Judgement V. S. KOKJE, J. :- Heard on admission. 2. These are appeals from two petitions decided by the learned single Judge by two different orders of the same date. 3. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3171/95 was initially filed by Shri Mohan Singh on whose death during the pendency of that petition his son Narendra Singh continued the petition as his legal representative after being brought on record. D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 552/97 is an appeal challenging the order in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3290/94. The other petition was filed by Narendra Singh Bhati in his personal capacity and against the order passed in this petition D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 553/97 has been filed. 4. The litigation has a history of over two decades. 5. By a document titled as "Licence Agreement" executed on August 2, 1975, late Col. Mohan Singh came to possess and occupy a land commonly known as "Sewage Farm" from the Municipal Council, Jodhpur for an agreed amount stated in the agreement as licence fee for a period of two years commencing from August 2, 1975 and renewable by mutual consent for a further period of two years. Late Col. Mohan Singh had specifically agreed in this document to hand over vacant possession of the Farm and other building to the Municipal Council on expiry of the original period of lease or the renewed period of lease on August 1, 1977 or August 1, 1979 as the case may be. 6. The period of two years from execution of document expired on August 1, 1977 without there being any renewal. However, late Col. Mohan Singh did not hand over the possession and Municipal Council, Jodhpur served a notice on August 1, 1977 on him asking him to hand over the possession back as the period of two years of licence had come to an end. Late Col. Mohan Singh filed a Civil Suit in the Court of Munsif City, Jodhpur contending that the transaction in question was not a licence but was a lease and the Municipal Council was not authorised to ask for possession from him treating him to be a licensee. An application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also moved in that case and the Munsif directed that Shri Mohan Singh could be only evicted after following due process of law. An application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also moved in that case and the Munsif directed that Shri Mohan Singh could be only evicted after following due process of law. The Municipal Council went in appeal against the interim order which was dismissed. Thereafter, the Municipal Council filed an application under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 (for short 'the Act' hereinafter), before the Estate Officer on December 22, 1978 for eviction of Shri Mohan Singh from the premises. 7. On October 15, 1993, the Estate Officer passed the final order evicting Shri Mohan Singh from the premises. Shri Mohan Singh obtained the copy of the order on July 27, 1984 and preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur contending that the copy of the order dated October 15, 1993 was neither served on him not published in accordance with law. The appeal was dismissed on merits as well as on the ground of limitation. 8. After this, late Col. Mohan Singh filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3171/95 before this Court challenging the order of the Estate Officer dated October 15, 1993 as well as the order of the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated September 8, 1994. 9. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3290/94 was filed on July 18, 1994 by Narendra Singh Bhati son of late Col. Mohan Singh. Shri Narendra Singh after giving the history of the earlier proceedings against his father contended in his petition that his father Col. Mohan Singh finding himself unable to look after the Farm, handed it over to him and made a request to the Municipal Council that the lease may be transferred in favour of and in the name of his son Shri Narendra Singh. According to Shri Narendra Singh this request of his father Col. Mohan Singh was accepted by the Municipal Council, Jodhpur recognising the petitioner as lessee in the premises in question and receipts of the lease money were issued by the Municipal Council in the name of the petitioner. According to Shri Narendra Singh this request of his father Col. Mohan Singh was accepted by the Municipal Council, Jodhpur recognising the petitioner as lessee in the premises in question and receipts of the lease money were issued by the Municipal Council in the name of the petitioner. He also contended that two such payments were made by him one on August 1, 1989 of Rupees one lac and the other on August l, 1991 for another Rupees one lac, receipts for which were passed in the name of Narendra Singh though in the receipt dated August 1, 1989 name of Mohan Singh was also written in the bracket. Narendra Singh also contended that for the subsequent period also cheques were also issued to the Municipal Council, Jodhpur but they were not realised for the reasons best known to the Officials of the Municipal Council. Shri Narendra Singh also contended that he made an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Civil Suit before the Civil Court for being joined as a party as having become lessee. That application was ultimately dismissed. Shri Narendra Singh further contended that the Municipal Council, Jodhpur was well aware of the fact that he was in actual possession of the premises in question and he had also been recognised as lessee by accepting lease money and by issuing receipts. Thus, Shri Narendra Singh also challenged the order dated October 15, 193 passed by the Estate Officer. 10. As already stated, the learned single Judge dismissed both the above petitions and Shri Narendra Singh has filed these two appeals one in his capacity as legal heir of late Shri Mohan Singh and another in his personal capacity as a lessee of the premises. 11. For the sake of convenience, both these appeals were heard together on admission and this common order is being passed. 12. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the document on the basis of which late Mohan Singh was inducted in possession of the premises was actually a lease deed though styled as licence deed. We have carefully examined the document which, read as a whole in our opinion is nothing but a licence deed and we find no reason to take a different view in the matter than that of the learned single Judge. We have carefully examined the document which, read as a whole in our opinion is nothing but a licence deed and we find no reason to take a different view in the matter than that of the learned single Judge. It was also contended that the Municipal Council through its counsel had conceded that the transaction was a lease as it had accepted to receive rent in a settlement before this Court in Special Appeal No. 72 of 1979 disposed of on August 30, 1979. We have perused the order (Annexure/5 to Mohan Singh's petition). The language of order clearly shows that there is no concession on the part of the counsel for the Municipality as regards nature of the transaction. The word 'rent' used in the order has not been used at the instance of the Municipality and the Court did not decide the question as to whether the transaction was lease or licence. 13. Apart from this the clear language of Section 2(e) of the Act which defines "unauthorised occupation", clearly shows that continuance in occupation by a person of the public premises after the authority, whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer, under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever, shall also be deemed to be an unauthorised occupation. Thus, even if the document is construed to be a lease, on the expiry of the period of two years on August 1, 1977 late Mohan Singh became an unauthorised occupant who could be evicted by following the procedure under the Act. 14. The next question raised was about the competence of the Estate Officer when he passed the order dated October 15, 1993. It was contended that on December 17, 1992, the Municipal Council, Jodhpur became a Municipal Corporation and the authority under the Notification dated October 17, 1995 issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 3(a) of the Act appointing Commissioner and Executive Officers of the Municipal Councils and the Municipal Board as the 'Estate Officer' came to an end. According to the appellant, there being no fresh Notification appointing any of the Officers of the Municipal Corporation of Jodhpur as Estate Officer, the order dated October 15, 1993 was unauthorised and without jurisdiction. According to the appellant, there being no fresh Notification appointing any of the Officers of the Municipal Corporation of Jodhpur as Estate Officer, the order dated October 15, 1993 was unauthorised and without jurisdiction. The learned single Judge has dealt this point and relying on Supreme Court decisions held that under the General Clauses Act, the Authority of the Estate Officer appointed for the Municipal Council, Jodhpur shall continue even after the Municipal Council, Jodhpur became a Municipal Corporation. In addition to the reasons given by the learned single Judge, we find that Section 20 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 which is on the same lines as Section 18 of the Central Act, applies to the situation and so long as the Estate Officer is not appointed by a fresh Notification, the earlier authority given to the Commissioner of the Municipal Council shall continue after the Municipal Council has been converted into a Municipal Corporation. 15. It was next contended that the order dated October 15, 1993 suffers from bias. It was submitted that the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation could not have remained independent, in his approach and he had in fact demonstrated by his actions that he entertained an official bias in the matter. The learned single Judge has for the reasons given by him rejected this contention and we also see no reason to disagree with him. 16. Eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises is a quasi-judicial or quasi-administrative matter. The administrative authorities are normally entrusted with such functions and as safeguards against injustice a fair procedure is prescribed involving proper notice and opportunity of hearing to the affected party. Judicial review is exercised by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the Act. It is, therefore, inherent in the situation that the concerned administrative officer alone will be dealing with the matter and no third person is expected to be appointed as an Estate Officer. As an instance of the alleged official bias, it was contended that the Estate Officer has sent the file to the Administrator, a superior Officer at some stage of the proceedings. As an instance of the alleged official bias, it was contended that the Estate Officer has sent the file to the Administrator, a superior Officer at some stage of the proceedings. The learned single Judge has pointed out that no objection has been raised in this regard either before the Estate Officer or even before the Appellate Authority and even the original petition filed did not contain that ground. It was taken by way of amendment later on. Apart from this what is apparent from the record is that the file was sent only for the purpose of getting the amount due ascertained which in the circumstances of the case would not be an indication of bias. We see no reason to take a different view than that taken by the learned single Judge on this point also. 17. It was then contended that Shri Narendra Singh was in factual possession and without issuing a notice to him for his eviction under the Act and without following the procedure prescribed under the Act against an unauthorised occupant being followed after giving a notice to him, he could not be evicted. The possession claimed by Shri Narendra Singh is on two counts. One on the ground that late Col. Mohan Singh even during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act had informed the Estate Officer that he was so put in possession and secondly as he had become the lessee of the premises because of acceptance of rent and passing of receipts by Municipal Council in his favour. 18. Annexure R/4/11 filed with the reply of the Municipal Corporation in Mohan Singh's petition, is pressed into service for this proposition. We find that the said document being proceedings of September 17, 1990 in the file of the Estate Officer only records the declaration of Shri Mohan Singh that Shri Narendra Singh and his Lawyer Jagdish Prasad Joshi have full information about the case and in future, the correspondence in this regard be made with Shri Narendra Singh Bhati and Shri Jagdish Prasad Joshi, Advocate. By no stretch of imagination, this document can be construed as assignment of his rights by Shri Mohan Singh in favour of Shri Narendra Singh. By no stretch of imagination, this document can be construed as assignment of his rights by Shri Mohan Singh in favour of Shri Narendra Singh. In fact it is pointed out that in the replies filed before the Estate Officer in the year 1992, Shri Mohan Singh did not take a position that rights under the lease had been transferred to Shri Narendra Singh. 19. As regards the money receipts dated October 5, 1989 and August 6, 1991, it is noteworthy that in one of these Mohan Singh's name is mentioned. It is also noteworthy that along with the licence agreement dated August 2, 1975 a deed of guarantee was executed by Shri Narendra Singh Bhati guaranteeing the payment of licence fee by his father Shri Mohan Singh. If, in these circumstances, when Shri Narendra Singh was responsible to make payment as guarantor, payment is accepted by the Municipal Corporation from Shri Narendra Singh, it could not be said that such payment would create leasehold rights in favour of Shri Narendra Singh. 20. In Dr. H. S. Rikhy v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1962 SC 554 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that in case of Municipal Committees a transfer of property would take place only on observing the formalities required to be observed for such transfers and if such formalities are not complied with, the transfer shall not be binding on the Municipal Committee. It is also observed in this case that where the statute makes it obligatory that there should be contract in writing and duly executed by the person authorised to do so, the absence of such contract cannot be cured by mere receipts of rent from the occupiers of the shops owned by the Municipality. 21. In the present case also Section 68 and Section 80 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 provide such procedure. Actually, Section 80(3) provides that it any person entered into the possession of any municipal land in pursuance of any lease, sale, transfer or any other contract made by a Board or by the Chairman, ViceChairman or any member or Officer of the Board, in contravention of the provisions of Section 80, he shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation within the meaning of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964. 22. 22. It cannot, therefore, be held that the money receipts passed on by the Officers of the Municipal Council create any legal right in Shri Narendra Singh Bhati. It is also curious that Shri Narendra Singh Bhati himself is not clear about from which point of time he started claiming independently of his father, whether on the basis of the proceedings dated October 17, 1990 Annexure R/4/11 in the case before the Estate Officer or from October 5, 1989 on which date the first receipt was issued or from the year 1980 as stated in his application dated July 17, 1994 made to the Estate Officer annexed to his petition as Annexure/4. We are, therefore, not satisfied that Shri Narendra Singh Bhati had any right independent of his father which necessitated hearing to be given to him as an independent unauthorised occupant of the premises. In any case, late Shri Mohan Singh against whom the order dated October 15, 1993 was passed after following the procedure under the Act was alive till November 8, 1995 and was fighting the litigation claiming to be a tenant holding over. We, therefore, do not find any force in this contention also. 23. The learned Counsel for the appellant had also made a request that in case we do not admit the appeals, a reasonable time to vacate premises be given to the appellant as it would take some time to get the employees of the appellant living on the premises shifted to some other place. We do not find that in the circumstances of this case when a large tract of public land given for two years was not vacated by the appellant and his father for over twenty years litigating on technical grounds, there is any case for showing the appellant any further indulgence and specially when the appellant is not prepared to give any undertaking for vacating and handing over the possession within reasonable time. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no force in these appeals and they are hereby dismissed on admission stage.