Judgment J. N. Dubey, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29-3-1993 for the respondent No.2, the administrator, Bihar State Co-operative land Development Bank Limited (for short the Bank) dismissing the petitioner from service. 2. The case of the petitioner is that on 6.1.1982 when he was working as Accountant in the Belsand branch of the bank, he was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding. On 12.5.1982, he was served with a notice asking him to explain certain charges. He submitted his explanation within the stipulated time. His explanation was forwarded to the District Manager of Sitamarhi branch of the Bank for his opinion, who exonerated him of all the charges. On 27.8.1984, the Managing Director revoked suspension of the petitioner but directed for continuing the disciplinary proceeding. 3. On 10.12.1984, a formal disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and one H. P. N. Singh was appointed as Enquiry Officer. On 21.12.1984, the Enquiry Officer directed the petitioner to submit his written defence. On 1.2.1985, the petitioner requested the Enquiry Officer to supply copies of relevant documents to enable him to file his written defence. He also requested the Managing director to change the Enquiry Officer as he himself was the Reporting Officer in the matter. On 19.10.1985, the Managing director appointed one Raj Kumar Singh as Enquiry Officer in place of H. P. N. Singh. On 12.3.1986, the petitioner was again directed to submit his written defence within one month. He again requested the Enquiry Officer to supply copies of the relevant documents. When the petitioner was not supplied with the copies of the documents inspite of repeated reminders, he submitted his explanation on the basis of whatever material available with him. 4. On 22.8.1990, the respondent No.3, Tripati Narain Singh, Regional Manager of the Bank, wrote to the respondent No.2 that the petitioner was absent from 11.8.1990 without leave and requested him to transfer him to some other region. 5. On 16.10.1990, second disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner on the basis of letter dated 22.8.1990 of the respondent No.3 and he was again placed under suspension. On 30.8.1991, the petitioner was served with a copy of the charge-sheet and asked to submit his explanation which he submitted within the stipulated time. 5. On 16.10.1990, second disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner on the basis of letter dated 22.8.1990 of the respondent No.3 and he was again placed under suspension. On 30.8.1991, the petitioner was served with a copy of the charge-sheet and asked to submit his explanation which he submitted within the stipulated time. On 25.9.1991, raj Kumar Singh, the Enquiry Officer was himself placed under suspension and respondent No.3 was appointed as new enquiry Officer in his place. On 11.11.1991, the petitioner was served with an unsigned copy of the charge-sheet. But this time also, he was not supplied with the copies of the documents. 6. On 29.11.1991, third disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner for his refusal to join his temporary headquarter. He was served with a fresh charge-sheet and asked to submit his explanation which he submitted within the stipulated time. On 2.12.1991, the Enquiry officer submitted an ex pane enquiry report. On 4.12.1991, the petitioner received second notice asking him to submit his explanation against the findings of the Enquiry Officer. On 20.12.1991, he submitted his explanation. On 6.1.1992, he filed complaint to respondent No.2 against the behaviour and conduct of the new Enquiry Officer. Inspite of repeated requests neither the Enquiry Officer was changed nor was the petitioner supplied with the copies of the desired documents. On the other hand, on 16.1.1992, the Enquiry officer submitted another exparte enquiry report on the basis of which a second notice was served on the petitioner. On 16.4.1992, he submitted his explanation. On 4.6.1992, the respondent No.2 directed the Enquiry Officer to submit a fresh enquiry report after affording the petitioner reasonable opportunity of hearing. On 9.7.1992, the respondent No.3 again submitted an ex-pane enquiry report. On 11.9.1992, the Enquiry Officer published a notice in Hindustan daily newspaper to the effect that the petitioner should receive copy of the notice from his office, failing which the service will be deemed sufficient on him. The petitioner went to (he Enquiry Officer to get a copy of the notice but it was not supplied to him. He accordingly sent a telegram to respondent no.2 in this, regard. Since the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the notice, he could not file his explanation against it. 7. The petitioner went to (he Enquiry Officer to get a copy of the notice but it was not supplied to him. He accordingly sent a telegram to respondent no.2 in this, regard. Since the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the notice, he could not file his explanation against it. 7. On 25.9.1992, fourth disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner for not receiving second notice and sending a false telegram to respondent no.2. Although the petitioner was not served with any notice of this proceeding, service was deemed sufficient on him under the Code of Civil Procedure and it was presumed that he had no explanation to offer. On 29.3.1993, the respondent No.2. dismissed the petitioner from service. Feeling aggrieved, he has filed this writ petition. 8. On the other hand, the respondents in their counter-affidavit without disputing that the respondent No.3 himself was the Reporting Officer in some cases, stated that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on that account. It is further stated that the petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings and his claim that all the enquiry reports were submitted ex-pane is incorrect. 9. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent no.3 was not legally justified in deciding all the four disciplinary proceedings by a common order. In order to appreciate this aspect of the case, relevant paragraphs of the impugned order are quoted below: "this order relates to the following four disciplinary proceedings initiated against the aforesaid accused employee by different managing Directors and Administrators on different occasions: (i) Proceeding initiated vide Memo No.646 dated 10.12.84 by the then Managing director relating to charges involving defalcation, unauthorised absence, non-performance of essential duties, indiscipline and financial bunglings etc. (ii) Proceeding initiated vide Memo No.1722 dated 16.10.1990 by the then Administrator relating to charges involving unauthorised absence, non-performance of essential duties, lack of interest in work etc. (iii) Proceeding initiated vide Memo no.5922 dated 29.11.1991 alleging failure to join in his Headquarters fixed during the period of his suspension. (iv) Explanation called from him vide memo No.6005 dated 25.9.1992 alleging refusal to receive a second show cause notice and also for having sent a false telegram. (iii) Proceeding initiated vide Memo no.5922 dated 29.11.1991 alleging failure to join in his Headquarters fixed during the period of his suspension. (iv) Explanation called from him vide memo No.6005 dated 25.9.1992 alleging refusal to receive a second show cause notice and also for having sent a false telegram. Each of the aforesaid charges proved against the accused employee is in itself serious enough to warrant his dismissal. Moreover, as the aforesaid discussions would indicate, these delinquencies of the accused employee are not isolated instances, but indicate repetitions of earlier instances. The accused employee, in course of years, has not tried to mend his manners, inspite of several explanations called, and in spite of his being placed under suspension earlier. Hence there are no extenuating circumstances so as to award him any punishment other than dismissal. Accordingly, in consideration of the seriousness of such of the charges that have been proved against the accused employee, these four proceedings are hereby concluded with the following orders: (i) The accused employee, namely, Sri prem Prakash Arya, is dismissed from the services of this Bank with effect from the date of issue of these orders. (ii) The accused employee shall not be paid any amount more than the subsistence allowance for the periods he remained under suspension. (iii) No leave of any kind be allowed to the accused employee for any of the days he has remained absent from duties in the past in an unauthorised manner. " 11. In my opinion, the respondent no.2 was not legally justified in deciding four disciplinary proceedings by a common order. Learned Counsel for the respondents has failed to point out any provision authorising the disciplinary authority to decide more than one disciplinary proceedings by a common order. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the respondent No.3 himself being Reporting officer in some cases, could not be legally entrusted the enquiry. According to him, the respondent No.3 was also biased against the petitioner and, therefore, submitted ex-pane enquiry reports without affording him proper opportunity to defend himself. He has invited my attention to the letter dated 22.8.1990 of the respondent no.3 written to the respondent No.2 in support of his contention. In order to appreciate this aspect of the case, the letter of the respondent No.3 is quoted below: 13. I find substance in this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He has invited my attention to the letter dated 22.8.1990 of the respondent no.3 written to the respondent No.2 in support of his contention. In order to appreciate this aspect of the case, the letter of the respondent No.3 is quoted below: 13. I find substance in this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In my opinion, in view of the fact that respondent No.3 himself was the Reporting officer in some cases, he could not be legally appointed the Enquiry Officer. Once the respondent No.3 himself had reported to the respondent No.2 about unauthorised absence of the petitioner and has requested him to transfer him to some other region describing him as burden on the Bank, he could not be expected to conduct fair enquiry into the matter. It is now well settled that nobody can be a judge of his own cause and , therefore, the respondent no.3, who was the Reporting Officer could not be entrusted the enquiry. My this view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. V/s. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , which reads thus: " The salient facts being thus admitted there can be no escape from the conclusion that Shri B. N. Bhalla should not have presided over the trial any longer. The point in issue was whether Shariful Hasan was in family relationship with the respondent mohammed Khatll had In his evidence at the trial denied having made any statement to this effect. Shri B. N. Bhalla gave evidence that mohammed Khalil had in his presence admitted this friendship of Shariful Hasan with the respondent. Which of the two witnesses, mohammed Khalil and Shri B. N. Bhalla, was to be believed was the duty of the person presiding over the trial to determine. Shri B. N. Bhalla was obviously most ill suited to undertake the task. Having pitted his evidence against that of Mohammed Khalil, Shri B. N. Bhalla vacated the Judges seat and entered the arena as a witness. The two roles could not obviously be played by one and the same person. Indeed Shri B. N. Bhalla himself realised it and accordingly had his own evidence recorded on both the occasions by other high Officers. It is futile to expect that he could, in the circumstances, hold the scale even. The two roles could not obviously be played by one and the same person. Indeed Shri B. N. Bhalla himself realised it and accordingly had his own evidence recorded on both the occasions by other high Officers. It is futile to expect that he could, in the circumstances, hold the scale even. It is suggested that there might have been other evidence establishing the friendship between Shariful Hasan and the respondent and that the evidence of Shri B. N bhalla might not have been relied on or might not have been the deciding factor. There is nothing on record before us to support this suggestion but assuming that Shri B. N. Bhaila did not rely on his own evidence in preference to that of Mohammed Khalil - a fact which is bard to believe, especially in the face of his own affidavit quoted above - the act of Shri B. N. Bhalla in having his own testimony recorded in the case indubitably evidences state of mind which clearly discloses considerable bias against the respondent. If it shocks our notions of judicial propriety and fair play, as indeed it does, it was bound to make a deeper impression on the mind of the respondent as to the unreality and futility of the proceedings conducted in this fashion. We find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the rules of natural justice were completely discarded and all canons of fair play were grievously violated by Shri B. N. Bhalla continuing to preside over the trial. Decision arrived at by such process and order founded on such decision cannot possibly be regarded as valid or binding. " 14. The claim of the petitioner that the respondent No.3 was biased against him can also not be easily brush aside. When the respondent No.3 could go to the extent of describing the petitioner as burden on the Bank, it cannot be reasonably claimed that he was not biased against him. The respondent No.3 who wanted the petitioner to be transferred outside his region describing him as burden on the Bank would have ordinarily tried to get rid of him on the first available opportunity. Moreover, it is now well settled that existence of bias need not be proved by direct evidence and it can be in-ferred from certain proved circumstances. The respondent No.3 who wanted the petitioner to be transferred outside his region describing him as burden on the Bank would have ordinarily tried to get rid of him on the first available opportunity. Moreover, it is now well settled that existence of bias need not be proved by direct evidence and it can be in-ferred from certain proved circumstances. My this view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in S. Parthasarathi V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2701 , which reads thus : the question then is : whether a real likelihood of bias existed is to be determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances by Court objectively, or, upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large. The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the oasis of the whole evidence before it whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances inter that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring Officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring Officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M. R. in Metropolitan properties Co. (F. G. C.) Ltd. V/s. Lanon (1968) 3 wlr 694 at page 707 - etc. ] We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings. " 15. (F. G. C.) Ltd. V/s. Lanon (1968) 3 wlr 694 at page 707 - etc. ] We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings. " 15. The petitioner has given details in the writ petition how the Enquiry Officer did not supply copies of the relevant documents to him inspite of his repeated requests and went on submitting one ex-parte enquiry report after another without affording him proper opportunity to defend himself. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent most of the paragraphs of the writ petition have either not been replied at all or have been replied in most abasive manner. After going through the writ petition, the counter-affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit, I feel that the petitioner has not been fairly treated by the Enquiry Officer. 16. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are not binding on the disciplinary authority and, therefore, even assuming that the respondent No.3 was biased against the petitioner, he is not entitled for any relief. In support of his contention he has cited a decision of the supreme Court in Union of India V/s. H. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , which reads thus : "the enquiry report alongwith the evidence recorded constitute the material on which the Government has ultimately to act. That is the only purpose of the enquiry held by competent Officer and the report which he makes as a result of the said enquiry. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the high Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant was not justified in differing from the findings recorded by the enquiry Officer. As we have just indicated, if it is held that the report of the Enquiry Officer is not binding on the Government, then the constitutional safeguard afforded by Article 311 (1) and (2) cannot be said to have been contravened by the appellant and the grievance made by the respondent in that behalf must fail. " 17. In my opinion, this case is of no help to the respondents. " 17. In my opinion, this case is of no help to the respondents. It is true that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not binding on the disciplinary authority but that does not mean that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner although the Enquiry Officer himself was reporting Officer in some cases and was biased against him. 18. The impugned order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and is liable to be quashed. 19. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 29-3-1993 of the respondent No.2, the Administrator, Bihar State Co-operative land Development Bank is quashed. No order as to costs. Petition Allowed.