ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. M/s Usha International Ltd. as proprietor of Central India Sales Corporation, have tiled the suit seeking the relief of permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from interfering with the right of the plaintiff of enjoyment of the their tenanted premises and a decree against the defendants directing them to remove the obstacles put by them in front of the entrance door of the tenanted premises in the form of tables, furnitures and utensils. In the suit, an application under Order 39, Rule 1-2 C.P.C. was also filed seeking a temporary injunction that the defendants be restrained from creating any obstacles in the enjoyment for the plaintiffs tenanted premises and a mandatory injunction directing them to remove the obstacles put by them in front of the entrance door of the tenanted premises. 2. The defendants contested the suit and opposed the application, inter alia, pleading that the plaintiff has not stated as to when they have become proprietor of Central India Sales Corporation. The plaintiff M/s Usha International Ltd. is not the tenant, the plaintiff has no right to institute the suit and the defendants did not let out the Chabutra outside the shop, they have not caused any interference in the right of plaintiffs enjoyment of the property and they have only kept their goods etc. On the said Chabutra, which is not causing any interference with the right of the plaintiff. Both the parties have filed various documents and photographs in support of their contentions and so supported their allegations by affidavits. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties, by its order dated 22.3.1993 found a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and also found that the defendants were causing hindrance in the plaintiffs right of enjoyment. Without any authority, they have kept the goods on the said Chabutra. The trial Court granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff. Being dis-satisfied by the said order, the defendants took up the matter in appeal. The appellate Court by its order dated 17.2.1995 passed in M.A. No. 16/93, set aside the order passed by the trial Court, holding that the plaintiffs have no prima facie case, the balance of convenience was in favour of the defendants. Being dis-satisfied by the said order, the defendants took up the matter in appeal. The appellate Court by its order dated 17.2.1995 passed in M.A. No. 16/93, set aside the order passed by the trial Court, holding that the plaintiffs have no prima facie case, the balance of convenience was in favour of the defendants. It also found that the reliefs claimed in the suit would fall within the purview of section 38 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, therefore, the civil Court would ' have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. Being dissatisfied by the said order, the plaintiff have preferred this revision petition. 3. Shri Sapre and Shri Vegad learned counsel for the applicant contended that the appellate Court was not justified in observing that M/s Usha International Ltd. was not the tenant and had no right to institute the suit. They also submit that the photographs and the letters, documents/agreements would clearly show that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff and the provisions of section 3X of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act are not applicable to a situation like the present. They submit that the appellate Court was unjustified in interfering with the order passed by the trial Court. On the other hand, Shri N.K. Patel learned counsel for the non-applicants states that as the plaintiff have not pleaded as to nor M/s Usha International Ltd, became the tenant, of the defendants, it would have no right to institute the suit. The defendants arc earning their livelihood by keeping their goods on the Chabutra and occupying a small space beyond public road, therefore, the balance of convenience would be in favour of the person who is earning his livelihood and the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction in view of section 38 of the Act. 4. I have heard the parties at length and have perused the records of the two Courts. 5. Section 38 of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads as under: 38. Cutting off or withholding essential supply of service- (1) No landlord either himself or through any person purporting to act on his behalf shall without just and sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the accommodation let to him. Cutting off or withholding essential supply of service- (1) No landlord either himself or through any person purporting to act on his behalf shall without just and sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the accommodation let to him. (2) If a landlord contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1), the tenant may make an application to the Rent Controlling Authority complaining of such contravention. (3) If the Rem Controlling authority on enquiry finds that the essential supply of service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the accommodation was cut offer withheld by the landlord without just and sufficient cause, it shall make an order directing the landlord to restore such supply or service. (4) The Rent Controlling Authority may in its discretion direct that compensation not exceeding fifty rupees- (a) by paid to the landlord by the tenent, if the application under sub-section (2) was made frivolously or vexatiously; (b) be paid to the tenant by the landlord if the landlord had cut off or withheld the supply or service without just and sufficient cause. Explanation I - In this section 'essential supply or service' includes supply of water electricity, lights in passages and on and on stair cases, conservancy and sanitary service. Explanation II - For the purpose of this section, withholding any essential supply or service shall include acts or omissions attributable to the landlord on account of which the essential supply or service is cut off by the local authority or any other competent authority. 6. According to sub-section (1) of Section 38, no landlord can without just and sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the accommodation let out to him. Essential supply or service includes supply of water, electricity, lights in passages and on (sic) cases, conservancy and sanitary services. For the purposes of section 38 win-holding any essential supply or service shall include acts or omissions attributable to the landlord on account of which the essential supply or service is cut off by the local authority or any other competent authority. According to section 38, the landlord is forbidden from cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant. According to section 38, the landlord is forbidden from cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant. In the instant case, the case of plaintiff/tenant is that the premises were let out as shop to the plaintiff for their business and show room. The applicants has invested substantial amount in renovating the show room. Two sides of the show room shows that the frontage of the show room and one side wall are completely of glass panels. According to the plaintiff, the glass walls provide a pictures que view of the goods kept in side the show room. The plaintiff have stated that the defendants, with a view to harass the plaintiff created obstructions in the enjoyment of the tenanted premises. They have set up one tea stall; near the front door of the applicant's show room as a result of which the show room was completely blocked and the said obstruction resulted in regular and continuous nuisance. It also affected the applicant's business because unwanted elements started sitting in the tea stall and the shed put up by the defendants was shadowing glass panels of the show room resulting in total closure of the business. It would be seen from the allegations made in the plaint that the plaintiff were affected by the nuisance created by the defendants. Their statement before the Court was that by some illegal act, the defendants were not permitting the plaintiff to fully use and enjoy the demised premises. It is not a case where the defendant/landlord has cut of or withheld any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant. True it is that the main door or entrance to the shop, if is blocked by the landlord, then it would amount to withholding the essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant. In the instant case the plaintiff have stated that defendants have installed a tea stall in front of the demised premises which is over-shadowing their show room. It has also been submitted that the defendants are throwing garbage in front of the staircase and by putting a tea stall, they arc inviting unsocial elements. It is not a case where because of the acts of the defendants essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant has been cut off or withhold. It has also been submitted that the defendants are throwing garbage in front of the staircase and by putting a tea stall, they arc inviting unsocial elements. It is not a case where because of the acts of the defendants essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant has been cut off or withhold. In fact, the right of entry is adversely hampered and the tenant is unable to use the premises for the purpose it was taken on lease. Under section 38, the Rent Controlling authority may have jurisdiction to direct the defendant to restore the essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the accommodation let out to him but it cannot grant an ad interim writ or the injunction of the nature sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs arc seeking a temporary, injunction that the defendants be restrained from creating any obstacles of any kind which may interfere with the plaintiffs right of enjoyment of the tenanted premises. They are also seeking an injunction that the defendants be directed to remove the obstacles put by him in front of the entrance door of the tenanted premises. The nature of the relief claimed by the plaintiff would not fall within the ambit of section 38 nor it cannot be held that the civil Court would have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. The Court below was not justified in holding that the suit prima facie appears to be barred under the provisions of section 38 of the Act. 7. So far as the balance of convenience is concerned the Court Mow was not justified in giving a finding in regard to this aspect of the matter, when if found that the plaintiff has no right to institute the suit. Without making any comments on this aspect of the matter, I will decide the question of prima facie case in relation to whether the plaintiff has a right to file the suit or not. 8. The premises were let out to M/s Usha Sales Private Ltd. which is evident from the letter dated 20.3.1970. M/s Central India Corporation is not shown to be in the picture. By Letter dated 3.10.75, M/s Central India Sales Corporation informed of certain facts to the defendants. On the letter head it is clearly written that M/s Usha Sales Ltd. are the proprietors. M/s Central India Corporation is not shown to be in the picture. By Letter dated 3.10.75, M/s Central India Sales Corporation informed of certain facts to the defendants. On the letter head it is clearly written that M/s Usha Sales Ltd. are the proprietors. By another letter dated 11.7.80, written by Central India Sales Corporation, it appears that M/s Usha Sales Corporation is shown to be the proprietor. Vet by two other letters dated 14.4.85 and 12.4.90 written by M/s Central India Sales Corporation, it appears that M/s Usha International Ltd. are the proprietors of M/s Central India Sales Corporation. In the suit, the plaintiff has simply stated that the plaintiff has taken on lease the suit premises for their show room from the defendants. As observed above, unless it is shown that M/s Usha International Ltd. is the successor of Usha Sales Ltd. or Usha Sales Private Ltd. and it is a proprietor of the Central India Sales Corporation, it certainly cannot institute a suit. It may be that M/s Usha Sales Pvt. Ltd. was converted or reconstituted and M/s Usha Sales Ltd. and later on the said M/s Usha Sales Pvt. Ltd. became a limited company in the name and style Usha International Ltd. It is expected of the plaintiff that they would provide material facts in the plaint to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that M/s Usha International Ltd, is successor of Usha Sales Pvt. Ltd. M/s Usha International Ltd. is carrying on the business in the name of M/s Central India Sales Corporation. Unless these facts are brought on record, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the plaintiff has no prima facie case cannot be said to be incorrect. Placing reliance on a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the matter of N.K. Moosa Bhai Amin vs. Rajasthan Textile Mills A.I.R. 1974 Raj. 194, learned counsel for the applicant states that when a limited company carries on business in an assumed name, then the suit can be filed against the said limited company in its assumed name and as such the limited company can file a suit as proprietor of the firm in assumed name, if the limited company was carrying on the business. The principle of law cannot be disputed. The principle of law cannot be disputed. A limited company if carries on business in the assumed name, then it can sue or be sued in its assumed name and it would not be permitted to say that the limited company cannot file a suit for a limited company would be permitted to say that as the suit was not against the company but was against the assumed name, if is not maintainable. For application of the principles of law, there must be proper pleadings on record. In the absence of pleadings, it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff is carrying on the business in the assumed name 'Central India Sales Corporation' or it is successor of M/s Usha Sales Pvt. Ltd. The Court below was not unjustified in holding that the plaintiff prima facie does not appear to be tenant of the defendant/landlord. 9. It is, however, made clear that if the plaintiff brings all material particulars on record, then it shall be entitled to move another application before the trial Court seeking the relief of temporary injunction and the Court below shall reconsider the entire matter without being influenced by the fact that the earlier application of the plaintiff was rejected. It is, however, made clear that the finding recorded by this Court that the civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit is final for the purposes of the suit itself. 10. The revision is dismissed. No order as to costs. Application dismissed