Judgment :- M.S. LIBERHAN, C.J.: 1. The learned counsel for the appellant by the writ petition sought a declaration that a decree of a civil court, passed as far back as 23rd October, 1967, as being without jurisdiction as well as not binding on the petitioner, as he was not a party. Secondly, it is stated that he cannot get his rights enforced under Sec.108 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. 2. In order to support the submission made by the learned counsel he relies on the decision in Subba Rao v. Jagannadha Rao , A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 591; (1964)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 112; (1964)2 An.W.R. (S.C.) 112; (1964)2 S.C.J. 518 by contending that a compromise decree is an agreement between the parties having the super-imposition of the seal of the court. Consequently, the compromise decree can be challenged in writ jurisdiction. 3. We find no force in the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant. Though there is no doubt that the trend of the courts earlier was that the compromise decree was an agreement having the super-imposition of the seal of the court, which view stood changed in 1996 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by holding that a compromise decree is as good as a decree of any competent court having civil jurisdiction. Even a void decree is binding on the parties, unless in a suit for declaration the same is set aside, for which limitation provided is three years. Considering the fact that the compromise decree was passed as far back as 1967, the remedy to challenge the same has become barred by time, as the declarator) ‘suit can be brought within three years, when the cause of action has arisen to the parties. 4. Merely contending that he was not a party to the lis and then seeking declaration that the decree is without jurisdiction, is of no consequence, so far as the bar of limitation is concerned, for a remedy. 5. Be that as it is, the appellant, by the impugned judgment under appeal, was relegated to an alternative remedy of suit. It is well established by now that no decree, where the other remedies are provided against decree by way of appeal suit etc., can be interfered in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. In view of the observations made above, the appeal is dismissed. It is well established by now that no decree, where the other remedies are provided against decree by way of appeal suit etc., can be interfered in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. In view of the observations made above, the appeal is dismissed. C.M.P. is also dismissed.