and, therefore, the decree is executable in the existing form against Respondent No. 1. Reference was made to Rules 15 and 16 of Order XXI of Civil Procedure Code. Respondent No. 1 preferred further Appeal in the High Court against the said Order, which was registered as M. A. 168/1971. On account of local amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure, this M. A was directed to be converted into Civil Revision and was sent to the District Court for hearing the parties on merits. This was precisely done in view of the State Amendments, made in Section 115 of Civil Procedure in the Year 1984, vide M.P. Act No. 29 of 1984. The matter having been, thus, remitted to IInd Additional District Judge, Ujjain for being treated as Civil Revision, was heard by the said Court and the Impugned Order, is the result of the said Revision. 17. The Revisional Court has specifically held that the objections of Respondent No. 1 dt. 17-3-1977 are valid and proper objections. Consequently, it is held that in view of these objections, execution proceedings initiated by Petitioners, cannot continue, thereby execution has been dismissed. It is this Order, which has been annexed as Annexure P. 23, is being assailed, by Petitioners in this petition filed Under Article 227 of the Constitution. 18. On notice being issued, Respondent No. 1 alone has filed his Return, opposing the prayer of Petitioners. Certain preliminary objections have been raised by this Respondent. Respondent No. 1 has submitted, that Petitioners have no right or authority to file Annexure P. 1 to Annexure P. 4, as they do not constitute the record of the execution case. The Executing Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the decree. Petitioners by filing these documents, in a clandestine manner and by unlawfully using them, have tried to support their case and illegally got the warrant of possession issued by the Executing Court. The present petition is untenable for want of necessary parties to this petition, as Mohanbai, a party in Appeal and Revision, has not been arrayed as one of the Respondents. The scope of Article 227 being limited, no interference is called for in the present petition. The present petition is untenable for want of necessary parties to this petition, as Mohanbai, a party in Appeal and Revision, has not been arrayed as one of the Respondents. The scope of Article 227 being limited, no interference is called for in the present petition. Further submission is, that the Revisional Court has neither exceeded its jurisdiction, nor, has committed any error of law in rejecting the Petitioners' execution application and accepting the objections, as raised by the Respondent No. 1. Main objection is, that without adjudication of Petitioners' right to execute the decree, passed in favour of deceased Seth Jawarharlal, Petitioners could not have executed the same against the Judgment- Debtors, more so, when, there is a serious objection to it by Respondent No. 1. 19. Now I shall deal with the objections of Respondent No. 1, which were first rejected by Executing Court on 1-4-1977 and the similar set of objections, which were reiterated on 3-8-1977, but, were rejected by the Executing Court again on 18-4-1979. The salient features of the objections as noted in the two objections are mentioned hereinbelow : (i) That the Execution Form has not been filed by all the L.Rs. of late Seth Jawaharlal; (ii) It has not been shown whether it is a trust property or HUF property. If trust property, the necessary details in this regard be furnished. 20. It has been objected to by Shri P. K. Saxena, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1, that in Executing Court, plaint, written statement, Judgment and decree of trial Court and Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court were not on record, therefore, same could not have been considered by it nor the same can be referred to here. His contention is that the Revisional Court has rightly rejected the application of Petitioners for execution. 21. In this regard, judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1972 SC 1371 , Bhavan Waja v. Solanki Hanuji, Mansang throws light on the controversy. It has been held that it is true that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can, and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can, and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court often has to ascertain the circumstances under which these words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the executing court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty, it would be deemed to have failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. 22. Thus, this judgment fully clinches the issue that even, if, pleadings, judgment/decree of the Trial Court or Appellate Court were not before the executing Court, the Executing Court has the jurisdiction and power to execute the decree. Apart from this, it may also be mentioned that each Court is required to maintain a Civil Suit Register, in which, each and every details are required to be mentioned. Thus, from this Register also all the details can be checked and verified. Thus objection in this regard, by Respondent No. 1 being devoid of merits, is, hereby rejected. 23. Now dealing with the objections, as raised by Respondent No. 1, I find that the executing Court has recorded a finding that the execution has been filed by Mohanlal, Hukumchand, brothers of the deceased plaintiff late Seth Jawaharlal, who was described as Karta of HUF on whose behalf the suit was filed, as also by Kailashchandra, the adopted son of late Seth Jawaharlal. Considering this aspect of the matter, the learned Executing Court after proper adjudication, rejected the objections as raised by Respondent No. 1. 24. In this regard, the affidavit of Respondent No. 1, filed in support of his objections is necessary to be seen. He has submitted that apart from the aforesaid Decree-holders, there are other members also of HUF, whose names have been given by him in the affidavit dated 30-3-1977 filed in the Executing Court. In the affidavit, the main ground is, that the sons of Mohanlal and Hukumchand have not signed the same. This objection has got no force, for the simple reason that as long as Mohanlal and Hukumchand were alive, it was not necessary for the execution to be signed by their L.Rs. also. In the affidavit, the main ground is, that the sons of Mohanlal and Hukumchand have not signed the same. This objection has got no force, for the simple reason that as long as Mohanlal and Hukumchand were alive, it was not necessary for the execution to be signed by their L.Rs. also. Perusal of the plaint, written statement and all other documents, pertaining to the execution, fully establish that the suit was filed by late Seth Jawaharlal as Karta of HUF. On his death, one of the two brothers would be the Karta of HUF and his adopted son, for whom there is no dispute, has also signed the Execution Form. Thus, the objection raised by Respondent No. 1 is of no consequence. 25. From narration of the aforesaid facts, it will be seen that both the objections of the respondent No. 1 were rejected on merits. 26. The question that arises for consideration now in this petition is whether such objections, as have been projected above, could have been raised legally and whether the Impugned Order can be upheld in law. 27. Both parties have cited several authorities in support of their respective contentions. 28. In the case reported in AIR 1961 SC 1277 , Devidas v. Shri Shailappa, it has been held that the question of the right of Manager to sue in that capacity is one of authority if the other co-sharers are adults, and the right to insist on the other coparceners being brought on the record is for the benefit of the defendant to insure himself against further litigation and is, therefore, dependent on the objection being taken at an early stage, the objection on the score of want of authorisation being one of a character which it is clearly open to the defendant to waive. 29. Perusal of the plaint would show that late Seth Jawaharlal had filed the suit as Karta of the family, there is no dispute also in this regard. On his death he has been represented by other Karta, who is the next surviving senior male member of the family. Respondent No. 1 did not have any right to raise objections to this fact. Petitioners have clearly mentioned in the execution form, their status and how they have become entitled to execute the decree against respondent No. 1. 30. In the case reported in AIR 1936 Mad. Respondent No. 1 did not have any right to raise objections to this fact. Petitioners have clearly mentioned in the execution form, their status and how they have become entitled to execute the decree against respondent No. 1. 30. In the case reported in AIR 1936 Mad. 205 (FB), Kanchanmalai Pathar v. Shahaji Rajah Sahib, while considering Section 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, it has been held, that if execution is sought against legal representative, then decree holder must proceed Under Section 50 of the Civil Procedure Code. 31. Much has been argued by learned counsel for both sides with regard to applicability of Order 21, Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code. For ready reference, Rule 16 is reproduced hereinbelow :- "Application for execution by transferee of decree - Where a decretor, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour two or more persons, the interest of any decree holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it, and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such holder : Provided that, where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution : Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others. Explanation. - Nothing in this rule shall affect the provisions of Section 146, and a transferee of rights in the property, which is the subject-matter of the suit, may apply for execution of the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by this rule." 32. It has been submitted by the petitioners that proviso to Rule 16 does not apply to the petitioners case as it is not a case of transfer of any assignment but, shall be covered by the words "operation of law" therefore, no notice of the execution was required to be sent to the Judgment Debtor. 33. It has been submitted by the petitioners that proviso to Rule 16 does not apply to the petitioners case as it is not a case of transfer of any assignment but, shall be covered by the words "operation of law" therefore, no notice of the execution was required to be sent to the Judgment Debtor. 33. Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to consider import of Rule 16 of Rule 21 reported in AIR 1983 P & H 50, Chet Ram v. Amin Lal Full Bench has held that the provisions of Rule 16 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code are only enabling and the transferees if they so desired, could get themselves impleaded as decree-holders in place of the original one. So long as this is not done, the person whose name appears as decree-holder in the decree, is entitled to execute the decree. 34. Supreme Court has also considered Rule 16 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code in a judgment reported in AIR 1955 SC 376 , while considering the meaning of the words "by operation of law", it has been held elegantly as under in para 29 :- "More often than not transfers "by operation of law" will be found to be brought about by the operation of statutory law. Thus, when a person dies intestate there is a devolution of his properties to his legal representatives by operation of the law of testamentary succession which is now mainly statutory in this country. When a person is adjudged insolvent his properties vest in the official assignee and that transfer is brought about by the operation of the insolvency laws which have been codified. Court sale of property execution of a decree vests the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in that property in the auction-purchaser thereby effecting a transfer by operation of the law embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. Likewise, statutes in some cases provide for the forfeiture of property, e.g. property in relation to which an offence has been committed, namely, illicit liquor or opium, etc., and thereby effect a transfer of such property from the delinquent owner to the State. It is neither necessary nor profitable to try and enumerate exhaustively the instances of transfer by operation of law. It is neither necessary nor profitable to try and enumerate exhaustively the instances of transfer by operation of law. Suffice it to say that there is no warrant for confining transfers "by operation of law" to transfers by operation of statutory laws. When a Hindu or a Mohammaden dies intestate and his heirs succeed to his estate there is a transfer not by any statute but by the operation of their respective personal law. In order to constitute a transfer of property "by operation of law" all that is necessary is that there must be a passing of one person's rights in property to another person by the force of some law, statutory or otherwise." 35. Judgment of Nagpur High Court in this regard is also pertinent to be mentioned. It is reported in 1952 NLJ 488 = AIR 1953 Nag. 38, Hiralal Karelal v. Bare. The Division Bench has held that the decree can be executed by the decree holder or his legal representatives, but, not by his successor. In this case also, the petitioner No. 3 being the adopted son is the legal representative of deceased Seth Jawaharlal. Others are brothers and, therefore, they have every right to execute the decree. It is not in dispute that Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are the brothers of late Seth Jawaharlal and petitioner No. 3 is his adopted son. 36. It is too well settled that Executing Court, has got no power to go behind the decree and the decree has to be executed as it stands. This legal aspect of the matter finds place in a judgment reported in AIR 1960 SC 388 , Topanmal Chhotamal v. M/s Kundomal Gangaram. 37. Relying on a judgment of Single Bench of this Court reported in 1966 MPLJ Note 177 = 1966 JLJ 452, Woman (through L.R.) Indirabai v. Anokchand, Shri Pavecha submitted that the Revisional Court was wholly unjustified in rejecting the execution and submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment parties should have been granted time to cure the defects, if any. He further submitted that the defects were not such which could not have been cured. On this count also, his submission is that the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 38. Replying to the aforesaid submissions, Shri P. K. Saxena, learned Sr. Counsel dubbed the same as being unmeritorious and without any legal basis. 39. He further submitted that the defects were not such which could not have been cured. On this count also, his submission is that the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 38. Replying to the aforesaid submissions, Shri P. K. Saxena, learned Sr. Counsel dubbed the same as being unmeritorious and without any legal basis. 39. He submitted that it was obligatory on the part of the Executing Court to have held an enquiry Under Order 21, Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code. More so, when the petitioners had themselves mentioned in the execution form that they have become entitled to execute the decree on account of death of late Seth Jawaharlal, the original plaintiff. The petitioners have not mentioned their status and their capacity in signing the execution form. Respondent No. 1 Judgment Debtor without losing any time, filed his objections, against execution. Since the objections were filed, it was incumbent on the part of the executing Court to have adjudicated the said objections. The decree still stands in the name of late Seth Jawaharlal. Unless the decree itself is corrected, the question of its execution does not arise. Since other Judgment Debtors Fatelal and Vasudev have expired, their legal representatives should be brought on record. Notice of the execution should have been issued to all the Judgment-Debtors as also to the legal representatives of deceased Judgment-Debtors. Not having done so, the execution in present form could not have been executed. 40. He has placed reliance on a judgment reported in 1943 NLJ 499 = AIR 1944 Nag. 80, Prayagdas Shankerlal Marwadi v. Mt. Indirabai to contend that every Judgment-Debtor is entitled to a notice to show-cause, against an application of the legal representatives of the decree holder to substitute their names. 41. He, then, submitted that a person who has not been authorised to make application as provided by Order 3, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot sign and present application for execution, simply, because he is acquainted with facts of the case. For the aforesaid proposition, he has placed reliance on a judgment reported in AIR 1957 Raj. 122, Superintendent Court of Wards v. Raj Purohit Gopi Krishanji. In the said case, Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court was considering provisions of Order 21, Rule 11(2) as also Order 3, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. 42. For the aforesaid proposition, he has placed reliance on a judgment reported in AIR 1957 Raj. 122, Superintendent Court of Wards v. Raj Purohit Gopi Krishanji. In the said case, Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court was considering provisions of Order 21, Rule 11(2) as also Order 3, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. 42. He has strenuously submitted that, in view of the provisions of Rule 16 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was mandatory for the Executing Court to have issued notices to all the Judgment-Debtors, as also to the legal representatives of the Judgment-Debtors. For the said proposition, he has placed his strong reliance on a judgment of Full Bench reported in AIR 1964 AP 1 , Arvapalli Ramarao v. Kanumarlapudi Ranganayakulu. Reading from the said judgment, he submitted that in case of assignment of decree, it itself does not give assignee a right to take execution proceedings, unless he is able to show and prove his recognition of assignment to the Court. His contention is that, unless the objections as posed by respondent No. 1 and opposed by the petitioners have properly been adjudicated upon, the decree could not have been executed. 43. He, then, submitted that in view of the fact that this being a petition Under Article 227 of the Constitution, no interference is called for especially in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 , Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim and AIR 1986 SC 1192 , State of Maharashtra v. Harishchandra. 44. Distinguishing the aforesaid cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, Shri Pavecha, submitted that in Prayagdas Shankerlal Marwadi's case (supra), Division Bench of Nagpur High Court, was not at all considering provisions of Order 21, Rule 16, the said case was with regard to question of "step-in-aid", so as to find whether execution was filed within the period of limitation. Since the question involved in this petition, was not directly or remotely connected to the facts of the said case, any observation made in this regard would only be an obiter. 45. As regards the case of Superintendent Court of Wards (supra), he submitted that the Rajasthan High Court, was considering the competence of a person to execute a decree on the basis of acquaintanced, with the facts of the case. 45. As regards the case of Superintendent Court of Wards (supra), he submitted that the Rajasthan High Court, was considering the competence of a person to execute a decree on the basis of acquaintanced, with the facts of the case. He submitted that, in this case the basic question was whether in absence of the execution being filed by decree holder, but, which was filed by some stranger, who was described as "Wakil Thikana", the said execution could still be executed. 46. According to him, in the case of the Arvapalli Ramarao (supra), Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering a case of assignment which occurs in Rule 16 of Order 21, but the case in hand is not a case of assignment but, is a case which would be governed "by operation of law". According to him, the cases relied upon by respondent No. 1 are clearly distinguishable on facts of the present case, and ratio decidendi of these cases would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 47. I have critically gone through the authorities cited by Shri P. K. Saxena. After my anxious consideration to the whole matter, I find myself unable to subscribe to the contentions as raised by him. For this reason, the authorities cited by him, render no help to the case of respondent No. 1. 48. After over all consideration of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the Impugned Order cannot be sustained in law. If the Revisional Court had found that, there was some defect in the execution form, then, the same could not have been rejected outright, as the defects as found by the said Court were not of such nature, which could not have been cured. No reasons have been assigned for not giving an opportunity to the petitioners to cure the alleged defects. After examining the execution form, I am of the firm view that there existed no defects at all and the execution form as it is was in accordance with law and the same should have been executed. Thus, I have no option but to set aside and quash the Impugned Order Annexure P. 23 dated 29-4-1992, passed by the Revisional Court. 49. The case which was weighing heavily on me is the case of Mohd. Thus, I have no option but to set aside and quash the Impugned Order Annexure P. 23 dated 29-4-1992, passed by the Revisional Court. 49. The case which was weighing heavily on me is the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra), as admittedly this being a petition Under Article 227, scope of interference is much narrower than the scope conferred on this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 50. To overcome this, I have been able to lay my hands on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1997 SC 2077 , Achutananda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayen. While considering, powers of Superintendence of the High Court Under Article 227 of the Constitution, Supreme Court has held elegantly in its paras 10 and 11 as under :- "The power of superintendence of the High Court Under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court Under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the Courts and Tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required to do. Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the High Court can interfere Under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving a finding which is perverse or based on no material or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the inferior Court, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the subordinate Court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the powers Under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate Court came to the conclusion without any evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse. If the evidence on record in respect of a question of fact is not at all taken into consideration and without reference to such evidence, the finding of fact is arrived at by inferior Court or Tribunal, such finding must be held to be perverse and lacking in factual basis. In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction Under Article 227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse finding of facts." 51. The said judgment, clearly opens a gate for interference, in a matter Under Article 227 and also shows ray of hope to the Petitioners to execute the decree. I have no doubt in my mind that the case in hand falls within the four corners of the aforesaid case, and in a given case, where the Lower Court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted wholly illegally, interference is called for. The same has then to be exercised in favour of the party who has been wronged. 52. It may be mentioned here that even, though, a decree has been passed in favour of the petitioners almost 20 years back, but, till date they have neither been able to get any rent, mesne profits or possession of the suit premises. The fruits of decree even though ripe, could not be given to the petitioners on account of flimsy, repetitive, and frivolous objections of respondent No. 1. 53. It is also pertinent to mention that each and every objection as may be raised by the Judgment-Debtors or same third party, is not required to be adjudicated upon, unless the Executing Court, is able to find truth, genuineness and prima facie case in this regard. Otherwise, it shall become an absolute impossibility for the Decree Holder to execute the decree, passed in his favour. Such frivolous objections cannot be permitted to be converted into a deed of conveyance, in favour of Judgment Debtors, without payment of any price for the property involved in the Suit. For ascertaining these facts, the Executing Court has to be careful, cautious and vigilant. There may be so many other factors, on the basis of which Executing Court, has to consider the objections. 54. Needless to say, if the same falls within the frame work of law, then the same should be adjudicated upon as expeditiously as possible and preferably on day to day basis. 55. There may be so many other factors, on the basis of which Executing Court, has to consider the objections. 54. Needless to say, if the same falls within the frame work of law, then the same should be adjudicated upon as expeditiously as possible and preferably on day to day basis. 55. While exercising jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it has to be seen at once as to "who is wronged" and "who has wronged" and whether the order sought to be mortalised needs to be incinerated or protected to undo the wrong. Injustice has to be uprooted. 56. From the narration of the aforesaid facts, injustice can be uprooted only when a decree passed by competent Court is directed to be executed, so that petitioners are able to ultimately get the fruits of the decree. 57. For the foregoing reasons, I allow this petition, quash the impugned Order Annexure P. 23 and direct the Executing Court to proceed forthwith, with the execution of the decree. Petition is, thus, allowed with cost. Counsel fee, Rs. 2,000/-, if certified.