S. K. PHAUJDAR, J. This writ petition and the matters in Writ Petition numbers 9042 and 5086 of 1996,12175,17715,17842, 10849 and 10850, all of the 1997, were heard together on the question of admission and interim orders. As a common question was raised in all these matters, the present order will cover all the aforesaid writ petitions and specific directions in individual cases, depending upon the variations in the specific cases, are also indicated herein. 2. All the petitioners in these petitions are teachers in State aided schools, managed by private management. In the year 1978, a Govt. order was issued calling for options from teachers in the schools under private management to indicate whether they proposed to retire at 58 and avail an opportunity of the old pension scheme or they would opt for retiring at 60 years and to come under the new pension scheme. The aforesaid G. O. was followed by another in 1990 calling for fresh option not only from such teachers who had not opted in terms of the 1978 G. O. but also from those who had once opted under that G. O. This G. O. of 1990 was modified by a sub sequent G. O. in 1991. In the G. O. of 1990 it was indicated that a teacher, who does not opt, would be deemed to have opted to retire at the age of 58. Regulation 21 under Chapter 3 of the Regulations made under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act had raised the age of retirement of teachers from 58 to 60 and this necessitated the modifica tion in the G. O. of 1990 and G. O. of 1991 was issued to indicate that absence of option would deem that a teacher had chosen to retire at 60. This modified G. O. did not affect in any manner the right of second option of a person who had already made an option in 1978. 3. All the present petitioners had exer cised their first option either in accordance with the 1978 G. O. or under the subsequent G. Os. Subsequently, presumably on some interpretation of a judgment of this Court, each of them withdrew that option and most of them made a second option. In terms of their first options, they would have retired at 58 on some date prior to 30th June, 1997. Subsequently, presumably on some interpretation of a judgment of this Court, each of them withdrew that option and most of them made a second option. In terms of their first options, they would have retired at 58 on some date prior to 30th June, 1997. In one individual case, however, to be indicated subsequently when specific cases are taken up, superannuation would have effect on 30-6-1995 and the petitioner was continuing and was retired in April, 1996. The petitioners claimed that with their withdrawal of the first option or with the placement of a second option, the first option stood nullified. 4. The common questions of law that arise for consideration are whether an op tion once exercised could be withdrawn and the second option could be exercised and, if so, at what point of time. A further question arose as to what would be acceptance of an option. In most of the cases the petitioners urged that the G. Os. required that accep tance or rejection of the options should be intimated to the individual teachers and it was urged that non-communication would amount to non-acceptance and, as such, withdrawal or exercise of second option was open to each of them. 5. In this connection, reference maybe made to the case of Devi Krishna Goel, as decided by the Supreme Court. Here also a first option was exercised. No. communica tion of acceptance was made to the con cerned teacher. The High Court decided the matter against the teacher and the matter went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court clearly ruled here that an option may be withdrawn at any point of time prior to its acceptance. On facts, it was found that when there was no denial of the averment that the option was not accepted; it was deemed to have been not accepted. No pronouncement was made on the point if non-communication would automatically suggest non-acceptance. 6. So far the Allahabad High Court is concerned, similar points came up before Honble S. R. Singh, J. in the case of Prakash Chand Sharma, in W. P. No. 17267 of 1992. The decision stands reported in (1995) 3 UPLBEC1971. No pronouncement was made on the point if non-communication would automatically suggest non-acceptance. 6. So far the Allahabad High Court is concerned, similar points came up before Honble S. R. Singh, J. in the case of Prakash Chand Sharma, in W. P. No. 17267 of 1992. The decision stands reported in (1995) 3 UPLBEC1971. It was held in this case that when a teacher was employed in an institu tion covered by the G. O. of 1978 and he had exercised his option to retire at 58 years, in the prescribed form and such form was counter-signed by the competent authority, i. e. the DIOS, the matter attained a finality and no specific seperate order of formal acceptance was necessary. Such option be came final and irrevocable. It was further ruled in this case that the subsequent G. Os. dated 6-10-90 and 6-11-91 on the question of renewal of option did not give any right to withdraw the first option already given by a teacher. This judgment was challenged in a Special Appeal No. 289 of 1995 and a Division Bench of this High Court con sidered all the relevant points in the matter and the case-laws on this point were dis cussed in details. The Division Bench held that submission of option by the teachers in response to the 1978 G. O. and the Rules dated 29-8-1981 amounted to acceptance on their part of the offer of the State Govern ment. It was further held that in the absence of express or implied requirement of accep tance, no further acceptance was required except as provide in clause (16) of the Rules of 1981, i. e. the counter-signature of the DIOS and forwarding one copy to the management for being pasted on the service record of the teacher and another copy to the Dy. Director of Education for informa tion which were merely official and mini sterial acts. The Division Bench further ob served that the time played a dominant role and after a lapse of a reasonable long period a teacher could not back out and revoke his promise. The scope of the Government order was also discussed by the Division Bench and it was concluded that options exercised by the teachers became final and irrevocable on their being counter- signed by the competent authority and the G. Os. The scope of the Government order was also discussed by the Division Bench and it was concluded that options exercised by the teachers became final and irrevocable on their being counter- signed by the competent authority and the G. Os. did not give a fresh opportunity to such teachers whose option had been accepted by the competent authority. 7. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in Devi Krishna Gaels case and from the judgment of the Division Bench in the special appeal, it is now clear that if an option had already been accepted it would not be open for revocation and the other judgments relied upon by the petitioner to say that the options were revocable at any point of time prior to superannuation would not be applicable to the present con troversy in view of the aforementioned two judgments. As to what is acceptance has also been explained by Honble Mr. Justice S. R. Singh and confirmed by the Division Bench in special appeal. 8. Another common point involved in the matters is whether non- communica tion would suggest non- acceptance. A read ing of the relevant G. Os. suggests that com munication is an act consequential to accep tance and was not a condition precedent for an acceptance. There is no suggestion that the act of acceptance would be deemed com plete only on communication. The Division Bench in this case of EC. Sharma has held that communication was merely a mini sterial act. If no communication was made, It will have its own bearing on the conduct of the officer liable to communicate, but it will not, in my view, nullify acceptance if other wise made. 9. Coming to the individual cases, it is found that in W. P. No. 12175 of 1997, the petitioner was to retire on 30-6-1995 on account of his first option made in 1982 on attaining the age of 58 years together with the session benefit. It is his grievance that there was no communication from the authorities whether his option was accepted or not. He submitted his second option in 1991. He was allowed to work even after 30th June, 1995 and was retired in April, 1996. The question is of acceptance in terms of the interpretation of the their acceptance and it is a question of fact. He submitted his second option in 1991. He was allowed to work even after 30th June, 1995 and was retired in April, 1996. The question is of acceptance in terms of the interpretation of the their acceptance and it is a question of fact. Accordingly, the respondents in this case are directed to come up with counter-affidavit within 6 weeks. Rejoinder affidavit may be put in within a week thereafter. For this case, it is directed that till further orders, no recovery of the extra payment made to the petitioner may be made. 10. In W. P. No. 5086 of 1996 the petitioner made the first option in 1982 and a second option was again made on 26-12-1991 on the ground that a fresh right was given by the new G. Os. of 1990 and 1991. In this case also the respondents are to indicate if the option exercised in 1982 was accepted. Let a counter-affidavit be filed within 6 weeks. Rejoinder affidavit may be filed within a week thereafter. As an interim measure, in this case, it is directed that if the option exercised in 1982 has not been ac cepted by counter-signature of the DIGS, the petitioner shall be allowed to work till he attains the age of 60 years together with session benefit. However, his retirement benefits may not be disbursed except with an order from this Court. 11. In W. P. No. 9042 of 1996, the learned Counsel very fairly submitted that the first option exercised in 1991 was ac cepted in 1992 and the second option was exercised in 1996 on the basis of a judgment of this High Court that an option could be changed any time before the retirement. Once the option has attained finality by acceptance in 1992, it is not open to be withdrawn and no second option could be exercised. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. 12. In W. P. Nos. 15474, 17715, 17842, 10849 and 10850, all of 1997, options were initially exercised to retire at 58. No com munication of acceptance or otherwise was made and either the options were withdrawan or second options were exer cised. Whether option were accepted or not could be known from the affidavits of respondents. Therefore, in all these cases the respondents are directed to come up with a counter-affidavit within 6 weeks. Rejoinder affidavit may be filed within a week thereafter. Whether option were accepted or not could be known from the affidavits of respondents. Therefore, in all these cases the respondents are directed to come up with a counter-affidavit within 6 weeks. Rejoinder affidavit may be filed within a week thereafter. In this case, it is directed that if the first options exercised by the respective teachers had not been accepted by the counter-signature of the DIOS on a date prior to the dates of withdrawal/second option, the concerned teachers will be al lowed to work till attaining the age of 60 years plus the period of session benefit. In all these cases, retirement benefits may not paid to the respective teachers except with an order from this Court. 13. The W. P. No. 9042 of 1996 has been dismissed. The other writ petitions be listed on 12-8-1997. Order accordingly. .