Judgment :- C.R.P. No.2705 of 1996 is against the common order dated 20.2.1995 in M.P. No.973 of 1993 in E.P. No.664 of 1993 in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989. 2. C.R.P. No.2706 of 1996 is against the very same common order dated 20.2.1996 in M.P. No.299 of 1994 in E.P. No.664 of 1993 in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989. 3. M.P. No.973 of 1993 was filed for dismissing the E.P. No.664 of 1993. While M.P. No.299 of 1994 is for permission to amend the E.P. No.664 of 1993 by adding “the back portion only” before the words “No.32, Namasivaya Chetty Lane, Washermanpet, Madras.” By a common order dated 20.2.1995, the learned 16th Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, allowed M.P. No.973 of 1993 and dismissed M.P. No.299 of 1994. Hence, these two civil revision petitions were filed by the landlord. 4. The landlord filed R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989 against the tenant and obtained an ex parte order dated 5. 1990. The tenant was occupying 4,000 sq.ft. in door Nos.31 and 32, Namasivaya Chetty Lane, Ma-dras-21, as per the agreement dated 8. 1987, for a consolidated amount of Rs.5,000. Even though the tenancy was for three years, the landlord filed eviction petition in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989 and got an ex parte order as mentioned above. Thereafter, the landlord filed E.P. No.459 of 1990. At that time, an agreement was said to be signed with the help of mediators. The said agreement is dated 11. 1990. As per the agreement, a new lease was granted to the tenant for three years. The new lease covered door No.32 and half of the back portion in door No.31. The monthly rent was Rs.5,000. An advance of Rs.50,000 was also paid. Pursuant to the agreement, E.P. No.459 of 1990, was dismissed. After the expiry of the new lease, the landlord filed E.P. No.664 of 1993 on 11. 1993. That apart, the landlord has also obtained orders for police aid and break opening of the lock of the building. Inasmuch as a new lease was created on 11. 1990 and the tenant is continuing as a tenant as per the said lease, the earlier order obtained by the landlord in R.C.t).P. No.2852 of 1989 cannot be executed. This is the case of the tenant, who is the respondent in both the civil revision petitions. 5. Inasmuch as a new lease was created on 11. 1990 and the tenant is continuing as a tenant as per the said lease, the earlier order obtained by the landlord in R.C.t).P. No.2852 of 1989 cannot be executed. This is the case of the tenant, who is the respondent in both the civil revision petitions. 5. According to the landlord, the E.P. No.459 of 1990 has not been proceeded with because of the agreement. An endorsement has been made on E.P. No.459 of 1990 mentioning about the agreement signed by both the parties. There is no new agreement of lease. The order of eviction in R.CO.P. No.2852 of 1989 has not been cancelled, it can be executed. 6. The learned Rent Controller after considering the oral evidence of the landlord and the tenant and after considering the Exs.P. 1 to P.3 and R. 1 to R.3 came to the conclusion that there has come to be a new lease with new terms after the filing of the E.P. No.459 of 1990 and as the tenant continues to be in possession pursuant to the new lease, he cannot be evicted pursuant to the old eviction order. He has also found that the eviction order in the earlier proceeding relates to a different portion and hence execution petition cannot be amended to include a different portion. In that view, the learned Rent Controller allowed the tenant’s petition M.P. No.973 of 1993 and dismissed the landlord’s petition M.P. No.299 of 1994 for amendment. 7. The learned counsel for the landlord Mr.S. Sampath Kumar, vehemently contended that there was no new lease at all and what was agreed was only to postpone the execution for three years. Therefore, after the expiry of three years period, the landlord is entitled to execute the order of eviction obtained in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989 on 5. 1990. 8. The learned counsel Mr.P.R. Selvaraj, appearing for the respondent, on the other hand contended that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the landlord gave Up his rights, which he obtained under the earlier eviction order and knowingly entered into a new agreement of lease and hence the tenant is entitled to continue in possession as’per the new lease. 9. 9. In the light of the submissions made by the counsels on both sides, the point that is to be found in the case is; Whether there was only a postponement of execution or a new lease was entered into on 11. 1990. 10. On 11. 1990 Ex.P.1 has been executed. The said document has been marked before the Rent Controller after the payment of necessary stamp duty. In Ex.R.1 Memo of compromise, there is reference about this agreement. A certified copy of execution petition in E.P. No.459 of 1990 was produced before me. It contains the endorsement dated 11. 1990. The counsel for the petitioner has made the endorsement, which reads as follows; “The petitioner is not pressing the E.P. in view of the compromise memo filed by the parties.” The said endorsement is also signed by the petitioner himself i.e., A.Lakshmi Narayanan. Thereafter the order of the court dated 11. 1990 is found, which reads as follows: “In view of the endorsement, this petition is dismissed as not pressed.” From the above, it is clear that though the compromise memo was filed into court but no order was obtained in terms of the compromise memo, and the execution petition was not pressed and therefore it was dismissed. 11. The certified copy of the compromise memo filed into court on 11. 1990 i.e., Ex.R.l. Ex.R.l contains the terms of compromise entered into between the parties. Ex.P.l contains the terms of the new lease agreement. In the memo of compromise Clauses 5 and 6 state that the tenant will vacate the property on the expiry of the period of three years from the date of compromise and if the tenant did not surrender vacant possession, the landlord would be entitled to execute the order of eviction granted in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989. Even though these clause are there in the compromise memo, since no order has been passed an the terms of compromise by the court, we cannot take it that the aforesaid clauses are orders of court, At the most they tantamount to an agreement between the parties. This view is further strengthened by Ex.P.l. Ex.P.l in the preamble narrates the circumstances leading to the agreement, after referring to the eviction order in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989 and the E.P. No.459 of 1990. This view is further strengthened by Ex.P.l. Ex.P.l in the preamble narrates the circumstances leading to the agreement, after referring to the eviction order in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989 and the E.P. No.459 of 1990. The last portion of the preamble states as follows: “Whereas the Landlord and the tenant have now agreed for a Settlement between them, the terms of which are as follows:” .12. A reading of Ex.P.l shows that after the Execution Petition was filed, the front portion of Door No.32 measuring about 30’ x 28’ was already surrendered. This portion was included in the old tenancy. The old tenancy relates to the entire door Nos.31 and 32, Namasivaya Chetty Lane. But the new tenancy was limited to entire Door No.31 and back portion of Door No.32, Namasivaya Chetty Lane. The rent for the portions of the building under the new agreement is Rs.5,000 per month. Under the old tenancy, the tenant was enjoying 4,000 sq.ft. But as per the new tenancy, he has been given 30’ x 60’ in door No.31 and 30’ x 40’ in door No.32. Under the new agreement only 3,000 sq.ft. is given to the tenant. The rent for this 3,000 sq.ft. is Rs.5,000 per month. A reading of both the compromise memo as well as the agreement goes to show that a new lease was entered into on 11. 1990. 13. It is true that in the compromise as well as in the tenancy agreement, there is a condition that the tenant should vacate after three years from the date of the agreement and in case he did not do so, the landlord could be entitled to execute the order of eviction in R.C.O.P. No.2852 of 1989. These conditions are not part of any court order, they are mere agreements only because we have already seen that even though the compromise memo was filed in the Court in the execution proceedings, viz., E.P. No.459 of 1990, no order was passed in terms of the compromise. Therefore, the question is whether such conditions are valid. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited the following authority and contended that the conditions contained in the compromise memo can be enforced. Bai Chanchal and others Syed Jalauddin and others, (1970)3 S.C.C. 124 . Therefore, the question is whether such conditions are valid. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited the following authority and contended that the conditions contained in the compromise memo can be enforced. Bai Chanchal and others Syed Jalauddin and others, (1970)3 S.C.C. 124 . In the said case, the Apex Court has held in paragraph 7 that there was no new tenancy created arid it was only a postponement of surrounding of possession in a decree for ejectment. In the above said case, the terms of compromise were recorded as decree of court. Therefore, the Apex Court construed the agreement only as consent decrees and held that all that the decree-holders did was to allow the judgment-debtors to continue in possession for five years on payment of mesne profits as a concession for entering into a compromise. As we have seen already in the case on hand, the compromise relied on is only a compromise between the parties and never attained the status of a decree. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of the said case are entirely different. .15. The learned counsel for the respondent cited a Judgment of this Court reported in Ramiah Chettiar v. K.Sankaralingam Pillai, (1970)1 M.L.J. 483 . In the said case in an eviction petition on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent, a compromise was entered into, whereby the tenant undertook to pay the future rents regularly and agreed that if he failed to do so, the landlord would be entitled to take possession of the demised premises without further notice from the Rent Controller. The petition was ordered in terms of the compromise memo. A learned single Judge of this Court took the view that the compromise decree is not valid since the Rent Controller cannot pass an order of eviction without satisfying himself about the existence of the ground for eviction. Hence, the learned Judge held that the compromise order was without jurisdiction. 16. In the above said case, the learned single Judge took the view that even a compromise clause providing for eviction in case of default in future is without jurisdiction. In this case we have no compromise decree or order of court, but only an agreement. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent also cited a decision reported in NaiBahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, (1978)1 S.C.C. 58 . In this case we have no compromise decree or order of court, but only an agreement. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent also cited a decision reported in NaiBahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, (1978)1 S.C.C. 58 . In the said case also the Apex Court has held as follows: “It is well settled that if the court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on the record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the court to pass a valid decree of eviction”. In this case also what is stressed is that without satisfying about the existence of a ground for eviction, the Rent Controller cannot pass an order or eviction on the basis of a compromise. Even though we are no concerned with the validity of the order of eviction obtained before the compromise, we are concerned with the question as to whether after obtaining a valid decree, the parties to the decree have entered into a new lease or not. From the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that a new lease has been entered into between the parties to the earlier decree of eviction and by that agreement the earlier order of eviction has been given up and. a new lease has been created. Once a new lease is created and the tenant assumes possession or deems to assume possession under the new lease, it cannot be said that the tenant continues to be in possession by virtue of the earlier lease. In my opinion, the earlier lease ceased to exist and all the proceedings taken in pursuance of the said lease ceased to be in force. When the landlord having rightly agreed to allow the tenant to continue in possession under a new lease, we have to go by the terms of the new lease only. 18. Merely because there is a clause for delivery of possession under the new lease, it cannot be said that the tenant is bound by the same. Here the provisions of the Rent Controll Act comes to play. 18. Merely because there is a clause for delivery of possession under the new lease, it cannot be said that the tenant is bound by the same. Here the provisions of the Rent Controll Act comes to play. As per the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Leaseand Rent Control) Act, 1960, a tenant shall not be evicted except by an order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and the order must relate to the tenancy under which the tenant assumed possession or deemed assume possession. In this case, what we have seen is an order of eviction with reference to an earlier lease and no order has been passed with reference to the lease dated 11. 1990 and so long as there is no order of eviction with reference to the said tenancy, the tenant’s possession is protected. 19. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find not infirmity in the order passed by the Rent Controller in M.P. No.973 of 1993. 20. The prayer in M.P. No.299 of 1994 is only to amend the execution petition for the purpose of executing the earlier order. Since the earlier order cannot be executed, as I have stated earlier, there is no necessity for allowing the petition for amendment also. Hence, in my view of the Rent Controller has rightly rejected the said petition also. In the circumstances, both the civil revision petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.