JUDGMENT 1. - The non-petitioner, who is the Principal of Saint Paul Higher Secondary School, Ajmer (Raj.), had received computer machines from Hindustan Computer Ltd., Ghaziabad, U.P., worth Rs. 1,44,000/-on 29.6.85. No octroi duty had been paid on such machines at the time of their having been brought inside the city of Ajmer. The octroi duty payable was Rs. 2,880/-. The respondent appears to have contacted the Commissioner of the petitioner on 10.9.85 and requested him to move the State Government for exemption of the goods from charge of octroi duty as the institution was already exempted from paying sales-tax and excise-duty on goods purchased by it for the purposes of education. It was also mentioned in the application that the respondent would abide by the decision of the State Government and would pay the octroi duty, if the State Government refused to grant exemption from octroi duty on the goods in question. The petitioner appears to have moved the State Government accordingly. No orders from the Government appears to have been received by the petitioner in the matter. The petitioner, therefore, moved the State Government intimating them that they were withdrawing their recommendations for exemption from octroi duty of the goods, received by the respondent. 2. The petitioner vide their letter dated 4.7.86 and 25.8.86 demanded the payment of octroi duty from the respondent and on his failure to pay the same, presented a complaint before the learned Magistrate on 24.1.87 for offence u /Secs. 132, 251 and 253 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Act of 1959) and Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Octroi Duty Rules, 1962 (Rules of 1962). The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the aforesaid offences on 24.1.1987 and summoned the respondent as an accused therein. The respondent put in appearance through his Counsel on 7.10.91 but he was directed to put in appearance in person. The respondent put in appearance in person on 28.6.94. The learned Magistrate read over and explained the substance of the accusation to him 24.4.95 and asked the complainant to produce his witnesses. It may be mentioned that in the list accompanied with the complaint only two witnesses namely Sh. Suresh Garg and Sh. Kamal Nayan Sharma had been cited as witnesses. Sh. Kamal Nayan Sharma appeared on 11.9.95 and was examined. The case was adjourned to 16.10.95 for enabling the complainant to produce the other witness. It may be mentioned that in the list accompanied with the complaint only two witnesses namely Sh. Suresh Garg and Sh. Kamal Nayan Sharma had been cited as witnesses. Sh. Kamal Nayan Sharma appeared on 11.9.95 and was examined. The case was adjourned to 16.10.95 for enabling the complainant to produce the other witness. Despite issuance of process from the Court the said witness could not he produced. The hearing of the case was adjourned to 4.12.95 and 18.3.96. On both the dates the Presiding Officer was not present in the Court and, therefore, the case was adjourned to 13.5.96. On that date neither the complainant appeared before the Court nor any witness was produced. The learned Magistrate, therefore, dismissed the complaint under section 256, Cr.P.C. 3. The learned Counsel urged that dismissal of the complaint on 13.5.96 was not justified inasmuch as on the earlier dates the learned Magistrate had summoned the witnesses though the summons were returned un-served. The Presiding Officer himself was also not present on those dates. Moreover, the learned Magistrate should have considered the evidence of Sh. Kamal Nayan Sharma before dismissing the complaint for the absence of the complainant. 4. Section 256, Cr.P.C. certainly empowers the Magistrate to dismiss a complaint if the complainant, whose attendance is considered necessary on that day, does not appear before him. The provisions contained in Section 256, Cr.P.C., however, give discretion to the Court to adjourn the hearing of the case also. In the present case since the Presiding Officer was not present on 4.12.95 and 18.3.96 and on earlier occasions the summons of the witnesses had been received un-served it would have been proper on the part of the learned Magistrate to have adjourned the hearing of the case rather than to have dismissed the complaint for absence of the complainant. However, since the Magistrate did exercise the discretion vested in him in a judicial manner, though he could have exercised such discretion in another way also, this Court would not like to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case to be pointed out as under:- 5. The offences were alleged to have been committed in the year 1985 and the matter of exemption of the goods, received by the respondent, from octroi duty was pending with the State Government. The offences were alleged to have been committed in the year 1985 and the matter of exemption of the goods, received by the respondent, from octroi duty was pending with the State Government. The petitioner itself had recommended his case for exemption from octroi duty. The goods received by the respondent was to be utilised for educating the children in computer technology i.e., for a public cause. The State Government had taken no decision on the issue. The matter was thus pending before the authorities concerned and had the element of dispute of civil nature. 6. Apart from the above, the offences alleged to have been committed were punishable with fine only. The complaint had been filed much beyond the period of limitation, prescribed under section 468, Cr.P.C. The period of limitation provided by Section 468(2)(a), Cr.P.C. for such offences was six months only whereas the complaint was filed as late as in the year 1987 after a lapse of about 2 years with no explanation for the delay. The offences alleged to have been committed in the present case were not, in my opinion, continuing offences. "The very essence of a continuing wrong, as held by the Apex Court, is that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury." (See Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waglhmare & Ors. v. Shree D.M. Sansthan, AIR 1959 SC 798 ) . 7. In the instant case the alleged wrongful acts constituting offence punishable under/Secs.132, 251 and 253 of the Act of 1959 and Rule 13 of the Rules of 1962 were committed in the year 1985. Such acts, allegedly causing injury to the petitioner's rights of charging octroi duty, were complete on the dates on which the goods was received. 7. In the instant case the alleged wrongful acts constituting offence punishable under/Secs.132, 251 and 253 of the Act of 1959 and Rule 13 of the Rules of 1962 were committed in the year 1985. Such acts, allegedly causing injury to the petitioner's rights of charging octroi duty, were complete on the dates on which the goods was received. Since the alleged wrongful acts of the respondent, causing injury to the petitioner, were complete in that year, there was no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from respondent's acts might have continued in subsequent years. The injury allegedly caused, was complete as soon as the goods was received without paying octroi duty thereon, if the same was at all payable. The injury itself did not continue. What continued thereafter was the effect of the injury. The prescription for imposition of fine on day-to-day basis, as stated in the relevant provisions, simply provides a mode to measure the effect of the injury. Such prescription is not a part of the substantive injury which makes the offence. It simply makes a machinery provision to calculate and complete the effect and extent of the injury caused. 8. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, I would not like to interfere with the impugned order. Hence, this petition is dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******