JUDGMENT : C.K. Thakker, J. These two appeals arise against two interim orders passed by a learned single Judge in Civil Application No. 9633 of 1996 in A.O. No. 527 of 1996 and Civil Application No. 9634 of 1996 in A.O. No. 528 of 1996. One of the orders in Civil Application No. 9633 of 1996 reads as under: "After having heard Mr. Jhaveri learned advocate appearing for the respondent at length, it appears that the valuation made by the Corporation is totally arbitrary, without giving any opportunity to appellant and fixed the amount and issued the bill claiming huge amount of Rs. 35,000/-. Considering the fact that the appellant being an old widow, prima-facie it appears that it is not possible for her to pay the huge amount to the Corporation. I feel that the interim relief as prayed for is necessary. Hence, interim relief in terms of para-3(B)." Para 3(B) of C.A. reads thus: "This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass order to stay an execution order passed in M.V.A. No. 145/96 passed by the learned Small Causes Judge Shri A.F.Vanazara till this appeal is finally decided." 2. Initially the Division Bench issued notice on April 21,1997. On May 8, 1997 the Division Bench heard Mr. Jhaveri learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P.M. Vyas learned counsel for the respondent. The Division Bench asked Mr. Jhaveri as to how Letters Patent Appeals would be maintainable against orders passed in Appeal from Order Mr. Jhaveri submitted that though the appellants had filed Appeal from Orders, no Appeal from Order would lie and those appeals were really regular appeals i.e. First Appeals and hence were subject to Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench heard the arguments and passed the following order: "Heard Mr. Jhaveri for the appellant and Mr. Vyas for the respondents. This appeal involves a neat question of law involving interpretation of section 411(bb) read with section 406(2)(c) proviso of the BPMC Act. Hence appeal is admitted. A contention is raised by Mr. Vyas that this appeal is against the order passed in an AO. However, we are prima-facie of the view that though the appeal no. 527/96 is numbered as AO it is in fact in the nature of a first appeal under the statute" Thereafter appeals were admitted and were finally heard. 3. The respondent had filed two appeals being Appeal from Orders Nos. However, we are prima-facie of the view that though the appeal no. 527/96 is numbered as AO it is in fact in the nature of a first appeal under the statute" Thereafter appeals were admitted and were finally heard. 3. The respondent had filed two appeals being Appeal from Orders Nos. 527 and 528 both of 1996. She was applicant in Civil Application Nos. 9633 of 1996 and 9334 of 1996. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad in Municipal Valuation Appeal Nos. 11085 and 11086 both of 1996, two appeals were instituted. The Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad directed the appellant to deposit the amount of house tax as mentioned in the order. 5. The first question which arises for our consideration is whether Letters Patent Appeals would lie. A preliminary contention was raised by Mr. Vyas learned counsel for the respondent that since proceedings before the learned single Judge were Appeal from Orders, orders passed were not subject to Letters Patent Appeals. For that submission, he placed reliance on sub section (2) of section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. He also relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bhikhabhai Kalyanbhai v. Pirbhai Vaghabhai 1988 (29) 2 GLR 1282. In that case, interpreting the provisions of Sections 100-A and 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 and Clause 15 of Letters Patent, the Division Bench held that where an appeal from an appellate decree or order was heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal would lie from judgment, decision or order of a Single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal. In other words, where the order is passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in Second Appeal or from Appeal from Order, Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent. 6. This legal position is not disputed by Mr. Jhaveri learned counsel for the appellant. He however, submitted that in the instant case though respondent has filed appeals giving nomenclature as Appeal from Orders and the registry has registered, them as such,(i.e. Appeal from Orders) considering the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 (herein after referred to as 'the Act'), no Appeal from Order would lie and that appeals which are competent would be under Section 406. Section 406 reads thus: "406. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any rateable value or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Judge. (2) No such appeal [shall be entertained] unless- (a) it is brought within fifteen days after the accrual of the cause of complaint; (b) in the case of an appeal against a rateable value a complaint has previously been made to the Commissioner as provided under this Act and such complaint has been disposed of; (c) in the case of an appeal against any tax in respect of which provision exists under this Act for a complaint to be made to the Commissioner against the demand, such complaint has previously been made and disposed of; (d) in the case of an appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book for property taxes during the official year, a complaint has been made by the person aggrieved within fifteen days after he first received notice of such amendment and his complaint has been disposed of; (e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against {rateable value, the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed rateable value, upto the date of filing the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner}: {Provided that where in any particular case the judge is of the opinion that the deposit of the amount by the appellant will cause undue hardship to him, the judge may in his discretion, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, dispense with a part of the amount deposited so however that the part of the amount so dispensed with shall not exceed twenty five percent of the amount deposited or required to be deposited}" Mr. Jhaveri also drew our attention to a decision of a Division bench of this Court in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad (1993) 2 GLH 897 . Jhaveri also drew our attention to a decision of a Division bench of this Court in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad (1993) 2 GLH 897 . Interpreting the provisions of Sections 406, 409, 411 and 413, the Division Bench speaking through Bhagwati, C.J.(as then he was) observed in para 18 of the judgment as under: "...It is apparent from the provision in Section 409 sub-Section (1) and particularly the words "before evidence as to value has been adduced" that the appeal against rateable value is in the nature of an original proceeding where evidence as to value may be led by both parties. The Chief Judge may on the application of a party to the appeal appoint a competent person to make the valuation and such person may be called as a witness and, if he is so called, he may be cross-examined by the other side. The evidence as to value which may be adduced before the Chief Judge in the appeal may be based on any method which is regarded by the party or his witness as appropriate: It cannot be restricted to the method of valuation adopted by the Commissioner. So also when a competent person is directed to make a valuation, he may value it according to the method which he regards as proper: there is no requirement in the statute that his valuation must be based on the method adopted by the Commissioner. The entire question as to rateable value would be open before the Chief Judge and as contemplated under Section 411 Clause (a), it would be for the Chief Judge to fix the rateable value and the decision of the Chief Judge fixing the rateable value would be final, subject to appeal to the High Court and the Commissioner would be bound to give effect to such decision as provided in Section 413. The whole scheme of the provisions clearly contemplates that in the appeal against the rateable value, the Chief Judge would have to fix the rateable value after considering the evidence as to value which may be adduced before him and it is implicit in this process that he would also have to decide which method of valuation should be adopted. The whole scheme of the provisions clearly contemplates that in the appeal against the rateable value, the Chief Judge would have to fix the rateable value after considering the evidence as to value which may be adduced before him and it is implicit in this process that he would also have to decide which method of valuation should be adopted. If, therefore, the Chief Judge takes the view that the contractor's test method is inappropriate or inapplicable, he can decide which other method should be adopted and fix the rateable value by applying such method on the basis of the evidence before him." Anant Mill Company Ltd. came to be considered again by a Division Bench in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. 1994(2 GLH 433. In paras 69, 70 and 71, the Division Bench quoted with approval the above observations in Anant Mill Company Ltd. The case of Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co.Ltd was taken to the Apex Court and the judgment of the Apex Court is reported in Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of India v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1995(1) GLH 1153 (SC). The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that so far as the nature of proceedings before the Court of Small Causes is concerned, the law laid down by the Division bench of this Court in Anant Mill Company Ltd. and reiterated in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. is not disturbed by the Supreme Court. The legal position therefore, appears to be well settled that proceedings before the Court of Small Causes are in the nature of original proceedings. 7. If this is the legal position, obviously appeals filed by the respondent in this Court would be First Appeals under Section 406 of the Act. Section 406 does not provide an appeal from order. An aggrieved party has remedy of filing statutory appeal under Section 406 and he/she cannot invoke the provisions of Section 104 or Order 43 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. We are therefore, satisfied that though the proceedings were filed by the aggrieved party as Appeal from Orders and the registry of this Court has registered those appeals as Appeal from Orders, in view of settled legal position, they must be treated as First Appeals. If proceedings were First Appeals, obviously Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. We are therefore, satisfied that though the proceedings were filed by the aggrieved party as Appeal from Orders and the registry of this Court has registered those appeals as Appeal from Orders, in view of settled legal position, they must be treated as First Appeals. If proceedings were First Appeals, obviously Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. We therefore, do not find substance in preliminary contention of Mr. Vyas that Letters Patent Appeal would not lie. 8. It was also contended that the order passed by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes cannot be said to be "Judgment" under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We do not find substance in the said contention also. So far as the deposit amount of tax is concerned, though appeals are pending and they will be heard on merits, Civil Applications stood disposed of and the learned single Judge issued directions regarding payment of amount. The applicant before the learned Single Judge will now pay a particular amount as mentioned in the order. To that extent, therefore, in our opinion the rights of the parties have been finalised. It is settled law that connotation "Judgment" does not mean that rights of the parties must have been finally determined in a proceeding. Even a part of controversy determined can be said to be a ' judgment.' An appeal filed against such a decision would invoke Clause 15 of Letters Patent. In the instant case, an order as to deposit enabling the appellant to proceed, with appeals, is 'judgment' and hence Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. 9. Once we hold that Letters Patent Appeals are competent, the only question is whether Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad has committed an error of law in imposing condition of deposit of amount of tax. In this connection, our attention was invited by Mr. Jhaveri, learned counsel for the appellant to Section 406(2) of the Act referred to above and contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to law. 10. It is settled law that a right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right. An appeal is a creature of statute and that right can be exercised only when it is conferred by an Act. 10. It is settled law that a right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right. An appeal is a creature of statute and that right can be exercised only when it is conferred by an Act. Again, the said right being statutory right, appropriate conditions can always be imposed by a statute and no appeal can be filed unless those conditions are satisfied. Right conferred by Section 406 of the Act imposes certain conditions regarding deposit of amount of tax. It also enumerates circumstances in which and the extent to which liability of deposit of tax be limited. The power, therefore, in our opinion, was rightly exercised by the Small Causes Court, directing the respondent to deposit a particular amount. The said order was in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the learned Single Judge could not have interfered with that order by directing to pay only a particular amount, which is not in accordance with law. As the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to law, it is liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, it is hereby set aside. 11. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 contended that the basis on which the action was taken by the Corporation is ill founded and there is no tenant in the property. The order is, thus, without jurisdiction and considering larger interest of justice, the learned Single Judge has passed order. He also submitted that the respondent is a widow and she is not in a position to deposit the amount as per the direction of the Small Causes Court. If she will be asked to deposit the amount, she would be ruined and serious prejudice would be caused to her. Mr. Jhaveri, disputed this factual position. He, however, stated that if the respondent will make an application, the authority will consider the same sympathetically and taking into account the circumstances including her inability to pay the amount, pass an appropriate order. According to Mr. Jhaveri, the Corporation had to approach this court by filing Letters Patent Appeals as the order passed by the learned Single Judge was contrary to law. The Corporation will try to do justice to her the respondent. 12. In our view, the stand taken by the Corporation is fair and reasonable. According to Mr. Jhaveri, the Corporation had to approach this court by filing Letters Patent Appeals as the order passed by the learned Single Judge was contrary to law. The Corporation will try to do justice to her the respondent. 12. In our view, the stand taken by the Corporation is fair and reasonable. It is open to the respondent to make appropriate application pointing out the facts and circumstances and the Corporation will consider the same sympathetically particularly when the point of law with which the Corporation was concerned has been decided in the present Letters Patent Appeals. 13. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the appeals deserve to be allowed. The orders passed by the learned Single Judge are quashed and set aside and the orders passed by the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad are hereby restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs all through out.