Judgment :- 1. The above Second Appeal has been filed by the defendant in O.S. No. 135 of 1977 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, Coimbatore dated 15.4.1982 in A.S. No. 10 of 1981, whereunder the learned judge has chosen to partly allow the appeal, thereby granting relief only in respect of the quantum of damages by reducing the damages awarded by the learned trial judge at Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 3,000/-with proportinate costs and in other respects confirming the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge dated 19.7.1980 in O.S. No. 135 of 1977. 2. The case of the plaintiff-respondent is that the plaintiff and the defendant are brothers and are also the common owners of a tannery property situated at Kurichi village of Coimbatore, comprising of land, buildings, machinery and other movable allotted to them in the family partition deed dated 31.1.1964. Both parties had equal rights and the properties have not been divided between them. While matter stood thus, it appears misunderstandings arose between parties as early as in 1970. Thereafter in the first week of April 1975, the defendant instituted a suit O.S. 238 of 1975, on the file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore for partition and the suit was said to be pending at that time. The defendant also appears to have instituted a criminal complaint against the plaintiff under Section 380, I.P.C. in C.C. 1922 of 1975 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate No. III of Coimbatore on the allegation that the plaintiff had committed theft of certain articles belonging to the said tannery. The defendant also appears to have obtained orders from the Court on 3.4.1975 for search of the residential house of the plaintiff and arrived at the residential house of the plaintiff in the evening of 4.4.1975 with Police party and initiated a search, which went on for more than two hours. A huge crowd was alleged to have been collected by the defendant at the entrance of the house and some articles were removed after the search from the residential house of the plaintiff. A huge crowd was alleged to have been collected by the defendant at the entrance of the house and some articles were removed after the search from the residential house of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was obliged, it was said, to attend the several hearings in Court as an accused, charged with an offence of theft, that the case was subsequently transferred to Judicial Second Class Magistrate No. III and the said complaint was absolutely baseless, reckless, hasty and bereft of any reasonable or probable cause and merely actuated by malice, spits and ill-will against the plaintiff. Articles were said to have been removed by the plaintiff in the broad day light from the tannery only for the better protection of the articles and even without proper verification of the facts how and why the articles were removed, the complaint appeared to have been laid and the articles seized under an order of search. The plaintiff also filed Crl.M.P. No. 1795 of 1975 on the file of this Court to quash the complaint preferred by the defendant and the same was allowed and the complaint was quashed by order of this Court dated 12.2.1976. In such circumstances, by making false charges and complaint with consequent orders obtained for search and seizure of the articles, the plaintiff was put to serious and irreparable damage, considerably affecting his reputation in the neighbour-hood as a consequence of which, he suffered mental agony and apprehension about personal safety and liberty. He claimed that he suffered special damages as also general damages and after exchange of notices between parties, the suit came to be filed for which he restricted the claim of damages in a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. 3. The defendant contended that the complaint given by him was neither actuated by malice nor was without any reasonable and probable cause, that he initiated the proceedings bonafide for preserving and protecting his interest and rights in the common property, that the defendant acted honestly believing that the articles were removed with the dishonest motive of depriving the defendant of his legitimate share in them and the only way of tracing articles removed was by having a search, as a result of which the articles removed could be identified and seized also. The allegation by the plaintiff that the defendant collected a huge crowd in front of his house was denied and the claim that the complaint was baseless and reckless or hasty or without probable cause or actuated by malice and spite or ill-will was also seriously denied. The defendant also disputed the claim of the plaintiff that the articles were removed from the tannery in broad day light for better protection of these articles, suggesting that if that was the motive, nothing prevented the plaintiff to have informed the defendant of his intention to do so before actually removing them and the complaint lodged was on reasonable grounds of the existence of a state or circumstances, which reasonably led the defendant to believe that the plaintiff was actuated by improper motives. The defendant also contended that after the tenant surrendered possession, both the plaintiff and the defendant put their respective locks as they have no confidence in each other and they have double locks and the plaintiff had opened the locks of the defendant without his knowledge and consent and the orders passed by this Court in the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition are not really relevant for the suit for proving that the complaint was malicious. While considering the fact that the articles have been seized and his attempts to separate the articles were thwarted, the defendant stated that the plaintiff also came to the defendant with some persons, assaulted and manhandled the defendant and the plaintiff neither suffered damages as claimed nor the so called damages could be said to be either reasonable or just. The suit it was stated was only to harass the defendant on account of ill-feeling and enmity. 4. On the above claims and counter claims, the suit came to be tried and both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. 5. The learned trial Judge, came to the conclusion that the prosecution launched by the defendant was without reasonable and probable cause. It was also held by the learned trial Judge that there can be no doubt that the prosecution was malicious and as a consequence, decreed the suit as prayed for. 6. Aggrieved, the defendant filed an appeal in A.S. No. 10 of 1981. It was also held by the learned trial Judge that there can be no doubt that the prosecution was malicious and as a consequence, decreed the suit as prayed for. 6. Aggrieved, the defendant filed an appeal in A.S. No. 10 of 1981. The learned First Appellate Judge, as noticed earlier, confirmed the findings of the learned trial judge and also arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution was a malicious one and without reasonable and probable cause, but at the same time in arriving at the quantum of damages, the sum decree was reduced to Rs. 3,000/- with propertionate coasts. Hence the above Second Appeal. 7. The learned Admission judge, at the time of considering the case for admission, has formulated the following two substantial questions of law as arising for consideration in the Second Appeal: — (1) Whether the findings of the Court below that the prosecution launched by the appellant against the respondent was without any reasonable and probable cause and that it was motivated by malice are vitiated by the misreading of the evidence and on the facts and circumstances of the case; and (2) Whether the inference of malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause on the part of the appellant can in law be drawn on the proved facts and circumstances of the case?. 8. Mr. N. Varadarajan, learned counsel, while elaborating the substantial questions of law, contended that though the relevant principles of law and decisions have been adverted to in the judgments of both the Courts below, they have been misapplied to the case and the Courts below misdirected themselves to the vital facts and consequently, the judgments of both the Courts below are liable to be set aside. Argued the learned counsel further that in the teeth of the very admission that the property is a common property, that the plaintiff has removed some of the articles from the common tannery premises to his exclusive residential premises without any advance intimation or information to the defendant or obtaining his consent, the move of the defendant in lodging a criminal complaint before the Criminal Court to search and seize the articles removed, cannot be said to be either reckless or malicious or without any reasonable and probable cause and consequently, the Courts below committed a serious error of law in up-holding the claim though by the Appellate Court for a lesser amount. The learned counsel invited my attention to some of the judicial pronouncements and the statement of Law contained in Salmond on Jurisprudence - XII Edition and also the Law of Torts by Ramaswami Iyer - VI Edition. Per contra , the learned counsel for the respondent, with equal force and vehemence, submitted that the concurrent findings of facts recorded by both, the Courts below are fully justified both on the materials available on record and in view of the Principles of law referred and this Court may not pleased to interfere with the same, in this appeal. 9. I have carefully considered the statements of the learned counsel appearing on other side. In my view, a reference to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel as also referred to in the judgment of the Courts below may be noticed before taking further consideration of the matter. In S.T. Sahib v. N. Hasan Ghani Sahib and others (A.I.R. 1957 Madras 646), a learned Single Judge of this Court had an occasion to deal with a claim for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution. The learned Judge on a thorough review of the entire case law on the subject as also the English case law, held that the plaintiff must show that (a) proceedings had been initiated against him (b) for an offence which was groundless as evidenced by the successful termination of the proceedings in his favour and (c) which were instituted against him by the defendant without probable cause and from malicious motives, i.e., an indirect and improper motive. When proceedings are within the criminal proceedings, the plaintiff was obliged to show that he has suffered special damage, unless the proceedings are such as from their very nature or calculated to injure the credit or honour of the plaintiff and malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice without probable cause to believe it can succeed and finally ends in failure. As to what constitutes reasonable and probable cause, the learned single Judge observed as hereunder: — “28, Reasonable and probable cause’ means simply reasonable cause, the word probable being used with its original meaning of ‘Probable’ and hence ‘reliable’. The conjunction of the adjectives ‘reasonable’ and ‘Probable’ is a heritage from the redundancies in which the old pleaders delighted. Salmond observes that probable is synonymous with reasonable and means a good cause and that probabilis caus was not unknown to classical Latin. The American case law as well as American text books speak “only of probable cause and do not make use of the phrase probable and reasonable cause”. We naturally follow the English practice. 29. In a suit for malicious prosecution the important question is whether the facts as known to the defendant or reasonably believed in by him at the material time, constituted a reasonably cause for the prosecution. The following extracts from the standard text books on the law of Torts will be helpful. Salmond on Torts, 11th edition, page 742, has the following to say: “Reasonable and probable cause means a genuine belief, based on reasonable grounds, that the proceedings are justified”. In “Hicks v. Faulkner, (1878) 8 QBD 167 at page 171 (X), Hawkings, J., said: “I should define reasonable and probable cause to be an honest belief in the guilt of the accused, based upon a full conviction, founded on reasonable grounds, of the of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accused, to the conclusion “that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed”. In Ramaswamy Iyers Law of Torts, pp. 321-326 it is stated: “The issue is one of the fact in the ordinary sense that it is a conclusion to be drawn from the circumstances. In Ramaswamy Iyers Law of Torts, pp. 321-326 it is stated: “The issue is one of the fact in the ordinary sense that it is a conclusion to be drawn from the circumstances. It is a question of law in England in the sense that it is for the Judge and not for the jury to decide. Where it is shown that the defendant did not believe in the plaintiffs guilt, there is no reasonable and probable cause for him and he cannot be heard to say that the real facts which were unknown to him would make out the plaintiffs guilt. In such a case the defendants conduct is exclusive evidence not merely of absence of reasonable and probable cause, but also of malice, where it does not appear that the defendant had no belief in the plaintiffs guilt, the plaintiff must show that the defendants conduct was unreasonable in the circumstances. Recklessness, haste, failure to make enquiries or test his information or grounds of suspicion would be evidence of such conduct. On the other hand, the fact that he placed his information fairly before his lawyers and acted on legal advice “would be evidence of the contrary. The existence of mere grounds of suspicion would not be reasonable cause. The plaintiff is bound to give some evidence which will prima facie suggest absence of reasonable and preamble causes; if he does, the onus may then be shifted to the defendant to rebut it. Whether mere proof of the plaintiffs innocence would be such evidence would depend on the facts of each case”. But as pointed out in Clerk and Lind sell on Torts, 11th edition, p. 864: “A man is not bound before instituting proceedings to see that he has such evidence as will be legally sufficient to secure a conviction,. In Dawsan v. Vansandau, (1863) 1 WR 516(y), the defendant had preferred a charge of conspiracy against the plaintiff on the evidence of an alleged accomplice, and it was held that he might well have reasonable and probable cause. ‘An accomplice or tainted witness may give evidence sufficient to make out a prime facie case and warrant the preferring of a criminal charge, though it might not be sufficient evidence upon which to convict’. “Neither is it necessary that the defendant should act only on legal evidence and inquire into every thing at first hand. ‘An accomplice or tainted witness may give evidence sufficient to make out a prime facie case and warrant the preferring of a criminal charge, though it might not be sufficient evidence upon which to convict’. “Neither is it necessary that the defendant should act only on legal evidence and inquire into every thing at first hand. It is sufficient if he proceeds on such information as a prudent and cautious man may reasonable accept in the ordinary affairs of life; and it is for the plaintiff to satisfy the jury that there was a want of proper care in testing that information. It is not justifiable to commence a prosecution on mere suspicion.” 34 American Jurisprudence, pp. 731-732 (S. 43), defines probable cause as follows: — “Many definitions of the term ‘Probable Cause’ as used in actions for malicious prosecution, differing more or less in their language, are to be found in the decisions. Thus, for instance, probable cause for a criminal prosecution has been defined as a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious, or as some Courts put it, a prudent man in the belief that the party is guilty of the offence with which he is charged as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, “acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the offence for which he was prosecuted, and as such facts and circumstances as, when communicated to the generality of men of ordinary and impartial minds, are sufficient to raise in them a belief or real, grave suspicion of the guilt of the person. With reference to civil actions, probable cause has been said to be such reason supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. ‘Probable Cause’ in this connection, does not mean sufficient cause; and the question in the action is not whether there was in fact a sufficient cause for the prosecution or proceeding complained of, since the acquittal or failure of the proceeding shows that there was not. ‘Probable Cause’ in this connection, does not mean sufficient cause; and the question in the action is not whether there was in fact a sufficient cause for the prosecution or proceeding complained of, since the acquittal or failure of the proceeding shows that there was not. A definition sufficiently exact to meet satisfactorily every possible, test would be difficult, if not impossible, tto furnish for the complete legal idea expressed by the term ‘Probable cause’ is not to be gathered from a mere definition. However, not withstanding the different wordings of the “Many judicial definitions before referred to, there seems to be sufficient substantial agreement among them to warrant the statement that the standard of conduct for beginning or continuing any proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is that of a reasonable or ordinarily prudent man placed in the same situation as the defendant. That is, if a reasonable man would have believed and acted under the circumstances as the defendant did, there would be probable cause; otherwise not. It is to be noted that the conduct of the defendant is to be weighed in view of what appeared to him at the time of instituting the prior proceeding, not in the light of subsequently appearing facts”. Restatement of the Law, Torts, Vol. III, S. 662, defines probable cause as follows: — “One who initiates criminal proceedings against another; has probable cause for so doing if he (a) reasonable believes that the person accused has acted or failed to act in a particular manner; and (b) (i) correctly believes that such “acts or omissions constitute at common law or under an existing statute the offence charged against the accused, or (i) mistakenly so believes in reliance on the advice of counsel under the conditions stated in S. 666’. 38 Corpus Juris sets out in S. 35 (pp. 405-406) the requisite knowledge of prosecutors as follows: — “The facts relied upon to constitute probable cause may be those which are within the personal knowledge of the prosecutor, or those of which he learns from proper information derived from others, or both. 38 Corpus Juris sets out in S. 35 (pp. 405-406) the requisite knowledge of prosecutors as follows: — “The facts relied upon to constitute probable cause may be those which are within the personal knowledge of the prosecutor, or those of which he learns from proper information derived from others, or both. Probable cause is wanting where he acts on facts within his own knowledge which, to his knowledge, do not constitute a crime; or where not-withstanding the sufficiency of the facts on which he makes this accusation, he has knowledge of other facts which satisfactorily show accuseds innocence, If he acts on information derived from others making an accusation, these facts to operate as a defence by way of probable cause must relate to the question of guilt. “And the test of the sufficiency of the resulting knowledge is whether it would have justified a prudent, honest and strong suspicion of the guilt of accused. Obviously mere rumor or information of a vague and indefinite nature, or information which the party making the accusation knows to be false, or which does not tend to establish the guilt of accused, or a mere statement by third parties that they believe that accused had committed a crime, does not establish probable cause for a prosecution”. But as pointed out in the next section: “The prosecutor is not bound to verify the correctness of each item of information, or to investigate the crime itself, or to institute an inquiry into the character and antecedents of accused before he attempts to set on foot a criminal prosecution, where he has information on which he is entitled to rely, or to act as a spy on accused for the purpose of ascertaining his defence, or to make inquiries from him or ask him for an explanation, it is sufficient that he acted with such caution, impartiality, and diligence as a reasonably prudent man would have used under the circumstances “to ascertain the trust of his suspicions. However, when facts or circumstances put him upon inquiry, he will be charged with knowledge of such facts as he would have learned if he or his agent authorised to investigate had made a proper investigation into the circumstances of the case, including the character and identity of accused”. 10. However, when facts or circumstances put him upon inquiry, he will be charged with knowledge of such facts as he would have learned if he or his agent authorised to investigate had made a proper investigation into the circumstances of the case, including the character and identity of accused”. 10. As to what constitutes malice and the manner in which the damages have to be assessed, the learned Judge has observed as follows: — “32. We now come to malice which is the last ingredient in a suit for malicious prosecution, and that the defendant was actuated by malice in prosecuting the plaintiff has also got to be proved by the plaintiff. Malice means the presence of some improper and wrongful motive that is to say an intent to use the legal process in question for some other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose. It means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will; it may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. “The malice necessary to be established in a suit for malicious prosecution is not even malice in law such as may be assumed from the intentional doing of a wrongful act, but malice in fact-Halus animus-indicating that the party was actuated either by spite or ill will towards an individual, or by indirect or improper motives, though these may be wholly unconnected with any uncharitable feeling towards anybody. A prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However wrong-headed a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be the initiator of a malicious prosecution. A malicious prosecution, says Harper on Torts, P. 586, is one that is begun in malice, and if there is no malice found to exist, in fact the action must fail. (33). Malice as stated already has to be proved as well as want of reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution. A malicious prosecution, says Harper on Torts, P. 586, is one that is begun in malice, and if there is no malice found to exist, in fact the action must fail. (33). Malice as stated already has to be proved as well as want of reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution. No action will lie for the institution of legal proceedings “however destitute of reasonable and probable cause unless they are instituted maliciously; Abu Eucker Ebrahim v. Magan Lal K. Javeri, AIR 1940 Mad 683 (Z 14), Braja Sunder Deb v. Bamdeb Das, AIR 1944 PC 1 (Z 15); 70 Mad LJ 695 : 1936 Mad WN 392 : AIR 1936 Mad 547 (Z10). But if there is malice alone, that too is not sufficient. There must be concurrence of malice and want of probable cause. A person actuated by the plainest malice may nevertheless have a justifiable reason for prosecution. On the other hand substantiating of the accuser from liability to an action, for he may have had good reason to make the charge, and yet be compelled to abandon the prosecution by the death or absence of witnesses, or the difficulty of producing adequate proof. The law therefore only renders him responsible where malice is combined with want of probable cause. It is also well settled law that the reputation of the plaintiff and the defendant will be relevant factors in deciding the existence or absence of probable cause. “34. Damages claimable in a suit for malicious prosecution may be classed under two heads, namely, (1) solatium for injury to reputation and feeling of the plaintiff and his detention (if any) and consequent suffering and (2) Legitimate expenses incurred by him in his defence: AIR. 1924 Mad 565; 46 Mad LJ 353 (Z11); Pannalal v. Kasturichand, 1945 Mad WN 720; 58 Mad LW 613 : ( AIR 1945 Mad 147 ) (Z12) Kanyalal v. Mohomad Idris , AIR 1938 Sind 11 (Z17); Narayana Mudali v. Peria Kalathi , AIR 1939 Mad 783 (Z 18); Mehtab v. KrishnaRao , AIR 1946 Nag 46 at p. 53 (Z19). Damages under the first head are variable. They may be aggravated or mitigated according to the circumstances of the case. Where both the plaintiff and the defendant were actuated by malicious motives, the Court would be justified in awarding only nominal damages. Damages under the first head are variable. They may be aggravated or mitigated according to the circumstances of the case. Where both the plaintiff and the defendant were actuated by malicious motives, the Court would be justified in awarding only nominal damages. In a proper case exemplary damages may be awarded. Exemplary damages sometimes called by the rather unpleasant name of vindictive damages are consolatory rather than penal, resting upon the principle that where there is malice, the mental pain caused to the plaintiff must be taken note of and a selatium award for it. The award of exemplary damages where the defendant has acted contumaciously has therefore a sanction behind it: AIR 1946 Mad 147 ; 1945 2 Mad LJ 461; 1045 Mad WN 720; 58 Mad LW 613 (Z16) Majijeh v. Sehrab, AIR 1949 Nag 273 : ILR 1949 Nag 74 (Z20)”. 11. In C. Dakshinamurthy v. K.K. Venkataswamy Chettiar and another (A.I.R. 1972 Madras 241) = (1971) 89 L.W. 813 Ramanujam, J has held that malice has to be independently established apart from want of reasonable and probable cause in a suit for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution. Salmond on Torts XII Edition also contains statement that no action will lie for the institution of legal proceedings however destitute of reasonable and probable cause, unless they are instituted maliciously, i.e., to say from some wrongful motive and that malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause must unite in order to produce liability and consequently, so long as the legal process is honestly used for its proper purpose mere negligence are want of sound judgment in the use of it creates no liability and if there are no reasonable grounds for the proceedings, no impropriety of motive on the part of the person, instituting the proceedings is itself any ground of liability. It is further stated therein that it is necessary to distinguish between honesty of belief and honesty of motive, the former being relevant to the question of reasonable and probable cause and the latter to the question of malice. It is further stated therein that it is necessary to distinguish between honesty of belief and honesty of motive, the former being relevant to the question of reasonable and probable cause and the latter to the question of malice. Further, it is stated therein that even if the defendant honestly believed the proceedings to be justified, there is no reasonable and probable cause unless this belief was based on reasonable grounds, and the said question is to be determined by the facts actually known to the defendant at the time when he laid the information and subsequently proceeded with the prosecution, not to the facts as they actually existed and therefore, facts unknown to the prosecutor do not prevent the facts, which were known to him from constituting reasonable and probable cause. It is only when a person embarks upon a prosecution without any evidence at all or with evidence on which no reasonable jury would convict, then whatever his state of mind there is strong evidence that he had no reasonable and probable cause. But as to reasonable and probable cause, the book of Salmond on Jurisprudence states: — “Reasonable and probable cause means a genuine belief, based on reasonable grounds, that the proceedings are justified”. 12. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the Courts below appear to have been carried away much on the fact that this Court has in Crl. M.P.1745 of 1975 quashed the proceedings. The appreciation of the materials by this Court in a quash petition would be different and could not be the same for the appreciation of the material in suit for damages for alleged malicious prosecution. In my view, the fact that with the knowledge of the watchman at the tannery premises and after giving a list to him, the articles have been removed is no ground to put the blame for having recourse to complain before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases. In my view, the fact that with the knowledge of the watchman at the tannery premises and after giving a list to him, the articles have been removed is no ground to put the blame for having recourse to complain before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases. There is no controversy over the position that the property which has been removed belong to both, that they were at the time of removal in a place which was common to both, that those materials have been removed without any prior intimation or without the consent of the defendant and as a matter of fact, after they were seized and restored, they were stored in the tannery premises only and the ruse invented by the plaintiff for such removal under the pretext of safety and protection of the materials cannot appeal to any judicial forum. If the storage of the materials which have been removed, in the tannery premises is not conducive to their maintenance, it could not at any Mate be said to be a sudden development and it is not as though it could not brook even the delay in informing the defendant either by telephone or telegram or by any notice before actual removal and to justify the removal by contending that it has been done with the knowledge of the watchman and after giving a list to him, is no justification at all and it cannot appeal to any standards of reason or logic, and the defendant could not be penalised despite the recklessness on the part of the plaintiff. That apart, there is no certainty before verification and seizure of the articles that the plaintiff has removed only those articles for which a list has been given to the watchman and in order to verify the correctness of the same too, a personal verification is required and having regard to the already strained relationship, there was hardly any possibility of such verification and consequently, there could be nothing wrong in the defendant laying a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate to have the same verified by getting a search warrant and seizing the articles admittedly removed from common ownership to personal and individual ownership without the consent of the other party. If so much of the facts are indisputable and admitted, I fail to see any justification for both the courts below to come to the conclusion that the defendant had no reasonable or probable cause for having recourse to the criminal Court or that he was malicious in instituting the proceedings. The Courts below, in my view, have gravely mis-directed themselves to the relevant principles of law and the conclusions arrived at by them could not have been arrived at, if the consideration was objective and judicious and the conclusions arrived at seem to be more on account of lack of judicial approach and proper appreciation of the indisputable facts on record. There has been conspicuous misapplication of law too, in the matter. As pointed out earlier, the Courts below appear to have been greatly influenced by the order of this Court in the quash petition marked as Exhibit A6 and as pointed out earlier, the Courts below have over-looked the fact that the standards and norms of appreciation and consideration required for sustaining a tortious claim for damages for alleged malicious prosecution and in a quash petition by a criminal Court or Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, are totally distinct and separated and de hors the only point in the quash proceedings, the plaintiff ought to have substantiated the claim in terms of the well settled principles repeatedly laid down by Courts to which a reference has been exhaustively made, supra. Consequently, I am of the view that the findings of the Courts below that the criminal prosecution was without any reasonable and probable cause and that the same was malicious, cannot be sustained on the facts and circumstances of the case and the conclusions arrived at to the contra are vitiated by patent error of law and perversity of approach in the matter of appreciation of the materials and also in the matter of application of the relevant principles of law. 13. The Second Appeal, therefore, is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned First Appellate Judge to the extent it confirmed the judgment and decree of learned trial Judge are hereby set aside, and the suit shall stand dismissed. No costs.