Judgment :- 1. The defendant is the appellant. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance. The plaintiffs case is as follows:— The suit property is in enjoyment of the defendant. The defendant agreed to sell the suit property at the rate of Rs. 8 per culie and entered into an agreement of sale on 12.8.1981. The defendant also received a sum of Rs. 500. The total price of the suit property is Rs. 3,112/- at the rate of Rs. 8 per culie. According to the terms of the agreement the defendant shall receive the balance within a month and execute a sale deed. The plaintiff purchased the necessary stamp papers and requested the defendant to execute the sale deed. As the defendant was delaying, the plaintiff issued a notice on 8.9.1981 calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed. The defendant refused to receive the notice. Then the plaintiff issued a telegram to the defendant calling upon the defendant to come to the Sub Registrars Office to execute the sale deed. But despite the same the defendant did not choose to come forward to execute the sale deed. Hence the suit. 2. The defendant contended as follows:— The defendant never entered into an agreement of sale. The property belonged to the defendants father-in-law Lakshmanan. He died leaving behind his sons Dakshinamurthy and two other sons. This property was allotted to the share of Dakshinamurthy. The defendant is managing the said land after the death of her husband. She has three sons and two daughters. She is not the absolute owner of the property. The defendant was asked to give the land to the plaintiff for the purpose of excavating the earth to put up brickiln. The period was fixed as one year and the plaintiff has to pay Rs. 100 per lakh of bricks. The defendant agreed and the signature of the defendant was obtained in a document. The defendant does not know to read and write. She believed the words of Chockalingam. She received Rs. 500/-. It was stated that the amount shall be settled as and when the bricks are taken from brickiln. The defendant has not received any notice or telegram. In 1981 in the month of September she was at the Hospital attending his son Karunanithi. She believed the words of Chockalingam. She received Rs. 500/-. It was stated that the amount shall be settled as and when the bricks are taken from brickiln. The defendant has not received any notice or telegram. In 1981 in the month of September she was at the Hospital attending his son Karunanithi. It was only after the suit summons she came to know that the plaintiff has brought about the said document with ulterior motive. The document is vitiated. 3. The learned District Munsif, Mayuram dismissed the suit with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Sub Court, Mayuram and the learned Sub Judge, by his judgment dated 28.6.1983 allowed the appeal. Hence the second appeal by the defendant. The only point for consideration is: Whether the agreement of sale dated 12.8.1981 is true and valid? If so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance? 4. The Point:— The defendant has taken a definite stand in the written statement that it is her ancestral property obtained by her husband in partition and that her husband died leaving behind three sons and two daughters. In the plaint it is not stated that the property belongs solely to the defendant. It is simply stated that the property was enjoyed by the defendant. When the plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1 she has not chosen to say that the property belonged absolutely to the defendant. Therefore when the defendant has taken the stand that the property is an ancestral property and that it has been obtained by her husband in a partition and that her husband has died leaving behind three sons and two daughters and the defendant is a heir, the suit by the plaintiff for specific performance against the defendant alone cannot be maintained. It is not the plaintiffs case that the defendant executed the agreement as the Manager of the Hindu family. She being a female cannot be the manager of any co-parcenery nor of any joint family. Therefore it cannot be stated that the agreement was executed by her as the Manager. It is also not by her as a guardian of any minor children. It is executed by hen as though the property belonged to her absolutely and in her individual capacity. Therefore it cannot be stated that the agreement was executed by her as the Manager. It is also not by her as a guardian of any minor children. It is executed by hen as though the property belonged to her absolutely and in her individual capacity. Therefore, if at all, the defendant is entitled to only a share in the property, and the share to which the defendant is entitled to is not a major share. For, according to the defendant there are three sons and two daughters. Therefore, at best she is entitled to only 1/6th share in the property. The plaintiff has not chosen to implead the children of the defendant. Nor the plaintiff has chosen to amend the plaint suitably in the context of the averment made in the written statement. Therefore, as the defendant has only a fraction of the share in the property the specific performance of the agreement cannot be compelled. The other heirs have not been made parties either to the suit or to the agreement. Therefore, on this ground the suit must fail. The numerous inconsistencies in the evidence of plaintiff and his witnesses have not at all been properly appreciated by the lower Appellate Court. They are simply brushed aside when there are no reasons for doing so. Admittedly, the defendant is an illiterate lady. The plaintiff and his witnesses categorically stated that the entire transaction took place in the house belonging to Duraikannan who mediated and brought about the agreement. The said Duraikannan has not been examined at all. There is no reason for the non examination of the said Duraikannan. The plaintiff is a resident of Myladuthurai town. The defendant is residing in a village situate within Myladuthurai Taluk. The suit agreement is engrossed on two stamp papers one for the value of Rs. 2 and the other for the value of Rs. 50 paise. The stamps have been purchased from a stamp vendor by name Ranganathan of Sirkali. The property is situate in Myladuthurai. The plaintiff is a resident of Myladuthurai taluk. The defendant is a resident of Myladuthurai taluk. When so, there is absolutely no reason as to why stamp papers should be purchased from the stamp vendor at Sirkali. 50 paise. The stamps have been purchased from a stamp vendor by name Ranganathan of Sirkali. The property is situate in Myladuthurai. The plaintiff is a resident of Myladuthurai taluk. The defendant is a resident of Myladuthurai taluk. When so, there is absolutely no reason as to why stamp papers should be purchased from the stamp vendor at Sirkali. On the other hand from the evidence of one of the witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiff it is clear that there is a stamp vendor at Pattamangalam St., Myladuthurai. According to the witnesses the transaction was entered into at the house of Duraikannan a resident of Pattamangalam St., Myladuthurai. Therefore when it is so, it is rather strange that parties should go all the way to another place to buy the stamp papers. 5. The plaintiff has examined three witnesses. According to the plaintiff the agreement was written in the house of Duraikannan of Pattemangalam St., Myladuthurai. There is absolutely no reason why the said Duraikannan has not participated in the transaction as an attestor. Moreover it is not stated in the agreement that it was written at Pattamanagalam St., Myladuthurai. According to P.W-1 at the time when the negotiation went on, Duraikannan, Chokkalingam, Palani, Swaminathan were present. But there is nothing to show that Chockkalingam was present. Because he has not chosen to attest the agreement. 6. The second page of the agreement shows (at the bottom) under the heading ‘witnesses’ 1 and 2 (1) Chockkalingam and (2) written and witnessed by G. Swaminathan. But in between the signature of Chockalingam and Swaminathan the name of Co. Palaniswamy S/o. Govindasamy has been interpolated. Under the heading witnesses as against the numeral 1, T. Chockalingam has signed and attested. As against numeral 2. G. Swaminathan has witnessed and attested. But in between the two signatures in a cramped manner the name of Palanisamy has been written and introduced as an attestor to the agreement. This interpolation is so glaring that it is obvious that this must have been written subsequent to the so called execution of the agreement. 7. According to P.W-1 a copy of the agreement was taken on the same day and the said copy was written by the same scribe Swaminathan and the copy was written on a white paper and he signed the same and handed over the same to the defendant. 7. According to P.W-1 a copy of the agreement was taken on the same day and the said copy was written by the same scribe Swaminathan and the copy was written on a white paper and he signed the same and handed over the same to the defendant. As I pointed out already the attestor and scribe Swaminathan has not been examined and no reason is stated for the same. It is not stated m the plaint that on the same day a copy of the agreement was also written and it was signed by the plaintiff and handed over to the defendant. The first attestor Chockalingam has been examined as P.W-3. P.W-1 has stated in the course of cross examination that the stamp papers were purchased by him on the same day from a vendor at Pattamangalam St. According to P.W-4, the so called attestor, no copy was taken except A-1 agreement. P.W-3 does not mention about the presence of Duraikannan at the place. Thus we find considerable discrepancies in the evidence of P.Ws-1 to 4. If really the document is a true one, there could not have been so much discrepancy in the testimony of these witnesses. The defendants case is that one Chockalingam obtained her thumb impression on a request to allow the land for brickiln in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant agreed and for that purpose Chockaligam obtained her thumb impression in blank paper. This is greatly probablised from the circumstance to which I have pointed out. If really the document was executed on 12.8.1981 in the circumstances spoken to by the plaintiff there was absolutely no reason for the parties to indicate the place by putting a cross mark where the defendant has to sign. At page 1 of Ex. A-1 we find there is a cross mark by the side of the signature of the defendant. The question of place of signing would only arise if the person is not there or if the document is signed in blank paper. This aspect would again indicate the truth in the defendants case. There is yet another important circumstance which while probbablis in the defendants case, demolishes the plaintiffs caes. The document does not contain the particulars of property agreed to be sold. This aspect would again indicate the truth in the defendants case. There is yet another important circumstance which while probbablis in the defendants case, demolishes the plaintiffs caes. The document does not contain the particulars of property agreed to be sold. There is no mention about the survey number of the property, the extent of the property or the boundaries of the property. The price for which the property was agreed to be sold was also not indicated except to state that the defendant agrees to sell the property at the rate of Rs. 8/- per culie. The plaintiff does not say that the defendant was in possession of a definite extent of property and thus she agreed to convey the same. The document does not say the extent to be sold is to be determined. Therefore this is yet another indication that all is not well with the defendants case. Thus the agreement is vague. It does not set out the particulars of property viz. , the place where the property is situate. The extent the survey number of the property and the boundaries of the property. Thus this agreement vague in character cannot be enforced specifically. It is not stated as to when and where the property was measured. It is simply stated in pargraph 5 that it was measured and the extent was determined as 389 kulies. When the document does not give any particulars of property it is not known how the plaintiff is able to give a schedule of property in the plaint. The agreement does not even say that the property, is situate in the village of Mathakudi. Therefore in such circumstances the trial court rightly dismissed the suit. If really after negotiation for the agreement was settled there is no reason as to why the extent of property agreed to be sold could not be incorporated in the agreement. At least they could have incorporated the other details such as the village in which the property is situate, the survey number and the boundaries of the property so agreed to be sold. 8. The learned Sub Judge, Myladuthurai has chosen to reverse the judgment of the trial court without properly analysing the case. One reason given by the learned Sub Judge is that for the notice issued by the plaintiff the defendant has not sent sny reply. But she has refused the notice. 8. The learned Sub Judge, Myladuthurai has chosen to reverse the judgment of the trial court without properly analysing the case. One reason given by the learned Sub Judge is that for the notice issued by the plaintiff the defendant has not sent sny reply. But she has refused the notice. The defendant is admittedly an illeterate lady. The agreement states that within a month from the date of the agreement, the second party shall execute the sale deed. The agreement is dated 12.8.1981. Even before the period of expiry on 8.9.1981 the notice is said to have been issued. Therefore on the date when the notice was issued, the period for performance agreed has not expired. Further according to the defendant her relation was admitted in Hospital and therefore she was not aware of the notice. Ofcourse she has produced the chit given in the Hospital which is marked as Ex. B-1. It shows that the patient was discharged on 8.9.1981. This only probablises the defendants version. It is not her case that immediately after the discharge she went back to the village. Therefore, in such circumstances, I am of the opinion that a suitable explanation has been given by the defendant. For we find that on 10.9.1981 the endorsement is “gone to Mayuram” and the other endorsement is ‘gone to Pagasalai’ and final endrosement is dated 19.9.1981 as ‘refused’. Therefore the observation of the learned counsel that he attempted to serve the envelope on 10.9.1981 after return of the defendant is not correct. On the other hand the en dorsement to the effect that she had gone to Mayuram would only probablise the fact that she had some relation admitted in the Hospital and she was attending the person. It may be that the patient was discharged from Hospital on 8.9.1981. That only would mean that the treatment in the Hospital as an inpatient would come to an end on 8.9.1981. It does not follow that there was a further necessity for the patient to make further visit to Hospital for subsequent medication and treatment. Therefore the case of the defendant that she was not aware of the notice as she was attending her ailing son is thus probablised by the very endorsements made in Ex. A-3. 9. We have the further fact that she is an illiterate lady. Therefore the case of the defendant that she was not aware of the notice as she was attending her ailing son is thus probablised by the very endorsements made in Ex. A-3. 9. We have the further fact that she is an illiterate lady. Therefore there is nothing strange in the stand taken by her. Ex. A-4 is the telegram alleged to have been sent by the plaintiff to the defendant, the receipt of which is disputed by the defendant. The plaintiff could have applied to the Postal authorities and obtained the certificate to the effect that the telegram was sent to the addressee. But that has not been done. There is nothing to show to whom the telegram was addressed and what is the content of the telegram. Therefore in such circumstances Ex. A-4 cannot be accepted as proving the case of the plaintiff in any manner. It is not known on what basis the lower Appellate Court has chosen to hold that the telegram was sent to her address as given in receipt A-3. The receipt of the telegram is not admitted. The telegram does not bear the address. Therefore it is not established that any such telegram was actually sent to the defendant and it was received by her. The plaintiff had an opportunity to prove the same by taking steps to address the authorities concerned to find out that the telegram was addressed and that such a telegram was addressed to such a person and it was received. 10. The lower appellate court has also chosen to hold that she has admitted the signing of the document and that therefore she cannot plead that she does not know the contents cannot be accepted. In paragraph 12 of his judgment the Sub Judge has carefully scrutinised the evidence of P.W-1 and held that his evidence would show that the defenaidant has voluntarily come to the house of one Durikannan at Mahadhana Street at Mayiladuthrai and executed Ex. A-1. When so many descrepancies have been pointed out by the trial Court reason given by the Appellate Court to hold that the evidence of P.W-1 is satisfactory and trustworthy is really amusing. The appellate court has also stated that the name of P.W-4 in Ex. A-1 has been inserted later on in between the signature of the scribe and the signature of P.W-3. The appellate court has also stated that the name of P.W-4 in Ex. A-1 has been inserted later on in between the signature of the scribe and the signature of P.W-3. Further it is stated that the suggestion of the defendants counsel appears to be probable and therefore he is not inclined to accept the evidence of P.W-1 since he could have been introduced later in this transaction. When the trial Court has stated so much then the lower Appellate Court ought to have rejected the entire document. When it has accepted the case of the defendant that the signature of P.W-4 cannot be accepted then the very document in which such interpolation has been made cannot be significantly accepted as such. The very fact that the signature of witness has been subsequently introduced in the document would vitiate the document and would go to show that the document is a fraudulent one. The relief being an equitable relief plaintiffs suit must be thrown on this very ground. The lower Court has chosen to accept the evidence of P.W-2 as trustworthy. P.W-2 has not participated in the transaction by attesting the same. Therefore his evidence is not entitled to any acceptance more so when we find discrepancies in his evidence. The case of the defendant is that she is not the absolute owner of the property and the property is ancestral property. But P.W-2 would say that the property has been taken on lease by the defendants husband. An analysis of the evidence of P.W-2 would show that his evidence is unworthy of acceptance. The appreciation by the lower appellate court is thus faulted. When it is accepted by the lower Court that P.W-4 has been introduced into the transaction subsequent to the execution it follows that Ex. A-1 cannot be the genuine document. If really it is true transaction there could not have been any necessity at all for the parties to subsequently commit interpolation by introducing the signature of P.W-4 in the document. This very act would suggest that this document cannot be true document at all. Therefore I am satisfied that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court cannot be accepted or appreciated. On the other hand we find that the circumstances of the case would point out that the agreement cannot be a true one. This very act would suggest that this document cannot be true document at all. Therefore I am satisfied that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court cannot be accepted or appreciated. On the other hand we find that the circumstances of the case would point out that the agreement cannot be a true one. Even otherwise specific performance of such an agreement which is very vague cannot be effected. Moreover admittedly the property belongs to several persons and the defendant holds only a fractional share. Therefore such an agreement cannot also be enforced. Hence in such circumstances, I hold that the agreement is not true and that it is not valid and that the plaintiff is not entitled to seek specific performance of such an agreement of sale. 11. In the result this appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court is set aside. The suit shall stand dismissed with costs.