JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---The only question argued before me on behalf of the petitioner is whether the application filed by the respondents was maintainable under section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The question arises under the following facts : 2. Deceased respondent No. 2- Yeshwada w/o Nevratti Mali was the landlady widow on 1-4-1957 in respect of land comprising R.S. No. 347/2 now Block No. 1290 admeasuring O.H. - 19 acres, assessed at Rs. 0-15, situated at village Lengore, Tahsil Khanapur, District Sangli. The said land was held by the tenant one Pandurang Govind Mali respondent No. 1. Since the landlady was widow on the tiller's day, proceedings started under section 32-G were dropped till the postponed expiry period as laid down in section 32-F of the Tenancy Act. During this period in 1967 the landlady (widow) sold this land to the petitioner and who started obstructing the enjoyment of the land by the tenant. The tenant then applied under section 70(b) for a declaration that he is a tenant of the suit premises. The matter went up to High Court and it has been finally established that he has been a tenant of the suit land. There was also a recording in the Register of 7/12 extract that he was in possession during the years 1952-53 upto the year 1958-59 as a tenant. Thereafter, the cultivation has been shown in the name of the landlady from the year 1959-60 onwards, meaning thereby the tenants was dispossessed. Admittedly, the 1st respondent was the tenant 1-4-1957. Since he was dispossessed by the transferee of the landlady, the filed proceedings under section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, hereinafter cited the Tenancy Act before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Walwa Division, Sangli and by his order dated 28-1-1982, the land was ordered to be restored to the 1st respondent. Against this order, the petitioner filed Review before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur bearing No. M.R.T. S.S. 37/82. The Revenue Authority by its order dated 17-6-1983 dismissed the revision application of the petitioner. He approached this Court by way of this writ petition challenging these orders. 3. Against this order, the petitioner filed Review before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur bearing No. M.R.T. S.S. 37/82. The Revenue Authority by its order dated 17-6-1983 dismissed the revision application of the petitioner. He approached this Court by way of this writ petition challenging these orders. 3. As pointed out by me in the earlier part of the judgment, the only point regarding maintainability of the petition filed under section 84 of the Tenancy Act was argued before me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. S.G. Karandikar. He submits that the application filed by the respondent No. 1 was not maintainable under section 84 of the Act, though such an application would have been maintainable under section 29 of the Act. In support of this contention, he cited various decisions of this Court and Supreme Court. In order to understand the argument of the Counsel for the petitioner, we have to refer to sections 29 and 84. It is contended that since the 1st respondent had to establish the right, under the provisions of the Tenancy Act the proper course open to him was to apply under section 29 and therefore application under section 84 is not maintainable. The authorities below should have rejected, the application for having no jurisdiction to entertain the same. 4. In support of his contention the learned Counsel strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court which is reported in (Vallabbhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi and others)1, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1190 wherein the Supreme Court was examining this question within the ambit under sections 84 and 29 and observed that : "If the tenant did not seek to enforce a right arising under any provisions of the Act but claimed possession on his own title as a tenant, section 29(1) would not apply and his remedy would be under section 84 only. The High Court held that when a tenant claimed possession not relying upon any incident of his contract of tenancy nor on any provisions of the Act but on his own title to possession, that is, to protect his possession as a tenant against a trespasser section 84 and not section 29(1) would apply even though the land the possession of which he claimed was the land of which he was a tenant and the trespasser was his landlord. What the tenant in such a case was seeking to do was not to enforce his right as a tenant under the provisions of the Act but he was enforcing his right against third parties, namely, the petitioners in that case who were in wrongful occupation. The tenant was claiming possession not under the provisions of the Act but on his own title, albeit as a tenant, against a person who had no title to ownership or possession in the land and therefore section 29(1) did not apply to such a case. Consequently, section 29(1) was not another provision providing for eviction which opponents 1 and 2 could avail of." 5. I am of the view that this decision does not support the contention of the petitioner. On the other hand it fortifies the contention of the respondent. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the above decision of the Supreme Court has held that section 29 and section 84 of the Tenancy Act are not providing alternative sections. If the under section 29, an application at the instance of the tenant is maintainable, then it will not be maintainable under section 84. In other words, if the tenant claims possession under the provisions of the Act and not in strength of his own title no petition is maintainable under section 84. He also cited the decision reported in (Ramswaroop Gawrishankar Gupta v. Motilal Biranchilal Gupta)2, 1983 Mah.L.J. 65 and also the Full Bench of this Court reported in (1970 Mah.L.J. 462)3. I do not think that those decisions are of any help to the petitioner. I am of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case an application under section 84 will alone be maintainable at the instance of the tenant. Admittedly, the petitioner before me is not a landlord. In fact he is a transferee of the landlord. If the transfer in favour of the petitioner made by the respondent No. 2 deceased YESWADA is illegal, then the petitioner can be treated as stranger and respondent tenant can contest the petition by virtue of his own right. Then an application for recovery of possession under section 84 of the Act is very much maintainable in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. Admittedly on the tiller's day i.e. 1-4-1957 the transferor of the petitioner was a widow. Then an application for recovery of possession under section 84 of the Act is very much maintainable in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. Admittedly on the tiller's day i.e. 1-4-1957 the transferor of the petitioner was a widow. Under the provisions of section 32-F, if legislature wants to maintain this status quo as far as this land is concerned, till the widow expired. Even provision of section 32-G which gives the tenant an unalienable right over the property to purchase the land and tenant would be considered as a deemed purchaser of that land cannot be invoked and the same stood postponed. The legislature has imposed such condition obviously with an avowed object by maintaining the status quo as regards the tenanted land, whose landlord is minor or unsound person and/ or and widow. Evidently, such a provision is made for helping such a disabled persons, such as widow, minor, unsound person as landlord. Such a situation cannot be made use of for taking away the vested right of a tenant. Even if transaction entered into by such a person who was legally disabled, it must be deemed to have no legal effect. 6. In this view of the matter, transferor, in this case, being the petitioner, being transferee of the widow will not derive title of the property and he can be treated only as stranger. In that circumstance, tenant-respondent can very well maintain an application under section 84. The tenant respondent, on the other hand, in these circumstances, can not be said to invoking his rights to take possession of the land provided under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. In fact, he was exercising his own right qua stranger. Landlord's transferee was not right in submitting that remedy of the tenant would be under section 29. 7. On another aspect also, the petition is to be rejected. I do not think that any sufficient ground is made out to interfere in exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because at this belated stage, it is not proper to direct the parties to take up another round of litigation by remitting the matter back to the authorities to decide under section 29 of the Act, if at all the contention of the petitioner is acceptable. As stated earlier, before me, only argument advanced by the petitioner is with regard to the forum. In fact, the tenants' actual rights have not been argued before me. Therefore, I find it not appropriate to interfere in the matter at this juncture. In the result, writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.