Research › Browse › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 70 (GAU)

Shailabala Ghosh v. Nitai Chandra Saha

1997-04-23

A.K.PATNAIK

body1997
This is an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 10.12.1996 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. 46(MAC) of 1996. By the said order the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has denied the relief to the claimant-petitioners in the said claim case under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988andhas held that the said claim may be granted if the claimants satisfy the Court in the original suit TS (MAC) 179 of 1996 that the death of Baikuntha Ghosh on 7.1.96 was due to road traffic accident. 2. Mr. M. Kar Bhowmik, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted before the Tribunal a copy of the First Information Report dated 3.1.96 relating to the accident had been filed which would disclose that death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was caused by an accident with the jeep registered as TR-03 1989. Mr. Bhowmik further submitted that the popy of Sulathal report (Inquest report) dated 7.1.96 was also filed before the Tribunal in which it is stated that the deceased had been under treatment in GB Hospital for sustaining injuries by an accident on 31.12.95 at Shekerkote and he died on 7.1.96 at 13.40 hours at the GB Hospital and the dead body was sent to IGM Hospital morgue for ascertaining the real cause of death. Thereafter, the post mortem was conducted at the IGM Hospital, Agartala. The report dated 7.1.96, copy of which was also filed before the Tribunal, clearly discloses that the cause of death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was the accident which had taken place on 31.12.95 with the jeep registered as TR-03 1989. Mr. Bhowmik further submitted that a copy of the Certificate of Insurance granted by the National Insurance Co., respondent No.3, was also filed before the Tribunal which clearly indicated that the aforesaid vehicle (Jeep) was insured with the respondent No.2 for the period from 21.7.95 to 20.7.96. The Tribunal, therefore, ought to have allowed the no fault claim of Rs.50,000/- as provided under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and should not have deferred the adjudication of the no fault liability of the respondents till adjudication of the original suit TS (MAC) 179 of 1996. Mr. The Tribunal, therefore, ought to have allowed the no fault claim of Rs.50,000/- as provided under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and should not have deferred the adjudication of the no fault liability of the respondents till adjudication of the original suit TS (MAC) 179 of 1996. Mr. Bhowmik cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil & another vs. Vatschala Uttam More reported in 1991 AC J 777 and submitted that the provision under section 92 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is similar to the provision of section 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was in nature of beneficial legislation enacted with the view to confer the Benefit of expeditious payment of limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability and while interpreting such a beneficial legislation the approach of the Court should be to adopt a construction which advances the beneficial purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. Mr. Bhowmik also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of NKV Brothers (P) Ltd vs. M. Karumai Animal & others, AIR 1980 SC 1354 wherein the Supreme Court has deprecated the approach of the Motor Vehicles Accident dims Tribunal in being technical and has held that accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. 3. None has appeared for respondent No. 1 despite notice to the said respondent. Mr. B Bhattacharjee, learned councel for the respondent No.2, Insurance Co., however, vehemently argued that sufficient materials were not placed before the Tribunal to show that the death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was caused by the accident and whatever documents were submitted they were not originals but photo copies of the originals. He further submitted that no opinion of Doctor was on the records of the Tribunal to show that the death of Baikuntha Ghosh was caused on account of accident. Photo copies of the documents which were filed before the Tribunal and on which reliance has been placed by Mr. He further submitted that no opinion of Doctor was on the records of the Tribunal to show that the death of Baikuntha Ghosh was caused on account of accident. Photo copies of the documents which were filed before the Tribunal and on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Bhowmik were at best some documents containing the case of the petitioner and as such no investigation has been made by the investigating authorities into the said case of the petitioner that the death of Baikuntha Ghosh was caused by the accident with the jeep. On the materials that were on record, according to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the Tribunal was right in not allowing the no fault compensation to the claimant-petitioners and the Tribunal rightly deferred adjudication of the claim of the petitioners till hearing of the main claim case. 4. I am unable to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee. The point for consideration is whether the Tribunal was right in deferring the adjudication of the claim of the petitioners for no fault compensation till the adjudication of the main claim case. Sub-section (2) of section 141 of the MV Act, 1988 which provides for adjudication of such claim for no fault compensation is quoted herein below: "(2) A claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of no fault, the claim for compensation under section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place." . The bare language of the aforesaid sub-section (2) of section 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is clear that the claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of death or disablement of any person, has to be disposed of in the first place under section 140 and as expeditiously as possible. In view of the said clear provision of sub-section (2) of section 141 of the MV Act, 1988, the Tribunal, in my opinion, failed to exercise the jurisdiction that was vested in it to decide the liability of the respondents under the principle of no fault under section 140 of the said Act expeditiously and in the first place. 5. In view of the said clear provision of sub-section (2) of section 141 of the MV Act, 1988, the Tribunal, in my opinion, failed to exercise the jurisdiction that was vested in it to decide the liability of the respondents under the principle of no fault under section 140 of the said Act expeditiously and in the first place. 5. The reasons that have been given by the Tribunal in the impugned order for not disposing of the claim of the petitioners under section 140 are that the petitioners neither filed the report of post mortem examination nor the injury report from which the injury and the cause of death of late Baikuntha Ghosh could be ascertained and that they have not been able to satisfy the Court that the death of Baikuntha Ghosh on 7.1.96 took place on account of road accident. This approach of the Tribunal, in my opinion, was a hyper technical approach. In a case relating to claim for compensation due to death or injury in the motor accident case, the approach of the Tribunal should not be hyper-technical but must be reasonable, just and fair as has been held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case of NKV Bros. (P) Ltd vs. M. Karumi Ammal & others etc. (supra). In the present case the copies of FIR, Inquest Report and the report dated 7.1.96 of the IGM Hospital filed before the Tribunal sufficiently indicated that the cause of death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was the accident with jeep bearing registration No. TR-03 1989. The said j eep was also insured with the respondent No. 2 as per the copy of the Certificate of Insurance Company which had been filed before the Tribunal. TL^ respondent No.2 as per the copy of the Certificate of Insurance company which had been filed before the Tribunal. The respondent No.2 in its written objection filed before the Tribunal has merely stated that subject to production and proof of validity of the insurance policy to be produced by the owner of the jeep the Insurance Company was liable to indemnify the insurer as per the provision of section 140 of the MV Act, 1988. The respondent No.2 has, therefore, not disputed in its pleadings the fact that the death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was caused by the accident with the said jeep. The respondent No.2 has, therefore, not disputed in its pleadings the fact that the death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was caused by the accident with the said jeep. Respondent No. 1 who is the owner of the said jeep has not filed any objection before the Tribunal disputing the fact that the death of late Baikuntha Ghosh was caused due to accident with the jeep. On the pleadings and materials on record it is clear that the death of Baikuntha Ghosh on 7.1.96 was on account of road traffic accident with the said jeep and the Tribunal should have straight way allowed the no fault compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioners instead of deferring the said claim under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 till the hearing of the main case. 6. In the result, this revision petition is allowed and the respondent No.2 is directed to pay no fault compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioners within a period of 2 (two) months from today with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation of the same. An authenticated copy of this order shall be furnished to the petitioners within 7 (seven) days from today. No costs.