JUDGMENT K. Narayana Kurup, J. 1. Defendant in O. S. No. 167 of 1980 on the file of the Court of the Munsiff of Kozhikode is the appellant in this Second Appeal. Respondent is the plaintiff in the suit which was instituted for specific performance of Ext. A-1 agreement executed by the appellant to sell the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff respondent. It is averred in the plaint that on 1,7th March 1978 the appellant defendant executed an agreement (Ext. A-1) in favour of the respondent, agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property measuring 90 cents for a sum of Rs. 5,000, that a sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid as advance, that towards the balance sale consideration a sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid by the plaintiff and a sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid by one Moideenkoya (P.W. 4) who owned money to the plaintiff and that in spite of demand the appellant did not execute a sale deed and convey the property to the plaintiff respondent. 2. The appellant resisted the suit and contended inter alia that he has not executed the agreement, that the payment of Rs. 2,000 as advance and Rs. 3,000 as balance sale consideration is not true and correct, that he had borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,000 from the plaintiff on 17th March 1978 and as security for the loan the title deed of the suit property was handed over to the plaintiff, that a sum of Rs. 1,500 has been repaid and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance. 3. The evidence in this case consists of oral testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 4 and D.W. 1 and documentary evidence of Exts. A-l to A-4, B-l; to B-6 and X-l. The trial court on an analysis of the evidence held that the agreement (Ext. A-1) was executed by the appellant defendant, that only a sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid by the plaintiff, that a sum of Rs. 3,000 is payable towards the sale consideration and that the plaintiff is entitled to seek specific, performance of the agreement (Ext. A-1). The suit was accordingly decreed on 26th November 1981. The lower appellate court by Judgment and decree dated 26th September 1988 dismissed the appeal A. S. No. 30 of 1982 filed by the defendant appellant and affirmed the decision of the trial court. A-1). The suit was accordingly decreed on 26th November 1981. The lower appellate court by Judgment and decree dated 26th September 1988 dismissed the appeal A. S. No. 30 of 1982 filed by the defendant appellant and affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this Second Appeal. 4. Heard counsel on both sides. The sheet anchor of the appellant's case before this court is that in the plaint as originally filed, there was no averment to the effect that the plaintiff was at all times ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Even in the amendment to the plaint (I.A. 3146 of 1981), the plaintiff only states that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract by paying the balance sale consideration if the court finds that the balance sale consideration has not been paid. Even according to the plaintiff, as per the agreement the balance sale consideration was to be paid on or before 30th October 1978 and the document was to be executed, failing which the defendant has agreed in the agreement to compensate the plaintiff. The appellant would contend that the suit was instituted only on 3rd June 1980 and long thereafter on 28th October 1981 the plaintiff came forward with an application for amendment of the plaint by incorporating a plea to the following effect, as Para.4 (a) in the plaint: (Malayalam) The case of the appellant is that the amendment introduces a new plea-cause of action which is tailored to suit the occasion, that it is made after the period of limitation, that though the alleged agreement is dated 17th March 1978 the suit is instituted only in June 1980, that the amendment of the plaint was allowed only on 31st October 1981 and that in this view of the matter and in the circumstances of the case the plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. In reply to the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent defendant had no occasion to plead that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract earlier than the filing of the application for amendment. The specific case of the plaintiff is that the entire sale consideration mentioned in Ext. The specific case of the plaintiff is that the entire sale consideration mentioned in Ext. A-l was paid by him in which event, there is no necessity to plead in the plaint that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as nothing remains to be performed since the entire sale consideration has been paid. It was only when the appellant denied in the written statement, the execution of the agreement and receipt of consideration, that the plaintiff respondent was alerted of the legal-requirement to amend the plaint so as to include the statement regarding the readiness and willingness to pay the balance amount due under Ext. A-1 agreement if the court finds that the balance sale consideration has not been paid. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff respondent cannot be faulted for having filed an application for amendment of the plaint at a later stage of the proceedings in the trial court. 5. The definite case of the respondent before this court is that an application for amendment of the pleadings can be carried out at any stage of the proceedings including the appellate stage. This question is no longer res integra. The Bombay High Court in Trimbak v. Nivratti A.I.R. 1985 Bombay 128 after adverting to a situation similar to the case on hand where nothing remaining to be performed by the plaintiff held that the question of averring readiness and willingness does not arise. It was also held as follows: "6. ............... The point is that in the nstant case there was nothing to be performed by the plaintiff at all. The entire amount of Rs. 7,000 which was the consideration for the sale deed is already lying in the coffers of the defendant. The possession of the land has already been made over by the defendant to the plaintiff. All that remains to be done is the execution of the sale deed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. So far as the plaintiff is concerned, it is an executed contract on his part; what remains executory is the part to be performed by the defendant. These are the facts averred in the plaint and not denied in the written statement at all ............. The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that he himself has done everything that he had to perform under the contract. These are the facts averred in the plaint and not denied in the written statement at all ............. The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that he himself has done everything that he had to perform under the contract. If any part of the performance of the agreement had remained, then he would have been duty bound to state in the plaint that he was willing to perform that part of the agreement but no such position exists in the present case. I will go a step further and state that in case such statement is not made by the plaintiff when it is necessary to be made, the Court should normally give an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint for incorporating such averment in the plaint because by doing so the plaintiff does not change the nature of the case at all and normally no prejudice is caused to the defendant,if the plaintiff is allowed to 'amend the plaint in such circumstances. If the plaintiff refused to amend the plaint even after such direction by the Court, the Court may be required to consider whether the plaintiff's suit for Specific performance should be decreed or not in the absence of such necessary averment in the plaint; but all this discussion is academic so far as the present case is concerned. In the present case there remains nothing for the plaintiff to perform towards the contractual obligation. If this is so, failure on his part to express his willingness to perform his obligation is of no legal consequence." In Byomkesh v. Nani Gopal AIR 1987 Calcutta 92, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court went to the extent of holding that a suit should not be thrown out and the plaintiff should be given reasonable opportunity to make good the defect by amendment of plaint even at the appellate stage. In the instant case, on the defendant's denial of the existence of the agreement, the plaintiff has demonstrated his readiness and willingness by filing an application to amend the plaint in which it is specifically stated that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the instant case, on the defendant's denial of the existence of the agreement, the plaintiff has demonstrated his readiness and willingness by filing an application to amend the plaint in which it is specifically stated that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It must be noted that it was not the case of the appellant, at any stage, either in the written statement or at the trial stage or even before this court, that the plaintiff was not so ready and willing, but the case of the appellant was one of complete denial of execution of Ext. A-1 agreement, which is concurrently found against by both the courts below. That being so, the amendment prayed for was rightly allowed by the trial court as contemplated under S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The case of the appellant that the effect of the application for amendment was to introduce a fresh cause of action pales into insignificance having regard to the fact that no fresh cause of action was sought to be introduced by the amendment sought for. On the other hand all that the plaintiff sought to do was to complete the cause of action for specific performance for which relief he has already prayed. As already noted, the averment required in law to be made in a plaint in a suit for specific performance in view of the provisions of S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was not made on account of the clear facts and circumstances already noted viz. that it was the specific case of the plaintiff that nothing remains to be done pursuant to Ext. A-1 agreement on his part, as it is the definite case that the entire sale consideration contemplated under Ext. A-1 has been paid to the defendant. Even in a case where the legal requirement was not pleaded on account of some oversight or mistake of counsel who drafted the plaint and that was sought to be rectified by the amendment applied for, it must be held that so long as it does not cause any prejudice to the other side such defects in pleadings are capable of being rectified by amendment. At any rate, on the facts and circumstances established in the instant case, I am not persuaded to hold that the plaintiff has introduced any fresh cause of action by the amendment and hence, there is no question of causing any injustice or prejudice to the appellant on that count. It has to be noted that here is a case where both the courts below have exercised the discretion by ordering specific performance of the contract. In S. J. Silas v. C. J. B. Kohlhoff AIR 1954 TC 440 a Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court held as follows: "Specific performance is by no means an absolute right but one which rests entirely in judicial discretion and always with reference to the facts of a particular case. It is also settled law that where a trial court has exercised its discretion in one way, an appellate court will not interfere unless it be established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles." On the facts and circumstances established, I do not think that there is any justification in interfering with the discretion already exercised by the courts below. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision reported in Gajanan J. Joshi v. Prabhakar M. Kalwar 1990 (1) SCC 166 . Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, I am of the view that this will not help the appellant in advancing his case before this court. Likewise, reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the decision in S. V. R. Mudaliar v. Rajabu F. Buhari AIR 1995 SC 1607 . That decision is also of no assistance to the appellant's case. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision in Ahammed v. Mammed Kunhi AIR 1987 Kerala 228 and Jayalakshmi v. Anil Kumar 1996 (1) KLT 727 are also mis-placed as the facts of the case was entirely different from the facts of the present case. 7. As regards the denial of execution of Ext. A-1, it has been concurrently found by both the courts below that the appellant has executed a sale deed and being a concurrent finding on a question of fact, that is not liable to be interfered with in this Second Appeal. 7. As regards the denial of execution of Ext. A-1, it has been concurrently found by both the courts below that the appellant has executed a sale deed and being a concurrent finding on a question of fact, that is not liable to be interfered with in this Second Appeal. No doubt P. W. 4 was disbelieved, but that by itself will not affect the substratum of the plaintiff's case so long as Ext. A-1 was upheld by the courts below. In the result the Judgment and decree of the Courts below are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.