JUDGMENT : D.M. Patnaik, J. - This revision is disposed of at the admission stage. The short question for decision is, whether the Judge, Family Court, Cuttack was correct in directing a reconciliation between the husband and the wife in spite of the written objection of the wife to the same. 2. It is not disputed that the petitioner and the opposite party had a registration marriage on 31-8-1 9-. While it is the case of the wife that such a marriage was solemnised on false representation/fraud practised on her by the opposite party, it is the case of the opposite party that the marriage is a valid one and there was no question of fraud or misrepresentation as alleged by the petitioner. Wife's further case is, when the matter before the Family Court was ripe for hearing, the opposite party filed a petition on 20-8-1996 for a reconciliation and this being allowed by the Court in spite of her objection, the order is illegal. 3. Mr. Palit, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that once the wife challenges the marriage as a nuliity on the ground of fraud and/or misrepresentation, farcing the parties for reconciliation is against the requirement of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act as well as the settled principles of law. It was next contended that before directing the parties to the 'reconciliation cell' the Court should have been first satisfied as to the existence of a reasonable possibility of settlement between the parties and according to the learned counsel, under no circumstance such a direction could have been given when the wife objected to this in writing. Mr. Ashok Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that the language of Section 9 of Family Courts Act which is pari materia with that of the language used in Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to make an endeavour for a reconciliation and, according to him, under no circumstance it would depend on a question whether the marriage is a void or voidable one. It was therefore argued that, in the present case the Court having made a sincere effort to bring about a settlement between the parties has not committed any error or illegality. The rival contentions of the learned counsels for the parties need examination. 4. It was therefore argued that, in the present case the Court having made a sincere effort to bring about a settlement between the parties has not committed any error or illegality. The rival contentions of the learned counsels for the parties need examination. 4. Let me first deal with the view of the learned Judge, Family Court that the provisions of Section 9 is 'mandatory'. The same is expressed by stating that it is a 'statutory mandate'. The law is well-settled that question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon intent of the Legislature and not on the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and the intention of the Legislature must govern and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, design and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other (vide decisions reported in State of U.P. Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, and AIR 989 SC 2206, Vali Pero v. Fernandeo Lopez and Ors.). It is also equally well-settled that if the provision is mandatory, any act done in breach thereof would be invalid, out if it is directory, the act would not be invalid although non-compliance may give rise to some other penalty if provided by the statute (vide decisions reported in Rani Drig Raj Kuer Vs. Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh, and Rubber House Vs. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., ). It is clear from the decision in the case of Tanima Mishra Vs. Pradeep Kumar Patnaik, (referred to by both the counsels) approving the proposition laid down in the case of Sk. Salam Vs. Sant Singh and another, that non-compliance of the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act would not make a decree under the Act nullity. That apart, the provisions of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act which is in pari materia with that of the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act do not prescribe the consequences for non-compliance of these provisions of the section for reconciliation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 9 of the Family Court Act is mandatory. No doubt in the decision of this High Court in the case of Anupama Misra Vs. Therefore, it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 9 of the Family Court Act is mandatory. No doubt in the decision of this High Court in the case of Anupama Misra Vs. Bhagaban Misra, and another decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Manju Singh Vs. Ajay Bir Singh, the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act has been held to be mandatory. But I am unable to concur with the view since in these decisions no reason has been assigned as to how they are mandatory and secondly the proposition laid down by the apex Court referred to above has not been taken note of. Rather, I would like to subscribe the view taken in the case of Dilipbhai Chhaganlal Patel Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, which holds that the rule is not absolute but a duty in cast on the Court to make an endeavour for settlement. Not the same can also be said to be directory because of what has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Rani Drigraj Kuer (supra). In para 21 of the judgment the Court has held as follows: "A. provision giving discretionary power leaves done of the power free to use or not to use it is at his discretion. The directory provision however gives no discretionary power to do or not to do the thing directed. A directory provision is intended to be obeyed but a failure to obey it does not render a thing duly done in disobedience of it, a nullity." In those cases where the family Court does not direct parties for reconciliation the ultimate decision of the Court either way is not rendered invalid for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Therefore, I am of the view that, the provision is neither 'mandatory' nor directory but casts an onerous duty on the Court to make a sincere endeavour for settlement to save the estranged couple breaking away from the company of each other. 5. Both the learned counsel for the parties, pointing out different portions of the same judgment, in support of their respective contentions, have railed on the decisions reported in the cases of Jivubai v. Ningappa AIR 1963 Mys 3, Raghunath Prasad Vs. Smt. Urmila Devi and Another Sk. Salam Vs. Sant Singh and another and Tanima Mishra Vs. 5. Both the learned counsel for the parties, pointing out different portions of the same judgment, in support of their respective contentions, have railed on the decisions reported in the cases of Jivubai v. Ningappa AIR 1963 Mys 3, Raghunath Prasad Vs. Smt. Urmila Devi and Another Sk. Salam Vs. Sant Singh and another and Tanima Mishra Vs. Pradeep Kumar Patnaik. Besides these, Mr. Palit has relied on the decision reported in the case of Smt. Jolly Das v. Tapan Ranjan Das, JUDGMENT TODAY 1994 (3) SC 529 which is not exactly on the point at issue and needs no discussion. ALL the other decisions mentioned above deal with the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act which is admittedly in pari materia with the provisions of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act with which we are concerned. Keeping in view the language of the section, its spirit, the legislative intent and the principles decided In the above decisions. I am of the view that a duty is cast on the Court while dealing with matrimonial case to make an endeavour for settlement of the ruptured family relationship irrespective of the nature of the case i.e., whether voidable or not, whether written statement is filed or not and irrespective of the stage of the proceeding. The views expressed in all the above decisions are also unanimous that non-compliance of the provisions would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case and return a verdict either way. The Division Bench in the case of Jivubai (supra) held that the trial Court has a duty to perform by making every endeavour to bring out a reconciliation between the parties u/s 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act and the matter does not go to the question of jurisdiction. But at the same time the Court held that if no endeavour is made by the trial Court. It would undoubtedly be a serious omission which has to be taken into account, but it cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Mohanty is accepted to the extent that the Court is competent to direct a reconciliation in the circumstances mentioned above. It would undoubtedly be a serious omission which has to be taken into account, but it cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Mohanty is accepted to the extent that the Court is competent to direct a reconciliation in the circumstances mentioned above. But the point is whether the Court has made any endeavour in the present case and if direction of the Court for reconciliation before the reconciliation cell without being first satisfied as to whether there is any reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties is correct or not which is rather the corner-stone of the argument of Mr. Palit. This is dealt in the following manner. 6. In the case of S. Thanikodi Vs. Ramuthayee the Court while dealing with the case u/s 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act held that the section casts a duty on the Court in the first instance to bring about a reconciliation between the parties in the matrimonial cause. But according to the Court, it is only when the Court finds that there may be some chance of saving the marriage that the Court would try to make a rapprochment and not otherwise. Same is the view taken in the case of Raghunath (supra). In para 3 of the judgment, the Court held that the Court should ascertain from the parties themselves as to what brought the 'rupture' in their relation as husband and wife and exploit the possibility of reconciliation between them. This may be achieved only when the parties appear before the Court in person. In the case of Chhote Lal Vs. Kamla Devi and Others the wife through her Lawyer registered her objection against reconciliation. Dealing with the case the Court held that in order that the requirement of making 'every endeavour' fulfilled, it is at least requisite that the Courts should have at first hand version on the point of view of the lady form her own mouth so that the Court might be in a position to appreciate what really has led to the estrancement between the two. In the case of Tanima Mishra (supra), this Court was conscious of the discretionary power and in para 6 of the judgment held that when it appears to the Court that there is 'reasonable possibility for settlement', the Court has a discretion to adjurn the proceeding to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement. 7. There is nothing in the impugned order that the Court applied its mind to hold that there was any possibility of a settlement at that belated stags. I make it dear that no doubt the section casts a duty on the Court to make an endeavour for reconciliation, but such endeavour should be made in a case, 'where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstance of the case to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement'. This being the language employed in Section 9 of the Act, the same calls for the Court's satisfaction about a possible settlement and this is rather a concomitant to the Court's 'endeavour' for reconcilation. It is appropriate to refer to the language in Section 9(2) of the Act which mentions about the Court being satisfied with reasonable possibility of settlement. Once the Court is satisfied with this primary requirement, then only question arises of its making any endeavour for settlement and this can be done by Court itselt ascertaining the respective case of the parties from pleadings, documents or other materials on the record or in the absence of any of them, by calling both parties for the purpose. 'Satisfied' should mean 'reasonably satisfied' and it cannot import the meaning of an arbitrary or irrational state of being satisfied. Satisfaction must be honest, careful and deliberate after exercising due care and caution, vide decision reported in Liversidge v. Sri John Anderson : 1942 AC 205 followed with approval in the case In re v. Venkataraman : AIR 1949 Mad 529. 8. In this connection, I feel it appropriate to point out the apparent omission in the rules framed by the High Court. Section 9 of the Family Courts Act comes under Chapter-IV of the Act and prescribes that the Family Court should follow such procedure in matter of settlement between the parties subject to the rules framed by the High Court. In this connection, I feel it appropriate to point out the apparent omission in the rules framed by the High Court. Section 9 of the Family Courts Act comes under Chapter-IV of the Act and prescribes that the Family Court should follow such procedure in matter of settlement between the parties subject to the rules framed by the High Court. Under Sub-section (2) (c) of Sub-section 21 of the Act power is invested with the High Court to frame rules prescribing the procedure which should be followed by the Family Court in the matter of settlement between the parties. The Family Courts (Court) Rules, 1988 framed by the High Court is notified in the Orissa Gazette dated 12, January 1983. Surprisingly no rule has been framed by the High Court pursuant to Sections 9 and 21 of the Act. No other rule was also brought to the notice of this Court. This, however, does not mean that the action of the Family Court to send the parties to the counselling centre would be invalid in the absence of the prescribed rule because, the Court has the implied authority to give such direction. 9. In the result, this revision is partly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remitted back to the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. The Family Court shall call both parties to appear in person in camera and ascertain from them as to whether there is any reasonable possibility of a settlement between the two and then only the Court should send them to the counselling centre for reconciliation as per rules.