Judgment : This appeal has been directed by the Manager, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Hosur, Dharmapuri District against the judgment of acquittal by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate Hosur, on 8. 1988 in C.C. No.274 of 1986 on his file. .2. The facts which have given rise to the present appeal are briefly as follows: The appellant/ the Manager, Employees state Insurance Corporation, Hosur, Dharmapuri district, filed a complaint before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hosur, under Sec.85-A of the Employees State Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as the act) alleging that as per resolution passed on 18. 1958 the appellant/ complainant had powers to inspect the factories. At door Nos.A-4 and A-5, SIPCOT Industrial Estate, Hosur, the first respondent/first accused is conducting a factory with the name M/s. Mohan conductors as the proprietor. The second respondent/ second accused is the Manager of the said factory. The factory of the respondent is covered by the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act. As per Sec.45-A of the Act the respondents have to collect the contribution from the labourers working in their factory and along with the contribution of the management, they should deposit the same to the account of the Employees State Insurance Fund. But the respondents have not deposited the contribution amount for the period from 26. 1985 to 30.6.1985, which came to Rs.12,875.50, even after expiry of the due date. Even though the respondents were instructed to pay the said amount within fifteen days from 25. 1985, they have not done so. Hence, they are liable to be punishable under Secs.85-A and 85(i) of the Act. 3. Copies of the complaint were furnished to the respondents free of cost as per Sec. 207 of Crl.P.C. As the respondents denied the offence, they were ordered to be tried by the Magistrate. .4. P.W.1 Muralidharan Nair gave evidence that he was working as the Inspector, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Hosur. When he went to the factory of the first respondent on 12. 1985 to make an inspection, the second respondent/ Manager was present, but he did not produce the accounts of the company as required, but gave the better Ex.P-1. After sending a registered letter dated 20.1.1986, copy of which is Ex.P-2 and postal acknowledgement Ex.P3, he went for a second time to make an inspection on 2. 1986. 1985 to make an inspection, the second respondent/ Manager was present, but he did not produce the accounts of the company as required, but gave the better Ex.P-1. After sending a registered letter dated 20.1.1986, copy of which is Ex.P-2 and postal acknowledgement Ex.P3, he went for a second time to make an inspection on 2. 1986. Even on that date, the second respondent did not produce the accounts. Thereafter, he gave a complaint with the SIPCOT police station on 22. 1986. When he went for athird time for inspection on 13. 1986, both the respondents were absent and an employee produced three different attendance registers. As per the same 20 persons were shown to be working in the factory including the second respondent. Thereafter, he sent a report Ex.P-4 to the Regional Office. On 13. 1986 he had signed in the attendance register and visitor’s books of the respondents factory. P.W.2 Radhakrishnan, who was working as Assistant Director, Employee’s State Insurance Corporation, deposed on 26. 1984 he inspected the factory of the first respondent and found 22 employees and his inspection report is Ex.P-5. He had also stated that electric energy was used by the respondent in the factory. P.W.3 Gopal Rao is a complainant. He said he was working as the Manager, Employees’ State Insurance corporation Branch at Hosur. The respondent have not deposited the contribution of the employees working in the factory for the period from 26. 1984 to 30.6.1985, namely Rs.12,8750. Thereafter Form C-16 and notice were issued by the respondents on 9. 1985, copies of which are Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7 respectively. The reply sent by the respondents is Ex.P-8 and the order passed by the Regional Manager is Ex.P-9 and the copy of the resolution is Ex.P-10. The order passed by the Regional Manager to prosecute the respondents is Ex.P-11. He also stated that the respondents have admitted their guilt before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras and paid fine and the copy of the Judgment is Ex.P-12. P.W.4 Rajagopal gave evidence that he was working as Head Clerk in the Regional Office of the Employees State Insurance corporation. The factory of the respondents has been registered. The registration No.51/45034, which has been marked as Ex.P-13. 5. When the respondents were questioned under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. regarding the incriminating evidence against them, they denied the same. P.W.4 Rajagopal gave evidence that he was working as Head Clerk in the Regional Office of the Employees State Insurance corporation. The factory of the respondents has been registered. The registration No.51/45034, which has been marked as Ex.P-13. 5. When the respondents were questioned under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. regarding the incriminating evidence against them, they denied the same. The learned Sub Judicial Magistrate, Hosur, on a consideration on the evidence placed before him met the conclusion there is no acceptable evidence to show 20 and more employees were working in the factory of the first respondent and P. W. 1 has not seized the three attendance registers produced before him and the complaint ought to have been filed within six months from the last date, namely, from 30.6.1985 but the complaint filed on 111. 1986 is out of time, and ultimately dismissed the complaint and acquitted the respondents/ accused. The correctness of the said finding is being challenged in this appeal by the appellant. 6. The point for determination is whether this appeal can be allowed? 7.Re. point: The learned counsel for the appellant forcibly contended before this Court that the trial Magistrate has grievously erred in acquitting the accused on untenable grounds and the trial Magistrate was not correct in holding the complainant has not proved 10 and more employees were working in the factory. The conclusion of the learned trial Magistrate the Inspector ought to have seized the attendance registers is erroneous, as under the Act, the Inspector is not empowered to seize any document. It was also argued the learned trial Magistrate has wrongly computed the period of limitation whereas the complaint as filed is well within the time. Ultimately, he argued that the judgment of the trial court acquitting the respondents/ accused is manifest errors perverse and reasonably not a possible view. 8. The learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the respondents/ accused, justified the conclusion of the learned trial Magistrate and argued that it is the duty of the complainant to establish that 20 and more employees were working in the factory on the date of his inspection. Further, P.W.1 has not ascertained the earlier salaries of the employees, is a matter of fact, the second respondent was receiving a salary of more than Rs.1,600 per month and therefore, he is not covered by the provisions of the Act. Further, P.W.1 has not ascertained the earlier salaries of the employees, is a matter of fact, the second respondent was receiving a salary of more than Rs.1,600 per month and therefore, he is not covered by the provisions of the Act. If that is, if the second respondent is excluded, only 19 employees were working and the factory of the first respondent will not be affected by the provisions of the Act. Thus, it was projected, the conclusion of the trial Magistrate, is unassailable and correct. It was also cautioned that this is an appeal against acquittal, and therefore this Court should be very much restrained in appreciating the matter and cannot disturb the judgment of acquittal lightly. .9. After listening the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties, we are persuaded to reappraise the evidence to satisfy ourselves whether the conclusion reached by the learned trial Magistrate is reasonably possible and no manifest error has been committed by him in appreciating the evidence. It is well settled norm that the appellate court, in particular, the High Court is not prevented to reappraise the evidence, if it is satisfied that the judgment of the trial court is manifestly erroneous and no two views are reasonably possible. On a careful consideration of the evidence, we are unable to agree with the finding of the learned trial Magistrate that the Inspector, P.W.1, has not proved 20 and more persons were working ass employees in the factory of the first respondent and the supporting evidence of P.W.4 in this regard is not acceptable. It is elementary principles of jurisprudence that an inspecting authority can assertion the exact number of persons who are working in a particular factory, only when the true and correct accounts are made available to him or he was permitted by the Manager of the said factory to make a head amount of the employees working in the factory. Even then, it is not possible for him to ascertain salary of each of the employees, unless it is made known to the inspecting officer by producing the true accounts. In the case on hand, P.W.1 had clearly asserted even though he went to the factory of the first respondent on 12. 1985 for the first time and 2. Even then, it is not possible for him to ascertain salary of each of the employees, unless it is made known to the inspecting officer by producing the true accounts. In the case on hand, P.W.1 had clearly asserted even though he went to the factory of the first respondent on 12. 1985 for the first time and 2. 1986 for the second time, after announcing his intended visit by registered post with acknowledgement due dated 20.1.1986, though the second respondent was present there, had produced the accounts. When he visited the factory for the third time on 13. 1986 after giving a police complaint dated 22. 1986, both the respondents were absent and three different attendance registers were made available to him by an employee of the factory and there was no responsible person to answer his question. Therefore, he had no other alternative except to return his office after putting his signature in the attendance register. In our opinion, the observation of the trial Magistrate that P. W. 1 ought to have seized the attendance registers and produced them in the court, is unfortunate, as the provisions of the Act do not empower the Inspector to seize any document. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4 makes it very clear that the respondents were very adamant in not producing the account books of the factory and the second respondent was not even prepared to produce correct accounts showing the salary he was receiving at that time. It is not disputed by the respondents that the factory is covered by the provisions of the Act. In the above circumstances, they are duty bound to produce the true and correct accounts of the factory, when competent person, namely, the Inspector authorised by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation visited the factory for the purpose of check. But the attitude of the respondents clearly shows that they were absolutely non-cooperative and were not prepared to produce the account inspite of a registered letter intimating the visit by P.W.1 and a police complaint latter. How the trial Magistrate reached the conclusion the second respondent was receiving a salary of more than Rs.1,600 per month, is not known, when the correct and true accounts were not produced. .10. How the trial Magistrate reached the conclusion the second respondent was receiving a salary of more than Rs.1,600 per month, is not known, when the correct and true accounts were not produced. .10. As already pointed out, when the fact the factory of the first respondent is covered by the provisions of the Act, it goes without saying they are bound to collect the contribution from the employee and along with their contribution they have to deposit the same periodicially well before the date of expiry of a particular period. It is not the case of the respondents that they are not bound to pay contribution or their factory was not covered by the provisions of the Act which we made clear earlier. In the above circumstances, the respondents should have made available satisfactory evidence as to how they are exempted from paying the employees contribution. We find there is absolutely no satisfactory or acceptable evidence on the side of the respondents proving such exemption. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a social legislation to mitigate the suffering of the employees working in the factories and the provision of the said Act has to be construed strictly as any failure to do so would defeat the very purpose of the Act, for which it has been enacted. As pointed out earlier, during all the three visits of P.W.1 he was shown utter non-co-operation by the respondents and did not make any sincere attempt to produce the accounts on the third time, but remained absent from the factory entrusting the work by producing three different attendance registers through the said employee. The above audacity of the respondents show that they have no mind of inclination to follow the provision of the Act or co-operate with the Inspector P.W.1 and also P.W.4 in implementing the provision of the Act. When true and correct accounts were failed to be produced, it is impossible for P.W.1 to make available correct particulars before the court and P.W.1 has no other alternative except to take recourse to the provision of Sec.45-A of the Act and make ad fioc assessment provided thereunder. When true and correct accounts were failed to be produced, it is impossible for P.W.1 to make available correct particulars before the court and P.W.1 has no other alternative except to take recourse to the provision of Sec.45-A of the Act and make ad fioc assessment provided thereunder. On a careful sifting of the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4, we are inclined to hold that their evidence is trustworthy, credible and acceptable, and the trial Magistrate has grievously erred in observing that P.W.1 had failed to proved the exact number of employees working in the factory of the first respondent. 11. The second ground, on which the trial Magistrate has dismissed the complaint, is the complaint has not been filed within time, i.e., within six months from the last date, namely, 30.6.1985. It is the case of the complainant that the contribution amount for the period from 26. 1984 to 30.6.1985, had not been paid by the respondents even after the due date. The learned Counsel for the appellant produced the judgment in Crl.M.P. No.6797 of 1984 dated 110. 1987, wherein similar objections have been taken regarding the question of limitation. In that case a complaint was laid regarding employees contributing amount for the period from 4. 1979 to 310. 1985 and the prosecution filed on 4. 1986 and the respondent/ accused contended that the complaint was not in time, as the same was not filed within six months from 310. 1985. The learned Judge, Padmini Jesudurai, J., on a consideration of the provision of the Act in paragraph Nos.7 to 9 of the said judgment found the following observation: "7. Thiru. P. Rajamanickam, Standing Counsel for the respondent, pointed that in the instant case the offence cannot be said to be committed 21 days after the end of the wage period since the petitioners had not filed any returns disclosing the employees and indicating the wage-period and that, therefore, the wage-period is not known and consequently the offence is committed only after the petitioners failed to pay contribution within the time stipulated in the notice under Sec.45-A of the Act and that, therefore, the prosecution is within time. 8. 8. The scheme of the Act, as well as the analysis of the foreging provisions quoted above, show that the legislation has taken efforts to bring within the scope of the Act, all kinds of employees and extend the benevolent provisions of the Act to them. The Legislation is a measure of social justice to the weaker sections of the employee. The interpretation that has to be put upon the provisions of the Act, should therefore be a purpose oriented interpretation. Sec.45-A of the Act has two a limbs; the first one deals with determining the contribution, when either the principal employer or the immediate employer fails to submit returns, furnish particulars and maintain registers or records. The second limb deals with a situation where after the return are furnished, the Inspector enters the premises of the factory for the purpose of enquiring into the correctness of the particulars stated in the returns and is obstructed in exercising his functions or discharging his duties, in which case the Corporation, may on the basis of the information available to it, determine the amount of contribution. The present case comes within the first, limb of Sec. 45-A of the Act. An analysis of Sec.45-A would show that this provision would include within its ambits atleast who situations. One would be, when a factory has been regularly submitting returns under Sec.44 of the Act and whose contributions have been determined on the basis of the returns, but there is a sudden lapse in filing returns, furnishing particulars and maintaining registers or records and in the absence of any such material, the Corporation is required to determine the contribution under Sec.45-A of the Act on the basis of the information already available with. In such a contingency, the possible number of employees, their wages and the wage period would all be known to the Corporation. When the wage period is thus known, the offence could be said to be committed 21 days after the end of the wage period. Even if the contribution is ultimately fixed under Sec.45-A of the Act. It would be said that the date of the commission of the offence would be 21 days after the end of the wage period. The limitation, therefore, would start running from that period. 9. Even if the contribution is ultimately fixed under Sec.45-A of the Act. It would be said that the date of the commission of the offence would be 21 days after the end of the wage period. The limitation, therefore, would start running from that period. 9. The second category of cases that could come within the first limb of Sec.45-A of the Act, would be the one found in the present case. The petitioners had been submitting returns disclosing only certain kinds of employees and not disclosing a vast number of employees, employed through an immediate employer, working in the premises of the factory itself and engaged in a work which is part of the factory or atleast, is incidental to the purpose of the factory. The amount paid to them, had been shown in the accounts under different heads. It was only during inspection, that these factors had come to light. Thereafter, the Corporation had been calling upon the petitioners, to furnish accounts, so that the wage period could be fixed, as also the amount of contribution. The petitioners had not complied with the demands. Thereafter, an inspection had been made and physical verification of the attendance register show that 456 employees were actually engaged in stitching, cutting, folding overlook finishing etc. in the main factory premises itself and the names of the contractors under whom they were employed were also ascertained. The employees were actually found engaged in work at the time of the inspection. Thereafter, a show cause notice had been given to the petitioners asking them to produce the accounts so that the wage period could be ascertained and the contributions fixed. The petitioners had neither replied nor had attended the personal hearing. It was under those circumstances, that an order under Sec.45-A of the Act is passed determining the contribution on the basis of the inspection made on 29. 1985 and calling upon the petitioners to pay the above amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. In such a situation, in the absence of any information as to the wage period, the only interpretation that is possible is that the offence is committed only on the day when the petitioners failed to pay the contribution as fixed in the notice issued Under Sec.45-A of the Act. In such a situation, in the absence of any information as to the wage period, the only interpretation that is possible is that the offence is committed only on the day when the petitioners failed to pay the contribution as fixed in the notice issued Under Sec.45-A of the Act. When the wage period is known to the Department through returns filed earlier, limitation could run from 21 days after the commencement of the wage period. However, in cases like the instant one, where even the wage period is not known, the offence can be said to be committed only when the petitioners fail to pay the contribution within the time fixed under Sec.45-A of the Act. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the spirit of the Act and would lead to strange anomalies, since an employer who successfully with holds information be employment, for a period of six months from the end of the wage period could never be prosecuted. Such could never be the intend of the Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that failure to pay the contribution fixed under Sec.45-A of the Act, will only enable the Corporation to recover the same under Sec.45-B of the Act and will not make the petitioners liable for prosecution cannot be accepted; now will Sec.45-A(2) of the Act lead to any such inference. All that Sec.45-A(2) of the Act indicates is that, in an order Under Sec.45-A of the Act, in the absence of any returns, particulars, registers or records, the order passed under Sec.45-A would be sufficient proof of the amount determined under the Act for the purpose of recovery under Sec.45-B of the Act." If the ratio of the judgment is applied to the facts of the present case, it is very clear that the computation of the period of limitation of six months by the learned trial Magistrate is erroneous and the period of limitation has to be computed from the time when the respondents failed to pay the contribution within the time fixed under Sec.45-A of the Act and the complaint is well within time. 12. For the Feasons stated above, we are clear in our mind that the conclusion reached by the trial Magistrate on both the grounds is manifestly wrong and perverse. 12. For the Feasons stated above, we are clear in our mind that the conclusion reached by the trial Magistrate on both the grounds is manifestly wrong and perverse. He has grievously erred in computing the period of limitation and the view taken by him is not a reasonably possible view. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the acquittal rendered by the trial Magistrate. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the trial Magistrate is accordingly set aside. The respondents/accused are found guilty under Sec.5(a) of the Act and convicted thereunder. We have already found the respondents have shown an attitude of utter non-corporation and disobedience of the provision of the Act and therefore, there is no mitigating circumstances to take a lenient view. Respondents 1 and 2 are sentenced to undergo S.I. for a period of four months each and they shall also pay a fine of Rs.1,000 each, in default to undergo S.I. for a period of one month each. The fine amount shall be paid by the respondents in the trial court within a period of two weeks from the date of the receipt of a copy of this judgment by the lower court. The trial Magistrate shall issue non-bailable warrant for arresting the respondents/ accused and commit them to Prison to undergo the sentence of imprisonment imposed on them without any delay.