ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. 1. Petitioner by Shri Balwant Singh Kushwah Advocate. Respondents by Shri R. K. Vashishtha Additional Advocate General. Heard. The circumstances, under which, this petition has arisen be noticed: 2. The petitioner had filed a civil suit. This bears No. 235-A of 1982. This was decree on 23rd of November, 1987. A decree was passed to the effect that the petitioner who figured as a plaintiff be given all those benefits with effect from 19th of September, 1980 as were given to defendants Nos. 5 to 7 in the civil suit. This order as per the petitioner attained finality. No appeal or second appeal was filed by any of the parties. 3. The further fact is that the petitioner has sought execution of the decree also. He has come to this court also. According to him there is wilful disobedience of a judgment and decree passed by the civil court. He accordingly submits that apart from the execution proceedings he can seek remedy under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 4. I am of the opinion that as the petitioner has already availed of his remedy of execution in the executing court no interference is called for in this petition. The objection taken by the State counsel is well founded. In this regard it would be apt to refer to a Division Bench Judgment of Madras High Court in the case reported as Ramalingam v. Mahalinga Nadar, 1966 Mad. 21. In para 3 following observations ware made: "Essentially, contempt of court is a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals, a party can bring to the notice of court, facts constituting what may appear to amount to contempt of Court, for such action as the Court deemed it expedient to adopt. But, essentially, jurisdiction in contempt is not a right of a party, to be invoked for the redressal of his grievances; nor is it a mode by which the rights of a party, adjudicated upon by a tribunal, can be enforced against another party" After making aforementioned observation, it was observed that the entire corpus of execution law exists for the enforcement of rights, by one party against another, which have been the subject matter of adjudication. It was further observed that if execution proceedings are permissible then it would be inexpedient and undesirable to institute proceedings under contempt jurisdiction. The reasons given for this was that all these are disputed questions of fact and these can be gone into only at the execution stage. The aforementioned decision of the Madras High Court was followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case reported as R. R. Pandey v. R. K. Bhargava, AIR 1971 All. 231 . It was observed as under: "Where an application was filed in High Court invoking its powers to punish condemners for disobedience of an order of injunction passed by subordinate Court it was held that the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act in a case where a detailed enquiry could be made under Order 39, Rule 2, sub-rule (3), Civil Procedure Code, by the Court which had passed the injunction order. It is true that in a case where the contempt is serious and there is an apprehension that the Subordinate Court whose order has been disobeyed may not be able to award adequate sentence, or, it may otherwise find itself in difficulties in dealing with the case. High Court may take action under the Act notwithstanding the specific provisions of Order 39, Rule 2, sub-rule (3), Civil Procedure Code. But such cases must be exceptional and clear. As there was no special reason, High Court declined to exercise its powers." The Allahabad High Court referred to another decision of Full Bench of Trav-Co reported as U. C. Thomas v. Thomokutty, AIR 1952 Travancore 113. In the above case, an order under section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code was said to have been violated. It was observed that as alternative mode is available, therefore the parties should be left free to proceed with alternate remedy and interference under contempt proceedings is not called for. The position in this case is no different. The petitioner has already availed all alternate remedies therefore, it is not though apt to pursue this matter any further. The learned counsel places reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in the case reported as Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, 1994(4) SCT 633 . A perusal of the aforementioned decision indicates that ratio of that case is not attracted to the facts of this case. The learned counsel places reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in the case reported as Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, 1994(4) SCT 633 . A perusal of the aforementioned decision indicates that ratio of that case is not attracted to the facts of this case. Accordingly, this petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed. The rule issued in this case is discharged leaving the petitioner to pursue his remedy which he has already availed in the executing court. Disposed of accordingly.