S. K. DUBEY, J. ( 1 ) -THIS is defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20th August, 1981, passed by viith Additional District Judge, Ujjain in Civil appeal No. 17-A/1980, preferred against the judgment and decree dated 19. 3. 1981 passed in Civil Suit No. 135-A/80 by Civil judge, Class I, Khachrod. ( 2 ) THE appeal was admitted on 12-11-1981 on the following substantial questions of law : (A) Whether the learned Additional district Judge was right in treating the notice to quit (Ex. P1) as valid in spite of the fact that it pur 'ported to terminate the tenancy of the appellant treating it to consist of merely two rooms whereas in fact it consists of certain other premises not specified therein? (b) Whether the learned Additional district Judge was right in permitting the amendment enlarging the scope of the suit, that too without affording an opportunity to the defendant-appellant for making amendment consequential thereto? ( 3 ) FACTS giving rise to this appeal are thus: Admittedly, the appellant was a tenant of the tenanted premises consisted of two rooms, kitchen, bathroom and latrine on the ground floor of the building Municipal No. 25 (New number 31) situated at Jawahar Marg, nagda Mandi. Tenancy was month to month, commencing from 1st of English Calender month. The respondent-landlord served a fifteen days' notice dated 11. 5. 1976 (Ex. D3)under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act, 1882 (for short T. P. Act) terminating the tenancy with the expiry of the month, that is, on 30. 6. 1976, postal acknowledgment due is ex. P2. In the notice premises were described as two rooms, taken on rent by the appellant for the purpose of carrying hotel, but the appellant was using for residential purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy. The demand for arrears of rent, Rs. 800/- payable upto 30. 6. 1976 at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month was also made. The appellant sent the reply dated 2. 7. 1976, Ex. D. 6, stating therein that he was admitted as tenant in the year 1962 on monthly rent of Rs. 50a per month of the accommodation, consisted of two rooms, latrine, bath room and rasoi (kitchen) for the purpose of residence. The rent was then increased to Rs. The appellant sent the reply dated 2. 7. 1976, Ex. D. 6, stating therein that he was admitted as tenant in the year 1962 on monthly rent of Rs. 50a per month of the accommodation, consisted of two rooms, latrine, bath room and rasoi (kitchen) for the purpose of residence. The rent was then increased to Rs. 60/- per month, in the year 1967 and then in the year 1973 Rs. 70/- and lastly from 1. 6. 1976 Rs. 80/- per month. The quit notice was served with an ulterior motive to increase the rent. ( 4 ) AFTER the expiry of the period of the quit notice the plaintiff instituted the suit on 1. 7. 1976 for eviction and arrears of rent. The appellant contested suit on various grounds amongst which the legality of notice under section 106 of the T. P. Act, was challenged as the notice was not for whole of the accommodation taken on rent. The trial court after recording of evidence negatived the defences and decreed the suit for the accommodation described in paragraph 1 of the plaint. The appellant aggrieved of the judgment and decree of eviction, preferred an appeal. In appeal, the respondent-plaintiff filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of civil Procedure on 17. 8. 1981 to amend paragraph 1 of the plaint so as to correct the description of the tenanted accommodation, that is, two rooms, inclusive of kitchen, verandah, bath room, latrine. The First appellate court after hearing the appeal on merits and hearing on the application for amendment allowed amendment on costs of Rs. 50/ -. Thereafter, in exercise of powers under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code passed the decree which ought to have been passed by the trial court for the tenanted accommodation, that is two rooms, kitchen, bath room, latrine, which were given on rent along with the two rooms and not independently of two rooms on the ground floor of municipal House No. 25. ( 5 ) SHRI P. K. Saxena, learned Senior-Counsel for the appellant contended that the accommodation taken on rent consists of two rooms, latrine, bath room and kitchen. But In quit notice, Ex. P. 1, the accommodation is described as two rooms on ground floor or municipal House No. 25 of which the appellant is shown as tenant on the monthly rent of Rs. But In quit notice, Ex. P. 1, the accommodation is described as two rooms on ground floor or municipal House No. 25 of which the appellant is shown as tenant on the monthly rent of Rs. 80/ -. Therefore, the quit notice was illegal and bad and on such notice, the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit. The trial court decreed the suit in relation to the two rooms only as of which the quit notice was served against which the appellant filed an appeal wherein the appellate court under order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme court in Koksingh v. Deokabai passed the decree for other portion also of the tenanted accommodation, namely, latrine, bath room and kitchen for which there was no notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act. The notice under Section 106 of the T. P. . Act ought to have been for entire tenancy and not for the determination of partial tenancy. The plaintiff could not have terminated the tenancy in part nor could have instituted the suit on such illegal notice for seeking ejectment of the accommodation let to the appellant. The First appellate court after hearing arguments not only allowed the application for amendment butalso granted the decree for ejectment for the accommodation let to the appellant without giving an opportunity to make a consequential amendment in the written statement and without recording any evidence. The respondent did not file any cross objection or appeal for seeking the decree of the part of tenanted accommodation which was not granted. Therefore, the First Appellate Court, under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure code illegally passed the decree. Counsel cited a decision of the Supreme Court in chimanlal v. Misrilal and an unreported decision of this court in Beni Shanker v. Hussain Bee, at Bench at Indore. ( 6 ) SHRI M. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the written statement, the appellant admitted that he is the tenant of the two rooms, kitchen, bath room, latrine on the ground floor of House No. 25, on monthly rent of Rs. 80/ -. The validity of the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was challenged as it did not purport to two rooms, kitchen, bath room and latrine. The omission was due to bona fide mistake. 80/ -. The validity of the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was challenged as it did not purport to two rooms, kitchen, bath room and latrine. The omission was due to bona fide mistake. The respondent intended to terminate the tenancy with respect to entire accommodation of which rent was Rs. 80/- per month. It was a case of mis-description about the accommodation in question in the notice Ex. P1. The appellant knew full well and sent the reply Ex. D6. As the monthly tenancy was right determined under Section 111 (h) of the T. P. Act by notice in accordance with Section 106 of the T. P. Act, the First Appellate Court rightly allowed the application for amendment so as to remove ambiguity in the pleadings in relation to the tenanted premises of which the parties went with the trial conscious of the issue. Therefore, no prejudice was caused to the appellant in not giving the opportunity to make a consequential amendment in the written statement. The decree passed by the trial court was rightly modified by exercise of the powers under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, Counsel relied on Koksingh's case (supra) and a short noted decision of this court in S. A. No. 153/74 (J) decided on 4. 1. 1977 Motilal v. Balkrishna. ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY; the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 were not extended to the area of Nagda Mandi, therefore, the suit for eviction was instituted after expiry of the period of notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act to determine the tenancy. True, it is the law that the notice determining the tenancy must be in respect of property leased or given on rent and not in respect of only a portion of the rented property, as splitting of tenancy is not permissible. However, in the case in hand, it is not the case of either party that the notice intended to splitting of the tenancy of the appellant. It is also not the case of either party that the kitchen, latrine and bath room are not part of the tenanted accommodation consisted of two rooms on the ground floor of Municipal House no. 25. The kitchen, latrine and bath room cannot be independently used. In the notice there was a bona fide omission of the premises. It is also not the case of either party that the kitchen, latrine and bath room are not part of the tenanted accommodation consisted of two rooms on the ground floor of Municipal House no. 25. The kitchen, latrine and bath room cannot be independently used. In the notice there was a bona fide omission of the premises. Therefore, in the circumstances, the notice to quit has to be liberally construed so that it should not be defeated by inaccuracy either in the description of the premises on because of incorrect name either of the tenant or landlord or other similar inaccuracy. The appellant was well informed of termination of his tenancy of the entire premises which he was occupying as a tenant on monthly rent of rs. 80/- that is, the respondent intended toterminate the tenancy with respect of the entire accommodation let to him. The Privy council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi roy, held that a notice to quit under Section 106 of the T. P. Act has to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice and it has not to be construed strictly as a pleading. Notice to quit containing errors honestly but mistakenly on inadvertently made, has to be construed in the light and the test whether the contents of the notice were sufficient for the tenant, conversant of all facts. Attempt should not be made to find fault to render the notice defective, but the notice must be construed; ut res magis valeat guam pereat (it is better to validate thing than to invalidate it; better the act prevail than perish ). However, Privy Council has stressed that this principle would not apply where inaccuracy therein has been deliberately inserted for some fraudulent or ulterior purpose. ( 8 ) THE decision relied in Premshanker's case (supra) has no application in the facts of the present case as in the facts of that case this court observed that the description of the premises in the notice was not honest or due to inadvertent mistake; but was deliberate or for some ulterior purpose in order to make out an additional ground for eviction under clause (0) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the m. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. ( 9 ) THE decision in Chimanlal's case (supra) is distinguishable on facts. ( 9 ) THE decision in Chimanlal's case (supra) is distinguishable on facts. In that case the suit was instituted for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent under Section 12 (1) (a)of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and notice mandated under Section 12 (l) (a) demanding rental arrears did not relate to entire accommodation actually let to tenant, but, in order to lesser part of it. The supreme Court after referring to Sections 12 (l) (a), 12 (3) and 13 observed that, it is not a case of the mis-description of the accommodation where both parties knew perfectly well that the notice referred to accommodation let to tenant, nor it was a case where the discrepancy between the accommodation alleged by the landlord and that actually let to the tenant is marginal or insubstantial. The proceedings show that there was a serious dispute between the parties as to the material extent of the accommodation let by the one to the other. Therefore, the Supreme Court after referring to Sections 12 (l) (a), 12 (3) and Section 13 observed that the notice referred to in Section 12 (l) (a) must be a notice demanding the rental arrears in respect of the accommodation actually let to the tenant. It must be a notice (a)demanding the arrears of rent in respect of the accommodation let to the tenant and (b)the arrears of rent must be legally recoverable from the tenant. There can be no admission by a tenant that arrears of rent are due unless they relate to the accommodation let to him. The notice of demand is an act independent of the institution of the suit. The notice and plaint are two distinct matters, different by nature, designed and different purposes and located in two different points of time. They operated in two different planes, and are related in so far only that one is a condition for maintaining the order. ( 10 ) IN the case in hand, it is not the case of the appellant that notice was for ulterior or fraudulent purpose, but it intended to terminate the tenancy of the entire tenanted premises let to the appellant. Therefore, the omission in the notice of kitchen, bath room and latrine was not fatal. To say so, I take support from the decision of this court in motilal's case (supra ). Therefore, the omission in the notice of kitchen, bath room and latrine was not fatal. To say so, I take support from the decision of this court in motilal's case (supra ). ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, allowing the application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the civil Procedure Code by the First Appellate court to remove inaccuracy or omission of the part of the premises let, that is, kitchen, latrine and bath room, cannot be said to be mala fide; but, was necessitated in the interest of justice and to remove the defect of inaccurate pleading contained in paragraph 1 of the plaint, in relation to which the parties contested the suit, conscious of the issue, involved in the objection raised by the appellant in his written statement and for that parties led evidence. Therefore, it was not necessary to give an opportunity to make a consequential amendment in the written statement and to give an opportunity to parties to lead evidence. The appellant was not prejudiced nor any prejudice has been shown. Therefore, the First Appellate Court was right in passing the decree for the eviction of entire accommodation under Order 41, Rule 33, civil Procedure Code, placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Koksingh's case (supra ). ( 12 ) AS a result of the above, there is no merit in this appeal and has to be dismissed affirming the decree for eviction and mesne profits. The appellant is granted six months time from the date of this judgment to hand over the vacant possession of the suit accommodation to the respondent landlord on the condition that the appellant shall deposit all the arrears of the rent, if not already deposited and the costs throughout with an undertaking before the trial court to hand over the vacant possession within the time fixed by this court. ( 13 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 750 if pre-certified. Appeal dismissed. .