JUDGMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. Being arrieved by the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in F.A. No. 299/95, reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned III Addl. Judge, to the Court of District Judge, Raipur granting maintenance to wife and child, the defendant-wife is in appeal. 2. The marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnised on 6.7.88 and in their wedlock a son was born. With the passage of time the parties started drifting away from each other and as the breach broadened without ameliorative mend, an attempt was made by the husband to restore the relationship and accordingly he filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right which was duly decreed. The decree remained a decree on paper and all attempts for living together became an exercise in otiosity. The wife did not join the husband which compelled him to institute the aforesaid suit seeking divorce. The learned trial Judge decreed the suit and at the time of passing of the decree directed that the husband shall pay Rs. 500/- per month to the wife and Rs. 400/- to the minor child towards maintenance. This direction was given in exercise of powers conferred on the court under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The decree for divorce was conceded to by both the parties but the husband, feeling aggrieved in regard to grant of maintenance, challenged the said part of the decree in F.A. No. 299/95. 3. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended on behalf of the husband that the trial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while granting maintenance to the wife and child under section 25 of the Act as no application was filed for grant of the same and that being the essential preliminary, the direction of the court is demonstratively vulnerable. This contention was resisted by the wife on the ground that filing of the application is not a condition precedent for grant of maintenance and the court can, in its discretion, grant maintenance without an application being filed. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention raised by the appellant and set aside the direction contained in paragraph 9 (b) of the judgment which relates to grant of maintenance to the wife and child. 4. Impugning the aforesaid judgment Mr. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention raised by the appellant and set aside the direction contained in paragraph 9 (b) of the judgment which relates to grant of maintenance to the wife and child. 4. Impugning the aforesaid judgment Mr. H.B. Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the learned Single Judge has erred in law in holding that filing of an application was a necessary preliminary as mandated by the statute to confer jurisdiction on the court to grant maintenance though the object and purpose of the legislation and the intendment of the Legislature is in a different direction. it is further submitted by Mr. Agarwal that the learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration that the Act in question is a benificial legislation, and therefore, the concept of rigorism has to be ostracised while interpretating a provision of the statute and the underlying purpose of the law makers has to be given due weightage. It is his further submission that the learned Single Judge has given undue emphasis on the punctuation marks occurring in the section though the same could have been totally ingorned to interprete the provision in favour of a distressed and desolate wife. Mr. Ajit Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has built up his argument by contending that the language of the section is clear and unambiguous and when an application is required to be filed to confer jurisdiction on the court for grant of relief, the Court cannot assume jurisdiction in absence of the same as that would not only be against the spirit of the enactment but also would run counter to the concept of natural justice. It is his further submission that when various factors have been woven into the area of functional operation of section 25 of the Act, it would be against the established canons of justice to give an interpretation whereby the basic essence of the provision is frustrated and the aggrieved party's right is whittled down. 5. The core question that falls for determination in the present appeal is whether a court at the time of passing a decree under the Act can grant relief as enjoined under section 25 of the Act without an application being filed. To appreciate the whole scenario it is essential to refer to section 25 (1) of the Act which reads as under - 25. To appreciate the whole scenario it is essential to refer to section 25 (1) of the Act which reads as under - 25. Permanent alimony and maintenance - (1) Any Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant (the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case) it may seem to the Court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is perceptibly clear that filing of an application is a requirement for the court to grant relief as enjoined therein but Mr. Agarwal learned counsel for the appellant would like us to read that "an application made to it for the purpose" should be connected with the terms 'any time subsequent thereto' and not with the words 'at the time of passing any decree'. His alternative submission is that purposive interpretation should be given by ignoring the commas. The first part of his submission is not in consonance with the principles of interpretation or even grammer. The provision as it reads we find that 'at the time of passing any decree or any time subsequent thereto' is placed within the commas and both the conditions have to be given equal weightage and both are governed by the subsequent stipulation. There is no reason to accept that 'an application made to it for the purpose' is only related to the words 'at any time subsequent thereto' because both the conditions have been encompassed within the pregnant commas and nothing can be introduced to hold that a part of it relates to filing of the application and the other part does not. The interpretation which is sought to be given by Mr. Agarwal is not only grammatically unacceptable but also against the principles of statutory interpretation. The interpretation which is sought to be given by Mr. Agarwal is not only grammatically unacceptable but also against the principles of statutory interpretation. The second limb of submission of Mr. Agarwal is to ignore the commas to give a purposive interpretation as that would further the cause of justice. It is well settled that if a statute in question is found to be carefully punctuated, the marks of punctuation should not be ignored. In the case at hand when the punctuation commas subserve the object and purpose, there is no reason to brush them aside. Moreover, on a reading of the provision we find it absolutely clear and unambiguous and there is no justification not to read as they are. The Appex Court in the case of M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India and others (1988) 2 SCC 299 held as under - The words in the statute must, prima facie, be given their ordinary meanings. Where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to pravail unless there are some strong and obvious reasons to the contrary. Nothing has been shown to warrant that literal construction should not be given effect to. Again in the case of Dr. Ajay Pradhan V. State of M.P. (1988) 4 SCC 514 the Apex Court registered its view in the matter of construing a statute thus - If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and give them full effect. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are alternative methods of construction. Where the language is explicit its consequences are for Parliament, and not for the courts, to consider. Applying the aforesaid parameters, we are inclined to hold that the commas used in the section give a purposive meaning to the provision; do not any way distort the sense; and act in furtherance of the intendment of the legislature. 6. It is next contended by Mr. Applying the aforesaid parameters, we are inclined to hold that the commas used in the section give a purposive meaning to the provision; do not any way distort the sense; and act in furtherance of the intendment of the legislature. 6. It is next contended by Mr. Agarwal that filing of the application cannot be regarded as mandatory and the court can pass an order on its own because the language used is 'at the time of passing any decree' and a party would not be in a position to know whether a decree is likely to be passed or not. It is also highlighted that when the court is aware of the total factual matrix, filing of an application should be regarded as directory as the court, in a given case, can exercise the power, suo-motu. This submission of Mr. Agarwal is seriously combated by Mr. Singh. To appreciate the aforesaid contention we would refer to various provisions under the Act relating to grant of maintenance. Section 24 of the Act provides for grant of maintenance, pendente lite, and expenses of proceeding. Under the said provision, if it appears to the court either husband or wife, as the case may be, has no independent income for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, application being filed the court can direct the respondent therein to pay the petitioner's expenses of the proceeding and monthly maintenance at such sum during the proceeding. Section 25 of the Act deals with the grant of permanent alimony and maintenance. Section 26 deals with custody of children and authorises the court to pass such orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper towards custody, maintenance and study of minor child. We find that section 24 enjoins filing of an application and the court is required to form an opinion that the persons making application has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and necessary expenses of proceeding it would pass necessary direction. Section 25 has its own sphere of operation. The legislature has clothed the court with jurisdiction to grant permanent alimony and maintenance but has provided a condition precedent of filing an application by the party concerned for the said purpose. This has an objective. Section 25 has its own sphere of operation. The legislature has clothed the court with jurisdiction to grant permanent alimony and maintenance but has provided a condition precedent of filing an application by the party concerned for the said purpose. This has an objective. Neither husband nor wife can be asked to pay alimony or maintenance without being given an opportunity to contest the matter. Permanent alimony and maintenance are given when a decree is passed disrupting the marital status. If there is no disruption in marital status, the question of grant of maintenance does not arise. If the authority of the court is invoked and the condition precedent is satisfied that is, there is disruption of marital status, the court can grant permanent alimony and maintenance. In this context we may refer to the decision of the Appex Court in the case of Chand Dhawan (Smt.) V. Jawaharlal Dhawan (1993) 3 SCC 406 , wherein it has been held as follows: We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the martial status has come by, at that conjucture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief. And such order, in all events, remains within the jurisdiction of that court, to be altered or modified as future situations may warrant. Mr. Agarwal has impressed upon us that the Appex Court has confined the filing of application to the subsequent stage but not to the stage when the decree is passed. We are not inclined to accept the same as we find that their Lordships were considering the disruption of marital status and further their Lordships have only said that "if that power is invoked at that time" and, therefore, it would be in appropriate to construe that filing of an application can be dispensed with. 7. On a scrutiny of sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Act we find that the language used in section 25 has far reaching effect. 7. On a scrutiny of sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Act we find that the language used in section 25 has far reaching effect. In fact, the said provision has been amended in 1976 which widened the scope of section 25 so that the court can look to and take other circumstances of the case into consideration besides the income of the spouse. In the case of Bhikalal V. Kamla Bai 1 (1982) DMC 83 it has been held as follows - The effect of change in Section 25 (1) is that at the time of passing of any order under that section, the Court must now also look to and take into account "other circumstances of the case" besides the income of the parties and their conduct. The Court, therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under that Section must also consider such of circumstances placed before it as may influence the grant or refusal of the alimony. The amendment has thus widened the scope of Section 25 (1) and the Court cannot just ignore circumstances which the parties plead and prove in support of their claims for grant or refusal of the alimony. An enquiry in that direction is mandatory and the parties must be given full opportunity to substantiate their rival contentions by proper evidence. That apart we notice the court has not only to look to the conduct of the parties and such circumstances of the case but also can grant a periodical sum. The court is conferred with jurisdiction to grant lumpsum amount. The conduct of the party can be a relevant factor while considering the quantum. There is further distinction between section 24 and this provision. Under section 24 maintenance is to be determined on the basis of the income of the petitioner and the income of the respondent but in an application under section 25 the quantum of a maintenance has to be determined not only by the income but also by other property of the respondent. At this juncture we may profitably refer to a decision rendered in the case of Meerabai V. Laxminarayan Mishra 1 (1984) DMC 120 wherein the court took the view that the party has to file an application u/s 25 of the Act and the appellate court though eager and willing would not fix the permanent alimony and maintenance as many factors are to be taken into consideration. To quote their Lordships - It is, no doubt, true that section 25 of the Act, empowers the Court to pass a decree for permanent alimony, while passing decree for divorce. The section, in turn requires an application to be made for this purpose. The application can be made either at the time of passing decree or even thereafter. The decision on the question of alimony will have to take into consideration the earning of the husband, conduct of the parties and other facts and circumstances of the case. This cannot be done, unless both the parties are given opportunity to place material facts before the Court. Inspite of my eagerness and willingness to grant some amount to the appellant, as permanent alimony, it is not possible to fix the same in the absence of any material on record. Under the circumstances, it will be open to the appellant to file an application before the trial Court under section 25 of the Act, and get an order for permanent alimony as provided in law. 8. We have referred to the aforesaid rulings to indicate that the court has to exercise its jurisdiction under section 25 of the Act on different factual scenario altogether. The nature of controversy which is determined under section 25 of the Act is quite different what is done under section 24 of the Act or for that matter u/s. 26 of the Act. Considering the various factors to be taken into consideration and the nature of the case the court is required to look into, the Legislature has used the words 'on an application made to it for the purpose'. This Court in Jitbandhan V. Smt. Gulab Devi and ors. C.R. No. 1125/82, D/-13.10.82 has held as follows - The second objection is that jurisdiction under section 25 arises only on an application made to the Court for that purpose by either the wife or the husband; and as no application under section 25 was made by either of the parties, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass any order under that section. It is not in dispute that the petition for divorce made by the husband was dismissed. It is also not in dispute that no application under section 25 was made by either party. In my opinion, both the objections raised by the learned counsel for the husband must be upheld. It is not in dispute that the petition for divorce made by the husband was dismissed. It is also not in dispute that no application under section 25 was made by either party. In my opinion, both the objections raised by the learned counsel for the husband must be upheld. The view taken in the aforesaid revision is in consonance with the mandate of the statute and we find that the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on it and, we would say, rightly. We would hasten to add that when a liability is going to be saddled on the husband or wife, and the liability can be onerous, there has to be compliance with principles of natural justice. If no application is filed and the plea of the relief-seeker is not known and the other side is kept in dark and the court exercises its jurisdiction without proper scrutiny of the factual backdrop, and without being in a position to consider the defences of the other side, the whole adjudication would be against the concept of, audi alteram partem, and for that reason, in our humble view, the Legislature in its wisdom has qualified the situation by 'on an application made to it for the purpose'. The application can be filed during the pendency of the suit, contesting respondent can be afforded reasonable opportunity to resist the same and thereafter, the Court would dispose of the controversy at the time of delivery of the judgment if other condition precedent i.e. disruption of marital status, has been satisfied. The parties can adduce evidence in that regard and the court on consideration of the materials on record can proceed to pass necessary order as enjoined under law. This would subserve the cause of justice and would be in consonance with the principles of natural justice. It is to be borne in mind that concept of natural justice has been described as 'substantial requirements of justice' by Kerl of Selborne, L.C. in Atrhur John Sopkmen V. The Plustood District Board of Works (1984-85) 10 Appeal ca 229, 240. Recently this Court in the case of Nandlal Kanoria V. National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and others M.A. No. 36/1997, D/-25.7.97, has held thus - A duty to act fairly having respect for what is right and wrong is the quite essence of principles of natural justice. Recently this Court in the case of Nandlal Kanoria V. National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and others M.A. No. 36/1997, D/-25.7.97, has held thus - A duty to act fairly having respect for what is right and wrong is the quite essence of principles of natural justice. The otherside has to be heard before any adverse order is passed. In this context I may also refer to the principle embodied in 'Qui aliquid statu-erit, parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dexerit, haud aequum facerit', that is, he who determines any matter without hearing both sides, though he may have decided right, has not done justice. It is well settled in law that justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. The sacrosanctity of the marriage and the nobility of the sacred relationship are recognised in all civilised societies. In fact, emotional bedrock of the society is founded on the sound marital relationship. But when disruption takes place, the protagonists have to surrender to the requirements of law and are to be guided by its mandate. Neither sympathy nor empathy can marginalise, the statutory requirements. In view of this analysis of ours, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge and affirm the judgment and decree passed by him. 9. The learned Single Judge has observed that it is open to the wife to file the application as enjoined under section 25 of the Act and seek relief. If an application is filed the trial Judge will do well to dispose it of as expeditiously as possible. That is the requirement of law. 10. Resultantly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. There will be, however no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed