Judgment : Plaintiffs 2 to 4 in O.S.No.163 of 1979, on the file of Sub Court, Thanjavur, are the revision petitioners. 2. Predecessor of the petitioners, late V.V.Swami-nathan filed the above suit for partition. The matter was settled and a compromise was entered into between the parties. As per paragraph 3 of the compromise, it was agreed that since the plaintiffs were allotted properties of a greater value, they should pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000 to the defendant. The said amount was agreed to be paid in instalments of Rs.1,000 per mensem. The amount so paid will also carry interest at 6% per annum. The compromise was recorded and thereafter the original plaintiff died. It is the case of the petitioners that pursuant to the compromise, the amounts were paid to the respondent. From the accounting year 1979-80 to 1985-1986, every month, amount was paid and the same is reflected in the accounts which are maintained by them. It is said that the receipt of the amount is also admitted by defendant in his income-tax returns. It is their case that after payment of instalments and also the interest the petitioners were to pay by the end of Financial year 1985-86, only a sum of Rs.61,585-65. In the meanwhile, the respondent also filed an Execution Petition without giving any reduction to the amount alleged to have been received. The petitioners/therefore, filed the present execution petition without giving any reduction to the amount alleged to have been received. The petitioners, therefore, filed the present execution application under Sec.47, C.R.C. to enter satisfaction of the decree, and for the said purpose they sought the assistance of court for an enquiry. They also wanted to issue summons to the Income-tax Department to produce the accounts, and also wanted the defendant to produce the accounts wherein the defendant has admitted receipt of the amount. The said execution application was not numbered by the Court below, and after hearing the objection of the respondent, the same was dismissed. The said order is now under challenge. 3. The court below has held that the application filed by the revision petitioners under Sec.47, C.P.C. cannot be entertained by the Executing Court and it has no jurisdiction to pass order on that application. 4. The said order is now under challenge. 3. The court below has held that the application filed by the revision petitioners under Sec.47, C.P.C. cannot be entertained by the Executing Court and it has no jurisdiction to pass order on that application. 4. Challenging the legality of that Order, learned Counsel for revision petitioners relied on O.21, Rule 2, Sub-rule (2), (a) and (b), C.P.C. to contend that if any payment or adjustment is proved by documentary evidence, satisfaction of the decree could be entered under O.21, Rule 2, C.P.C. It is his case that the defendant has already admitted receipt of the amounts in his accounts and also in his returns to the Income-tax Department. Therefore, they are entitled to call for those documents. 5. According to me, the order of the lower court does not call for any interference in view of the binding precedents. 6. In a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997)1 S.C.C. 373 ; (1997)2 L.W.522, their Lordships considered the scope of Sec.47 read with O.21, Rules 2 and 3, C.P.C. The argument before the Supreme Court was that since Sec.47, C.P.C. provides for determination of all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, the question whether any payment was made also could be decided under Sec.47, C.P.C. even though the payment is not certified or recorded. The said contention was replied by the Supreme Court paragraph 18 to 24 of the judgment read thus: "Under Sec.38 of the Code a decree may be executed either by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution. The court which passed the decree has been defined in Sec.37. Transfer of decree to another court for its execution has been provided for in Sec.39. Sec.40. provides for transfer of decree to a court in another State. Sec.42, lays downs that the court to which a decree is transferred for execution shall have the same powers in executing that decree as if the decree was passed by itself. These revisions including Sec.37 thus clearly speak of the powers and jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree. provides for transfer of decree to a court in another State. Sec.42, lays downs that the court to which a decree is transferred for execution shall have the same powers in executing that decree as if the decree was passed by itself. These revisions including Sec.37 thus clearly speak of the powers and jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree. O.21, Rule 2 applies to a specific set of circumstances, If any money is payable under a decree, irrespective of the nature of decree, and such money is paid out of court, the decree holder has to certify such payment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree and that court has to record the same accordingly. Similarly, if a decree, irrespective of its nature is adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, the decree holder has to certify such adjustment to that court which has came to record the adjustment accordingly. If the payment or adjustment is not reported by the decree-holder, the judgment-debtor has been given the right to inform the court of such payment or adjustment and to apply to that court for certifying that payment or adjustment after notice to the decree-holder. Then comes Sub-rule (23) which provides that payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded under Sub-rule (1) or (2) shall not be recognised by the court executing the decree. The words ‘or the decree of any kind is otherwise adjusted’ are of wide amplitude. It is open to the parties namely, the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor to enter into a contract or compromise in regard to their rights and obligations under the decree. If such contract or compromise amounts to an adjustment of the decree it has to be recorded by the court under Rule 2 of O.21. It may be pointed out that an agreement, contract of compromise, which has the effect of extinguishing the decree in whole or in part on account of decree being satisfied to that extent will amount to an adjustment of the decree within the meaning of this Rule and the court, if approved, will issue the certificate of adjustment. An uncertified payment of money or adjustment which is not recorded by the court under O.21, Rule 2, cannot be recognised by the Executing Court. An uncertified payment of money or adjustment which is not recorded by the court under O.21, Rule 2, cannot be recognised by the Executing Court. In a situation like this, the only enquiry that the executing court can do is to find out whether the plea taken on its face value amounts to adjustment or satisfaction of decree, wholly or in part, and whether such adjustment or satisfaction had the effect of extinguishing the decree to that extent. If the executing court comes to the conclusion that the decree was adjusted wholly or in part but the compromise or adjustment or satisfaction was not recorded and, or certified by the court, the executing court would not recognise them and will proceed to execute the decree. The problem can be looked into from another angle on the basis of the maxim ‘generalia soeciablibbus non derogant. Sec.47 as pointed out earlier, gives full jurisdiction and power to the Executing Court to decide all questions relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree. O.21, Rule 3, however, places a restraint on the exercise of that power by providing that the Executing Court shall not recognise or look into any uncertified payment of money or any adjustment of decree if any such adjustment or payment is pleaded by the judgment-debtor before the Executing Court, the latter, in view of the legislative mandate, has to ignore if it has not been certified or recorded by the court. The general power of deciding questions relating to executing discharge or satisfaction of decree under Sec.47 can thus be exercised subject to the restriction placed by O.21, Rule 2 including Sub-rule (3) which contains special provisions regulating payment of money due under a general provision under Sec.47 has, therefore, to yield to that extent to the special provisions contained in O.21, Rule 2 which have been enacted to prevent a judgment-debtor from setting up false or cooked up pleas so as to prolong or delay the execution proceedings. If Sec.47 and O.21, Rule 2 are read together, as has been done by us in this case, the so-called conflict. If Sec.47 and O.21, Rule 2 are read together, as has been done by us in this case, the so-called conflict. (We say “socalled” as, in fact, there is none) stands dispelled by employing the rule of harmonious construction’ of the other rule that the general provision must yield to the special provision.“ Their Lordships held that O.21, Rule 2, C.P.C. is a special procedure, and if the payment or adjustment is not recorded as provided under O.21, Rule, C.P.C. the Executing Court cannot take evidence regarding the same or declare an adjustment. 7. In Manuraj Chandrakant Babar v. Babusaheb Babasaheb Deshmukh, A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 41. It was held thus: ”Any payment made by a judgment-debtor to the decree-holder outside the court or any adjustment made by him with the decree-holder outside the court cannot be recognised in the absence of the same being recorded under O.21, Rule 2 of the Code. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 which empowers the Executing Court to record or certify any payment or adjustment contemplates a judicial decision by the court whether the payment or adjustment should be recorded or not. The Executing Court is bound by virtue of O.21, Rule 2(3) not to recognise the payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded by Sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 2 of O.21.“ 8. In Nandagopal Gounder v. Kannan and another, A.I.R. 1988 Mad. 224: (1988)1 L.W. 10 , in paragraphs 7 to 9, a learned Judge of this Court held that any payment outside the court cannot be recognised in the absence of the same being recorded under O.21, Rule 2, C.P.C. The said paragraphs read thus: ”There is no express article in the Limitation Act, applicable to the certification by the decree-holder of a payment made out of court to him. It is not necessary for me to go into the question why the Legislature should have prescribed a specified time for the application under 0.21, Rule 2(2), C.P.C. and should have made no specific provision of limitation with regard to the procedure of certifying by the decree holder under 0.21, Rule 2(21), C.P.C. if such procedure were regarded as an application within the meaning of the Limitation Act, Rule2(3) provides that a payment, which has not been certified as recorded as aforesaid, shall not be recognised by any court executing the decree. The provision in Rule 2(3) no doubt was inserted for good reasons known to the Legislature. Obviously, such a provision has been made to simplify and expedite the proceedings in the execution proceedings. Insofar as the application to be made by the judgment-debtor is concerned, the old Limitation Act provides 90 days and under the present Limitation Act, Art.125 provides only 30 days for filing such an application In view of this positive position, the only question to be decided is, whether there is any area of discretion available to the court to recognise an uncertified payment when as a matter of fact, such payment has been proved. “ This question was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Nalam Subramanian v. Devara Ramaswami, A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372: 35 L. W. 538, wherein this Court has held as follows: ”Where a decree has been adjusted if the decree-holder does not certify such adjustment to the court, the judgment-debtor himself may apply to the court to issue a notice to the decree-holder, to show cause why such an adjustment should not be recorded as certified. Under Art.274, Limitation Act, he has 90 days in which to do this, If the decree-holder has not certified the adjustment and the judgment-debtor has not got the adjustment recorded with in that period, such an adjustment cannot be recognised by the court executing the decree. “ The same question was considered by the Privy Council in the decision reported in Raja Sri Prakash Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd., 56 M.L.J. 233: A.I.R. 1929 P. C. 19: 29 L.W.161, wherein has been held as follows: ”The terms of Rule 2(1) of O.21 of C.P.C. do not provide for any application being made by the decree-holder. The decree holder would comply with the terms of the rule if he were to certify to the court that money payable under the decree has been paid to him out of court and it would then rest with the Court to record the payment in accordance with the provisions of the rule. Sub-rule (2) of O.21 does not contemplate an application by the judgment-debtor.“ Again another Full Bench of this Court interpreted the scope of O.21, Rule 2, C.P.C. in the decision reported in Chowdri Abdul Subhan v. Kante Ramanna, I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 827: A.I.R. 1945 Mad. Sub-rule (2) of O.21 does not contemplate an application by the judgment-debtor.“ Again another Full Bench of this Court interpreted the scope of O.21, Rule 2, C.P.C. in the decision reported in Chowdri Abdul Subhan v. Kante Ramanna, I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 827: A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 161: 58 L. W. 163, wherein it was held that it is not open to judgment-debtor or any one standing in his shoes to plead an uncertified adjustment of a decree by way of defence to a suit filed by an auction purchaser for possession of property sold in execution of the decree. Similar view was taken by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in Krishna Govind Patil v. Moolchand Keshavachand Gujar, 43 Bom.L.R. 751: A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 302, which is in the following terms: ”Where an assignee of a decree makes an application under O.21 Rules 11 and 16, C.P.C, 1908 to the court passing the decree for executing it, the court is hearing the applications as an Executing Court and is bound in virtue of O.21, Rule 2(3) not to recognise payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as required by Rule 2(1), (2). Almost all the courts in India and the Privy Council have taken similar view on the question and, therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that any payment made by a judgment-debtor to a decree holder outside the court cannot be recognised in the absence of the same being recorded under O.21, Rule 2, C.P.C. these principles have already been considered by this Court in Kannappa Mudaliar v. Chellakutti Udyar, (1972)2 M.L.J. 7 : A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 287: 85 L.W.187 Therefore, I am of the view that the payment pleaded by the petitioner in the execution proceedings cannot be recognised. 9. In Thangavel v. Kuppusamy Muddaliar, (1996)1 L.W.128, also, a learned Judge of this Court has taken a similar view and has held thus: “...the amendment to Code of Civil Procedure made in 1973 introducing Sub-rule (2-A) to O.21, makes it compulsory for recording satisfaction, that only if the payments were made in the modes mentioned in 0.21, Rule 1 and Sub-rule (2-A), the satisfaction could be recorded. The contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is against the purport of Sub-rule (2-A) and the court below is perfectly correct in rejecting the petition in view of the sub-rule introduced in the amendment in 1976.” 10. In this connection, the decision reported in K.R.Shankar Raj v. State Bank of India, Vellore, A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 255: (1988)102 M.L.W. 441, also requires consideration. In that case, Srinivasan, J., as he then was, held that Sub-rule (2-A) to Rule 2 of O.21, C.P.C. is in the nature of a provision and if only the judgment-debtor proves the payment in accordance with Sub-rule (2-A) the question regarding adjustment will arise. 11. The application filed by the judgment-debtor should also be within 30 days from the date of the respective payments to have the adjustment recorded. If no such application is filed within the prescribed time, the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the same. (See: Art. 125 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963). In this case, the judgment-debtor has no case that he has moved the application within the prescribed time. Either way, the finding of the lower court that it has no jurisdiction to decide the matter is correct. The civil revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. C.M.P.No.5588 of 1992 for stay is also dismissed consequently.