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1997 DIGILAW 669 (MAD)

Shree Andal Poly Industry v. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd.

1997-07-07

A.R.LAKSHMANAN, S.M.SIDICKK

body1997
Judgment : AR. Lakshmanan, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 13. 1997 in W.P. No. 3679 of 1997 passed by Jayasimha Babu, J., dismissing the writ petition filed by the writ appellant challenging the proceedings initiated by the respondent/ Corporation under section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act. 2. The appellant applied to the respondent/Corporation for a term loan of Rs.13.5 lakhs for construction of the building and purchase of machinery and setting up a factory for manufacture of HDPE woven sacks, which was sanctioned on 3. 1985. The petitioner firm executed a registered mortgage hypothecation and other connected documents on 15. 1985 and also created an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of the respondent mortgaging the land and premises in Pudupatti Village bearing S.F. No. 672 and all the machineries etc., and promising to repay the amount with interest at 14.5% p.a. The appellant had also agreed to pay an additional interest of 2% p.a. in case of default. Subsequently, the Corporation sanctioned an additional term loan of Rs.2.45 lakhs on 21. 1986 out of which Rs.2.18 Lakhs was disbursed. According to the appellant, the industry became sick from the very beginning on account of various reasons, the chief among them being the non-availability of continuous power supply and as a result, the appellant firm defaulted in repayment to the respondent/Corporation. Consequently, the Corporation filed S.F.C.O.P. No. 5 of 1990 under section 31 and 32 of S.F.C.Act, 1951 against the appellant herein in the court of he Principal District Judge of Ramnad at Madurai praying inter alia (a) attachment of the mortgaged properties (b) order for sale of mortgaged/hypothecated properties (c) appointment of a receiver in respect of the petitioner concern/unit, (d) order of injunction restraining the petitioner firm from transferring or removing the machinery, plaint and equipments from the factory without the permission of the respondent and (e) enforcing the liabilities of the sureties, namely the other partners of the firm as per amended section 31(i)(aa) of the S.F.C.Act. An exparte decree was passed against the appellant herein and when the appellant came to know about the ex parte decree, he filed I.A. No. 432/93 in S.F.C.O.P. No. 5/92 on the file of the District Judge, Kamarajar District at Srivilliputtur, to set aside the ex parte decree and to give him an opportunity to defend the main petition on merits. The said I.A. was dismissed on 212. 1993 and thereafter, the appellant filed C.M.A. No. 525 of 1994 before this court to set aside the aforesaid order and this court passed a conditional order on 211. 1996 setting aside the ex parte decree on condition that the appellant herein shall deposit a sum of Rs.5 lakhs within two months and if deposit was not made, the appeal would stand dismissed. According to the appellant, he was unable to deposit the said amount within the stipulated time, since his unit has become sick. There upon, the Corporation sent a notice on 3. 1997 which is the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition stating that the respondent Corporation has decided to take possession of the industrial assets on 13. 1997 under section 29 of the S.F.C.Act and has requested the appellant to be present on that day to hand over possession. According to the appellant, the notice dated 3. 1997 is illegal and without jurisdiction and once the Corporation has chosen to file a petition in a civil court under sections 31 and 32 of the S.F.C.Act, the Corporation is prohibited from taking any steps under section 29 of the S.F.C.Act. Therefore, the appellant filed the above writ petition to quash the proceedings of the respondent dated 3. 1997. 3. Before the learned single Judge, it was contended that the respondent has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 29 of the S.F.C.Act having obtained a decree in the civil court. Before the learned single Judge, the Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and another etc., A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 2151, was cited. Construing the said decision, the learned single Judge held that it is open to the Corporation to abandon or withdraw or give up the proceedings under section 31 at whatever stage it may be. Construing the said decision, the learned single Judge held that it is open to the Corporation to abandon or withdraw or give up the proceedings under section 31 at whatever stage it may be. This apart, at the time of hearing of the writ petition the Corporation has also made its choice and it has proceeded to pursue the proceedings under Sec.29 of the Act and not to pursue the proceedings under section 31 of the Act, though it had obtained a decree. By making the said observation, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant writ petitioner filed the above appeal. Mr.V.P. Venket, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent has not categorically stated about the abandonment of the proceedings under sections 31 and 32 of the Act, but has relied on the order of this court passed in C.M.A. No. 525 of 1994, in its order dated 3. 1997, it is only logical to conclude that the respondent was proceeding under section 29 of the Act in addition to, not instead of , proceedings under sections 31 and 32 of the S.F.C.Act. It is also contended that the order of the learned single Judge is in violation of the judgment by the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and another etc., A.I.R.1994 SC 2151. 5. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. As already seen, the appellant filed I.A. No. 432 of 1993 in S.F.C.O.P. No. 5 of 1992 on the file of the District Judge, Kamarajar District at Srivilliputtur, to set aside ex parte decree and to give him an opportunity to defend the main petition on merits. The said I.A. was dismissed on 212. 1993. Therefore, he filed C.M.A. No. 525 of 1994 before this court to set aside the aforesaid order. This court passed a conditional order on 211. 1996 setting aside the ex parte decree on condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.5 lakhs within two months and if deposit was not made, the appeal would stand dismissed. admittedly, the appellant has not remitted the said sum of Rs. five lakhs to the respondent Corporation within the time stipulated. Under the above circumstances, the Corporation has decided to take possession of the industrial assets on 13. admittedly, the appellant has not remitted the said sum of Rs. five lakhs to the respondent Corporation within the time stipulated. Under the above circumstances, the Corporation has decided to take possession of the industrial assets on 13. 1997 under section 29 of the S.F.C.Act. We are of the view that the appellant has only made the respondent Corporation to invoke sec.29 of the Act by their own conduct. Though a direction was given to the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. five lakhs, the appellant had miserably failed to deposit the said sum in order to prove his bonafide. As held by the Supreme Court, it is always open to the Corporation to abandon or withdraw or give up the proceedings under section 31 of the Act at whatever stage it may be. In the instant case, the respondent has given up their right to proceed under sections 31 and 32 of the Act even though they had obtained a decree and have decided to pursue the proceedings under section 29 of the Act. In our opinion, it is open to the Corporation to make such a choice at any stage of the proceedings. The very same argument which was made before the learned single Judge, was also repeated at the time of hearing of this appeal. We directed the Corporation to file a memo as to whether the Corporation is willing to pursue remedy under sec.29 of the S.F.C.Act. The respondent has now filed a letter dated 4th July, 1997, addressed to its counsel Mr.R. Viduthalai, which reads thus: “The Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., (Sponsored by the Govt. of Tamil Nadu) No. 473, Anna Salai, Nandanam, Chennai 600 035. TIIC/Legal/97-98 Thiru R. Viduthalai,Advocate Chennai. Sir, Sub: M/s.Shree Andal Poly Industry - reg. Ref: W.A. No. 316/97. Though the Corporation is in possession of the decree passed by the Principal District Judge, Ramnad in SFC OP. No. 5/92 wherein the subject unit is the respondent, it had decided to pursue action under Sec.29 of the SFCs Act against the assets of the unit, pursuant to which a notice was issued to the subject unit and the assets were taken possession. The Corporation is not pursuing the remedies under sec.29 and 31 of the SFC Act simultaneously and will not also do so in future as regards the assets of the subject unit.” Yours faithfully, Sd. The Corporation is not pursuing the remedies under sec.29 and 31 of the SFC Act simultaneously and will not also do so in future as regards the assets of the subject unit.” Yours faithfully, Sd. — Manager (Law)” 6. In view of the above letter, the Corporation has made it very clear about its intention or decision to pursue action under section 29 of S.F.C.Act against the assets of the Unit pursuant to which a notice was issued to the subject unit and the assets were taken possession. In our opinion, the Corporation has got powers under section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 to take possession of the assets of the defaulting units and sell the same to recover its dues. The Supreme Court in U.P. Financial Corporation v. M/s.Gem Cap (India) Ltd. , reported in A.I.R. 1993 S.C 1435 has held that courts cannot interfere with the action under section 29 of SFC Act unless there is unfairness and that SFC has to recover the dues. A Division Bench of this Court in TIIC v. Vimal Formulations (P) Ltd. , Writ Appeal No. 507 of 1993 followed the same and has declined to intervene. It is held that Financial Institution (TIIC) cannot be made to wait for realisation of their monies and it would frustrate their public purpose viz., making available funds to others either for the purpose of starting or expanding industries. They are in need of funds for discharging their duties and functions and such funds could be secured only by taking necessary steps for the recovery of the amounts due to them. 7. In our opinion, the appellant cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, when the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is that of debtor and creditor and the appellant cannot throw the solemn contract to the wind. Therefore, the present writ appeal is not maintainable in law or on facts. The opinion expressed by us in this case is also fortified by several other recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court and more particularly the very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. Micro Cast Rubber and Allied Products (P) Ltd. and others, 1996(5) Supreme Today 37. 8. The Writ Appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 4922 of 1997 is dismissed.