JUDGMENT 1. - One Keshar Singh Shekhawat filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2635 of 1995 contending, inter alia, that his candidature be considered against the Non-Gazetted Employees (N.G.E) quota in respect of the examination conducted under the Rajasthan State & Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Combined Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1962 (hereinreferred to for the sake of brevity as 'the Rules'). The facts of his case, inter alia, were that he is B.E. Engineering and was appointed initially as a Junior Engineer in the Department of Agriculture, Government of Rajasthan. He availed all four chances as contemplated under Rule 11 of the Rules. An advertisement was issued by the R.P.S.C. on 15.2.1993 in which the last date for submission of the application forms was determined as 31.3.1993. It may be recalled that the previous syllabus that was there was changed with effect from 3.2.1993 and a new scheme of examination was effected and on 15.2.1993 the RPSC by advertisement as stated above notified initiation of the selection process for Rajasthan State & Subordinate Service providing for reservation for N.G.E. category. As per the rules, 7% reservation was accorded to NGE category in terms of Rule 4(1) proviso of the Rules. A corrigendum was issued on 27.3.1993 by which the said date for submitting the application was extended ultimately to 30.6.1993. The petitioner submitted the application form in terms of the advertisement as NGE candidate because he could not appear as an open market candidate. The amendment under Rule 15 was made on 15.5.1993 by which the following proviso was added:-, "Provided that a candidate who has already availed four chances before the change in syllabus and scheme of the examination vide notification No. F.5(l) DOP/A-II/92 dated 3.2.1963 and who is otherwise eligible shall be permitted one more chance at any of the examinations to be held after the above mentioned notification." After the addition of the said proviso in the rules, the petitioner filed another application form in which he declared his candidature not as a N.G.E. candidate but as an open market candidate. It is contended that there had been number of instances where the RPSC has permitted the change of category of the candidates i.e. their option for open market candidates from N.G.E. candidates. It is contended that there had been number of instances where the RPSC has permitted the change of category of the candidates i.e. their option for open market candidates from N.G.E. candidates. After taking the examination the petitioner found that he had 40th rank in the merit in overall competition by if he was taken as N.G.E. candidate, his ranking would have come first as a candidate. The appointments that were given to the N.G.E. candidates were from 44th in rank. It is also stated that the petitioner approached the RPSC but the RPSC contended that only those candidates who have given their options before declaration of their results were permitted to change their status from open market category to N.G.E. category or vice versa. His option for conversion was thus turned down. 2. It may be recalled that to avail the benefit of consideration for the reservation in N.G.E. quota of 7% an N.G.E. candidate acquires eligibility only upon exhaustion of all the four chances available to him in the general category. The eligibility to avail the benefit of N.G.E. quota thus could be availed of by the candidates only after they avail of four chances in the general category and were unsuccessful. The 7% reservation for N.G.E. category was thus indeed a valuable right for such candidates for whom it was the last chance to avail of in the N.G.E. quota benefit. 3. Santosh Kumar Sharma, Surendra Maheshwari, Jyoti Swaroop Sharma, Ghanshyam Sharma, Nathi Lal Sharma, Sanjay Yadav, Surendra Singh Udawat, Virdha Ram Choudhary and Rajendra Kumar Sharma, are all applicants in the N.G.E. category and they appeared in the examination for claiming the benefit as such in the N.G.E. category and their applications were all processed by the RPSC as N.G.E. categories in response to the advertisement dated 15.2.1993 as in terms of the rules they could take the examination as N.G.E. candidates. The special case for Santosh Kumar Sharma was that in view of his age it was his last chance to avail the N.G.E. quota benefit since he had already exhausted his four chances in the general category. There is a particular rule that if a person is entitled for appearing in the examination as an open market candidate then he cannot be considered for N.G.E. reservation. 4. There is a particular rule that if a person is entitled for appearing in the examination as an open market candidate then he cannot be considered for N.G.E. reservation. 4. Looking to the hardship of the candidates in general, the Government effected amendment in Rule 11 by providing for one more chance to the-candidates who had already availed of four chances. It was indeed a beneficial provision and the amendment was obviously prospective in nature. The intention of the amendment was to permit the candidates to take the examination who were not otherwise eligible. The amendment really applied to only those candidates who but for the amendment could not take the examination. It was contended before us that the amendment has no application for N.G.E. category candidates who have acquired a valuable vested right to take the examination as an N.G.E. candidate. 5. As stated already, on 27.5.1993 RPSC categorically represented to the candidates that those who already applied in terms of the advertisement dated 15.2.1993, need not apply again. The R.P.S.C. thus determined the eligibility of the candidates favourably as N.G.E. candidates under Rule 11(4) of the Rules. By this corrigendum the RPSC also changed the last date of receipt of application from 31.3.1993 to 30.6.1993. It was contended before us that the intention of the amendment and the corrigendum was to express that all candidates eligible in terms of the advertisement dated 15.2.1993 before the amendment, were to remain untouched. On 10.10.1993 the preliminary examination was conducted taking all the appellants to be N.G.E. candidate except Keshar Singh Shekhawat who was treated as an open market candidate by virtue of his availing the fifth chance pursuant to the amended provision of Rule 15. Santosh Kumar Sharma was also treated as N.G.E. candidate and his eligibility was determined by the RPSC in terms of Rule 11(4) and was placed at serial No. I in the N.G.E. category. Surendra Maheswari and Jyoti Swaroop Sharma took their examination as N.G.E. candidates and were assigned merit Nos. 2 and 3 respectively in the separate merit list prepared for N.G.E. candidates. Surendra Maheswari and Jyoti Swaroop Sharma took their examination as N.G.E. candidates and were assigned merit Nos. 2 and 3 respectively in the separate merit list prepared for N.G.E. candidates. Virdha Ram Choudhary and Rejendra Kumar Sharma who were not at all impleaded in the writ petition No. 2635/95 filed by Keshar Singh Shekhawat, but they were adversely affected by virtue of the judgment dated 12.12.1995 as passed by the learned Single Judge, since they also secured a high position and were ranked within the first ten in the N.G.E. category. 6. Surendra Singh Udawat was assigned merit No. 4 in the separate list prepared for N.G.E. candidates and as per his merit he was likely to be appointed in the RAS category but in case his merit is adjudged amongst the general candidates, he would not be adjusted in the said service at all. 7. Nathu Lal Sharma and Sanjay Yadav also appeared as N.G.E. candidates and secured a high position and since they were not impleaded as parties in the writ petition of Keshar Singh Shekhwat, they were condemned unheard by virtue of the judgment dated 12.12.1995 as passed by the learned Single Judge. 8. The learned Single Judge was of the view while disposing of the writ petition of Keshar Singh Shekhawat, that in view of the availability of the fifth chance to all the candidates for this examination, there could not be any N.G.G. quota. The learned Single Judge did not. however, consider certain substantial issues as to what was the nature of the amendment dated 15.5.1993, whether the said amendment could be taken to be retrospective in character, whether a valuable right which accrued in favour of the N.G.E. category candidates who already had four chances in the general category, could be curtailed by the amendment. The question as to whether the amendment offended the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 21 as regards the special privileges granted to the N.G.E. category candidates, has also to be considered in this particular perspective. That apart, the determination as made by the learned Single Judge was in issue in the writ petition and that part the affected parties were not heard at all when the learned Single Judge made a pronouncement to the effect that no body would be entitled to the category benefits as regards N G.E. category. 9. That apart, the determination as made by the learned Single Judge was in issue in the writ petition and that part the affected parties were not heard at all when the learned Single Judge made a pronouncement to the effect that no body would be entitled to the category benefits as regards N G.E. category. 9. The reasoning as advanced by the learned Single Judge in paras 10 and 11 of the judgment, was to the effect that by virtue of the addition of the proviso on 15.5.1993 one additional chance was provided to such candidates to appear as open market candidates. Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 only four chances were contemplated for the open market candidates. The proviso was an exception to the said rule by giving out that one more chance would be permitted to those who have already availed four chances prior to the issuance of the notification of change of the syllabus dated 3.2.1993 and were otherwise eligible. This proviso did not make any distinction between the candidates who were in service and who could appear as N.G.E. candidate or otherwise and, therefore, this fifth chance was available to all the candidates who had already availed of their fourth chance. Where the learned Single Judge erred was that this fifth chance as conferred would be considered as of open market category. The learned Single Judge also misconstrued the rule by holding that if a person is entitled for appearing in the examination as an open market candidate, then he could not be considered for N.G.E. reservation at all. The learned Single Judge did not take into consideration the fact that despite the appearance in the examination in the context of this additional opportunity being granted by way of fifth chance and the last date of application forms being extended further, those of the candidates who had already appeared or exercised their mind to appear as N.G.E. category candidates could not be forced to change their status as general category candidates. The learned Single Judge thought that the eligibility condition made it clear that the candidates must not be eligible to appear as open market candidates and this additional fifth chance rendered them as open market candidates taking away their status as N.G.E. category candidates. The learned Single Judge thought that the eligibility condition made it clear that the candidates must not be eligible to appear as open market candidates and this additional fifth chance rendered them as open market candidates taking away their status as N.G.E. category candidates. The learned Single Judge did not properly take into consideration the submission of the learned advocate for the RPSC that the corrigendum had made it clear that the candidates who have applied earlier as N.G.E. candidates need not apply afresh. The learned Single Judge thought that this very fact could not be taken as a factor overriding the provisions of Rule 4(2) (v) that he must not be eligible to appear in the examination as an open market candidate. The learned Single Judge held that so far as the candidates who are in Government service and are otherwise entitled to be treated as N.G.E. category candidates, on being conferred one more opportunity to them, should be treated as open market candidates and they could be thus be considered as eligible for N.G.E.-category quota. The learned Single Judge held that the RPSC cannot act contrary to the rules and bring the result in conformity therewith. "The option at the time of interviews could not have been taken nor could have been considered as none of the in-service candidates were eligible for the reserved post. No instructions, guidelines, or action (taken by the RPSC) could be contrary to the rules." The learned Single Judge thought that the rules hold the field and if the proviso to Rule 11(l) has entitled the in-service candidates to have the fifth chance in the examination as open market candidates, then they could not have been considered for the reservation meant fir the N.G.E category. Any action taken by the RPSC contrary to Rule 4(2) (v) was non est and, therefore, they have to act only in accordance with the rules and bring the result in conformity therewith." The learned Single Judge considered the question raised that in accordance with the proviso to Rule 11, the open market candidates were provided with the fifth chance and if such a chance is availed by the in-service candidates and they may be treated as open market candidates, then the reservation made in the advertisement for the N.G.E. category candidates would be of no use. The learned Single Judge brushed aside the point by holding that it had no relevance because there may be such candidates who in spite of toe fifth chance may be eligible as N.G.E. category candidates. The learned Single Judge thus struck don the entire procedure which was effected by the RPSC, as contrary to law and observed that so long the proviso to Rule 11(1) remains in respect of the examination . if 1933, the N.G.E. candidates who are eligible to avail the fifth chance in the examinations were not eligible to claim the reservation under the proviso to Rule 4(1). Not only writ petitioner Keshar Singh Shekhawat was found dis-entitled to any relief but The learned Single Judge thought not only that he could be entitled to be treated as N.G.E. candidate but all such candidates who claim the benefit of N.G.E. quota, would be disentitled for it. The learned Single Judge did not think of the perspective that when a person is already granted an opportunity to appear as N.G.E. candidate and the candidate concerned has already filed his application form preparing himself for the examination, by a subsequent action of the RPSC or by the State Government in granting a fifth opportunity to some of the candidates to appear in the examination, as an open market candidate, the N.G.E. status could not otherwise be taken away. The impact of the judgment would be that all such candidates who appeared as N.G.E. candidates and were entitled to the benefit to be treated as such and were liable to be observed having proper ranks in the separate merit list of N.G.E. candidates, would be deprived of the benefit by virtue of some action taken unilaterally by the State Government and/or RPSC in granting opportunity to some candidates to appear for yet another chance i.e. fifth chance to appear as an open market candidate. 10. We are of the considered view that such of the appellants who were not parties to the writ petition of Keshar Singh Shekhawat, could not be condemned unheard and their vested rights could not have been taken away when they have already appeared in the examination and obtained a result. The entire approach of the learned Single Judge is thus arbitrary and contrary to the norms of law and opposed to the tenets of natural justice and fairplay. The entire approach of the learned Single Judge is thus arbitrary and contrary to the norms of law and opposed to the tenets of natural justice and fairplay. The learned Single Judge could not have considered to interpret the rules in some such manner which resulted in the unworkability of the rule and such an interpretation ought to have been avoided and a workable interpretation ought to have been given. 11. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is quite contradictory since at one stage the learned Single Judge while declaring option invited by the RPSC at the time of interview as illegal has said that none of the reserved category candidates was available to get the benefit and yet in another place the learned Single Judge has observed that there might be some candidates who despite the fifth chance, might be eligible as N.G.E. candidates. 12. It is also pertinent to mention here that vide amendment dated 11.8.1995 which is clarificatory in nature, the RPSC has removed the condition No.(v) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Rules wherein it has been mentioned that a candidate can only be treated as N.G.E. when he is not eligible for open market and the said amendment was issued only to remove the difficulties for the applicants of the State & Subordinate Services, 1994, which were being faced by the candidates of the year 1993 but in case the rule is interpreted according to the rule of interpretation, then the appellants could not be declared as ineligible. 13. Vide amendment dated 11.8.1995 the State has deleted condition No.(v) mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 and has added a new proviso to Rule 11 to the following effect: "Provided further that a candidate who has already availed four chances under sub-rule (1) or the additional chance under proviso to sub-rule (1) and who is otherwise eligible shall be allowed one more chance at any of the examinations to be held after this notification." This notification was published in Rajasthan Gazette Ordinary dated 16.8.1995 at page 90. 14. The learned advocates appearing for the different appellants except Keshar Singh Shekhawat, contended before us that the amending notification has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in the proper perspective at all. 14. The learned advocates appearing for the different appellants except Keshar Singh Shekhawat, contended before us that the amending notification has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in the proper perspective at all. A perusal of the deletion clause would reveal that condition No. (v) mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 has been deleted and it would apply in the case of appellants also because of the pendency of the appointment process. The said deletion clause which made the rule of reservation workable is to be treated as retrospective in character. A further perusal of the proviso (2) added by the said amendment would reveal that the chance given under Proviso (1) to sub-rule (1) is an additional chance, therefore, the same is to be treated as optional or a special chance and will be available only on demand. The appellants have not demanded the fifth chance and, therefore, the question of covering their cases under proviso (1) to Rule 11 did not arise at all. Keshar Singh Shekhawat has availed the fifth chance in the same examination i.e. 1993 examination and is to be covered by the said proviso but the said proviso is not applicable in the case of appellants who have not demanded the fifth chance. 15. It is one of the canons of the interpretation of statutes that the rules are to be harmoniously so construed. If Rule 4(2) is harmoniously read along with Rule 11, we find that the fifth chance was only given to the candidates who have availed the fourth chance prior to the notification for change of the syllabus dated 3.2.1993 and that too on demand, as would be evident from the word "shall permit" and further words "any of the examinations to be held after the above mentioned notification." The same was not applicable to all the open market candidates who have not availed three chances and will be governed by main Rule 11. The learned Single Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring all the candidates who have not availed their fifth chance as open market candidates as being ineligible for N.G.E. quota, while dismissing the writ petition of Keshar Singh Shekhawat without there being any prayer to the said effect and has further committed a grave error in holding that the fifth chance is equally applicable to the general category candidates as well as N.G.E. candidates. That apart, the eligibility is to be taken from and on the date of the advertisement and not thereafter, and even if any amendment is made, then also the same cannot be interpreted in a manner in which a candidate is rendered ineligible for consideration in the service competitive examination for which he has already applied. Neither the State Government nor the RPSC had any intention to put the N.G.E. candidates in such a disadvantageous position by giving an option to them for availing the fifth chance so as to decategorise them from the category of N.G.E. candidates after the syllabus and scheme had already been changed vide notification dated 15.5.1993. The learned Single Judge ought not have been interpreted the rules in some such awkward way which would result in an unworkability of the rules. Such a method of interpretation ought to have been avoided and a workable interpretation ought to have been resorted to. Here in this case if the bar of fifth chance is applicable to all the candidates who applied as N.G.E. candidates, having earlier availed of all the four open market selection chances as per the main Rule 11 which was in existence on the date of the advertisement, then there would be no reservation for the year 1993 and in case the interpretation of the learned Single Judge is accepted, the proviso will render the main rule nugatory which is not permissible otherwise. 16. In view of the fact that for N.G.E. category candidates a separate merit list was prepared and if pursuant to the directions of the learned Single Judge the said list is revised and the appellants are placed in the general category, that would disturb the entire merit list and further result in insurmountable complication. 17. It was further not appreciated by the learned Single Judge that main Rule 11 has not been amended. Had there been any intention of the respondent State to make the fifth chance mandatory for deciding the eligibility of N.G.E. candidates, then there was no need for adding the proviso and making fifth chance optional and the respondents would have very well amended the main Rule 11. Had there been any intention of the respondent State to make the fifth chance mandatory for deciding the eligibility of N.G.E. candidates, then there was no need for adding the proviso and making fifth chance optional and the respondents would have very well amended the main Rule 11. But since the main Rule was kept as it is and a proviso was added, it thus clinches the intention that for deciding the eligibility the N.G.E. candidates, fourth chance of the general category is to be taken for consideration, and if a candidate opts for fifth chance in the general category, as was so done by Keshar Singh Shekhawat, he would be treated as a general category candidate and the question of the consideration of his case in the N.G.E. category did not aside at all. But in the case of other appellants, the eligibility of general category, as referred to in condition No.(v) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, has to be combined with reference to the main Rule II because the proviso is always of an exceptional nature and the same cannot be allowed to render nugatory the main rule. That apart, there would be no N.G.E. category quota for 1993 as none of the candidates has availed the fifth chance in general category prior to the filling up of the form in pursuance of the advertisement dated 15.2.1993, as on that date the eligibility of availing the fourth chance in the general category was in existence. 18. One of the N.G.E. candidates i.e. Santosh Kumar Sharma, who has crossed the maximum age limit of 40 years, will be rendered ineligible not only for the N.G.E. category but also for the fifth chance of general category. The appellants and other similarly situated persons who have been selected against the ten posts of N.G.E. quota, would now be placed in the merit list of general category and that would also disturb the entire merit list of the selections made in RAS, RPS and other five allied services at the stage when the process for appointment was going on and the training was going to start from 15.1.1996. The selected candidates of the year 1993 have not applied in pursuance to the advertisement issued and 21.11.1994 for the same posts and, therefore, they have to be deprived from appearance in the examination of 1994 as the process of selection is about to be completed. Many of the selected candidates would be non- selected and many of the selected candidates in the N.G.E. category would now be rejected all together in the general category and further placing of other meritorious candidates of N.G.E. category in the general category would result in the rejection of the candidature of many persons of the general category. The said situation would further result in multiplicity of the proceedings and many of the selected candidates would be now rejected without any notice and opportunity of hearing and their option exercised in different services would be totally disturbed on account of the revision of the merit list. That apart, there was a question of legitimate expectation of the different candidates who opted for the N.G.E. category. Even if it is assumed that the interpretation of the learned Single Judge as regards the said proviso to Rule 4(2)(v) read with Rule 11 is correct, still then such an interpretation ought to have been made prospectively. The learned Single Judge ought not to have made any observation in the absence of N.G.E. candidates for making them ineligible while interpreting the proviso (1) to Rule II of the Rules by condemning them unheard by taking a decision against them to their utter detriment without giving them an opportunity of being heard. 19. In N.T. Bevin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission & Others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1233 , it was observed : "....Where advertisement is issued inviting applications for direct recruitment to a category of posts, and the advertisement expressly states that selection shall be made in accordance with the existing Rules and Government orders, and if it further indicates the extent of reservations in favour of various categories, the selection of candidates in such a case must be made in accordance with the then existing Rules and Government Orders. Candidates who apply, and undergo written or viva-voce test acquire vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Candidates who apply, and undergo written or viva-voce test acquire vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Generally, a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his right crystallises on the date of publication of advertisement, however he has no absolute right in the matter. If the recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in accordance with the amended Rules. Whether the Rules have retrospective effect or not, primarily depends upon the language of the Rules and its construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent is ascertained either by express provision or by necessary implication, if the amended Rules are not retrospective in nature the selection must be regulated in accordance with the Rules and orders which were in force on the date of advertisement. Determination of this question largely depends on the facts of each case having regard to the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement and the relevant Rules and orders...... if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant Rules and the terms contained in the advertisement he does acquire a vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the Rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of Rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended Rules are retrospective in nature. In S.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, (1966) 3 SCR 682 : AIR 1966 SC 1942 , the dispute related to the validity of appointment of Assistant Engineers.... A Constitution Bench of this Court held that since the whole procedure of issuing advertisement, holding interviews and recommending the names having been followed in accordance with the then existing Rules prior to the enforcement of the amended Rules the appointments made on the basis of the recommendation made by the Public Service Commission could to be rendered invalid. In Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, AIR 1983 SC 852 : [1983(1) SLR 789 (SC)] , similar question arose relating to recruitment by promotion. In Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, AIR 1983 SC 852 : [1983(1) SLR 789 (SC)] , similar question arose relating to recruitment by promotion. The question was whether promotion should be made in accordance with the Rules, in force on the date the vacancies occurred or in accordance with the amended Rules. The Court observed as under: "The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules. It is admitted by counsel for both the parties that henceforth promotion to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II will be according to the new rules on the zonal basis and not on the Statewise basis and, therefore, there was no question of challenging the new rules. But the question is of filing the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules." The same view was taken in P. Ganeshwar Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 2068 : [1988(4) SLR 548 (SC)] . Similar view was taken in A.A. Calton v. Director of Education, AIR 1983 SC 1143 : [1983(1) SLR 785 (SC)] . It is a well accepted principle of construction that a statutory rule or Government order is prospective in nature unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Where proceedings are initiated for selection by issuing advertisement, the selection should normally be regulated by the then existing rules and Government orders and any amendment of the rules or the Government order pending the selection made by the selecting authority or the Public Service Commission unless amended rules or the amended Government orders issued in exercise of its statutory power either by express provision or by necessary intendment indicate that amended rules shall be applicable to the pending selections. P. Mahendra v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 405 : [1990(1) SLR 307 (SC)] ." 20. In State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal & Others, JT 1997(3) SC 198 : [ 1997(2) SLR 68 (SC)] , it was held that vacancies prior to amendment of the Rules would be governed by original rules and not the amended rules. 21. P. Mahendra v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 405 : [1990(1) SLR 307 (SC)] ." 20. In State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal & Others, JT 1997(3) SC 198 : [ 1997(2) SLR 68 (SC)] , it was held that vacancies prior to amendment of the Rules would be governed by original rules and not the amended rules. 21. In Ravindranath Pai v. State of Karnataka, 1995(2) SLR 113 , at paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 , almost a similar view was taken. No amendment in Act or Rule in its retrospective sweep could destroy the fundamental or legal rights of incumbents of a common cadre in respect of available services benefits. 22. Taking an overall view of the entire situation, we did not find any merit in the appeal preferred by Keshar Singh Shekhawant, but we allow other appeals by modifying the judgment of the learned Single Judge so as to hold that in view of the selection clause of the amended rules, full benefit is to be given to the other appellants and they could be entitled to the benefit of declaration of the result in their N.G.E. category status and to that effect a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent RPSC is to issue.Orders accordingly. *******