Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 12th February, 1984 passed by respondent no.2, the Secretary, Bihar State electricity Board, Patna (here in after referred to as the Board) rejecting the petitioners representation which was filed pursuant to a direction of this court in CWJC No.3355 of 1993. By the said order the Secretary of the board held that the promotion granted to the petitioner to the post of Under secretary on and from 28th April, 1986 was rightly granted and consequently the petitioners claim for promotion to the post of the Joint Secretary is not acceptable as the petitioner had not fulfilled the required period of Kalawdhi for getting promotion to the post of joint Secretary after the said post fell vacant with effect from 1st February, 1988. 2. The material facts which led to the passing of the aforesaid order and are required to be noted to decide the controversy in this case are stated below: according to the assertion made in the writ petition, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Administrative officer on 8th June, 1968 and he was granted selection grade scale in the said post of Administrative Officer. The petitioner also claimed that he had worked as Superintendent which ac-cording to him was a post equivalent to that of Under Secretary from 24th august, 1979 to 22nd February, 1984. 3. It is not in dispute that the next promotional post is that of Under secretary and as" per the resolution dated 8th June, 1983, the Kalawdhi for the post of Under Secretary is 8 years of service as an Administrative Officer and the Kalawdhi for the higher post of the joint Secretary is seven years service as under Secretary or equivalent thereto. 4. It is also not in dispute that the post of Under Secretary fell vacant on 1st March, 1982 and by that time the petitioner had more than 13 years of service as an Administrative Officer and as such had completed the prescribed period of Kalawdhi for being considered for promotion to the post of Under secretary. The petitioner stated that he made representation dated 13th July, 1982 to that effect to the authorities concerned but the authorities did not pay any heed to the same and the petitioner also gave a reminder to the same. The petitioner stated that he made representation dated 13th July, 1982 to that effect to the authorities concerned but the authorities did not pay any heed to the same and the petitioner also gave a reminder to the same. These facts stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition have not been disputed in the counter-affidavit of the Board. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that though the petitioners case for promotion to the post of Under secretary was eligible for consideration in the month of March, 1982 itself, it was considered only in the month of march 1986 when the Departmental promotion Committee was convened for considering the case of other eligible candidate to the post of Under secretary and on the basis of such consideration the petitioner was promoted to the post of Under Secretary by notification dated 27th May, 1986 with effect from 28th April, 1986, the date of which the petitioners junior Sri Ganesh prasad Mishra was promoted. As the petitioners representation claiming that he is entitled to be promoted to the post of Under Secretary with effect from 1st March, 1982 could not produce any result, he filed a writ petition which was numbered as CWJC No.800 of 1991. The said writ petition contained multiple prayers and one of them was relating to the petitioners post retirement benefit and the other was relating to his right to claim promotion to the post of Under Secretary with effect from 1st March, 1982. The said writ petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 4th August, 1992. The said order is in two parts. The first part of the order is with respect to the claim of the petitioner relating to post retirement benefit with which this Court is not concerned and the second part of the order is with respect to the claim of the petitioner for promotion and consequential financial benefits. In the second part of the order, the learned judges directed the petitioner to make a representation before respondent No.3 by 31st August, 1992 and respondent no.3 was directed to dispose of the same by passing a reasoned order after giving the petitioner a personal hearing. In the second part of the order, the learned judges directed the petitioner to make a representation before respondent No.3 by 31st August, 1992 and respondent no.3 was directed to dispose of the same by passing a reasoned order after giving the petitioner a personal hearing. On the basis of the said direction of this court, the petitioner made a detailed representation as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition and the said representation was disposed of by the Secretary of the Board by an order dated llth March, 1993 by rejecting the petitioners representation without, however, giving the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing. Prior to this order, as the respondents were not disposing of the petitioners representation, the petitioner had to file a contempt petition before this Court being MJC No.1836 of 1992 complaining of inaction of the Secretary of the board in not disposing of the petitioners representation dated 28th August, 1992. The petitioner states that it was only after filing of the contempt petition that the petitioners representation was disposed of by an order dated llth March, 1993 without granting a personal hearing to the petitioner and rejecting the petitioners representation. As the order dated 11th March, 1993 was passed by the respondents without granting a personal hear-ing to the petitioner, the petitioner again moved this Court and filed another writ petition being CWJC No.3355 of 1993. The said writ petition was again disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court which quashed the said order dated 11th March, 1993, inter alia, on the ground that the personal hearing was not given to the petitioner. Therefore, the order dated llth March, 1993 is not in existence today. Thereafter a personal hearing was given to the petitioner and the aforesaid impugned order was passed which is annexed as annexure-1 to the writ petition. 6. Therefore, the order dated llth March, 1993 is not in existence today. Thereafter a personal hearing was given to the petitioner and the aforesaid impugned order was passed which is annexed as annexure-1 to the writ petition. 6. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Board, after describing the history of the case, states that consequent upon the decision of the departmental Promotion Committee all the Administrative Officers who had been found fit for promotion to the higher post of Under Secretary including a junior to the petitioner was given promotion whereas one post of Under secretary was kept reserved for the petitioner and as the vigilance clearance from the Vigilance Department was received by the Board on 15th May,1986, the promotion was given to the petitioner to the post of Under secretary by order dated 27th May, 1986 with effect from 28th April, 1986, the date from which his juniors was promoted. It has been admitted in paragraph 25 of the counter-affidavit that a post of Under Secretary fell vacant with effect from 1st March, 1982 but it has been stated that it is not a case of automatic filling up of the post since the aforesaid post is to be filled up in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Service Regulation. In paragraph 27 of the counter-affidavit it was stated that as some allegations were levelled against the petitioner regarding the irregularities committed by him while posted in Stationary and Supply of forms Department, the petitioner was not found fit for promotion to the higher post by the Department and accordingly one post was kept reserved for him and on receipt of the Vigilance clearance from the Vigilance Department by letter dated 15th May, 1986, the petitioner was given promotion to the higher post of Under Secretary vide boards notification dated 27th May, 1986. This is broadly the case made out in the counter-affidavit. 7. In the so called reasoned order which is at Annexure-1 to the writ petition which is impugned here and which was passed after hearing the petitioner pursuant to the direction of this Court, the said ground that the petitioner was not found fit for promotion in view of some allegations levelled against him has not been mentioned. 7. In the so called reasoned order which is at Annexure-1 to the writ petition which is impugned here and which was passed after hearing the petitioner pursuant to the direction of this Court, the said ground that the petitioner was not found fit for promotion in view of some allegations levelled against him has not been mentioned. The following grounds have been mentioned in the impugned order in justification of the boards action of not considering the petitioners case for promotion on 1-3-1982, when the promotional post admittedly fell vacant:- (i) It is not a question of automatic filling up of the post by promotion on the date the post falls vacant. (ii) The post has to be filled up after observing all formalities. (iii) The Board thought it fit to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion with effect from 28th April, 1986. So these are the grounds mentioned in the impugned order while the petitioners case for promotion to the post of Under Secretary was not considered. 8. The fact relating to Vigilance clearance was stated in the previous order dated llth March, 1993 but the said order, as mentioned earlier has been quashed by a Division Bench of this Court. 9. Therefore, in the subsequent order which is impugned here the respondents must have consciously chosen not to refer to the alleged fact of vigilance clearance. From the records which have been very fairly produced by the learned Counsel for the Board relating to such allegation, it appears that the petitioner is not responsible for any lapses. The said Vigilance Clearance is dated 16th November, 1984 and was placed before the Court by the learned counsel for the respondents. 10. Therefore, the respondents were quite right is not referring in the impugned order to the allegation of vigilance Clearance for not considering the case of the petitioner for promotion earlier in 1982 when the vacancy occurred. The impugned order being a public order publicly made, cannot be subsequently improved by the reasons supplied in the form of affidavit. 10. Therefore, the respondents were quite right is not referring in the impugned order to the allegation of vigilance Clearance for not considering the case of the petitioner for promotion earlier in 1982 when the vacancy occurred. The impugned order being a public order publicly made, cannot be subsequently improved by the reasons supplied in the form of affidavit. This position is now well settled by the Apex court in atleast two of its judgments, the first one being in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay V/s. Gordhan Das Bhanji reported in AIR 1952 SC page 16 and then again in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of mohinder Singh Gill and another V/s. The chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others reported in AIR 1978 SC page 851. 11. Another ground which was urged by the learned Counsel for the board in the course of hearing is that the petitioner should not have any reason for grievance as the petitioners senior Sri Janardan Mishra was also promoted to the post of Under secretary with effect from the said date i. e.28th April, 1986, the date from which the petitioner was promoted. 12. This ground was also mentioned in the order dated 11th March,1993 which now stands quashed and has not been mentioned in the impugned order which is at Annexure-1 which is assailed in this writ petition. 13. So because of the fact that both these grounds are not mentioned in the impugned order, the Court need not consider the same to decide the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order. 14. But this Court finds that on merits also those two grounds, as would appear from the discussion below, have no substance. 15. The relevant rules of the Board relating to such promotion will appear from Regulations 85 and 86 of the Bihar state Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976 which are set out below:- "85. 14. But this Court finds that on merits also those two grounds, as would appear from the discussion below, have no substance. 15. The relevant rules of the Board relating to such promotion will appear from Regulations 85 and 86 of the Bihar state Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976 which are set out below:- "85. Promotion:- No employee of the board or any of its establishment including the Area Board and the Generation-cum-Transmission Organisation shall have a right of promotion to a post- (i) which does not fall in the line of his promotion, (ii) for which he does not possess the minimum qualification, (iii) which is outside the cadre to which he belongs, (iv) if he has not completed the minimum years of service as laid down by any specific rules pertaining to his cadre or by any general order fixing the minimum years of service in a lower post as an eligibility criteria for a higher post; (v) if he has failed to clear a departmental or proficiency examination which is one of the eligibility criteria for promotion" "86. No employee of the Board shall be promoted from his existing post, if prima facie charges, of corruption, bribery, gross negligence, misappropriation or any other charges involving lack of integrity, serious lapse of duty and acts of indiscipline, are pending enquiry or any departmental proceeding is being conducted against him provided that the Board or the competent authority on the recommendation of a Promotion/selection Committee may reserve posts for such employees in suitable cases pending the disposal of the enquiry. " 16. From a perusal of these regulations it appears that no person shall have a right of promotion to a post if he has not completed the minimum years of service as laid down by any specific rules pertaining to his cadre or by any general order fixing the minimum years of service in a lower post as an eligibility criteria for a higher post. The other conditions mentioned in Regulation 85 are not relevant here. On the strength of Regulation 85 (iv) of the said Regulation, it can be said that the petitioner has completed minimum years of service as per the Kalawdki by the month of march, 1982. The other conditions mentioned in Regulation 85 are not relevant here. On the strength of Regulation 85 (iv) of the said Regulation, it can be said that the petitioner has completed minimum years of service as per the Kalawdki by the month of march, 1982. The petitioner asserted this fact in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that he completed by March 1982, 13 years of qualifying service in the post of Administrative Officer and this has not been controverted in the counter-affidavit. The required period of service for promotion to the post of Under secretary is 8 years. 17. A perusal of Regulation 86 of the said Regulations would show that if, prima facie, charges of corruption, bribery etc. involving lack of integrity or serious lapse of duty and acts of indiscipline, are pending enquiry or any departmental proceeding is being conducted against him such employees shall not be promoted. 18. Here in the instant case, no enquiry or disciplinary proceeding was pending against the petitioner and there were no prima facie charges either. From the records which have been produced in this case relating to vigilance Clearance it is clear that there were certain allegations against the petitioner and in respect of the said allegation the Director of Accounts of the board reported that the petitioner cannot be held responsible for any lapses. The said report relating to Vigilance clearance was sent by one A. K. Sinha, joint Secretary on 16-11-1984. So when the meeting of the Departmental promotion Committee was convened on 20th May, 1986, by that time it should have been made known to the authorities that there was nothing pending against the petitioner on the vigilance side. Therefore, the departmental Promotion Committee was not right in coming to the conclusion that so far as the petitioner is concerned, one post has to be kept reserved pending clearance on the allegation reported by the Vigilance department because the report dated 16-11-1984 has already cleared the petitioner. 19. In so far as the case of the petitioners senior Shri Janardan Mishra is concerned, from the Vigilance report it appears that a departmental proceeding was drawn up against the said Sri Mishra and the findings of the enquiry Officer was examined and was put up for final decision. 19. In so far as the case of the petitioners senior Shri Janardan Mishra is concerned, from the Vigilance report it appears that a departmental proceeding was drawn up against the said Sri Mishra and the findings of the enquiry Officer was examined and was put up for final decision. Ultimately Sri mishra was inflicted with the punishment of censure and such censure will have adverse effect on this promotion till 1981-82. 20. All these things appear from the proceedings of the Selection committee which was held on 20th March,1986. Therefore, on the strength of regulation 86 of the said Regulation, sri Janardan Mishra, who was senior to the petitioner could not have been considered for promotion in the year 1982 but the same is not the case of the petitioner because no disciplinary proceeding was ever initiated against him nor any chargesheet was filed against the petitioner nor the petitioner was ever put under suspension. Therefore, on the strength of mere allegations, the chance of being considered for promotion of the petitioner, who is otherwise eligible for consideration, cannot be deferred. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of union of India and others V/s. K. V. Jankiraman reported in (1991) 4 SCC page 109. In Jankiraman (supra) in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment this aspect of the matter has been considered and it has been held that it is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a chargesheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employees, it can be said that the departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee and only in such a situation the sealed cover procedure is to be resorted. Even the pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. The contrary contention raised by the authorities were repelled by the Supreme Court by observing as follows in paragraph 16, page 118 of the report:- "as has been the experience so far, the preliminary investigations take an inordinately long time and particularly when they are initiated at the instance of the interested person, they are kept pending deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/charge sheet. " 21. Many times they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/charge sheet. " 21. In the instant case the said interpretation should be given to Regulation 86 of the said Regulations which says that when, pritna facie, charges are existing against an employee, he shall not be promoted. Here mere allegations cannot be equated with prima facie charges against the petitioner within the meaning of Regulation 86 of the said regulation. In fact, the Selection Committee of the Board proceeded on the aforesaid basis on 21st March, 1986 while considering the case for promotion of one Suresh Pandey to the post of Administrative Officer. Sri Pandey was found fit for promotion by the committee with the following remarks "external vigilance report indicates that there is some enquiry pending against Sri Pandey, since if at enquiry stage, allegation is not prima facie proved. " 22. A different yardstick cannot therefore, be applied in case of the petitioner as against him there were just allegations and the Vigilance Clearance was also given in 1984. 23. From the aforesaid discussion, two things are clean-la) The case of the petitioner cannot be equated with his senior Sri Janardan mishra against whom disciplinary proceeding was initiated which ultimately resulted in the infliction of the punishment of censure against him. (b) On the ratio of Jankiramans case (supra), mere allegation against the petitioner cannot be equated with the existence of prima facie charges of corruption against him. 24. The following admitted facts thus emerge: - (i) On 1st March, 1982, vacancy occurred in the post of Under Secretary. (ii) The petitioner on 1st March, 1982 had completed the required Kalawdhi for being considered for promotion. (Hi) On 1st March, 1982, it cannot be said that within the meaning of Regulation 86 of the said Regulation any prima facie charge of corruption was pending against the petitioner. (iv) On 1st March, 1982, Janardan mishra, an employee who was just Senior to the petitioner could not have-been considered for promotion as he was censured pursuant to a disciplinary proceeding and regulation 86 of the Board bars such promotion. (v) But on 1st March, 1982, the petitioner was entitled to be considered for such promotion but was not considered. (vi) No reason for such non-consideration is given in Annexure-1. 25. (v) But on 1st March, 1982, the petitioner was entitled to be considered for such promotion but was not considered. (vi) No reason for such non-consideration is given in Annexure-1. 25. In the impugned order the board is quite right in saying that there cannot be any automatic filling up of the post by promotion as soon as it falls vacant. But one thing is far too well settled to be disputed that right to be considered for promotion flows from the constitutional guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 to the Constitution. Against that background the other assertion in the impugned order that the Board thought it fit to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion from 28th april, 1986 without giving any justification why the petitioner should not be considered for promotion earlier and with effect from the date of occurring of -the vacancy especially when the petitioners eligibility for such consideration is not disputed in the impugned order does not satisfy the test of either reason or relevance. 26. In C. O. Arumugam and others V/s. The State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in (1991) (Supp.) SCC page 129, the Apex Court made it clear that consideration for promotion case only be postponed on reasonable ground. Here no reasonable ground has been shown in the impugned order why the petitioners case for consideration for promotion to the post of Under secretary was postponed. 27. So in the absence of any cogent reason in the impugned order, this Court cannot sustain the same. The attempt of the learned Counsel for the board to improve the impugned order on the basis of additional reasons not mentioned in it also cannot be accepted for the well settled legal position discussed here-in-above. 28. Therefore, the question is whether an employee is free to defer at its sweet will the consideration of an incumbents case of promotion when the vacancy occurs and when the persons whose case is ripe for consideration is making repeated representations for such consideration of his case. If the answer is given by this Court in affirmative then an employer would be put in the position of being an imperium in imperio. Under the constitutional set up no body can claim that position. If the answer is given by this Court in affirmative then an employer would be put in the position of being an imperium in imperio. Under the constitutional set up no body can claim that position. On the other hand the Apex Court is constantly harping on the fact that the governmental authorities in keeping with the concept of a Welfare State should act as a model employer. Acting as a model employer, implies that persons who are entitled to be considered for promotion at the time when the vacancy occurs ought to be so considered in accordance with law and they must know where they stand. Therefore, a fair consideration of case for promotion implies a timely consideration and not a belated one or at any time when the employer thinks it fit. As the employee has a fundamental right of having his case for promotion considered fairly, similarly the employer has an obligation to do it objectively. There is no scope for a subjective approach in this area. So the authority must remember that in considering an employees case for promotion, it is undertaking an exercise in the context of certain constitutional imperatives. And it is expected that the authority must act with a due sense of responsibility and in an objective manner and in such cases always there is an accountability attached to its actions. So the authority cannot take the stand, as it has taken in the impugned order that it will consider the case for promotion when it thinks fit. The impugned order thus betrays a clear lack of perception on the part of the authorities about its duties in this respect. 29. This Court is of the view that discipline in public service is not one way traffic. If the authorities expect discipline and dedication from the employees, they must also adhere to some discipline in the discharge of duties and obligations and as a model employer and one such obligation is to consider the eligible employees for promotion in accordance with the rules and within a reasonable time when vacancies in the promotional post occur. 30. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this Court cannot sustain the impugned order which is at annexure-1 to the writ petition. Annexure-1 is thus quashed. 30. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this Court cannot sustain the impugned order which is at annexure-1 to the writ petition. Annexure-1 is thus quashed. This Court, therefore, directs:- (a) The appropriate authorities of the board must consider the petitioners case for promotion to the post of Under secretary with effect from 1st March, 1982 inasmuch as petitioner is eligible for consideration on that date and there is no impediment to such consideration. (b) If as a result of such consideration, the petitioner is found entitled to promotion to the post of Under Secretary from an earlier date, the petitioners promotion should be suitable preponed and the order at Annexure-3 will be suitably altered. (c) In the event the petitioners promotion to the post of Under Secretary is preponed, in that case his case for promotion to the post of the Joint secretary after completion of seven years of Kalawdhi from the date of preponing of promotion to the post of Under Secretary should be considered keeping in mind the fact that the petitioner was holding the current charge of Joint Secretary at the time of his retirement. (d) All the aforesaid exercise mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) above must be completed within a period of four months from the date of service / production of a copy of this order on the appropriate authorities of the Board by the petitioner. (e) Consequential financial benefits by way of difference of salary and in the matters of calculation of pensionary benefits may be made available to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of expiry of the period mentioned in clause (d ). 31. This writ petition is therefore, allowed in terms of the directions and to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to cost.