N. K. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) - This revision u/secs. 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is filed by the accused-applicants challenging the charges framed against them u/secs. 304-B, 306 and 498- A of the Indian Penal Code by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Mhow, in S. T. No. 580/95. ( 2 ) FOR the purposes of this revision it is not disputed that the deceased Umabai was the second wife of the accused-applicant No. 2 Suresh with whom her marriage was solemnised about 2 years prior to the incident in question and that at the time of this second marriage the accused-applicant had his first wife namely Anusuiyabai alive. Other accused - applicants are the relatives of the accused husband of the deceased woman. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution the accused persons had subjected the deceased Umabai to cruelty and harassment in connection with demand for dowry and that it was on account of this kind of behaviour of the accused persons that Umabai committed suicide by consuming poison. ( 4 ) AT the arguments learned Counsel for the applicants has confined his challenge to the charges only u/secs. 304-B and 498-A, IPC and it was contended that the marriage of the applicant No. 2 Suresh with Umabai was void by reason of its taking place during the life-time of first wife of Suresh and as such she was not the validly married wife of the accused and no charge u/secs. 304-B and 498-A. IPC can therefore, be framed against the accused persons. As against it learned Government Advocate contended that term woman in Sections 304-B and 498-Aofthe Code should be given wider and extended meaning so as to include therein not only a lawfully wedded wife but also a woman married in fact by performance of necessary rites as per personal law. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions it would be useful here to read Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which are, as follows:"304-B. Dowry Death Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns, bodily injury or occurs otherwise that under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for. or in connection with any demand for dowry such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. "section 304-B was inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 while Section 498-A comprising an independent chapter was inserted by Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 Section 304-B was inserted with a view to combating the increasing menace, of dowry deaths while Section 498a reflects anxiety of the Parliament to extend protection to the weaker spouse, A common feature of both these provisions is that in both the cases the offence is committed against a woman be her husband or any relative of her husband. Both the sections thus presuppose marriage of the victim woman with the offender husband. Relatives of the husband would obviously come into existence only after a marriage has taken place. When we talk of a wife or a husband or of a marriage, it always means legally wedded wife or husband and a valid marriage. Surely both these sections have been specially enacted to protect the life and limbs of a married woman and so before any prosecution can be launched under these provisions it must be shown that the victim woman was a legally married woman. Any other victim woman would not fall within the purview of these provisions and a crime if any committed against such other woman may be dealt with under other provisions of law. ( 6 ) HONBLE the Supreme Court in Bhauraos case1 interpreting the expression whoever. . , marries occurring in Section 494, IPC has held: Prima facie, the expression whoever. . , marries in Section 494, Penal Code must mean whoever. . , marries validly or whoever. . , marries and whose marriage is a valid onet. If the marriage is not a valid one, according to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of the person marrying arises. . , marries validly or whoever. . , marries and whose marriage is a valid onet. If the marriage is not a valid one, according to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law. The bare fact of man and woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the society treats them as husband and wife. Interpreting the expression wife used in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. the Apex Court in 'yamunabais case2 held: The expression wife used in Section 1. 25 of the Code should be interpreted to mean only a legally wedded wife. The word wife is not defined in the Code except indicating in the Explanation of Section 125 its inclusive character so as to cover a divorce. A woman cannot be a divorcee unless there was a marriage in the eye of law preceding that status. The expression must, therefore, be given the meaning in which it is understood in law applicable to the parties. The marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is. therefore, not entitled to the benefit of Section 125 of the Code. ( 7 ) GENERALLY speaking a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is strictly construed. Justice G. P. Singh in his Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Sixth Edition 1996) has summed up the content of this rule and its limits in the sense now understood as follows: (1) If the prohibitory words in their known signification cover only some class of persons or some well-defined activity their import cannot be extended to cover other persons or other activity on considerations of policy or object of the statute. (2) If the prohibitory words are reasonably capable of having a wider as also a narrower meaning and if there is no indication in the statute or in its policy or object that the words were used in the wider sense they would be given the narrow meaning. In other words where after full consideration it is found that the prohibitory words are equally open to two constructions one of which covers the subject and the other does not the benefit of construction will be given to the subject. (3) If the prohibitory words in their known signification bear a wider meaning which also fits in with the object or policy of the statute the words will receive that wider meaning and their import will not be restricted even if in some other context they can bear a narrower meaning. (4) If the literal reading of the prohibitory words produces an unintelligible or non-sensual result but the statute read as a whole gives out its meaning clearly effect will be given to that meaning by curing a mere defect in phraseology and even by rejecting words as surplusage. ( 8 ) THE prohibitory words woman. . . of her marriage and by her husband used in Section 304-B and husband of a woman used in Section 498-A. undoubtedly cover only some class of persons that is to say legally wedded woman and her husband and a valid marriage and they also fit in the object and the policy of the two amending statutes (by which these two Sections were inserted) and as such their import cannot be extended so as to include a woman married in fact but whose marriage is void in law. ( 9 ) IN the instant case the victim was the second wife of the applicant accused who at the time of this second marriage already had a wife living. She is still living and has also been examined by the police and cited as a witness. The marriage with the victim was thus void in view of the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955. It was thus no marriage in the eye of law and the applicant - accused cannot be treated as husband of the deceased woman for the purposes of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. ( 10 ) IN the result the charges u/secs. 1955. It was thus no marriage in the eye of law and the applicant - accused cannot be treated as husband of the deceased woman for the purposes of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. ( 10 ) IN the result the charges u/secs. 304-B and 498-A. IPC against the accused-applicant cannot be sustained. I therefore, allow the revision and quash both these charges. The trial shall, however, proceed under Section 306. IPC. The Court below shall be free to frame such other charge as may be made out on the facts and the evidentiary material of the case. Revision allowed. .