JUDGMENT C.K. Prasad, J. 1. This is plaintiff's first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed suit for declaration of title over the house and the land adjoining thereto, as also for its vacant possession. First Additional District Judge, Khandwa by judgment and decree dated 11.2.94 passed in Civil Suit No. 2-A of 1988 dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 2. According to the genealogical table which is not disputed, Ratan Mishra (deceased) had three sons who are all dead, namely Hiralal, Ramnarayan and Sitaram. Hiralal and Sitaram died issuless. Wife of Sitaram is Govindibai. Ramnarayan had a son namely, Ayodhya Prasad (deceased) who had two sons, namely, Laxman Prasad and Kalka Prasad, who are also dead. Laxman Prasad had two sons, namely, Sudershan Prasad and Surya Prasad. Sudarashan Prasad is the plaintiff in the case. Wife of Kalka Prasad is Laxmi bai who had three daughters, one of whom had predeceased her and others are defendants Pushpabai and Kusumbai Laxmibai was impleaded as defendant No. 1 in the suit, and after her death two sons of her deceased daughter have been substituted in her place. 3. According to the plaintiff Nazul plot No. 148 having an area of 10475 sq. ft., over which houses were existing belonged to Ratan Mishra. After his death his three sons, namely, Hiralal, Ramnarayan and Sitaram inherited the property. According to the plaintiff in the year 1894 partition took place between the three brothers and all of them came in possession of the house as also the land falling in their respective shares. According to the plaintiff disputed plot as also the house constructed over the same fell into the share of Sitaram and so long he was alive, he used the same for his benefit and after his death his wife Govindibai remained in possession thereof. It is the plaintiff's case that Sitaram and Govindi Bai had no issue. In the disputed house there was a family temple of Bhagwan Ramchandraji and Bhagwan Mahedeoji. According to the plaintiff Sitaram died in the year 1896 whereas Govindibai died on 26.11.1939. 4. According to the plaintiff Govindibai executed a registered will on 7.6.1929 in relation to the suit property in favour of plaintiff Sudarshan Prasad. In the disputed house there was a family temple of Bhagwan Ramchandraji and Bhagwan Mahedeoji. According to the plaintiff Sitaram died in the year 1896 whereas Govindibai died on 26.11.1939. 4. According to the plaintiff Govindibai executed a registered will on 7.6.1929 in relation to the suit property in favour of plaintiff Sudarshan Prasad. In the said will Ayodhya Prasad and Laxman Prasad as also predecessor-in-interest of the defendant Kalka Prasad are attesting witnesses. According to the plaintiff after the death of Govindibai in the year 1939 he is the exclusive owner of the suit property in view of the will. According to the plaintiff as predecessor-in-interest of the defendant Kalka Prasad having consented and attested the will, defendants are estopped from challenging the will. 5. Case of the plaintiff further is that in execution of the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 495-B of 1923 against Ayodhya Prasad, Laxman Prasad and Kalka Prasad, the decree-holder attempted to take possession of the suit property but Govindibai declined to give possession and filed Civil Suit No. 22 of 1927. According to the plaintiff decree was passed in favour of Govindibai on 22.9.1927 and appeal preferred by the decree-holder of Civil Suit No. 495-B of 1923 was dismissed by the District Judge and the second appeal, by the Judicial Commissioner. According to the plaintiff by virtue of the said decree Govindibai had sole right, title and interest over the disputed property. 6. According to the plaintiff, Kalka Prasad got his name mutated in Nazul Khasra. Kalka Prasad died on 13.5.1985. According to the plaintiff in some portion of the ground floor as also the first floor Kalka Prasad used to stay alongwith his wife and daughters. After the death of Kalka Prasad defendants filed application for mutating their names in place of Kalka Prasad, which was objected by the plaintiff and ultimately the Sub Divisional Officer asked the parties to seek declaration of their title. On the basis of the aforesaid premises plaintiff prayed for declaration that he has sole right, title and interest over the suit house and the land attached thereto and he be given vacant possession of the portion in occupation of the defendants as also the mesne profits. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid premises plaintiff prayed for declaration that he has sole right, title and interest over the suit house and the land attached thereto and he be given vacant possession of the portion in occupation of the defendants as also the mesne profits. 7. Defendants in the written-statement denied the story of partition put forth by the plaintiff and it is their stand that the three sons of Ratan Mishra constituted a joint Hindu family. It has been specifically denied that the property in dispute, in the partition, fell into the share of Sitaram. Defendants have stated that they have no knowledge as to whether Govindibai was the wife of Sitaram. It has been stated that property which was in possession of Kalka Prasad is in their possession. It has been stated by the defendants that Sitaram died in the year 1896 and in accordance with the then existing law Govindibai had the life estate and in that view of the matter the plaintiff do not derive any benefit from the will executed by her. It has been further stated that Ayodhya Prasad, Laxman Prasad and Kalka Prasad were only the attesting witnesses but have not consented to the execution of the will. Decree dated 22.9.1927 passed in Civil Suit No. 22 of 1927 does not hold that Govindibai had title over the disputed property. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties trial Court framed various issues. It held that the property originally belonged to Ratan Mishra and after his death his three sons, namely, Hiralal, Ramnarayan and Sitaram got the same by inheritence. Partition between the brothers took place in the year 1894 and all of them came in separate possession of their respective share. It further held that the property shown by letters, G, H, I, D in the plaint map fall into the share of Sitaram and he and his wife remained in possession of the same till their death. It further held that after the death of Sitaram, Govindi had life estate. Learned Judge further held that Govindibai executed a registered will in favour of the plaintiff on 7.6.1928 in respect of the suit property, but the same is illegal. It further held that after the death of Sitaram, Govindi had life estate. Learned Judge further held that Govindibai executed a registered will in favour of the plaintiff on 7.6.1928 in respect of the suit property, but the same is illegal. It negative the contention of the plaintiff that the defendants are estoppel from challenging the right and title of the plaintiff as their predecessor-in-interest were the attesting witness of the will. However, the learned Judge held that Kalka Prasad as also his two brothers i.e. attesting witnesses had knowledge of the will. The learned Judge further held that by virtue of judgment and decree dated 12.9.1927 passed in Civil Suit No. 22 of 1927 Govindibai had not become the exclusive owner of the disputed property. 9. Shri J.P. Sanghi, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, does not challenge any of the findings of the trial Court, but he submits that the view taken by the learned Judge that defendants are not estopped from challenging the validity of the will, is erroneous. He further submits that the view taken by the trial Judge that the Govindibai did not become the exclusive owner of the property by virtue of the decree dated 12.9.1927 passed in Civil Suit No. 22 of 1927 is also erroneous. Shri Abhay Sapre, however, appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents submits that the principles of estoppel does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the learned Judge is right in holding that by virtue of decree Govindibai did not become the exclusive owner of the property. In view of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, following questions require to be determined 1. Whether the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants being attesting witness and had knowledge of the will, are estopped from challenging the will on the principle of estoppel? 2. Whether Govindibai had become the exclusive owner of the property by virtue of the decree ? 10. Sanghi submits that predecessor-in-interest of the defendants having knowledge about the will and being attesting witnesses to the will, they are estopped from challenging the will. In the case of Raj Lukhee Dobea Vs. Gokool Chander Chowdry (1869) 13 Mon Ind App. 209 (PC) it has been held as follows- Their Lordships cannot affirm the proposition, that the mere attestation of such an instrument by a relative necessarily imports concurrence. In the case of Raj Lukhee Dobea Vs. Gokool Chander Chowdry (1869) 13 Mon Ind App. 209 (PC) it has been held as follows- Their Lordships cannot affirm the proposition, that the mere attestation of such an instrument by a relative necessarily imports concurrence. It might no doubt, he shown by other evidence that when he became an attesting witness, he fully understood what the transaction was, and that he was a concurring party to it, but from the mere subscription of his name that infrence does not necessarily arise.; Further in the case of Raibhan Laxmanji Vs. Namdeo Punjaji AIR 1952 Nag 96. it has been held as follows- Attestion itself, as their Lordships of the Privy Council observed, does not create any estoppel nor does the belief of other parties as to the meaning of attestation affect the man who has placed his signature as a witness, unless it can be established, which has not been done in the present case, that he knew that that belief would arise and signed with that intent: Pandurang V. Markandeya 18 Nag. L.R. 1 (PC) It is relevant here to state that the finding of the trial Judge in the present case is that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants attested the will and they had knowledge about the same. Shri Sapre, appearing on behalf of the defendants has not made any attempt to essail the aforesaid finding. In view of the aforesaid fact I have to proceed to decide the appeal on the facts found by the trial Court that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants after knowing the contents of the will, attested the same. 11. Shri Sanghi submits that once predecessor-in-interest of the defendants have attested the will after knowing the contents thereof they are estopped from challenging the same. In support of the aforesaid submission, Shri Sanghi has placed reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Beharilal Vs. Gulab Chand AIR 1971 SC 1041 and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 9 of the Judgment- Hence the plaintiffs particularly Lakshmi chand and Ganeshilal who alone were the reversioners to the estate of Bulakichand on the date of the death of Pattobai, are estopped from contending that they are entitled to succeed to the properties given to Pattobai. The other plaintiffs have no independant right of their own in the properties with which we are concerned. In Dhyan Singh's case, 1952 SCR 478 : AIR 1952 SC 145 this Court ruled that even if an award made is invalid, the persons who were parties to that award are estopped from challenging the validity of the award of from going behind the award in a subsequent litigation. In T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities Vs. M. Raghava Mudliar (1961) 3 SCR 624 : AIR 1961 SC 797 , this Court ruled that if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversionary enters into a transaction which settles in claim as well as the claim of the opponent at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually opens. At the time of the compromise Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal were the nearest presumptive reversionary. They must be deemed to have known their rights under law. Under the compromise they purported to give a portion of the suit properties absolutely to Pattobai, evidently in consideration of her giving up her claim in respect of the other properties. They cannot be now permitted to resale from the compromise and claim a right inconsistent with the one embodied in the compromise. They cannot advance their case by impleading their sons as co-plaintiffs. Their sons can only claim through them. (Underlining mine) Yet another decision of which learned counsel placed reliance is a Judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Jagannatham Vs. Kunjithapatham AIR 1972 Mad 390 , and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 5 of the Judgment- But in the present case the first defendant by attesting the original of Ex.A.7 with knowledge of its contents really consented to whatever interest he had in the properties passing title to valambai and it was no longer open to him to question her title of valambal to the properties covered by it. Shri Sapre, however, appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents submits that the question of estoppel as pleaded by the plaintiff shall not operate against the defendants as in the present case the property has not been transferred by the widow during her life time and predecessor-in-interest of the defendants were attesting witnesses to the will, which by its nature is to take effect after the death of Govindibai and in that view of the matter, the attestation of the will shall not estop the defendants from challenging the same. 12. In the case of transfers inter vivos, the widow confers upon the transferee the right to hold the property during her life; she has a full right to do so. A Hindu widow can confer a right which is valid during her life time and give effect to it by delivery of possession. However, there is a distinction between the rights acquired by the transferee before the death of the widow and those after her death. In case of former the possession of the property is under a valid title and occupation thereof is not ipso facto or ab initio void. The interest which may survive after the death of the widow, in such circumstances, is not absolutely void by reason of the fact that the title was validly created at the beginning, but it shall be voidable at the instance of the reversionary. In my opinion, a Hindu widow cannot create a valid interest or even void able title in favour of any person to take effect after her death that is, by means of a testamentary bequest. A legatee under a will made by a Hindu widow does not take any interest until the death of the widow, when the widow herself ceases to have any interest in the property, it reverts to the heirs of her deceased husband. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that by the will Govindibai did not create any valid interest or even voidable title in favour of the plaintiff. Thus the will executed by Govindibai in favour of the plaintiff is void. Once it is held that the will executed by Govindibai is void, the same is wholly in-effective, in-operative and incapable of ratification and nothing can cure the same. Thus the will executed by Govindibai in favour of the plaintiff is void. Once it is held that the will executed by Govindibai is void, the same is wholly in-effective, in-operative and incapable of ratification and nothing can cure the same. Accordingly attention by the predecessor in-interest of the defendants shall be of no consequence and the defendants shall not be estopped from challenging the validity of the will. 13. Now referring to the authority relied on by Shri Sanghi, it is to be borne in mind that no rider is put on a Hindu widow having a life estate on the enjoyment or dealing with the property during her life time and she may alienate the same for legal necessity. A widow has most absolute power of the enjoyment and so long she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession. Therefore, a subtle distinction exists between a widow dealing with the property during her life time and dealing with the property by a document which takes effect after the death of the widow. A deed is an assurance of property from living persons to living persons but will is an assurance of property from the dead to the living. In the case of Krishna seharilal (supra) the principle of estoppel was applied in a case of family arrangement which is in the nature of a deed by which adjustment of the property took plane during life time which is not the situation, in case of a will. The authority relied on by the learned counsel is thus clearly distinguishable. In the case of Jagannathan Filial (supra), limited estates has become absolute by virtue of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. In the said case the Madras High Court has held as follows- If a widow succeeding to the estate of her husband alianates the property prior to the Act and her daughter as a limited owner succeeds in a suit filed by her as reversioner against the alianee, she would get a limited interest by virtue of the Hindu law of succession in force prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and it would be enlarged into an absolute estate under section 14(1) of the said Act. If the contingent interest created by a Hindu dying prior to the Hindu Succession Act fails and the property reverts to his estate, it may very well devolve as a limited estate on a female heir by virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Law in force prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and such limited estate will abviously become absolute by virtue of S. 14(1) of that Act. Thus, the authority relied on by Shri Sanghi is clearly distinguishable. 14. Shri Sanghi as also Shri Sapre submit that the question posed in the present case has been answered in the case of Tejmal Vs. Sawaji AIR 1931 Nagpur 194; but their stand is that the same supports the respective submissions made by them. It is not to reproduce in detail the said Judgment. It has been held as follows- A Hindu widow is incompetent to make a testamentary disposition of the property which devolves on her from her husband is beyond controversy. The question is whether the will becomes operative by reason of the fact that the next reversionary who could have contested the will consented to its terms simultaneously with its execution and subsequently during the proceeding before the mutation officer. It appears to me that the consent of the next reversion cannot validate a widow's will. (Underlining mine) In the said case it has been further held that as follows- These observations fully apply to the case of widow's will. The consent to a disposition cannot be legally effective until the instrument itself comes into force. I have already pointed out that a Hindu widow's will has no validity since her interest is extinguished on her death. It therefore, appears to me that the consent given by. Mt. Amriti and Mt. Dari cannot operate to impart any validity to Tulsa's will. Nor could It be a family arrangement since the dispositions comprised in the instrument were not put into affect during the widow's life time. However, Shri Sanghi has drawn my pointed attention to the following passage of the said Judgment- In fact he was not bound to go behind the entries in the Record of Rights for satisfying himself as to the title of his mortgagor See Mubarakan Nisse Sibi Vs. Muhammed Raza Khan A.I.R. 1931 Nag 194, Mt. Amriti and Mt. However, Shri Sanghi has drawn my pointed attention to the following passage of the said Judgment- In fact he was not bound to go behind the entries in the Record of Rights for satisfying himself as to the title of his mortgagor See Mubarakan Nisse Sibi Vs. Muhammed Raza Khan A.I.R. 1931 Nag 194, Mt. Amriti and Mt. Dari deliberately held out Dipa as the owner and they cannot now turn round and say the Dipa was not authorized to make the transfer. The principle of estoppel must therefore operate against the plaintiff who claims as the representatives of Mt. Amriti. Shri Sanghi drawing my attention to the aforesaid passage strenuously urged that in the aforesaid case principle of astoppel was applied and the suit was decreed. Shri Sanghi's reliance on the aforesaid passage is absolutely misconceived. In this case principle of estoppel was sought to be applied on the basis of consent to the will as also before Mutation Officer. In the case of former it has been specifically held that the principle of estoppel does not apply, whereas in the case of later it has been held that the same applies. Principle of estoppel was applied in the said case in relation to the entries in the record of Rights on the basis of consent, and has been specifically negatived in relation to will wherein it has been held that the 'consent given by Mt. Amriti and Mt. Dari cannot sparate to import any validity to Tulsa's will'. The authority referred to above clearly supports the case of the defendants. 15. It is relevant here to state that before the trial Court, reliance was placed on Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Dodda Subba Reddi Vs. S. Govinda Reddy A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 430; but in view of the judgment in Tejmal (supra) the trial Court found that even if it is held that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants have consented and attested the will, the same will not render the will legal. Shri Sanghi submits that judgment in the case of Dadda Subba Reddy (supra) clearly supports the case of the plaintiff and it has been wrongly distinguished by the trial Court. Shri Sanghi submits that judgment in the case of Dadda Subba Reddy (supra) clearly supports the case of the plaintiff and it has been wrongly distinguished by the trial Court. Shri Sanghi has drawn by attention to the following passage from paragraph 4 of the Judgment- During the life-time of the widow, a presumptive reversionary has only a spes succession is in the estate of the last male holder and he cannot, therefore, purport to convey the said interest or otherwise deal with it. His rights in the property would be crystallised only after succession opens. But after succession opens or even during the widow's life-time he may elect to stand by the transaction entered into by the widow or otherwise ratify it, in which case he would be precluded from questioning the transaction. In this connection, the cases have dealt with three different aspects on the principle of estoppel (i) that which is embodied in section 115 of the Evidence Act (ii) election in the strict sense of the term, whereby the person electing takes a benefit under the transaction and (iii) ratification i.e., agreeing to abide by the transaction. A presumptive reversionary, coming under any one of the aforesaid categories, is precluded from questioning the transaction when succession opens and when he becomes the actual. True it is that presumptive reversioner may elect to stand by the transaction entered into by the widow or otherwise retify it, in which case the reversioner would be precluded from questioning the transaction. As It is well known that by will the testator does not transfer the property during her life time, but by its nature, it takes effect after the death of the testator, Legatee by virtue of the will does not get anything during the life time of the testator. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that no transfer having taken place by virtue of will, its attestation by the reversioner shall not precludes them from questioning the same. Thus the judgment relied on by the learned counsel is clearly distinguishable. Further in the case of Tejmal (supra) this question pointedly came up for consideration and it has been held that in case of an instrument which has not been put into effect, during the widow's life time, the reversioner shall not be estopped from challenging the same. Thus the judgment relied on by the learned counsel is clearly distinguishable. Further in the case of Tejmal (supra) this question pointedly came up for consideration and it has been held that in case of an instrument which has not been put into effect, during the widow's life time, the reversioner shall not be estopped from challenging the same. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that the principle of estoppel does not bar the defendants in questioning the will executed by Govindibai in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that their predecessor-in-interest had attested and had knowledge of the will. 16. Shri Sanghi then contends that in view of the judgment and decree dated 22.9.1927 passed in Civil Suit No. 22 of 1927, Govindibai has exclusive title over the property and the defendants predecessor-in-interest being a party to the said proceeding, Govindibai had the right to deal with the property in the manner she liked. It is relevant here to state that a decree was passed against Ayodhya Prasad, Laxman Prasad and Kalka Prasad, and when the decree-holder attempted to take possession of the suit property Govindibai declined to give possession and filed Civil Suit No. 22 of 1927. Her suit was decreed by the trial Court on 12.9.1927 and the said decree has been affirmed in first appeal as also in second appeal. The decree passed in the said case reads as follows- It is declared that the plaintiff has right to the possession of the property mentioned on the reverse and marked A E F D on the map filed with the plaint and that the defendants cannot dispossess her from it. Shri Sanghi submits that the prodecessor-in-interest of the defendants being party in the aforesaid suit, the declaration in favour of Govindibai binds them and she can deal with the property in the manner she liked. In support of the aforesaid submission Shri Sanghi has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Gururmurthy and others Vs. K. Ayyappa A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1702; and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 8 of the said judgment- Her estate is not a life-estate, because in certain circumstances she can give an absolute and complete title. Nor is it in any sense an estate held in trust for reversionary. K. Ayyappa A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1702; and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 8 of the said judgment- Her estate is not a life-estate, because in certain circumstances she can give an absolute and complete title. Nor is it in any sense an estate held in trust for reversionary. Within the limits imposed upon her, the female holder has the most absolute power of enjoyment and is accountable to no one. She fully represents the estate, and, so long as she is alive, no one has any vested interests in the succession. The limitations upon her estate are the very substance of its nature and not merely imposed upon her for the benefit of reversionary. She is in no sense a trustee for those who may come after her. She is not bound to save the income, nor to invest the principal. If she makes savings, she can give them away as she likes. During her life time she represents the whole inheritance and a decision in a suit by or against the widow as representing the estate is binding on the reversionary heirs. It is the death of the female owner that opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession. In her life-time however, the reversionary right is a more possibility or apes succession is. It cannot be predicted who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. It is, therefore, impossible for a reversioner to contend that for any loss which the estate might have sustained due to the negligence on the part of the widow he should be compensated from out of the widow's separate properties. He is entitled to get only the property left on the date of the death of the widow. The widow could have, during her lifetime, for necessity, including her maintenance alienated the whole estate. The reversioner's right to institute a suit to prevent waste is a different matter. If it could have been established that in having allowed some part of the properties to be sold in revenue sale she was guilty of wilful waste it would have been a different matter. It would still have been necessary for the reversioner to have instituted a suit on that basis. If it could have been established that in having allowed some part of the properties to be sold in revenue sale she was guilty of wilful waste it would have been a different matter. It would still have been necessary for the reversioner to have instituted a suit on that basis. It is doubtful whether such a suit can be instituted after her death. In any case the necessary averments are not available in this suit. We are, therefore, unable to accept this contention. 17. Decree passed in favour of Govindibai is only in relation to her right to possession and not title and in that view of the matter she had the right only to deal with the property as a life estate. So long she is alive, no one has any vested interest in the succession. In her lifetime she could alienate the property for necessity including her maintenance. However, in the present case, Govindibai has not alienated the property during her lifetime. Govindibai represented the whole inheritance and decision in her favour as representing the estate is binding on the reversionary heirs. As stated earlier the decree obtained by Govindibai only conferred her the right of possession. Further the widow has not alienated the property during her lifetime. In that view of the matter, the authority in G. Gurumurthy and others (supra) is clearly distinguishable. In my considered opinion by earlier decree Govindibai did not become the exclusive owner of the property, but had only right to the possession. Accordingly it was not competent for her to execute the will. Both the submissions made on behalf of the appellant have, thus, no merit. 18. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed, but without cost. Appeal dismissed