R. D. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) L. P. A. is directed against the judgment and order dated 6-11-1996 of the learned single Judge whereby the order dated 20-11-1990 of the Sessions Judge, Indore passed in Cri. Rev. No. 5/90 (Ann. P/1), order of Conservator of Forest dated 12-8-1986 (Ann. P/2) and order of Competent Authority dated 28-12-1985 (Ann. P/3) have been set aside. ( 2 ) BRIEF history of the case is that petitioner-respondents are Sandal Wood dealers. They are residents of Miraj (Maharashtra ). They were granted permit by Forest Department of Miraj (Maharashtra) for purchase of Sandal Wood from Sangli and they had to transport it in any part of the country under the issuance of Transit Passes. Sandal Wood, so purchased, were kept in two different and separate lots. One lot was of fifty bags and another was of 71 bags. Consignments were hypothecated with Vijay Bank, Miraj and were under custody of the bank. Petitioner-respondents with intent to send the consignment had obtained Transit Passes under Maharashtra Transit Passes Rules, two transit passes were granted to them (i. e. one for transportation of fifty bags and another for 71 bags ). Consignment was sent from Miraj to Kannouj (U. P. ). The route mentioned in the Transit Passes was Miraj-Pune-Indore Kanpur-Kannouj and details of sandal wood were also given in the transfit passes. The Transit Passes were valid for a period of fifteen days from the date of issuance. The consignment was to be taken by motor truck. ( 3 ) THE truck carrying the consignment developed some mechanical problem at Pune and therefore, truck had to be changed. Consignment were brought in some other truck from Pune to Indore. As the truck could not go beyond Indore, as it had a permit up to Indore only, and therefore, the consignment were kept in Godowns of Transport Corporation of India, Indore for its destination to Kannouj. As the consignments were booked by the petitioners-respondents through above Transport Company at the starting point at Miraj. ( 4 ) ON 28-12-1985 Forest Department of M. P. received a message that some illegal and unauthorised Sandal Wood has been stored in the godown. They took the search and found 50 bags and 71 bags of Sandal Wood in godown No. 3 of Transport Corporation of India. ( 4 ) ON 28-12-1985 Forest Department of M. P. received a message that some illegal and unauthorised Sandal Wood has been stored in the godown. They took the search and found 50 bags and 71 bags of Sandal Wood in godown No. 3 of Transport Corporation of India. On opening the bags, they found that there were no hammer marks on the Sandal Wood kept in lot comprising 71 bags, only the bags were closed and sealed. Forest Officers seized the goods. A notice was given to the petitioner-respondents. Petitioner-respondents contended that they were carrying the Sandal Wood under the valid Transit permits and the bags were sealed by the officers of the Forest Department and, therefore, there was no necessity of having hammer marks on individual pieces of Sandal Wood kept inside the bags. Contention of petitioner-respondents did not find favour with the authorities of Forest Department and, therefore, competent authority under Section 52 of Indian Forest Act directed seizure of the said goods. ( 5 ) PETITIONER-RESPONDENTS filed appeal before the Conservator of Forest under Section 52 (A) of the Indian Forest Act. The sme was dismissed. As such a Revision against the order of Conservator Forest, was filed in the Court of Sessions Judge, Indore who upheld the orders of two officers (Ann. P/3 and Ann. P/2) vide order Annexure P/1. As such a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging all the three orders referred to above. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of petition before the learned single Judge petitioner-respondents filed I. A. No. 2019/91 on 4-4-1991 and prayed deletion of ground whereby constitutionality of Sections 52, 52 (A) 52 (B) and 52 (C) of the Indian Forest Act and the provisions of M. P. Transit (Forest Produce) Rules, 61 was challenged, Petitioners confined their objection to the grounds that the M. P. Transit (Forest Produce) Rules, 1961 are not applicable to the seized goods as they are forest produce of the State of Maharashtra and not of the State of Madhya Pradesh. M. P. Rules govern the transit of forest produce grown in Madhya Pradesh and originating in State of M. P. ( 7 ) REPLY in the case was filed by appellant State. Learned single Judge set aside three orders referred above i. e. Ann. /p1 Order of Sessions Judge, Ann. M. P. Rules govern the transit of forest produce grown in Madhya Pradesh and originating in State of M. P. ( 7 ) REPLY in the case was filed by appellant State. Learned single Judge set aside three orders referred above i. e. Ann. /p1 Order of Sessions Judge, Ann. P/2, Order of Conservator of Forest, and Ann. P/3 Order of Competent Authority. Aggrieved by the order of learned single Judge this L. P. A. was filed by State of M. P. ( 8 ) AFTER making appearance petitioner-respondents raised preliminary objection that order passed by the learned single Judge is in exercise of powers under Art. 227 of Constitution of India and, therefore, no appeal is maintainable. ( 9 ) AS against it learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the order is under Art. 226 of the Constitution or in any way if it is taken to be combined order under Arts. 226 and 227 of Constitution, the appeal against the said order would be maintainable. ( 10 ) CONTENTION of learned counsel for the petitioners-respondents is that though the original petition was filed under both Articles i. e. Arts. 226 and 227 of Constitution, but petitioners vide application dated 4-4-1997 (I. A. 2019/91) have deleted the challenge to the constitutionality of Sections referred above and the Transit Rules and, therefore, the order in pith and substance has been passed in exercise of powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, no appeal would be maintainable. ( 11 ) SECOND contention of learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent Shri A. M. Mathur is that it is the judicial order passed by Sessions Judge vide Annexure P/1 was virtually challenged and the challenge to orders Ann. P/2 and P/3, the orders of Conservator Forest and Competent Authority were consequential. ( 12 ) THIRD contention of learned counsel for petitioners-respondents is that as judicial order of Sessions Judge, as provided under Section 52 (B) of the Act was under challenge and, therefore, the powers invoked were supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 of Constitution. ( 13 ) AS against it learned counsel Shri Bhargava, Addl. Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that firstly the petition was under both the Articles i. e. 226 and 227 of Constitution and, therefore, appeal is maintainable. ( 13 ) AS against it learned counsel Shri Bhargava, Addl. Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that firstly the petition was under both the Articles i. e. 226 and 227 of Constitution and, therefore, appeal is maintainable. Secondly, even by deletion of the challenge to the Constitutionality of provisions of Forest Act and the M. P. Transit (Forest Produce) Rules a Certiorari was prayed for and, therefore, appeal would be maintainable on that ground. This contention of learned counsel for appellant is that it is in fact the writ jurisdiction which has been invoked in the case and, therefore, the appeal would be maintainable. Clause 10 of LPA makes a provision for intra Court appeal. Clause 10 of Latters Patent Nagpur which has been made applicable in Madhya Pradesh is in pari materia the same as provided in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court. Clause 10 of Letters Patent reads :"10. Clause 10 of LPA makes a provision for intra Court appeal. Clause 10 of Latters Patent Nagpur which has been made applicable in Madhya Pradesh is in pari materia the same as provided in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court. Clause 10 of Letters Patent reads :"10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Courts -And we do further order that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Nagpur from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence under the provisions of section one hundred and seven of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a Judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgment of Judge of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, Our Heirs and Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided. " ( 14 ) THIS matter has been dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai , AIR 1986 SC 1272 . " ( 14 ) THIS matter has been dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai , AIR 1986 SC 1272 . While dealing with the history of the provisions of L. P. A. in chartered High Courts, it has been observed in para 87 that it should be remembered that the Government of India Act of 1915-1919 was a Constitution Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction which was conferred upon the High Courts by Section 107 of that Act was a jurisdiction conferred upon them by a Constitution Act, and thereafter referring to the history and constitutional development it has been held where a petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution is according to the rules of a particular High Court heard by a single Judge, an intra Court appeal will lie from that judgment if such a right of appeal is provided in the charter of that High Court, whether such Charter be Letters Patent or a Statute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court gives in such a case a right of intra Court appeal and, therefore, the decision of a single Judge of that High Court given in a petition under Art. 226 would be appealable to a Division Bench of that High Court. It is equally well settled in law that a proceeding under Art. 227 is not an original proceeding. In this connection we need refer to only two decisions of this Court AIR 1972 SC 1598 : (1972 Lab IC 864) : AIR 1954 SC 215 . "the result is that an intra Court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition by such appeal expressly barred by Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent Court. "the result is that an intra Court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition by such appeal expressly barred by Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent Court. ( 15 ) LASTLY, in para 106, their Lordships held as follows :"in our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Art. 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Art. 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Art. 226. "and, therefore, it will have to be seen as to whether the petition and the order in pith and substance was under Art. 227 of the Constitution or a combined order under Arts. 226 and 227 of Constitution. ( 16 ) THIS observation of the Supreme Court was quoted with approval in a later case, Ratanagiri District Central Co-operative Banklimited v. Dinkar Kishi Nath Watve; (1993 Supp (1) SCC 9. ( 17 ) NOW, therefore, it will have to be seen as to whether the petition was really under Art. 227 or a combined petition under Arts. 226 and 227 and what is the order of learned single Judge. ( 18 ) AS observed in earlier paragraph, originally the petition was under Arts. 226 and 227 both but after filing I. A. No. 2019/91 petitioner-respondents deleted the prayer of challenge to the Constitutionality of Section 52, 52 (A) and 52 (B) of Indian Forest Act and M. P. Transit (Forest Produce) Rules and they confined their relief to challenge to the orders passed by the competent authority in original jurisdiction Conservator of Forest in Appellate jurisdiction and Sessions Judge in its Revisional Jurisdiction. ( 19 ) CRUX of the matter would be where the proceedings originally started undisputedly in this case original proceedings did not start in the High Court. ( 19 ) CRUX of the matter would be where the proceedings originally started undisputedly in this case original proceedings did not start in the High Court. It started with the approach to the Forest Officer under Section 52 of the Act; having failed therein as per the provisions of appeal, petitioner filed appeal before the Conservator and having failed before the Conservator, they approached Sessions Judge for exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction. Having failed all in the three places this prayer for quashing the three orders was made by way of petition. ( 20 ) THUS, what comes out is that the petitioner-respondents here invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court i. e. under Art. 227 and not the original jurisdiction as provided under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 21 ) IT is pertinent to note where order of authority and executive authority with or without provisions of appeal or revision but without any judicial scrutiny or scrutiny by judicial body at any stage is challenged the same would be normally for exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. But where law provieds the provisions of appeal and revision and the same is decided by judicial authority or quasi-judicial authority or where there is a scope for judicial scrutiny by subordinate court at the top the petition challenging such order would be covered under Art. 227 of the Constitution. A Division Bench of this High Court has taken similar view in a case reported in AIR 1997 MP 129 (Indore Dugdh Singh v. K. P. Singh ). ( 22 ) IN this case the petitioners have approached the authorities in exercise of their quasi judicial powers and thereafter approached the Sessions Judge for exercising judicial power (by invoking revisional jurisdiction) and, therefore, the petition will be deemed to have been filed for invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Though as observed earlier initial petition was combined petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution but after deletion of the prayer and challenge to the constitutionality of sections and provisions referred above the petition remained confined only under Art. 227 of the Constitution. ( 23 ) LEARNED Addl. Though as observed earlier initial petition was combined petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution but after deletion of the prayer and challenge to the constitutionality of sections and provisions referred above the petition remained confined only under Art. 227 of the Constitution. ( 23 ) LEARNED Addl. Advocate General Shri Bhargava referred to a case reported in AIR 1992 SC 185 (Sushilabai Laxminarain v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha), and submitted that the original petition being a combined petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of Constitution, LPA against the order of learned single Judge would be maintainable. We are in respectful agreement with the proposition of law enunciated therein but in that case the grounds unmistakably show that petition was under Art. 226 of Constitution. But int his case after deletation of the prayer and challenge to the constitutionality, the petition remained a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution only. ( 24 ) WHERE a petition is filed both under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution it will have to be considered whether the points raised in the petition arose for adjudication for the first time before the High Court. If the challenge in the petition is with respect to the points already adjudicated upon the subordinate Court or Tribunal, then it will have to be held that supervisory jurisdiction of High Court was invoked and not the original. In the instant case petitioner-respondents filed a petition both under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging of Tribunal/court as erroneous, the petition could be said to be invoking Supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and not the original jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeals against the decisions therein would not be maintainable as they are not directed against the impugned order passed by learned single Judge in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court. [air 1995 Kant 426 (The Management of Kalpana Theatre etc. v. B. S. Ravishankar Major)]. ( 25 ) IN our considered opinion, therefore, the petition filed by respondents in pith and substance was a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution (specially after deletion of the relief against and challenge to the Constitutionality of provisions of Forest Act and M. P. Transit (Forest Produce) Rules and therefore, no appeal against such order of learned single Judge would be maintainable. ( 26 ) SINCE we have taken a view that the appeal does not lie against the impugned order of learned single Judge, the L. P. A. is dismissed as not maintainable. ( 27 ) LEARNED counsel for appellant made a prayer by way of an application that in the alternative if the L. P. A. is not found maintainable, appellant may be granted some time for filing S. L. P. before the Supreme Court and the execution of the order of learned single Judge be stayed for reasonable period of three months. ( 28 ) AT the initial stage of hearing of this L. P. we have granted stay and therefore, the order of learned single Judge has not been executed till date. ( 29 ) IN view of above, we further direct that the order of learned single Judge shall not be given effect to till 23rd Dec. 1997. Appellants State is free to approach Hon'ble the Supreme Court for redressal of the grievance, if so advised. ( 30 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs. Order accordingly. .