JUDGMENT (1.) O. P. Garg, J. Heard Sri V. K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the applicant as well as learned A. G. A. (2.) THE applicant Munna son of Mohan Singh, resident of Garhi Jahan Singh, P. S. Shamshabad, District Agra has been convicted in three separate trials, in which maximum sentence has been passed for a prison term of five years. THE applicant is in jail since 12-3-1992. It is prayed that the order of sentence passed in the three Session Trials be made concurrent and since the applicant has already undergone a sentence of more than five years, the Jail Authorities be directed to release the applicant forthwith. The applicant was tried in Session Trial No. 25 of 1993 by Sri C. P. Sisodia with Additional Sessions Judge, Agra under Sections 363/366 and 376, I. PC, Case Crime No. 63 of 1902, P. S. Chhatta, District Agra. After convicting the applicant of the offences charged against him, the learned Additional Sessions Judge sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 363, I. P. C. and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-and in default thereof, to further undergo imprisonment for a period of six months; to three year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 366, I. P. C. and to pay find of Rs. 1000/- and in default thereof, to one years imprisonment and to a prison terms of five years under Section 376, I. P. C. and to pay-fine of Rs. 1500/- and in default thereof to undergo imprisonment for a period of 1½ years. The applicant was tried by the same Additional Sessions Judge in another Session Trial No. 24/1993 " (Case Crime No. 58/1992) and by order dated 28-10-1994, convicted and sentenced the applicant under Section 363, I. P. C. for a prison term of two years and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default thereof, to undergo six months' imprisonment and under Section 366, I. P. C, to three years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay-fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default thereof one year's imprisonment. The applicant faced the third trial in Session Trial Number 349 of 1992 under Section 376, I. P. C. before Sri Ajai Govind Lal, IXth Additional Sessions Judge who convicted and sentenced the applicant on 21-11-1994 under Section 376, I. P. C. to a prison term of five years and to pay-fine of Rs. The applicant faced the third trial in Session Trial Number 349 of 1992 under Section 376, I. P. C. before Sri Ajai Govind Lal, IXth Additional Sessions Judge who convicted and sentenced the applicant on 21-11-1994 under Section 376, I. P. C. to a prison term of five years and to pay-fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default thereof, to one year and three months' imprisonment. In view of the orders of sentence passed in the aforesaid three trials, the applicant has to remain in jail, at least for a period of 13 years as the sentence of imprisonment are to run consecutively. (3.) LEARNED counsel for the applicant urged that the entire amount of fine has been deposited by the applicant in the concerned Courts and since the applicant has been in jail throughout w. e. f. 12-3-1992, he could not file any appeal against the order of conviction and sentence. It was urged that this Court, in exercise of inherent powers, may make the sentences passed in the three trials to run concurrently so that after the expiry of the period of five years reckoned from 12-3-1992, the applicant may secure his release from jail. (4.) THE general rule is that a sentence commences to run from the time of its being passed. Section 424, Cr. P. C. however, creates an exception in the case of persons already undergoing imprisonment and postpones operation of the subsequent sentences until after the expiry of the previous sentence. Where the Court dealing with subsequent cases, does not pass an order that the sentence should run concurrently with the previous sentence, the law takes its course and the sentences are to run consecutively. In the instant case, as said above, no order has been passed in the subsequent two trials by the trial Court that the sentences passed in the said trials would run concurrently with the previous sentences, with the result, the orders of sentences passed in the subsequent two trials shall run consecutively. Now the question is whether this Court, in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. can make a sentence passed in the three different cases to run concurrently or not. There are series of decisions in which it has been held that the inherent power cannot be invoked to make sentences run concurrently. Now the question is whether this Court, in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. can make a sentence passed in the three different cases to run concurrently or not. There are series of decisions in which it has been held that the inherent power cannot be invoked to make sentences run concurrently. The view has been expressed that the discretionary power under Section 427 (1), Cr. P. C. to direct that the sentences of imprisonment on the subsequent conviction shall run concurrently with the sentence the convict was already undergoing is to be exercised at the lime of awarding subsequent sentences but not afterwards. In this connection, a reference may be made to AIR 1965 Patna 178 - Mahabir Beldar v. State, 1975 Cr. L. J. A. S. Naidu v. State of M. P. and AIR 1978, Delhi 138 (F. B.) Gopal Das v. State. The gamut of all these rulings is that the High Court in its exercise of inherent power, at the instance of a party, who has a right to appeal or revision, but has not availed of himself of that right, cannot pass an order directing that a sentence of imprisonment awarded to such person on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment when he is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment on an earlier conviction shall run concurrently with such previous sentences, (5.) A contrary view has been taken by this Court in a Full Bench decision reported in 1974 Cr. L. J. 1397 - Multaim Singh v. State in which it has been categorically held that it would be competent for the High Court in exercise of its inherent power to direct that the sentence of imprisonment under a subsequent conviction shall run concurrently with a previous sentence even if the stage for exercise of discretion under Section 397 (1) of the old Code (Section 427 (1) of the new Code) is over in circumstances where it would serve any of the three purposes mentioned in Section 561-A of the Old Code (Section 482 of the new Code) i. e. to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was further observed that it would be proper exercise of discretion in exercise of inherent power to make the sentence on subsequent conviction to run concurrently with the previous sentence where separate trials held for each offences which while constituting distinct offences are inherently or intimately connected with each other. In line of this decision are the cases reported in 1983 Cr. L. J. 1262 - Mani and another v. State of Kerala, 1983 Cr. L. J. 527 - Basudeb Pradhan v. State of Orissa. The consensus appears to be that there is no restriction in the Code of Criminal Procedure itself that direction to make consecutive sentence concurrently cannot be given in exercise of inherent power. Such a direction does not touch the merit of the matter and proceeds on the acceptance of the judgment of conviction as well as quantum of sentence. This Court, therefore, has the inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. to make the consecutive sentence to run concurrently. (6.) NOW the question is whether the discretionary power to make the consecutive sentence to run concurrently should be exercised in this case or not. The power can be exercised only when the offences in all the trials are inherently or intimately connected with each other. If the offences are independent and unconnected, the sentences should be consecutive and not concurrent. The basic rule so far has been the single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. Sentences should not be made to run concurrently where to do so would make the sentence ineffective or the crime inconsequential. If the habitual offenders with several convictions are allowed concurrent sentences, crimes may escape punishment and even dangerous criminals who must be segregated, would be let loose. In the instant case, the applicant appears to be a sex maniac, who has repeatedly committed crime of sexually abusing, criminally assaulting, defiling and ravishing the girls of tender age. In all the three cases, the age of the prosecutrix was around 4 to 5 years. In Session Trial No. 25 of 1993, the applicant was charged of the offence of kidnapping/abducting and raping a female child, Km. Barkha, of 5-6 years of age, on 9-3-1992. In Session Trial No. 24 of 1993, he was similarly found guilty of kidnapping/abducting Km. Nazbir, aged 4 1/2 years, on 4-3-1992 and in Session Trial No. 349 of 1992, the applicant raped Km. Barkha, of 5-6 years of age, on 9-3-1992. In Session Trial No. 24 of 1993, he was similarly found guilty of kidnapping/abducting Km. Nazbir, aged 4 1/2 years, on 4-3-1992 and in Session Trial No. 349 of 1992, the applicant raped Km. Durga aged about 4 years on 27-2-1992. All these three offences were committed by the applicant within a span of a fortnight. The medical evidence relating to these three girls is shocking. All the three offences are not, in any manner, related to or intimately connected with each other. The applicant had kidnapped/abducted and subjected to criminal assault the three different girls of tender age. If the sentences are made to run concurrently, it would mean that he would not have to face or suffer the consequences of the second and third convictions. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court should not make it a meaningless exercise missing the nuisance and the gravity of the offence in which the applicant has been sentenced to different prison terms. Therefore, even though this Court has the inherent power to make consecutive sentences passed against the applicant in the subsequent two trials to run concurrently, it is not found necessary and proper to exercise the said power in favour of the applicant keeping in view the perversity and the propensity of the applicant to commit sexual offences on the girls of tender age. (7.) THE application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. fails and is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed. .