JUDGMENT S.K. Dubey, J. 1. The defendants have filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18.8.1975, passed in Civil Appeal No. 8-A/71 by the Additional District Judge, West Nimar, Khargone affirming the judgment and decree dated 20th April, 1973, passed in Civil Suit No. 30-A/71 by Civil Judge, Class I, West Nimar, Khargone. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal arc thus: One Narayan Singh was original Krishak of the suit land. Kh. No. 291, area 4.77 decimal, kh. No. 315 and 316 area 3.87 decimal: kh. No. 365 area 0.41 decimal and kh. no. 512 and 513 area 1.97 decimal, total area eleven acres one decimal, situated in village Gogwa, tahsil Khargone, West Nimar. After the death of Narayan Singh his widow Rukma Bai became limited owner and on enforcement of Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 60 of 1950; for short 'MBLRT Act') Rukma Bai being the Class I heir, specified in section 82 of the MBLRT Act, she became Pakka tenant. Plaintiff is the daughter of Narayan Singh, who was married to Mohan Singh, the defendant no. 1 the appellant no. 1. The defendant no. 1 turned out the plaintiff from his house and then started living with his mother-in-law Rukma Bai, who executed an agreement to sale-Ex. D. 1 on 9.3.1956 in favour of defendant No. 1, On 16.7.1956 Rukma Bai executed a registered sale deed Ex. D. 2/Ex. P. 5 in favour of defendant no. 1 for sale of suit land for a consideration of Rs. 2000/-. Rukma Bai filed an application on 4.4.1956 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 70 (2) of the MBLRT Act for validation of the sale in favour of the defendant no. 1. The plaintiff filed objection on 9.5.1956. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate rejected the objection and validated the sale under section 70 (2) of the MBLRT Act vide order dated 3.12.1961. The plaintiff preferred an appeal (No. 37/62-63) wherein Rukma Bai filed an application that the sale was bogus, without consideration and fraudulent. The defendant no. 1 in that appeal was proceeded ex parte. The Commissioner vide order dated 30.4.1964 (Ex. The plaintiff preferred an appeal (No. 37/62-63) wherein Rukma Bai filed an application that the sale was bogus, without consideration and fraudulent. The defendant no. 1 in that appeal was proceeded ex parte. The Commissioner vide order dated 30.4.1964 (Ex. P. 1) allowed the appeal holding that the sale was a bogus transaction obtained without consideration by the son-in-law of Rukma Bai by misrepresenting the vendor with a view to defeat the claim of the plaintiff, the daughter of Rukma Bai. 3. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant no. 1 sold this land in different parts by three different sale-deeds. Ex. P. 3 dated 7.3.1963 in favour of Hira, the defendant no. 3 and two sale deeds dated 21.3.1963 in favour of defendant no. 4 Fakira. Ex. P. 4 and Ex. P. 2 in favour of Mangilal defendant no. 2. 4. Rukma Bai died on 15.4.1970. On her death the plaintiff became the owner and Pakka tenant of the suit land, who, after the sale in favour of defendant no. 1, having been declared invalid, filed the suit on 14.10.1971, for declaration possession and for mesne profits of Rs. 500/- for the year 1970-71 and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month till the date of possession, on the averments that after the death of her father, she was the co-owner of the suit land with her mother Rukma Bai and was in possession of the suit land as such. The defendant no. 1, without consideration fraudulently got the sale-deed executed on 16.7.1956 with a view to defeat the interest of plaintiff. Rukma Bai could not have transferred the holding without prior sanction of the Collector. Sale was not validated and was ineffective. The sale deeds executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 to 4 are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and does not transfer any right, title or interest as the defendant no. 1 had no right, title or interest in the suit land. After the death of her mother Rukma Bai on 15.4.1970, the plaintiff being sole heir of the deceased Narayan Singh, the rights of Bhumiswami devolved on her. The defendants no. 2 to 4 are occupying the suit land unauthorisedly, hence the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. After the death of her mother Rukma Bai on 15.4.1970, the plaintiff being sole heir of the deceased Narayan Singh, the rights of Bhumiswami devolved on her. The defendants no. 2 to 4 are occupying the suit land unauthorisedly, hence the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. The cause of action first arose on 30.4.1964 when the sale was not validated and then on 15.4.1970 on the death of Rukma Bai. 5. The defendant no. 1 in his written statement filed on 21.6.1972 denied the averments stating that the sale is neither fraudulent nor without consideration. The order of Revenue Commissioner is without hearing the defendant no. 1, against which an application on 16.2.1965 to set aside the ex parte order has been filed, which is pending. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff is premature and no cause of action has arisen to plaintiff. The sale deed was executed on 16.7.1956 and the plaintiff has instituted the suit for declaration of title and for possession in 1971 which is beyond the period of limitation. The defendants no. 2 to 4 filed their joint written statement on 29.3.1972 denying the right and title of the plaintiff and contended that after the death of Narayan Singh, Rukma Bai became Pakka tenant of the land, who sold the land to defendant no. 1 and in turn the defendant no. 1 sold the land to defendants no. 2 to 4. The plaintiff never remained in possession of the land. The sale deed executed in favour of defendant no. 1 by Rukma Bai was neither fraudulant nor was without consideration. The defendant no. 1 transferred the suit land to defendants no. 2 to 4 legally. How the cause of action arose in favour of the plaintiff has not been disclosed. 6. The trial court, after appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties, held that the first cause of action arose for the plaintiff on 30.4.1964 when the sale was not validated and then after the death of Rukma Bai on 15.4.1970. The sale in favour of defendant no. 1 was without consideration and was ineffective. The sale-deeds executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 4 were hit by principle of lis pendens and were covered by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the TP Act'). The sale in favour of defendant no. 1 was without consideration and was ineffective. The sale-deeds executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 4 were hit by principle of lis pendens and were covered by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the TP Act'). The defendants had no right, title or interest in the suit land. After the death of Rukma Bai, the plaintiff being the sole surviving heir of the deceased Narayan Singh, hence entitled for the decree for declaration, possession and for mesne profits of Rs. 500/- for the year 1970-71 and for future mesne profits from 1971, to be decided on the application after enquiry on payment of Court fees. 7. Aggrieved of this, the defendants preferred an appeal. The First Appellate Court on re-appraisal of the evidence affirmed the findings, recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 8. During the pendency of second appeal the ex parte order Ex. P. 1, passed by the Revenue Commissioner was set aside. The Second Appeal No. 413/78-79 was heard afresh which was allowed by the Commissioner vide order dated 29th January, 1982 holding that the sale was fraudulent and was without consideration, to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Certified copy of the order is on record. Learned counsel for the appellants did not place any material to demonstrate that this order was challenged by any of the appellants before the Board of Revenue or in any proceedings and has not attained the finality. 9. Shri S.D. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that Rukma Bai died on 15.4.1970. Though she was a limited owner but on the enforcement of MBLRT Act, became Pakka tenant being class 1 heir, under section 82 of the MBLRT Act. On enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956 from 17.6.1956 Rukma Bai became full owner of the suit land who transferred the holding by sale to defendant no. 1 without the previous sanction of the Collector of the District as required by Section 70 of the MBLRT Act, hence to validate the sale, the proceedings were initiated under sub-section (2) of section 70. In appeal, the sale was not validated as was found fraudulent and without consideration. This would not give any cause of action to the plaintiff as the defendant no. 1 and his transferees defendants no. In appeal, the sale was not validated as was found fraudulent and without consideration. This would not give any cause of action to the plaintiff as the defendant no. 1 and his transferees defendants no. 2 to 4 would be deemed to be trespasser under section 78 of the MBLRT Act. Therefore, Rukma Bai or after her death, the plaintiff ought to have taken action under section 58 of the MBLRT Act or under section 250 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. 1959 (for short 'the Code') which came into force from 2.10.1959. Neither Rukma Bai nor the plaintiff instituted the suit within the period of 12 years from the date of dispossession, that is, on 14.7.1956. Therefore, the suit of plaintiff is haired under section 142 of the Limitation Act, (1908), corresponding to Art. 64, of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the right of the plaintiff, if any, under section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 extinguished at the determination of period of limitation of 12 years. On extinguishment of the rights of the plaintiff, the defendants acquired Bhumiswami rights on perfection of their title by adverse possession. The law is well settled that when once limitation beings to run it does not stop merely because the appeal or any legal proceedings were pending before the Revenue Commissioner. Therefore, the Courts below ought to have dismissed the suit, as barred by time holding that the defendants have acquired Bhumiswami rights over the suit land by prescription. Learned Counsel cited the decisions in Kalika Prasad and another v. Chatrapal Singh (1997 R.N. 81 (SC); Rajendra Singh v. Santa Singh (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2537); Kashiram Gopal Gari. v. Nathu and another (1980 M.P.L.J. 670 (FB); Nahar Hirasingh v. Mst. Dukalhin (A.I.R. 1974 M.P. 141 (FB); Laxminarain v. Vithaldas (A.I.R. 1962 M.P. 31); Partha v. Kanchan Bai and others (1978 R.N. 211) and Bai Shevantibai v. Janardan R. Warick (A.I.R. 1939 Bom. 322). 10. Shri P.K. Saxena, learned Senior-Counsel for the respondent submitted that the suit of the plaintiff for possession and mesne profits is based on title, The cause of action for the plaintiff arose only when the sale was declared invalid, the plaintiff prior to that could not have enforced her right to get back the possession by taking recourse to the ordinary remedy of Civil Suit. It was not necessary for Rukma Bai who died in the year 1970 and then to plaintiff to avail the summary remedy provided in section 58 of the MBLRT Act or under section 250 of the Code and the plaintiff rightly filed the suit in Civil Court for declaration of title and possession, in pursuance of the sale which was not validated. Possession held by the defendant no. 1 in pursuance of sale and then by the defendants no. 2 to 4 on transfer by the defendant no. 1 cannot be tacked on to constitute adverse possession for required period. By virtue of section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, though Rukma Bai was out of actual possession, the suit land would be deemed to be possessed by her, as her ownership right fall back because the sale was found to be void and ineffective to her ownership rights, hence Rukma Bai was entitled to obtain actual possession and after her death, the plaintiff. The defendants cannot be allowed to raise the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession for the first time in second appeal for which neither the ease was pleaded nor was proved. On the other hand, the defendants contested the suit on the basis of the sale executed by Rukma Bai in favour of the defendant no. 1, who in turn transferred the suit land to defendants no. 2 to 4 and raised the plea that the suit was premature as the application to set aside the ex pane order was pending, It was not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff or her predecessor in title was ever forcibly dispossessed. The possession was under the deed of sale, which was found to be fraudulent and without consideration not only by the Revenue Courts but by the two Courts below as well. Therefore, this Court would not permit the appellants to raise the plea for the first time in appeal, of perfection of title by adverse possession. The possession of the appellants was under the document of sale; therefore, howsoever long may be the possession, it cannot constitute adverse possession. Therefore, this Court would not permit the appellants to raise the plea for the first time in appeal, of perfection of title by adverse possession. The possession of the appellants was under the document of sale; therefore, howsoever long may be the possession, it cannot constitute adverse possession. Counsel cited the decisions - Heera v. Kasturi Bai (1997 R.N. 1 (S.C.); Mohanlal through LRS Kachru and others v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and another (A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 910); Kishan Singh (Thakur) v. Arvind Kumar (1995 J.L.J. 1 (SC); Mangal Singh v. Ratanno (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786); Gurbinder Singh v. Lal Singh (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1553) Ramgopal v. Chaitu (1976 J.L.J. 278 (F.B.)); Leeladhar and others v. Ramsing and others (1974 J.L.J. 566); Kundan Singh v. Kunnu (1969 R.N. 264 (H.C.); Kanakmal v. Smt. Pyaribai (1984 R.N. 275 (H.C.) Hira v. Kasturi Bai (1989 R.N. 23 (H.C.)) 11. Before we deal with the contentions raised in this appeal, it would be appropriate to quote sections 58, 70 and 78 of the MBLRT Act; 58. All trespassers to pay a penalty - Any person he occupies land without lawful authority shall be regarded as a trespasser, and may be dispossessed by the Tahsildar at any time but he shall be liable to pay as penalty for each year, during the whole or part of which he has been in such occupation, a sum equal to twice the revenue or rent which would have been assessed if the land would have been allotted to any other person. The Tahsildar may impose a line, in addition, not exceeding Rs. 50/- in any case. XXX XXX XXX 70. Voluntary sale of holdings - (1) Subject to the rules made under this Act, a Pakka tenant may with the previous sanction of the Collector transfer his rights in the whole or part of the holding by sale to a registered co-operative farming society of the same village in which the land is situated or to a bona fide agriculturist. Voluntary sale of holdings - (1) Subject to the rules made under this Act, a Pakka tenant may with the previous sanction of the Collector transfer his rights in the whole or part of the holding by sale to a registered co-operative farming society of the same village in which the land is situated or to a bona fide agriculturist. (2) Subject to the rules made under this Act, a transfer by sale effected without the previous sanction of the Collector may be validated by such authority on payment by the transferee of a penalty which may extend to two years' revenue or rent of the land transferred; provided that the transfer has been made to a registered co-operative farming society of the same village in which the land is situated or to a bona tide agriculturist. (3) The Collector shall grant permission for sale under sub-section (1) or validate a sale under sub-section (2) in the following cases only- (a) if the Pakka tenant wants to sell away all his holdings in the pargana; or (b) if at least 5 acres of irrigated land or 15 acres of non-irrigated land are still left in the possession of the pakka tenant for the maintenance of himself and his family; Provided that the sale has not been effected fraudulently with a view to defeat the interest of his heirs. (4) A sale to a person other than a bona fide agriculturist or a registered co-operative farming society can be effected only with the sanction of the Government on payment of such fee as the Government may prescribe. (5) No sale shall without the previous sanction of the Government be sanctioned or validated under this section in favour of any person who already holds or would hold in his name if the sale is sanctioned, land measuring more than 50 acres of Pakka tenure : Provided that this restriction shall not apply in the case of a registered co-operative farming society. (6) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) (2), (4) and (5) the following persons and bodies shall have a prior claim to purchase the land under this section in the order in which they are mentioned-- (a) a co-tenant; (b) a sub-tenant who is for more than 2 years in possession of the land which is being sold; and, (c) a registered co-operative farming society of that village, if any. (7) In case of any dispute regarding the price at which land should be sold under sub-section (6), the vendor or pre-emptor may apply to the Tahsildar who will fix the price taking into consideration the market price prevailing in that locality or village. (8) No sale under this section shall be deemed to be valid until the sale deed effecting such a sale has been registered in accordance with the law of registration in force for the time being. XXX XXX XXX 78. Unauthorised transfers - (1) Any person who in contravention of the provisions of this Act, obtains possession of any land by virtue of a bequest, gift, sale mortgage or sub-lease or of any agreement purporting to be a bequest, gift, sale, mortgage or sub-lease shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of section 58. (2) On the dispossession of the trespasser under sub-section (1) the Pakka tenant, or if he is dead his legal heir shall under orders of the Tahsildar be placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. (3) If a pakka tenant or his legal heir as the case may be, refuses or fails to cultivate the land as required under sub-section (2), the land shall be deemed to have been abandoned. 12. Admittedly, the sale by Rukma Bai in favour of defendant no. 1 was not validated. Therefore, it was invalid, which is clear from reading of Section 70 of the MBLRT Act, which provides that sale of a holding made by a Pakka tenant must be with previous sanction of the Collector to transfer his right in the whole or part in the holding by a registered sale-deed or the sale must later be validated. Therefore, it was invalid, which is clear from reading of Section 70 of the MBLRT Act, which provides that sale of a holding made by a Pakka tenant must be with previous sanction of the Collector to transfer his right in the whole or part in the holding by a registered sale-deed or the sale must later be validated. Restrictions imposed by this section on the sale of the holdings by Pakka tenant and the sanction needed for validating such sale are not mere matters of formalities or procedure. It is a substantive provision of law. All sales are ineffective unless previous permission is obtained or the transaction is validated by subsequent permission. The very use of the word "validation" in the section implies that the sale is invalid before such validation and if the sale is not validated it would continue to be invalid sale. See a Division Bench decision in Kundan Singh's Case (Supra) 13. In Leeladhar v. Ramsingh (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court considered the distinction in agreement to sell and agreement purporting to be a sale, found to be invalid under section 70 of the MBLRT Act and its effect due to fiction contained in section 78 and the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court contained in section 147 of the MBLRT Act, if action is not taken under section 58 and concluded in paragraph 8 thus: (1) An agreement purporting to be a sale is within the mischief of section 78 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 but not so an agreement of sale. The two are distinct. (2) An agreement which lacks in prescribed legal formalities of a sale but in essence purports to transfer land as sold is "an agreement purporting to be a sale", such as where the vendor receives the price from the vendee and delivers him possession of the land. An agreement of sale, on the other hand, contemplates the happening of a future event or the fulfilment of a condition or conditions agreed upon. (3) The former is within the purview of section 78 as the legislature obviously intended to prevent the provisions of section 70 being defeated by a circumventing device. The latter being honest and innocent, is outside the purview of section 78 as the property is not yet transferred. (3) The former is within the purview of section 78 as the legislature obviously intended to prevent the provisions of section 70 being defeated by a circumventing device. The latter being honest and innocent, is outside the purview of section 78 as the property is not yet transferred. (4) If, in pursuance of an agreement of sale simpliciter, possession of land is given to the intending vendee, the fiction of section 78 does not come into play and the latter cannot be deemed to be trespasser so as to be liable to be ejected in the manner provided by section 58 of the Act. Section 58 being inapplicable to such a case, section 147 is completely out of the way. (5) If an agreement of sale simpliciter is frustrated, the intending vendor who has given possession to the intending vendee by virtue of such agreement, can enforce his right to get back the possession by taking recourse to the Ordinary remedy of civil suit. 14. As the sale was ineffective, and invalid from its inception, which has been found by Revenue Courts and the two Courts below also recorded a finding of fact that sale was fraudulent and without consideration, therefore, in the circumstances whether the defendants can take the defence that they perfected their title by prescription due to the fiction created by section 78 of the MBLRT Act as no action was taken by the plaintiff or her predecessor in title to eject the defendants in the manner provided by section 58 of the MBLRT Act or on enforcement of the Code under section 250 of the Code. It cannot be disputed that after the sale became ineffective, Rukma Bai or after her death, the plaintiff got right to get back the possession by taking recourse to the proceedings before the Revenue Authorities under the relevant provisions of the law or by ordinary remedy of Civil Suit. It is settled law that the suit for possession based on title is not barred either by section 147 of MBLRT Act or by section 257 (X) of the Code. See Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Ramgopal v. Chaitu (supra). Plaintiff instituted, the suit for declaration of her title, possession and mesne profits after the order of Revenue Commissioner dated 30.4.1964 when the sale was not validated. See Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Ramgopal v. Chaitu (supra). Plaintiff instituted, the suit for declaration of her title, possession and mesne profits after the order of Revenue Commissioner dated 30.4.1964 when the sale was not validated. Prior to 30.4.1964, the fiction created under section 78 of the MBLRT Act was not available to the plaintiff or to Rukma Bai and they could not have proceeded under section 58 of the MBLRT Act or under section 250 of the Code. The proceedings for validation of sale continued not only upto 30.4.1964 but terminated on 29.1.1982 when the appeal was again allowed and the sale was not validated after hearing the defendant no. 1. Therefore, the plaintiffs right to get back possession under section 58 of the MBLRT Act or under section 250 of the Code accrued only on declaration of sale being void. In such proceedings remain pending and continue in between the period prescribed for taking back the possession expires, then it would mean to defeat the provisions of section 70 of the MBLRT Act by a circumventing device. As Rukma Bai and after her death, plaintiff could not have taken any action to take back the possession of the suit land, before the declaration of sale as invalid and ineffective. 15. The contention that the defendants have acquired title by prescription cannot be accepted. The defendants have neither pleaded nor proved the case of acquiring title by adverse possession. It is for the reason that the defendant no. 1 came in possession by a derivative title through a sale deed executed by Rukma Bai and in turn defendants no. 2 to 4 from defendant no. 1. Therefore, having come into possession under colour of title from Rukma Bai, if the appellants intended to plead adverse possession, they ought to have disclaimed the title of Rukma Bai and pleaded hostile claim to the knowledge of Rukma Bai and on her death of the plaintiff and then if Rukma Bai or the plaintiff would not have taken any action thereon within the prescribed period, thereby the appellant's possession would have become adverse. In fact this inconsistant stand was not available to the defendants as the proceedings to validate sale were pending, which was also stand taken in the written statement. Therefore, the appellants cannot be permitted to take the plea of acquiring title by prescription. In fact this inconsistant stand was not available to the defendants as the proceedings to validate sale were pending, which was also stand taken in the written statement. Therefore, the appellants cannot be permitted to take the plea of acquiring title by prescription. To say so, I take support from the decisions in Ra. Chandverappa v. State of Karnataka ( (1995) 6 S.C.C. 309 ); Mohanlal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (supra); Laxman v. Ganpat (1983 R.N. 238); Raisingh v. Herchand (1988 R.N. 381). 16. As right of Pakka tenant devolved on Rukma Bai the widow of Narayan Singh and on death of Rukma Bai on the plaintiff, the sole surviving heir of Narayan Singh, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Hira (supra) affirming the decision of this Court in Hira v. Kasturi Bai (1989 R.N. 23) suit for possession based on title on the cause of action, which first arose when the sale was not validated and later when the mother of the plaintiff died in the year 1970, was well within limitation prescribed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 17. The decision relied by the learned counsel for the appellants are of no help and are distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 18. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal is devoid of any merit and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed