RAMA NAND RAI v. DIRECTOR PANCHAYAT RAJ U P LUCKNOW
1997-05-30
B.M.LAL, P.K.JAIN
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
P. K. JAIN, J. Heard Sri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respon dents. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner prays for quashing the order dated 3-10-88 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) awarding punishment of reduc tion of pension by 5% and directing that for the suspension period he was not entitled to salary and allowance except subsistence al lowance already paid to him. 3. Petitioner was posted as District Panchayat Officer in Deoria and vide order dated 3-2-1984 he was transferred from Deoria to Ballia. His claim is that the trans fer was stayed by the State Government vide order dated 9-2-84 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition ). He was, however, suspended by Deputy Director Administration Panchayat Raj, Deoria vide order dated 2-5-84. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 14410 of 1984 in this Court and this Court vide order dated 28-11-1984 stayed the order of suspension dated 2-5-84 and order appoint ing the enquiry Officer dated 4-5-84. The petitioner retired on 30-11-84 from the said post. However, a charge-sheet was framed against him on 8-11-84 which was served upon him on 19-7-85 and the enquiry was concluded by the impugned order dated 3rd October, 1988. It is further stated that the petitioner was confirmed on the post of Dis trict Panchayat Raj Officer by an order dated 31-3-87 passed by the Director Panchayat Raj U. P. with effect from 1-4-84 as he was approved for confirmation by the Public Service Commission on 2-6-86. 4. The impunged order is challenged mainly on the ground that all the charges against the petitioner related to the date prior to his confirmation, although the en quiry was completed subsequent to the date of the confirmation yet in view of the doctrine of condonation and doctrine of washing off the acts of misconduct, if any, prior to the date of confirmation could not have been made a ground for substantiating the charges and holding the petitioner guilty of such charges. 5. The fact as stated above, are not very much disputed except that the charge-sheet dated 9-11-84 was served upon the petitioner earlier than 19-7-85. 6. The short question raised in this petition is whether in the circumstances stated above the doctrine of washing off would apply or not.
5. The fact as stated above, are not very much disputed except that the charge-sheet dated 9-11-84 was served upon the petitioner earlier than 19-7-85. 6. The short question raised in this petition is whether in the circumstances stated above the doctrine of washing off would apply or not. It is well settled prin ciple of service jurisprudence that no per son can be indicted for acts of omission or commission amounting to misconduct if after the date of omission or commission of such acts he had been promoted or confirmed. It would he deemed that such lapses on the part of the Government servant were considered at the time of his promotion, confirmation or crossing of the efficiency bar as the case may he and in case a decision is taken in his favour the lapses prior to the date of that decision were condoned and consequently, all the adverse entries/acts of omission or commission should stood washed off. This doctrine of condonation or washing off has been reiterated in a number of judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. 7. In Mathura Rai v. State of UP. and another, (1989) 1 UPLBEC 22, the facts were that the petitioner was confirmed in June, 1985 w. e. f. April, 1983. Prior to that during September 11, 1981 to 31st July, 1983 the petitioner held the charge of General Manger, Obra Hydel and Thermal Project. On certain complaints received against him the Government initiated vigilance enquiry and the report of such enquiry was submitted after his retirement. The enquiry report recommended suitable reduction in pension of the petitioner. This recommendation alongwith the enquiry report was submitted by the Government in September, 1984 to the Board with advise to make suitable reduction in the pension of the petitioner. The Secretary of the Board however, advised for imposing punishment of censure of warning only. The Govern ment did not agree with the enquiry report and ultimately directed calling for explana tion of the petitioner. The Government passed an order f> n 14th August, 1987 directing the reduction of pension by 5%.
The Secretary of the Board however, advised for imposing punishment of censure of warning only. The Govern ment did not agree with the enquiry report and ultimately directed calling for explana tion of the petitioner. The Government passed an order f> n 14th August, 1987 directing the reduction of pension by 5%. The Honble Supreme Court observed that if a vigilance enquiry initiated against employee is concluded after his retirement and yet he is confirmed after submission of the report adverse to him from back date for a period for which the enquiry was held his services should be deemed to be approved. Otherwise the two limbs shall not be work ing in cohesion. If confirmation results in diluting earlier entries and entitles a person to move further on promotional ladder then it certainly negatives the vigilance report which looses all its weight the substance. And that is what exactly happened in case of the petitioner. The vigilance report was sub mitted in August, 1984 whereas the petitioner was confirmed in 1985. The effect of confirmation in law was that services of petitioner stood approved. His pension, therefore, could not be reduced. The Honble Supreme Court in para 5 further observed that in any case these aspects could have been taken into account while con firming him in 1985. The vigilance enquiry completed after retirement of petitioner may have furnished material for taking dis ciplinary proceeding against him since he had retired but it was certainly material on which the confirmation of petitioner could have been withheld. But once he was con firmed it should be deemed that he was exonerated of all these flaws which were mere irregularity than illegality and there fore, it could not have furnished material on which such a serious action under Regula tion 470 (b) could have been taken. 8. In another case Dr. Girish Bihari v. State of U. P. , (1984) UPLBEC 953, the Supreme Court held that once adverse entries are wiped off by reason of promotion of the officer to higher post those entries lose all value and even if they form part of the service record of the officer they cannot be given effect. 9.
In another case Dr. Girish Bihari v. State of U. P. , (1984) UPLBEC 953, the Supreme Court held that once adverse entries are wiped off by reason of promotion of the officer to higher post those entries lose all value and even if they form part of the service record of the officer they cannot be given effect. 9. In yet another case The State of Pun jab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, AIR 1970 S C 2086, the facts were that the respondent Dewan Chuni Lal was a Sub- Inspector of Police and during departmental enquiry he was called upon to answer a charge framed on October, 12, 1949 setting forth extracts from his con fidential character roll showing his inef ficiency and lack of probity while in service from 1941 to 1948. It was argued before the Supreme Court that the crossing of the ef ficiency bar must be regarded as giving him a clean bill up to that date and in view of this the reports of 1941 and 1942 should not have been taken into consideration against him. In para 14 the Supreme Court held that "in our view reports earlier than 1944 should not have been considered at all inasmuch as he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar in that year. It is unthinkable that if the authorities took any serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency con tained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1942 they could have overlook the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the efficiency bar in 1944. " 10. A Division Bench of this Court in Uma Kant Tripathi v. State of U. P. and others, (1990) 1 UPLBEC 417, reiterated the same principle of law. That was a case in which the services of the petitioner were not regularised and were terminated on ground that there were three adverse entries in his character roll. The petitioner had made a representation agianst the three adverse entries which was pending and the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficien cy bar and subsequent to the crossing of the efficiency bar the order refusing to regularise his services and termination was passed.
The petitioner had made a representation agianst the three adverse entries which was pending and the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficien cy bar and subsequent to the crossing of the efficiency bar the order refusing to regularise his services and termination was passed. The High Court held that the doctrine of washing off the adverse entries on promotion of the officer is applicable and the principle is not confined to the cases of promotion only. It applies to the cases of promotion on ad hoc or officiating basis as well as to the cases of crossing of the ef ficiency bar or confirmation. The High Court observed that if it were not so, an officer would be subject to repeated review of his adverse entries of remote past at various stages even though they were rendered ineffective as he was given promo tion to higher post at an earlier stage despite those adverse entries. 11. In view of the above settled legal position we are of the view that on facts of the present case also the doctrine of con donation and doctrine of washing off ap plies and once the petitioner was confirmed on a date subsequent to the date for which the lapses on his part were being inves tigated, he would be deemed to have been condoned with respect to such lapses. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 12. The petition is allowed. The im pugned order is quashed and it is directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to full salary for the period of suspension and also the full pension on his retirement on attain ing the age of superannuation. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. .