JUDGMENT 1. Appellants/accused have directed this appeal against the judgment and order of sentence dated 23rd Nov. 1987, rendered by Sessions Judge, Mandsaur in ST No. 152 of 87, thereby convicting the appellants and snetencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 6th February, 1987, at about 12.00 in the noon, prosecutrix Leelabai, when she was on her way back to her house after fetching water from the well of one Mahadeo, she was intercepted by the appellants and near rivulet, the accused persons committed rape on her one by one. In scuffling with the appellants, bangles and earthen pot of the prosecutrix were broken and she sustained injuries on her wrist and knees. After the act of rape, the accused persons threatened her not to tell the incident otherwise they would finish her. Thereafter, the accused persons fled away from the place of incident and the prosecutrix Leelabai returned her house. It is stated that prosecutrix Leelabai (PW 9) was the member of the scheduled castes and that in village Yisnia, her family was the only family belonging to scheduled castes. Prosecutrix Leelabai narrated the incident to her husband, Karoo (PW 8), thereafter, her husband took her to Police Station on 10.2.1987 after three days of the incident, and crime No. 12/87 was registered at Police Station, Nahargarh, the same day against the accused for the offence under sections 376/34 and 323 IPC. The prosecutrix Leelabai (PW 9) was medically examined at District Hospital, Mandsaur by Dr. Bharti Choudhari (PW 4) the same day and submitted her report Ex. P/12. Accused persons were also taken into custody and got medically examined. Police Nahargarh completed usual investigations and filed challan against the accused/appellants. The trial Court framed charges against all appellants for the offence punishable under section 376 IPC to which they pleaded not guilty. On completion of trial learned Sessions Judge convicted all the appellants and sentenced as indicated above. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal against the impugned judgment of the trial Court. 3. I have heard Shri P.K. Saxena learned Senior Advocate with Shri Jain for the appellants and Shri Abdul Salim learned Panel Lawyer for the State. 4. On completion of trial learned Sessions Judge convicted all the appellants and sentenced as indicated above. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal against the impugned judgment of the trial Court. 3. I have heard Shri P.K. Saxena learned Senior Advocate with Shri Jain for the appellants and Shri Abdul Salim learned Panel Lawyer for the State. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in view of the delayed First Information Report and material contradiction and omissions found in the statement of the prosecutrix, Leelabai, her uncorroborated statements cannot be believed for basing conviction for the offence charged against the appellants. The counsel submitted that in view of the facts and circumstances and the conduct of the prosecutrix before and after the incident, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and in the circumstances, the appellants deserve acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. 5. In oppugnation, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State supported the judgment and order of sentence passed by the trial Court and submitted that in view of the facts and circumstances, the trial Court has not committed any error in believing the statements of the prosecutrix, Leelabai and convicting the appellants for the offence charged against them. 6. I have carefully perused the record and considered rival contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The prosecution has examined only prosecutrix, Leelabai (PW 9) as a witness of the incident. As such whole case rests on solitary statement of the prosecutrix. 7. Before considering the case on merits, I consider it proper to look into position of law on the point of standard of proof expected by the Court in rape cases and also on the point of necessity of corroboration for the statements of the prosecutrix for basing conviction. 8. The law is well settled on the point, that in rape cases, sole testimony of the prosecutrix for basing the conviction can be relied on if her statement is found trustworthy and the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged. 9. 9. The Apex Court has laid down the law on the subject in case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain; ( AIR 1990 SC 658 ) and held, that, ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violance, unless there are special circumstances, which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. The standard of proof to be expected by the Court in such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than prosecutrix is available. Court must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity." 10. A similar view was reiterated by the Apex Court in case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat; ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eye-witness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the Courts in the Western World. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the Courts in the Western World. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the 'probabilities-factor' does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration." The Apex Court further held that – "Corroboration is non he sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt disbelief or suspicion?" 11. In view of the aforesaid position of law on examining the case at hand as also the statements of the prosecutrix it is found that Prosecutrix Leelabai in her statement has categorically stated that at the time of incident the accused persons took her to the rivulet and all of them committed rape on her one by one. The witness further stated that in scuffling with the appellants, her bangles and earthen pot were broken and she sustained injuries on her wrist and knees. Her statement on the point of sustaining injuries is corroborated from the statement of Dr. Smt. Bharti Choudhari (PW 4) and medical examination report, Ex. P/12 as also from the facts stated in the reply to query, Exh. P/14. 12. Dr. Smt. Bharti Choudhari (PW 4) in her statement stated that at the time of examination of prosecutrix, Leelabai she found two abrasions admeasuring 1/4" x 1/6" on her wrist and one contusion on her right knee admeasuring 2" x 1 1/2". The duration of the aforesaid injuries was within 72 hours of examination. In reply to query, Exh. P/14. Dr. Bharti Choudhari also stated that according to colour of the contusion, the duration of the injuries can be more than 72 hours. 13. The statement of the prosecutrix, Leelabai on the point of commission of rape by all the appellants one by one, further stands corroborated from the statement of her husband Karoo (PW 8) and from the facts contained in First Information Report, Ex. P/15. 14. 13. The statement of the prosecutrix, Leelabai on the point of commission of rape by all the appellants one by one, further stands corroborated from the statement of her husband Karoo (PW 8) and from the facts contained in First Information Report, Ex. P/15. 14. The counsel for the appellants submitted that the conduct of the prosecutrix, after the incident, makes the case of the prosecution doubtful. According to the statement of Karoo (PW 8) he was informed of the incident by his wife, prosecutrix after two days of the incident and thereafter First Information Report, Ex. P/15 was lodged at Police Station, Nahargarh on 10th Feb. 87 i.e. four days after the incident took place. The prosecution has not given any explanation for the delay of four days caused in lodging the FIR Ex. P/15. 15. It is well settled law that only on the ground of delayed FIR the case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out. In the case of delayed FIR the prosecution is under obligation .to explain delay. In Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh; ( AIR 1981 SC 361 ) the Apex Court has held that delay of 10 days in lodging FIR is reasonably explained by the prosecution as such it does not affect the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has held as under: "The occurrence, according to the prosecutrix took place on the night intervening the 20th and 21st August, 1972. The first information report was lodged on 31st August, 1972. The complainant had given reasonable explanation for lodging it after ten days of the occurrence. She stated that as honour of the family was involved, its members had to decide whether to take the matter to the Court or not. It is not uncommon that such considerations delay action on the part of the near relations of a young girl who is raped." 16. The learned trial Judge considered the aspect of delayed FIR on the facts and circumstances of the case at hand and has held that the delay of four days in lodging FIR got reasonably explained from the evidence of the prosecution. The reasoning and the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge on the aforesaid point are well founded and deserves affirmation. 17. The reasoning and the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge on the aforesaid point are well founded and deserves affirmation. 17. The statement of the prosecutrix, Leelabai, the victim of the incident is not found to be untrustworthy or unnatural in any manner. Learned trial Judge has thus, not committed any error in recording the conviction. However, I find that the appellants are beneficiaries of error committed by the trial Court in a matter of charge as noted hereafter. 18. In my view, the record clearly reveals that it is a case of gang rape and as such the appellants should have charged and tried for the offence punishable under section 376 (2) (g) of the IPC and should have been convicted and sentenced as provided thereunder. At one stage I was inclined to order remand and re-trial but learned Panel Lawyer submitted that it would not be proper to do so at this distance of time and that the conviction and sentence as recorded by the trial Court amply met the ends of justice. It is only because of long lapse of time and submissions urged before me by the learned Panel Lawyer that I have deemed it improper to order re-trial at this distance of time. 19. Except the aforesaid infirmity which does not tilt the balance in favour of the appellants, I am satisfied that the judgment of conviction and sentence deserves to be upheld. 20. In the result, this appeal fails and is, accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the trial Court are affirmed. The appellant No. 1 Bapulal is in jail. He is directed to serve out remaining part of the sentence, as awarded by the trial Court and confirmed in this appeal. The other two appellants are on bail, their bail bonds stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandsaur to serve out the sentence as ordered.