JUDGMENT : R.L. Khurana, J.- The petitioner has directed the present revision petition, under section 24(b) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, against the judgment dated 26.11.1991 of the learned Appellate Authority (II), Nahan, Camp at Solan, reversing the order dated 18.11.1990 of the learned Rent Controller, Kandaghat. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are these. The petitioner is the landlord owner of the property, detailed, in the petition and hereinafter referred to as the demised premises, situated at Saproon, Tehsil Solan The demised premises were let out by him to the respondent for being used as an office on an annual rental of Rs. 111/- excluding electricity charges, on 10.7.1978. 3. The petitioner filed a petition under section 14 of the HP. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, for the ejectment of the respondent from the demised premises on the following grounds:- (a) Change of user; and (b) Bonafide requirement for own use and occupation. 4. The respondent resisted the petition. Change in the user of the demised on his part and bonafide requirement of the petitioner was denied. 5. The learned Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition and passed an order on 18.4.1990 for the eviction of the respondent on the ground of change of user. The other ground put forth by the petitioner that the demised premises are bonafide required by him for his own and occupation did not find favour with the learned Rent Controller. 6. The respondent went up in appeal against the order dated 18.4.1990 before the learned Appellate Authority. Vide the impugned order, dated 26.11.1991, the learned Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller against the respondent. The learned Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the demised premises did not form part of the urban area of Solan, within the meaning of Section 2(K) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act 1987. The Rent Act was, therefore, not applicable and the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. 7. The petitioner be way of the present petition has assailed the finings of the learned Appellate Authority. 8. There is no denying that the demised premises are situated in Khasra No. 294 of Saproon area. The Rent Act was, therefore, not applicable and the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. 7. The petitioner be way of the present petition has assailed the finings of the learned Appellate Authority. 8. There is no denying that the demised premises are situated in Khasra No. 294 of Saproon area. The Governor of Himachal Pradesh on 15.7.1988, in exercise of the powers vested in him under section 6(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1968, as then in force, had, vide notification No. LSG (7) 23/71-11, excluded certain areas of Saproon from the Municipal limits of Solan. The area so excluded also included khasra No. 294, that is, the demised premises. Upon such exclusion, the area so excluded ceased to be urban area within the meaning of section 2(K) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 consequently, the provisions of the said Act ceased to apply to such area. 9. The eviction petition was filed by the petitioner before the Rent Controller on 12.8.1987, that is, during the period when the demised premises fell within the urban area of Solan. It was excluded from such urban area only with effect from 15.7.1988, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that since the demised premises formed part of the urban area of Solan and the provisions of Rent Act were applicable as on the date of the institution of the eviction petition, the law applicable on the date of the institution of the eviction petition alone would govern the case and the mere feet that the demised premises came to be excluded from the urban area of Solan, during the pendency of the case, the Rent Controller would not cease to have jurisdiction. In support of her contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the apex court in Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge and others (1992) 1 SCC 751). 11. In the case before the apex Court, a Civil suit was filed by the landlord in the year 1977 for the ejectment of the tenant after the tenancy was terminated by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. In the case before the apex Court, a Civil suit was filed by the landlord in the year 1977 for the ejectment of the tenant after the tenancy was terminated by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was averred that the tenanted premises were constructed in the year 1968 and that the provisions of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, did not apply to it, inasmuch as the Act, in its application, exempted the buildings for a period of 10 years from the date on which their construction was completed. It was argued by the tenant before the apex court that since the period of ten years expired during the pendency of the suit the Rent Act became applicable and the suit was liable to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions thereof. Repelling the contention, the apex court held that law applicable on the date of the institution of the suit alone would govern the suit and the mere fact that the Statutory period of ten years expires during the pendency of the suit/appeal/revision, the Rent Act would not become applicable. 12. The facts of the present case are different from the facts of the case before the apex court. In the present case, consequent upon the exclusion of the demised premises from the urban area of Solan, the Rent Act had ceased to apply. Therefore, the Rent Controller was divested of the jurisdiction in respect of the demised premises. He could not have exercised the jurisdiction under the law, which due to the change brought by exclusion of the area from Municipal area of Solan, had become inapplicable. Therefore, the order passed by him on 18.4.1990 directing eviction of the respondent was without jurisdiction. The same has been rightly set aside in appeal by the learned Appellate Authority. 13. Resultantly, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. -