JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. 1. This civil revision by the judgment debtor is directed against an order by which an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been rejected. 2. The sole opposite party along with his father (since dead) filed Money Execution Case No. 5 of 1969 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga, for realisation of decretal amount of Rs. 15,221.30 P. The petitioner filed objection under section 47 of the Code (Misc. Case No. 10 of 1972) which was dismissed in default on 14.8.1976. He filed another objection under section 47 (Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976) which was dismissed as not maintainable on 3.12.1976. The petitioner challenged the said order, initially by way of appeal (Misc. Appeal No. 68 of 1977) which was later converted into Civil Revision No. 1498 of 1977 in this Court. The said appeal was filed on 14.3.1977. In the meantime, the impugned auction sale was held on 11.3.1977 and confirmed on 12.4.1977. The delivery of possession was also allegedly effected on 23.3.1978. This Court vide order dated 8.1.1979 in C.R. No. 1490 of 1977 stayed further proceedings in the execution case. On 13.8.1979 the civil revision was finally allowed, the Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976 was restored and the matter was remanded to the executing court for decision on merit. In the meantime on 18.4.1978 the petitioner had filed an application under section 47 read with section 151 of the Code (Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978) to set aside the sale which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 24.11.1980. On 22.12.1993 Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976 was dismissed on merits. The petitioner challenged the said order in C.R. No. 404 of 1994 in this Court which, too, was dismissed on 15.4.1994. The petitioner, thereafter, filed application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code to set aside the sale, which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 7 of 1994. The application/miscellaneous case has been dismissed by the impugned order. The court has held that the petitioner became aware of the execution case in the year 1972 when he filed Misc. Case No. 10 of 1972 and the common sense does not permit him to believe that the sale was not within his knowledge. 3. The application/miscellaneous case has been dismissed by the impugned order. The court has held that the petitioner became aware of the execution case in the year 1972 when he filed Misc. Case No. 10 of 1972 and the common sense does not permit him to believe that the sale was not within his knowledge. 3. A salfen leave of the case, as would appeal from the chronology of events narrted avove is that the sale was confirrence before the expiry of period of initial on for may application to set aside the Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It may be mentioned here that the period of limitation earlier was 30 days which was enlarged to 60 days by section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976), which came into force with effect from 1.2.1977. The petitioner or any other person could have, thus, filed application to set aside the sale under any of the provisions of Rules 89, 90 or 91 upto 10.5.1977 when the period of 60 days expired. However, in the present case the sale was confirmed on 32nd day. Since the sale took place after coming into force of the amended provisions there can be no doubt that it will be governed by the amended provisions. In terms of Rule 92 of Order 21 of the Code after the Court makes an order confirming the sale, it became absolute, the Court has no power, to set aside the same. A premature confirmation of sale, thus, takes away a valuable right of making application to set aside the sale, which is available to a judgment-debtor or any other person claiming interest in the property. 4. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, learned counsel for the opposite party, submitted that in the facts of the case, the fact that the sale was confirmed before expiry of the period of limitation is of little consequence. He contended that in any view, an application to set aside the sale is to be made within a period of 60 days, reckoned from the date of the sale. The application (Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994) was, therefore, hopelessly time barred and the court below, therefore, rightly rejected the same on the ground of limitation. Mr. He contended that in any view, an application to set aside the sale is to be made within a period of 60 days, reckoned from the date of the sale. The application (Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994) was, therefore, hopelessly time barred and the court below, therefore, rightly rejected the same on the ground of limitation. Mr. Mahto pointed out with reference to the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act that the power of condonation of delay, that is, extension of prescribed period of limitation, does not extend to applications under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code. He placed reliance of Mohanlal vs. Hari Prasad Yadav 1994(2) PLJR 34 (S.C.): (1994) 4 SCC 177 . Mr. Mahto in this connection referred to the contents of the application (Misc. Case No. 3 of 1976) and submitted that the petitioner was well aware of the fact that the sale had taken place on 11.3.1977. In this regard Mr. Mahto pointed out that no ground has been made out to bring the case within the purview of section 17 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Mahto also contended that by reason of the dismissal of Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 (Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994) was barred by principle of res-judicata. He submitted that although the application (Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978) was purportedly filed under section 47 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the contents thereof would show that it was, in substance, an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code for setting aside the sale. In this regard he placed reliance on Ganpat Singh vs. Kailash Shanker ( AIR 1987 SC 1443 ) and Mani Devi vs. Ram Prasad (AIR 1968 Patna, 70). 5. Mr. Ashok Kumar Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contended that Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 was dismissed in default without any adjudication on merit, the principle of res-judicata, therefore, will not be applicable. The only application, which was adjudicated on merit was the one registered as Misc. 5. Mr. Ashok Kumar Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contended that Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 was dismissed in default without any adjudication on merit, the principle of res-judicata, therefore, will not be applicable. The only application, which was adjudicated on merit was the one registered as Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976, in which the petitioner had raised an objection to the effect that the father of the opposite party, one of the decree-holders and applicant of the execution case, had entered into compromise and a satisfaction petition had been filed and the decree, thus, stood satisfied. According to the counsel the rejection of the said miscellaneous case or the civil revision (C.R. No. 404 of 1994) arising therefrom would, therefore, not stand as a bar to consideration of the petitioner's case under Order 21, Rule 90 on merit. On the point of maintainability of the application, counsel placed reliance on Mangal Prasad vs. Krishna Kumar Maheshwari (AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1857) and Deshbandhu Gupta vs. N.L. Anand and Rajender Singh (1994) 1 SCC 131 : 1994 BBCJ 36 (S.C.), wherein it was held that pre-sale illegalities committed in the execution are amenable to remedy under section 47, post-sale illegalities or irregularities causing substantial injury to the judgment-debtor are covered under Order 21, Rule 90. Mr. Choudhary also submitted that a substantial area of land measuring 39 Bighas and odd was sold for sum of Rs. 16,000/- and odd causing substantial injury to the petitioner, this Court, therefore, should intervene in the ends of justice. He submitted that in terms of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 64 of the Code only that part of the property need be sold as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree and not the entire property. In this regard he placed reliance on Ambati Narasayya vs. M. Subbarao (AIR 1990 Supreme Court 119). 6. The submissions of Mr. Ram Balak Mahto appear to be well founded, supported by statute and authorities. The application for setting aside the sale (Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994), filed after about 17 years of the sale, was clearly barred by limitation. Article 127 of the limitation Act prescribes period of 60 days for filing application to set aside sale in execution of decree to be reckoned from the date of the sale. The application for setting aside the sale (Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994), filed after about 17 years of the sale, was clearly barred by limitation. Article 127 of the limitation Act prescribes period of 60 days for filing application to set aside sale in execution of decree to be reckoned from the date of the sale. By reason of the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act the court is precluded from extending the period of limitation with respect to an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Mohanlal vs. Hari Prasad Yadav (supra) the Supreme Court noticed the provisions of Articles 127 and section 5 of the Limitation Act and held that executing court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for setting aside sale after period of 60 days. The Supreme Court further held in this connection that the provisions of section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply to such a case for the simple reason that the time for making application is not fixed by the court but by the statute itself. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, I would observe that apart from the fact that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable and, therefore, Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994 had to be dismissed in limine on the ground of limitation, even if the provisions of section 5 were applicable, no ground for condonation of delay was made out in the application. The application does not mention as to when the petitioner learnt about the sale, possibly, in view of the fact that in the application filed earlier vide Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978, he had already disclosed the fact that he was aware of the factum of sale. The petitioner could still have overcome the bar of limitation if he had made out ground of fraud or mistake and brought the case within the ambit of section 17 of the Limitation Act. No attempt was made in this regard. 7. As regards the plea of res-judicata my attention was drawn to the statements made in paragraphs 7 to 10 of the application (Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978) which runs as under:– "7 That while the said objection in the Misc. No attempt was made in this regard. 7. As regards the plea of res-judicata my attention was drawn to the statements made in paragraphs 7 to 10 of the application (Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978) which runs as under:– "7 That while the said objection in the Misc. Case were pending, the decree holder had proceeded in the execution case and the process were never served on the spot either on the person or properties and the decree holder managed to suppress all the processes and got sold 42B. 9dh. land on 11.3.1977 for a paltry sum of Rs. 15,221.30 and the said land are situated in village Chakmass Bare Jalal, Chaklokman, Benipur, Harpur Madhi, Chakbhikhan Loknathpur all situated under Police station Dalsingsarai within the district of Samastipur. 8. That the said properties are valuable properties worth more than several lacs, most of them being situated in the town of Dalsingsarai and they have been sold for a grossly inadequate price which is as a result of active fraud and illegality in conducting and publishing the sale proclamation and other processes. 9. That the petitioner has come to know that even the process of D.P. is alleged to have been served although bala-bala and the court peon ever went to serve the said process nor D.P. was even effected and the petitioner apprehends that the Decree-holders might managed to get false report of service." It was submitted that the afore quoted statements leave no room for doubt that although the application was purportedly filed under section 47 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in substance, it was an application under Order 21, Rule 90 to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud and material irregularities in publishing and conducting the sale. The second application (Misc. Case No. 7 of 1994) was, therefore, barred by principle of res-judicata. It is true, as pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner, that Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 was dismissed in default. But in Ganpat Singh vs. Kailash Shanker (supra) also the previous application under Order 21, Rule 90 had been dismissed in default. Case No. 7 of 1994) was, therefore, barred by principle of res-judicata. It is true, as pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner, that Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 was dismissed in default. But in Ganpat Singh vs. Kailash Shanker (supra) also the previous application under Order 21, Rule 90 had been dismissed in default. The Supreme Court observed (at page 1449 of the report):– "It is inconceivable that even though no appeal has been filed against an order dismissing an application for setting aside the sale, another application for setting aside the sale can be made without first having the order set aside. Such an application will be barred by principle of res-judicata." 10. Mr. Ashok Kumar Choudhary argued with emphasis that sale of 39 Bighas and odd land was contrary to the provisions of Rule 64 of Order 21 of the Code. He submitted that by virtue of the provisions of the said rule, duty is cast upon the court to sale only such property or portion thereof as is necessary to satisfy the decree. The submission, I am afraid, in the facts of the case, is of no avail to the petitioner. Order 21 Rule 64 reads as follows:– "Any Court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it and liable to sale, or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and that the proceeds of such sale or a sufficient portion thereof shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive the same." (Emphasis added) 11. It would appear from plain reading of the rule that only so much of the property of the judgment-debtor is to be sold as is necessary to satisfy the decree. In Ambati Narasayya vs. Subbarao (supra) the decree had been passed for sum of Rs. 2,000/-. Property measuring 10 acres, however was sold in execution of decree for Rs. 17,000/-. The Supreme Court took the view that only that portion of the property should have been sold which would satisfy the decree of Rs. 2000/-. Sale of bigger property for sum in excess of the decretal amount was not legal. 2,000/-. Property measuring 10 acres, however was sold in execution of decree for Rs. 17,000/-. The Supreme Court took the view that only that portion of the property should have been sold which would satisfy the decree of Rs. 2000/-. Sale of bigger property for sum in excess of the decretal amount was not legal. The Court observed in this connection, "If the property is large and the decree to be satisfied is small, the Court must bring only such portion of the property, the proceeds of which would be sufficient to satisfy the claim of the decree-holder". In these facts the Court held that it is not a matter of discretion but obligation on the part of the court to see that only such portion as would satisfy the decree should be sold. In the case of Satya Narain Bajoria vs. Ram Narain Tibrewal AIR 1994 S.C. 1583 : 1994(1) PLJR 3 (S.C.) the facts were similar. The property was sold for recovery of the balance of the decretal amount of Rs. 350/- for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. In this case also, thus, the balance decretal amount could be realised by selling only portion of the property actually sold. The Supreme Court took into account other acts of fraud committed by the decree holder, as summarised in paragraph 15 of the judgment and came to the conclusion that the whole conduct of the execution proceeding at the behest of the decree holder shows that every effort was made by the decree holder to see that the judgment-debtor is kept in total ignorance of the execution proceeding right till the sale and its confirmation. The said two decisions are, therefore, of .no avail to the petitioner. As a matter of fact, provisions of Rule 64 of Order 21 are not applicable in this case because the property was sold for Rs. 15,221.30 P. which was the decretal amount for recovery of which the execution case had been filed and the property had been sold. Had it been a case of sale for any sum more than the decretal amount, the petitioner could make a grievance on the basis of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 64 that excess property had been sold and the court had committed error in confirming the same. Had it been a case of sale for any sum more than the decretal amount, the petitioner could make a grievance on the basis of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 64 that excess property had been sold and the court had committed error in confirming the same. Since entire 39 Bighas and odd land was sold for exactly the same amount for which the execution case had been filed, the rule has no application. 12. The decision in Mangal Prasad vs. Krishna Kumar Maheshwari (supra) or Deshbandhu Gupta vs. N.L. Anand (supra) also has no relevance in this case. The point for consideration in those cases was whether the remedy by way of objection under section 47 of the Code would exclude the remedy by way of application under Order 21, Rule 90 the Court held that it would not. In the instant case, however, the question of maintainability of the application has been challenged not on the ground of rejection of the objection under section 47 Vide Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976 or C.R. No. 404 of 1994 but on account of dismissal of Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 which was, as stated above, an application, in substance, under Order 21, Rule 90. 13. It is true that a substantial property of the judgment-debtor-petitioner has been sold for a rather small amount, but for the situation in which the petitioner finds himself today, he alone is responsible. He appears to have completely mishandled his case. After Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976 was dismissed by the executing court he had filed Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978. However, he allowed the same to be dismissed for non-prosecution on 24.11.1980. Perhaps, because in the meantime the dismissal of Misc. Case No. 2 of 1976 had been set aside by this Court in C.R. No. 1498 of 1977 on 13.8.1979. As held in the case of Mangal Prasad vs. Krishna Kumar Maheshwari (supra) both the proceedings could have been continued simultaneously. All said and done in view of considering the fact that a large property had been sold causing substantial injury to the petitioner and that non-prosecution of Misc. Case No. 3 of 1978 would be result of a wrong but bona-fide advice. I considered the desirability of interfering with the impugned sale under section 151 of the Code for the ends of justice. Case No. 3 of 1978 would be result of a wrong but bona-fide advice. I considered the desirability of interfering with the impugned sale under section 151 of the Code for the ends of justice. Having given my anxious consideration I have reached the conclusion that such interference would be contrary to the express provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the Limitation Act. In Ganpat Singh vs. Kailash Shanker (supra) the Supreme Court observed (at page 1448), that the sale can be set aside only under the provisions of Rules 89, 90 and 91 of Order 21. It is true the Supreme Court did not consider the possibility of interference under section 151 in appropriate cases. But then even while exercising power under section 151 of the Code, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the present application was filed after inordinate delay without any explanation for the same. It is true that the purchaser was none else than the decree-holder himself but his rights as a purchaser cannot be ignored altogether specially when period of 17 years has passed. In these premises, in my opinion, it would not be proper to interfere with the impugned sale under section 151 of the Code. 14. In the result, this civil revision is dismissed, but without any order as to cost.