Order Heard Mr. A.K. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 2. The grievance of the petitioner by this writ application is that once the alleged Award was published in the official Gazette under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'ACT') , the matter could not have been re-opened by the Industrial Tribunal after expiry of statutory period of 30 days from the date of publication of the Award when the Award was enforceable under Section 17A of the Act, and, therefore, the order impugned dated 4.10.1996 as contained in Annexure-4 is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed. 3. It appears that a dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal No.-1, Dhanbad, by the appropriate Government in exercise of its power under Section 10 of the Act for adjudication in the following terms : "Whether the action of the management of the M/s. BCCL at & P.C. Koyala Nagar, Dist. Dhanbad in dismissing Shri Ram Chandra Nonia from the service of the Co. w.e.f. 4.1.1992 is justified. If not, to what relief the workmen is entitled?" 4. The learned Tribunal after service of notice upon the concerned Union, who had espoused the case of the workman took up the matter to answer the reference and as the concerned Union did not turn up nor any written statement was filed the learned Tribunal held that the sponsoring Union is not interested in pursuing the present industrial dispute and further held that the Union has now no dispute with the management and, thus, passed "No Dispute Award" on 28.2.1995 as contained in Annexure-1. 5. After passing of the order as contained is Annexure-1, "No Dispute Award" was published in the official Gazette under section 17 of the Act on 15.3.1995 as contained in Annexure-2 and, thereafter, a petition was filed by the concerned workman on 12.8.1996 before the learned Tribunal after serving a copy of the same upon Sri S.N. Sinha, authorised Advocate for the management, to recall the order dated 28.2.1995 rendering the dispute as "No Dispute Award" on the ground that the concerned workman had no information of the proceeding and the Union, who had espoused its case, was prevented by sufficient cause in not appearing before the learned Tribunal. 6. The petition filed by the concerned workman is on record marked as Annexure-3. 6. The petition filed by the concerned workman is on record marked as Annexure-3. The learned Tribunal pursuant to the petition filed by the concerned workman directed Sri S.N. Sinha, learned counsel for the management to file rejoinder. On 04.10.1996 Mr. S.N. Sinha, learned counsel for the management appeared before the learned Tribunal and stated that he has no objection if the order dated 28.2.1995 rendering "No Dispute Award" is recalled and the learned Tribunal thereafter allowed the prayer made on behalf of the concerned workman on the same day fixed the case for 14.11.1996 for filing of the written statements, giving rise to this writ application. 7. Mr. A.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since "No Dispute Award" was published in the official Gazette on 15.3.1995 under Section 17 of the Act, the same had become enforceable after expiry of 30 days under section 17-A of the Act and after the award had become enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act, the learned Tribunal had become functus officio on expiry of 30 days from the date of the publication of the Award and, as such, the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to recall the Award. In support of his contention Mr. Mehta has placed reliance in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 606 and in case of Warring Co-op. Agriculture Service Society Ltd. vs. State of Pubjab and others, 1987 Lab. I.C., 539, (Pubjab & Harryana High Court). 8. for determining the question raised in this case, it would be proper to see the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Award has been defined under Section 2(b) of Act, which runs as under:- "award" means an interim or a final determination of any Industrial Dispute or any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A; Section 17 of the Act is the provision under which the award is published in the official Gazette and Section 17-A of the Act is a provision by virtue of which the award becomes enforceable on expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17 of the Act. 9. 9. Normally when an award or an exparte award is passed and the same is published in the official Gazette, the same becomes enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act on expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17 of the Act. 10. In this case is appears from the order as contained in Annexure-1 that it is no adjudication of the dispute and, therefore, the order an contained in Annexure-1 cannot be termed as an award as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Seeing the nature of the order as contained in Annexure-1, I hold that the order as contained in Annexure-1 is not an award as defined under section 2(b) of the Act, and therefore, the bar as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act shall not apply in this case and consequently thereof learned Tribunal does not become functus officio merely by virtue of operation of Sections 17 and 17-A of the Act. 11. In the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), the apex Court has held that the tribunal does not become functus officio provided an application is filed within 30 days of publication of award for setting aside the same. The apex court has further held that the tribunal has the powers of a Civil Court and an application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the exparte award was maintainable before the learned Tribunal, if the same was filed within 30 days of publication of the award. Since I have already held that the order as contained in Annexure-1 to this writ application cannot be termed as an award nor the same can be termed as an exparte award. The provision of Sections 17 and 17-A of the Act has no application and, thus, the ratio laid down by the apex Court does not fully apply in the facts and circumstances of this case. Likewise the ratio laid down in the case of Warring Coop. Agriculture Service Society Ltd. (supra) has also no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. The Industrial Dispute Act is a welfare legislation to ensure social justice to both employer and the employees and to ensure industrial harmony and progress of the industry by bringing cordial relations between the parties. Agriculture Service Society Ltd. (supra) has also no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. The Industrial Dispute Act is a welfare legislation to ensure social justice to both employer and the employees and to ensure industrial harmony and progress of the industry by bringing cordial relations between the parties. It, therefore, endeavours to resolve the competing claims of employers and employees by finding a solution which is just and fair to both the parties. 13. In the case at hand, it appears to me that the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal has been invoked by concerned workman who was dismissed from service and the dispute was already, referred by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act. Since the concerned workman or its Union espousing its case did not turn up before the learned tribunal, nothing was determined by the learned tribunal and merely an order was passed as contained in Annexure-1 rendering "No Dispute Award", which has been held to be not an award under Section 2(b) of the Act. From the tenure of the petition as contained in Annexure-3, it appears that it was an application tiled by the concerned workman under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for securing the ends of justice and also to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. It further appears to me that the prayer made on behalf of the concerned workman was not objected to by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the management petitioner and, therefore, the learned tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 151 of the C.P.C. allowed the prayer of the concerned workman and proceeded with the matter by the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4. Although the tribunal specified in Section 11 of the Act is not a court but it has the trappings of a Court and it exercises the quasi judicial function and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable in the proceeding before the tribunal and the learned tribunal, therefore, was justified in entertaining the petition filed by the concerned workman invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. and, thus, it logically followed that the learned tribunal was competent to entertain such an application to recall its previous order. For the reasons aforementioned it is, thus held that the learned tribunal had not become functus officio and it was competent to entertain the application filed by the concerned workman, which was well within its jurisdiction. The order impugned as contained in Annexure-4, therefore, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 14. In the result, I find no merit in this application. It is, thus, dismissed, but without costs.