C. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFFS filed the suit on 6-1-1985 for declaration that they are the real owners of suit land and house and defendant No. 6 Rajaram (now deceased) is their Benamidar. Defendants raised an objection that the suit is hit by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Civil Judge, Khairagarh by his order dated 2-7-1992 passed in Civil Suit No. 241-A/1984 rejected the said application. Defendants aggrieved by the same filed Civil Revision No. 6 of 1992 under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Addl. District Judge, Khairagarh by judgment and decree dated 30-1-1993 held that the suit is hit by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') and consequently the plaint is fit to be rejected. He further directed for drawal of the decree on the ground that rejection of a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 C. P. C. is a decree, Plaintiffs aggrieved by the same have preferred this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'code' ). By order dated 12-8-1993 this Court directed that the question of maintainability of the appeal shall be considered at the time of admission. Ultimately by order dated 4-11-1996 the appeal was admitted for final hearing. ( 2 ) SHRI Ashok Chakravarty, appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 6 raises a preliminary objection that under Section 96 of the Code, appeal lies from a decree passed by a Court exercised original jurisdiction and in the present case, the decree against which appeal has been preferred, being passed by the revisional Court exercising the power under Section 115 of the Code, no appeal lies. He submits that against the order passed by the revisional Court remedy is to file writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submits that against the order passed by the revisional Court remedy is to file writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of the aforesaid submission learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said judgment :"it has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 1979) that in case this Court is of the opinion that a revision petition under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, is not maintainable, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under Section 115 is a separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, and one cannot be identified with the other. "in the aforesaid case the question was, of exercise of the revisional power by the High Court against the order passed in Revision by a Court subordinate to it. However, the same is not the position here. The order passed by the revisional Court in the present case is a decree which was not a case before the Supreme Court. In my opinion, the judgment referred to above has no bearing in the present case as in the present case the question which falls for determination is whether the order passed by a revisional Court which leads to passing of a decree can be said to be a decree passed by a Court exercising original jurisdiction so as to make it appealable under Section 96 of the Code. Section 96 of the Code reads as follows :-"96. Appeal from original decree.- (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees. "true it is that Section 96 of the Code provides for appeal from decree by Court exercising original jurisdiction. Here in the present case the revisional Court has exercised the original jurisdiction to reject the plaint. Section 96 of the Code provides for appeal from a decree of a Court exercising original jurisdiction and not the decree of the original Court. In my opinion, the words "any Court exercising original jurisdiction" under Section 96 of the Code has to be read to mean that if the original jurisdiction has been exercised by any Court, the decree passed shall be deemed to be a decree by a Court exercising original jurisdiction. Taking any other view, in my opinion, shall lead to absurdity and render the plaintiff remedy less, in substance. It is suggested that the revisional Court after hodling that the plaint was fit to be rejected ought to have remanded the matter back to the trial Court for drawing the decree and in that case plaintiff could have availed remedy to file appeal under Section 96 of the Code before the appellate Court. In case this submission is accepted, the decree has to be drawn by the trial Court and appeal against the said decree shall lie before the same Court or Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, which has earlier held that the plaint is fit to be rejected. In such a situation, the remedy of appeal shall be meaningless as the Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction shall be bound by the earlier view of the Court in the same case. Accordingly I am of the opinion that as the original jurisdiction of rejection of plaint has been exercised by the revisional Court, appeal under Section 96 of the Code shall lie. It is not of substance, which Court has exercised the jurisdiction, but while passing the decree which jurisdiction has been exercised. Accordingly, I over-rule the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. It is not of substance, which Court has exercised the jurisdiction, but while passing the decree which jurisdiction has been exercised. Accordingly, I over-rule the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. ( 3 ) COMING to the merits of the case it is relevant here to state that the plaint has been rejected on the ground that suit is hit by Section 4 of the Act and for taking the said view learned Judge took into consideration the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of In the present case the suit has been filed on 7-1-1984 whereas Section 4 of the Act came into force on 19-5-1988. Supreme Court in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, (1995) 2 SCC 630 : ( AIR 1996 SC 238 ) has overruled its earlier judgment in Mithilesh Kumari's case (supra) and held that the suit filed before coming into force of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act shall not be hit by Section 4 of the Act. Thus the view taken by the learned Judge that the suit is hit by Section 4 of the Act is not correct. ( 4 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court to hear the suit on merits. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be not order as to cost. Appeal allowed. .