JUDGMENT : 1. The applicants are the heirs and legal representatives of deceased, Chandubhai Chhotabhai Patel, who was the respondent No.1 in Special Civil Application No.123/85. The said Special Civil Application No.123/85 was heard and judgment was delivered in it on 17.8.1993. Respondent No.1, Chandulal Chhotabhai Patel had died on 10.3.1989 at village Kanisa, Taluka Khambhat. Thus, when the aforesaid judgment came to be delivered, disposing of the Special Civil Application No.123 of 1985, the respondent No.1 Chandulal Chotabhai Patel, was already dead. The present Misc. Civil Application is filed for reviewing the said order dated 17th August, 1993 passed in Special Civil Application No.123 of 1985 and quashing it on the ground that the respondent No.1 had already died when the petition was heard and disposed of. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 2. Ms. V.P. Shah, learned Advocate appearing for the applicants, submitted that in view of the legal position as laid down in the case of Jadavji Devshanker v. Jiviben Lavji Rugnath, reported in (1977) 18 G.L.R. page 504, this application deserves to be allowed. In the above case of Jadavji Devshanker (supra), it is held that decree passed in favour of a dead man is a nullity. If it appears that the court could not have passed the decree, the executing court can examine the question. The said decision was taken to its logical conclusion by preferring Letters Patent Appeal and the Division Bench consisting of S. Obul Reddy, C.J. and Mr. Justice D.P. Desai (as they were then) in 18 G.L.R. page.883, upheld the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge holding, inter alia, that when a sole plaintiff or a sole appellant in appeal dies, the appeal abates. Therefore, there is no proceeding in the Court in which the Court is seized of the lis between the parties. In such a case, the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass any order, and if a decree is passed in ignorance of the death of the sole appellant, the decree evidently would be nullity. It has been further held by the Division Bench that there is no principle to distinguish the case of a decree in favour of a dead person from the case of a decree against a dead person. The real principle is whether the Court had inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree in such a case. It has been further held by the Division Bench that there is no principle to distinguish the case of a decree in favour of a dead person from the case of a decree against a dead person. The real principle is whether the Court had inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree in such a case. It lacked inherent jurisdiction because it had no seizing of the case as the sole appellant was dead; and no application for bringing heirs on record was made within the period of limitation. Therefore, in a case where a single or sole appellant died during the pendency of the appeal and the appeal came to be heard and a decree came to be passed in his favour, the said decree is a nullity, inasmuch as the appellate Court was not seized of the case on account of the death of the sole appellant and lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass any decree in such an appeal. In the present case, the situation is converse, namely, the respondent No.1 had died when the matter was heard and decided. It could not have been decided in absence of any party, who was admittedly no more at the time of hearing and decision. 3. Mr. Bukhari invited the attention of this Court to para 4 of the affidavit which reads, inter alia, that the deceased Chandubhai C. Patel resided out of India and first time as per the application, opponent No.1 came to know that he died on 10.3.1989 in the village. By this averment, Mr. Bukhari submitted that the deceased Chandubhai Chotabhai Patel would have died abroad. There is nothing on the record to support such contention, nor it can be said that Chandubhai Chotabhai Patel died out of India, inasmuch as the death certificate produced by the applicants is evidently clear in this regard. 4. Mr. Bukhari relied on the decision in the case of Gangadhar and another v. Shri Raj Kumar, reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court, 1202. In that decision, the provisions of Order 22, R.4 and 10-A (as amended in 1976) were dealt with. 4. Mr. Bukhari relied on the decision in the case of Gangadhar and another v. Shri Raj Kumar, reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court, 1202. In that decision, the provisions of Order 22, R.4 and 10-A (as amended in 1976) were dealt with. In that case, the sole respondent in second appeal before the High Court died on 19.4.1980.One R.K. applied on 1.7.1981 stating that he may be impleaded as an heir and legal representative of the deceased respondent, he being the adopted son of the deceased respondent or in the alternative he is the sole legatee under the last will and testament of the deceased. Immediately, on 15.7.1981 an application was moved by appellants for substitution. It was averred therein that the appellants came to know about the death of the respondent only when the so-called adopted son of the sole respondent moved the application on July 1, 1981 stating that the respondent has died on July 1, 1981. It was, therefore, held that the earliest knowledge about the death of the deceased-respondent can be attributed to the appellants on July 1, 1981 when RK applied for substitution. Promptly within two weeks, the application for substitution was made by the appellants. Therefore, it was satisfactorily established that the appellants were prevented by a sufficient cause in making the application for substitution within the prescribed period of limitation and the delay deserved to be condoned. Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of the party, he shall inform the court about it and the court thereafter shall issue notice to the other party. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no question of abatement, as the respondent No.1 had died. It is an admitted position that the respondent No.1 had died when the matter was heard and decided. As per Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the present application is made as soon as the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 came to know about the fact of death of respondent No.1. 5. Mr. Bukhari then relied on the case of N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court page 116. As per Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the present application is made as soon as the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 came to know about the fact of death of respondent No.1. 5. Mr. Bukhari then relied on the case of N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court page 116. That decision is on the law provided in Order 22, R.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with abatement on death of a party. The said rule 6, inter alia provides that no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncing of the judgment can take place and a judgment may in such cases be pronounced, notwithstanding the death and shall have the same force and effect, as if it had been pronounced before the death took place. In the instant case, there is no question of abatement and the deceased Chandubhai Chhotabhai Patel did not die during the interregnum period of hearing of the appeal and pronouncement of the judgment. He had died long before the arguments were heard. Thus, the decision relied on by Mr. Bukhari is not applicable in the facts of the case. 6. In the above view of the matter, the present Misc. Civil Application is allowed. The judgment and order rendered in Special Civil Application No.123/85 is recalled. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. Application allowed.