Honble JAIN, J. – This writ petition is pending since 1991 for admission. As agreed, the case has been heard finally. (2). It is alleged by the petitioners that 13 workmen were appointed by the respondent-Oriental Bank of Commerce in different years from January, 1981 to 1986 and they worked for 74 to 81 days, as mentioned in para 5 of the writ petition. Their services were terminated without any notice or notice may violating the provisions of Sec. 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter to be referred to as `the Act) and para 522 (4) of Shastri Award. It was alleged that respondents appointed junior persons in their place. On submitting the failure report by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Jaipur, the Central Government raised an indust- rial dispute. The Central Industrial Tribunal passed an award on 21.11.1990 holding their termination legal but each workman was awarded 14 days pay for non-giving 14 days notice to them. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners; 12 workmen through Union and one workman-petitioner No. 2 approached this Court by filing this writ petition praying that the impugned award dated 21.11.1990 (Ex. 4) be quashed and set aside and the workmen be reinstated in service with back wages. (3). Reply has been filed. It is stated that the petitioners were temporarily appointed for fixed term and they cannot raise dispute at belated stage. (4). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the material on record. (5). The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that though the workmen were appointed temporarily but they performed the work for permanent nature for 80 days and, after their termination, their juniors have been appointed and the services have been terminated without giving any notice and, as such, the respondents have violated the provisions of Secs. 25G & 25H of the Act and para 522 (4) of the Shastri Award. It has been contended that the Tribunal has erred in holding that provisions of Secs. 25G and 25H of the Act are applicable to those workmen who have put 240 days of service, and wrongly deprived petitioners of the benefit. (6). The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the workmen were appointed temporarily to meet out the exigencies of work and business. A temporary workman can be engaged upto 90 days as per Cl. (6). The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the workmen were appointed temporarily to meet out the exigencies of work and business. A temporary workman can be engaged upto 90 days as per Cl. 20.7 & 20.8 of First Bipartite Settlement in leave vacancies. The dispute was raised at a very belated stage. The provisions of Shastri Award are only directory in nature and cannot be given the status of a statutory right. The workmen were employed for less than 90 days and as such provisions of Secs. 25 G & 25H of the Act are not applicable, and not entitled for re- employment. (7). So far as industrial cases are concerned, there is special law over-riding the general law and, as such, provisions of special law is applicable. Now the question remains as to whether the provisions of re-employment and the retren- ched employee in Sec. 25H is confined to category of workmen covered by Sec. 25F i.e. persons who have completed 240 days or it also applies and can be claimed by a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year. The proposition is also not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents. Rule 77 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 requires the employer to maintain a seniority list of workmen in that particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service. R. 78 thereof speaks of retrench workmen eligible to be considered for filling the vacancies. (8). Keeping in view the settled proposition of law, it is clear that the petitioners who have been retrenched, but worked for longer period, are entitled for consi- deration first for re- employment against the persons who are having lesser period of service. But, nevertheless it debars the consideration of re- employment of workmen who have worked for lesser period. Thus the provisions of Sec. 25H of the Act will be applicable for both the categories of workmen and a separate list of each category is to be prepared irrespective of 240 days. Therefore, the interpreta- tion of the Court below given in the impugned award dated 21.11.1990 that the petitioners have not worked for 240 days and as such they are not entitled to get the benefit of Sec. 25H of the Act is not in accordance with law, to this extent. (9). Therefore, the interpreta- tion of the Court below given in the impugned award dated 21.11.1990 that the petitioners have not worked for 240 days and as such they are not entitled to get the benefit of Sec. 25H of the Act is not in accordance with law, to this extent. (9). Now, the question remains as to what extent the petitioners are entitled to get the relief? (10). The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the petitioners were not appointed by the Board, which is a condition precedent. It is submitted that due to insertion of sub-sec. (bb) in Cl. (oo) of Sec. 2 of the Act, the respondents are not required to follow the procedure laid down in Secs. 25F & G of the Act while terminating the services as the appointment was for fixed term. Thus the petitioners are not entitled to get any relief. A reference was made to decision of this Court reported as RLW 1995 (2) 603 (1) and RLW 1995 (1) Page 518 (2). He further argued that assuming, but not admitting that provisions of Sec. 25H of the Act is applicable, even then the petitioners are not entitled to get any benefit for want of specific pleading alleging that some persons who had worked for less period than the petitioners, were given benefit of re-employment and also that such persons were not made party to these proceedings. Further, the claim was filed at a belated stage i.e. the services were terminated during the years 1981 to 1985, while the claim was filed in 1988, which is apparent without any investigation but the Court below failed to decide the same. (11). On the other hand, Shri B.L. Samdaria has submitted that he has filed affidavits alleging that juniors to the petitioners were re-employed and that delay cannot be fatal at this stage as the claim has been adjudicated and the learned Court below has rejected the claim only by applying wrong principle without spe- cific finding in this regard, and now be considered for re- employment. (12). I have given my utmost consideration to the rival submission raised by the learned counsel for the parties. Undoubtedly, it has to be specifically pleaded and proved by the workman that a junior person who has worked for lesser period than him has been re-employed without assigning any reason. (12). I have given my utmost consideration to the rival submission raised by the learned counsel for the parties. Undoubtedly, it has to be specifically pleaded and proved by the workman that a junior person who has worked for lesser period than him has been re-employed without assigning any reason. Chapter V-A deals with all retrenchments while Sec. 25F is confined only to the mode of retrenchment of workmen in continuous service for not less than one year. Section 25G of the Act prescribes the principle for retrenchment and applies ordinarily the principles of `last come, first go which is not confined only to workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year, covered by Sec. 25F of the Act. The rule `last come, first go as envisaged in Sec. 25G of the Act is not an inflexible rule. To my mind, the management has a discretion to depart from the rule provided it acts bona fide and there are valid and justifiable reasons for such departure. Once valid and justifiable reasons are made out, it cannot be said that provisions of Sec. 25G of the Act has been violated. However, the burden is on the department and, as such, pleadings are necessary to discharge the burden. A reference can be made to the Division Bench decision of this Court, reported as WLR 1991 (S) Raj. 373 (3). In the instant case, it has only been pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioners that juniors to the petitioners were re-employed, but he has not been able to point out specifically that juniors to the petitioners in service was kept or re- employed. This Court will not enter into disputed question of fact at this stage, but since the record was called and, as alleged, the affidavits are on record, but, as insisted upon the remand of the case will further delay the issue, and in my view will not serve the purpose in absence of any specific pleading in this regard the petitioners cannot take advantage of applicability of Sec. 25H of the Act in their case. That apart, the petitioners have not impleaded such persons, having lesser period of service than the petitioners, as party to these proceedings. That apart, the petitioners have not impleaded such persons, having lesser period of service than the petitioners, as party to these proceedings. So, the directions, as prayed for by the petitioners, cannot be granted as, any direction, if granted, may result in the displacement of those who have not been made party. (13). Moreso, a perusal of the pleadings in para 5 of the writ petition shows that the petitioners had worked for 74 to 81 days during the years 1981 to 1985. One Hetram Vyas worked for 80 days from January, 1981 to May, 1981, Ashok Kumar Tiwari worked for 74 days from August, 1981 to March, 1982 and Nandlal Purohit worked for 81 days from June, 1985 to October, 1985. The claim was filed after delay of about 3 to 6 years and, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled for any relief despite the fact that the point was not dealt with specifically in the impugned award, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in case) Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyanarayan (4). In any view of the matter, it cannot be lost sight that Sec. 2 (oo) has been inserted in the Act and the petitioners have worked only for fixed term and, therefore, the respondents were not required to follow the procedure laid down in Sec. 25H and 25G of the Act and thus the petitioners are not entitled for any benefit of Sec. 25H of the Act. (14). No other point has been pressed before me. (15). Under the circumstances, even though the interpretation is not correct to the extent mentioned above, in view of what I have discussed above, the petitioners are not entitled for any relief as prayed for. No case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed with no orders as to costs.