Judgment :- SHIVRAJ V. PATIL, J. This appeal is by a person, who claims to be in possession of the property in question which is the subject-matter of the decree passed by this Court in C.S. No. 49 of 1975 which is in execution now, in E.P. No. 71 of 1993, against the order dated 23-12-1996 made by the learned single Judge in Application No. 4325 of 1996 in the said Execution Petition. 2. Briefly stated, the facts and events which are considered necessary and relevant for the disposal of this appeal, are the following :- C.S. No. 49 of 1975 was filed by the decree-holder for setting aside the sale deed dated 20-5-1965 in respect of the suit schedule property and for recovery of possession. Though the said suit was dismissed by the learned single Judge on original side, it was reversed by the Division Bench in O.S.A. No. 93 of 1979 and the sale deed dated 20-5-1965 executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant was held void, and further the defendants were directed to deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff. S.L.P. (Civil) No. 7849 of 1988 filed against the Judgment and decree passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforementioned appeal was also dismissed on 11-12-1992. 3. The decree-holder filed E.P. in 1993. On 5-4-1994 orders were passed for issuing warrant for delivery of possession. When the said warrant was sought to be executed, the appellant herein obstructed the delivery on 27-4-1994. On the same day the defendant in the suit filed application to set aside the warrant for delivery, and stay was granted in the Execution petition staying further proceedings. The stay order was vacated on 9-12-1994 on the application of the decree-holder. On 3-1-1995 the decree-holder applied for amending the door No. of the property and also sought police help which prayers were granted by the Master by order dated 20-7-1995. 4. Within a fortnight thereafter, the appellant filed Application Nos. 3896/95 and 3897/95 obstructing the execution of warrant and seeking stay of the order directing issue of warrant. An ex parte stay was granted by the Master on 3-8-1995. On notice the decree-holder, besides filing counter-affidavit to the said applications, filed an application No. 4813/95 for removal of the obstruction. 4. Within a fortnight thereafter, the appellant filed Application Nos. 3896/95 and 3897/95 obstructing the execution of warrant and seeking stay of the order directing issue of warrant. An ex parte stay was granted by the Master on 3-8-1995. On notice the decree-holder, besides filing counter-affidavit to the said applications, filed an application No. 4813/95 for removal of the obstruction. The Master by his order dated 18-11-1996 after holding enquiry on applications 3896, 3897 and 4813/95, directed to re-issue the warrant. 5. The appellant filed Application No. 4925/96 to set aside the order dated 18-11-1996 passed by the Master in Application No. 4813/95 in E.P. 71/93 in C.S. 49/75, and also to stay further proceedings in the said execution petition. The learned single Judge, after hearing the parties and on detailed examination of the contentions raised, passed the order under appeal, dismissing the application No. 4325/96 filed by the appellant. Hence this appeal filed by the appellant as already stated above. 6. Shri G. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the appellant urged that - (i) the application 4813/95 was clearly barred by time as it was not made within a period of 30 days from the date of actual obstruction i.e., 27-4-1994 having regard to Article 129 of the Limitation Act; (ii) the possession of the appellant over the suit property was not under the Judgment debtor,or the appellant did not claim his possession over the property under the Judgement debtor, or that he was resisting delivery of possession at the instance of the judgment debtor; he refers to his possession over the property prior to 1970 i.e., prior to filing of the suit itself; hence the order made for removal of obstruction was not correct and it was invalid; (iii) in view of the amended provisions of Order 21, Rules 91 to 98, it is open to the decree-holder to file a separate suit. Under the circumstances the learned single Judge was not right in dismissing application No. 4325/96 by the order under appeal. Under the circumstances the learned single Judge was not right in dismissing application No. 4325/96 by the order under appeal. In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions :- (i) "Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain" 1995 AIR(SC) 358, 1994 (3) CCC 282, 1994 (6) JT 626 , 1995 (1) RentLR 95, 1994 (4) Scale 597 , 1995 (1) SCC 6 , 1995 (1) SCJ 237, 1995 (1) BLJR 57, 1995 RD 144; (ii) "Babulal v. Raj Kumar," 1996 AIR(SC) 2050, 1996 (2) AD(SC) 330, 1996 (1) CLT 528 , 1996 (1) CCC 305, 1996 (2) JT 716 , 1996 (2) Supreme 601 , 1996 (2) Scale 438 , 1996 (3) SCC 154 , 1996 (1) UJ 700 , 1991 ILR(Kant) 254; (iii) "Vegulla Satyanarayana Murthy v. Alluri Annapurnamma", (1992) 1 Andh LT 371 and (iv) "Ambika Prasau Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rai", 1965 1966 AIR(SC) 605, 1966 (1) SCR 758 , 1966 BLJR 147. 7. Per contra, Shri C. T. Mohan, learned counsel for the respondents argued in support and jsutification of the order under appeal. He submitted that the obstruction said to have been made on 27-4-1994 was no obstruction in reality as Door No. of the property given in the decree was different and as such the decree could not be executed as on 27-4-1994. Thereafter application Nos. 3433/95 and 3434/95 were filed by the decree-holder seeking police protection and for amendment of the door number in the decree. The said application were allowed on 20-7-1995. On the same day the learned Master was pleased to pass orders to issue warrant for delivery of possession. The appellant filed Application Nos. 3896/95 and 3897/95 objecting and obstructing for executing the warrant for delivery of possession and for grant of stay. An ex parte stay was granted on 3-6-1995. The decree holder filed application No. 4813/95 on 18-8-1995 for removal of obstruction which was allowed on 18-11-1996 and order was passed to re-issue warrant to execute the decree and deliver possession. The warrant was issued on 19-11-1996 pursuant to the order made in Application No. 4813/95. It is thereafter the appellant filed Application No. 4325/96 to set aside the order dated 18-11-1996 passed by the learned Master who had ordered removal of obstruction and execution of the decree. 8. The warrant was issued on 19-11-1996 pursuant to the order made in Application No. 4813/95. It is thereafter the appellant filed Application No. 4325/96 to set aside the order dated 18-11-1996 passed by the learned Master who had ordered removal of obstruction and execution of the decree. 8. On the basis of those events, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that application No. 4813/95 filed on 18-8-1995 was clearly within the time reckoned from 3-8-1995 the date on which the appellant filed Application No. 3896/95 obstruction and objecting for executing the warrant for delivery of possession. The learned counsel also submitted that the appellant has taken inconsistent stand. Once he has stated that he was claiming his possession under the Judgment-debter, and at some other time he has stated that he did not claim any right or possession under the Judgment debtor. Further the appellant submitted to the jurisdiction and fully participated in the enquiry held in the application made for removal of obstruction; both oral and documentary evidence were brought on record during enquiry. He cannot now turn round and say that the order passed for removal of obstruction was without jurisdiction. The learned counsel added that the appellant has not shown the nature of his right as to title or interest in the property in question; his claim on the basis of adverse possession was neither pleaded properly nor it was established. 9. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of "Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain", 1995 AIR(SC) 358, 1994 (3) CCC 282, 1994 (6) JT 626 , 1995 (1) RentLR 95, 1994 (4) Scale 597 , 1995 (1) SCC 6 , 1995 (1) SCJ 237, 1995 (1) BLJR 57, 1995 RD 144 referring to Order 21, Rule 35(3), and Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. had held that Order 21, Rule 35(3) postulates that the person in possession of the immovable property covered by the decree must be per force bound by the decree, in other words the resistor must claim derivative title from the Judgment debtor. Under Order 21, Rule 97 the Court gets power to remove such obstruction or resistance and direct its officer to put the decree-holder in possession of the immovable property after conducting an enquiry under Rule 97, and that Rule 97 envisages "any person" even including the Judgment debtor irrespective whether he claims derivative title from the Judgment debtor, or sets up his own right, title, or interest dehors the Judgment debtor, and he resists execution of decree. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the said Judgment read thus :- "3. A reading of Order 21, Rule 35 (3) postulates that the person in possession of the immovable property to be delivered under the decree must be per force bound by the decree. Admittedly, Satyanarain was not a judgment-debtor and that therefore, he is not bound by the decree unless he claims right, title or interest through the judgment-debtor, Ram Kishan. The person resisting delivery of possession must be bound by the decree for possession. In other words the resistor must claim derivate title from the judgment-debtor. The Court gets power under Order 21, Rule 97 to remove such obstruction or resistance and direct its officer to put the decree-holder in possession of the immovable property after conducting enquiry under Rule 97." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 5. The procedure has been provided in Rules 98 to 103. We are not, at present, concerned with the question relating to the procedure to be followed and question to be determined under Order 21, Rules 98 to 102. A reading of Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. clearly enivasages that "any person" even including the judgment debtor irrespective whether he claims derivative title from the judgment-debtor or set up his own right, title or interest dehors the judgment-debtor and he resists execution of a decree, then the Court in addition to the power under Rule 35(3) has been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person in obtaining possession of immovable property was legal or not. The decree-holder gets a right under Rule 97 to make an application against third parties to have his obstruction removed and an enquiry thereon could be done. The decree-holder gets a right under Rule 97 to make an application against third parties to have his obstruction removed and an enquiry thereon could be done. Each occasion of obstruction or resistance furnishes a cause of action to the decree-holder to make an application for removal of the obstruction of resistance by such person." * 11. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as stated in paragraphs 3 and 5 extracted above, it is clear that the resistance or obstruction offered by a person claiming derivative title from the Judgment debtor is covered by Order 21, Rule 35 (3), and such obstruction can be removed. Any other person setting up his own right, title, or interest in the property dehors the Judgment-debtor, if resists execution of a decree, then the Court in addition to the power under Rule 35(3) of Order 21, gets power under Rule 97 of the said Order to remove the obstruction after enquiry. Further it is also laid down in the same Judgment, in paragraph 5 extracted above, that each occasion of obstruction or resistance furnishes a cause of action to the decree-holder to make an application for removal of the obstruction or resistance by such person. 12. In the case on hand, although the resistance was offered for the first time on 27-4-1994 the decree could not be executed on that date as the door number of the suit property was not correctly mentioned in the decree. The decree-holder made an application for amendment of the decree on 1-3-1995. The decree was amended accordingly on 20-7-1995. It was thereafter the learned Master ordered issue of warrant returnable by six weeks on 20-7-1995. The appellant filed application 3896/95 on 3-8-1995 obstructing execution of the warrant for delivery of possession. The decree-holder filed application 4813/95 on 18-8-1995 for removal of obstruction i.e., within 15 days from the date of obstruction. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that the application 4813/95 filed for removal of obstruction was barred by time under Article 129 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that the first application for obstruction was made on 27-4-1994, in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court aforementioned holding that each occasion of obstruction gives a cause of action for filing an application to remove the obstruction. The second occasion of obstruction was on 3-8-1995. The second occasion of obstruction was on 3-8-1995. Hence the application 4813/95 filed for removal of obstruction on 18-8-1995 was within time. 13. A reading of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Judgment of the Apex Court extracted above, do not leave any doubt having regard to Order 21, Rule 35(3), and Order 21, Rule 97 that even against any person not claiming under the decree-holder, obstructing the execution of a decree, an application can be filed for removal of obstruction. The Apex Court has explained, referring to two rules mentioned above as to "any person" stated in Rule 97. Thus both the contentions of the learned senior counsel that the application filed for removal of obstruction was barred by time and that such an application could not be filed against the appellant who did not claim under the Judgment debtor are to be rejected. 14. The learned single Judge in the order under appeal has noticed that the appellant has not stated anything as to how he derived title or interest in the property. He has simply stated that he has been in possession of the property even prior to 1970 i.e., prior to suit. The appellant has also not substantiated his plea of perfecting title by adverse possession over the suit property. The learned single Judge has also observed that the obstructor produced documents Exs. R1 to R9. In all these documents the address of the appellant is shown as the suit schedule property. The earliest of the document is of the year 1969. All other documents are subsequent to 1977. The suit was filed to set aside the sale deed dated 20-5-1965. The appellant did not even claim that he had acquired any right prior to 20-5-1965. On the materials placed before the Court, the learned Judge has recorded a finding that the appellant had no independant right over the property at all. Even otherwise, in the light of the Judgment of the Apex Court aforementioned, it cannot be said that the order under appeal is erroneous, inasmuch as whether the appellant claimed under the Judgment debtor his possession over the suit property or independent of the Judgment-debtor, the learned Master had jurisdiction to hold an enquiry and to pass an order to remove the obstruction, which the learned single Judge has rightly upheld. 15. 15. One more submission of the learned senior counsel made on behalf of the appellant to be noticed is that at least the matter could be remitted for holding an enquiry under Order 21, Rule 98, C.P.C. We do not think it is either appropriate or necessary to do so as the enquiry is already held by the learned Master before passing the order on 18-11-1996 in Application No. 4813/95 made for removal of obstruction. It is