JUDGMENT Vinod Kumar Gupta, J. This appeal at the instance of Messrs. Engineers India Ltd., a Government of India undertaking and a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act being appellant No. 1 and Messrs. Indian Corporation Ltd., a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act being appellant No. 2 and Cross Objection on behalf of writ petitioner respondent No. 1 Messrs. D. Wren International Ltd., a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act before us are directed against the judgment dated 28th March, 1996, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Application No. 1876 of 1995. 2. The learned Single Judge was of the view that a concluded contract having come into being between the appellants and the respondents, the writ petitioners respondents were entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the concluded contract was revoked by the appellants and as such he by the impugned judgment set aside the order dated 10.8.1995 and 8.10.1995 respectively. Thus aggrieved respondents appellants have come up in appeal. The Writ petitioner-respondents have preferred Cross Objection as they are allegedly aggrieved against the refusal on the part of the learned Single Judge in awarding the contract to them as a consequence of quashing and setting aside of the orders impugned in the writ application. 3. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the writ application are these : On 14th September 1994 M/s. Engineers India Ltd. appellant No. 1 floated a request for quotation whereby bids were invited for the supply of loading Arms (Rail Wagons) for the Project "Panipat Marketing Terminal". The persons to whom such quotation for request was floated were asked to send their agreed terms and conditions. The last date for receipt of the quotations was fixed as 27th October 1994. General Purchase Conditions (Indigenous) also accompanied the request for quotation. The writ petitioner M/s. D. Wren International Ltd. was one of such parties which had responded to the aforesaid request for quotation and had, accordingly, submitted the documents for favour of acceptance of its bid for supply of the loading arms. It also offered technical specifications in terms of the requests. The writ petitioner, along with other parties, submitted technical commercial bid and the price bid on 24.10.94. It also offered technical specifications in terms of the requests. The writ petitioner, along with other parties, submitted technical commercial bid and the price bid on 24.10.94. Thereafter various developments took place from time to time between the appellants and the parties who had offered their technical and commercial bids, taking the course of the contract from one stage to another involving the revision of terms of purchase, including the so called freezing of technical para-meters by the appellants. The negotiations were also conducted by the appellants with various parties who had submitted their bids. Ultimately, vide a communication issued on 5th August 1995 which was, in fact, sent through a fax message and which is popularly been referred to by the parties as the "fax of acceptance", the offer submitted by the writ petitioner on consortium basis on 24.7.95 was accepted by the appellants and the appellants, through the medium of the aforesaid "fax of acceptance" dated 5th August 1995 issued a firm order on the writ petitioners along with M/s. OPW Engineering System on consortium basis for supply of white oil loading arms, 840 in number (including commissioning spares) for a total cost of Rs. 5.70.06,180/- on F.O.T. site basis on the terms and conditions contained in the said "fax of acceptance". The terms and conditions, inter alia, provided that the purchase order would be jointly signed and accepted by the seller, i.e. the writ petitioners, and the writ petitioners will furnish contract performance bank guarantee equivalent to the 10% of the order value, valid till guarantee period of the equipment. This bank guarantee was to be submitted prior to the issue of purchase order. It was also provided in the terms and conditions of the fax of acceptance that the general purchase conditions and other conditions attached with the enquiry documents were to be totally accepted by the writ petitioners without any deviation whatsoever. The writ petitioners in the concluding part of the fax of acceptance were asked to acknowledge the receipt of the fax and confirm acceptance. It was also mentioned that regular purchase order would follow. On 5.8.95 itself the writ petitioners recorded and enforced at the bottom of the fax of acceptance, their acceptance of the aforesaid offer as made by the appellants by making the following enforcement thereupon :- "Vendor's Acceptance : We accept the above fax of acceptance in its entirety. It was also mentioned that regular purchase order would follow. On 5.8.95 itself the writ petitioners recorded and enforced at the bottom of the fax of acceptance, their acceptance of the aforesaid offer as made by the appellants by making the following enforcement thereupon :- "Vendor's Acceptance : We accept the above fax of acceptance in its entirety. CPC will be furnished on RIL's proforma within 10 days. Sd/- M/s. D. Wren International Ltd." However, on 10th August 1995 i.e. just about five days after the communication of the aforesaid fax of acceptance, the appellants intimated to the writ petitioners/respondents that they should hold action on the fax of acceptance dated 5th August 1995 till they would hear further from the appellants. It is worthwhile to re-produce the fax Message dated 30th August 1995 which is as follows : "Fax No. 033-248-0616 Attn: Mr. Sidharta Ghose Ref our fax of acceptance No. 3412/163 dt. 5.8.1995 for loading arms (Rail Wagon) 840 nos. for white oil for Panipat Marketing Terminals. Please hold action on fax of acceptance till you hear from us. Inconvenience is regretted. S.D.Kapoor/Eng. India (S.C. Kapoor) Dy. General Manager (Purchase) Job No. 3412 Date : 10.8.1995. M/s. D. Wren International Ltd. Wardley House, 3rd Floor, 25, Shallow Lane, Calcutta-700 001. P.S Please confirm receipt of this fax". It was on 8th October 1995 finally that the appellants sent a telegram by fax to the respondents/writ petitioners whereby they were informed that due to Techno Administrative Reasons it had been decided to re-issue the enquiry/tender for the subject contract work along with other bidders. Accordingly, the fax of acceptance dated 5.8.95 was to be treated as cancelled. Since this is the order which was ultimately impugned in the writ application filed by the respondents/writ petitioners, it is worthwhile to reproduce its text which reads as under :- "Attn. Mr. Sidharth Ghose subject 840 Nos. Loading Arms for white oil. For IOCLS Panipat Marketing Terminal EIL Job No. 3412 reference fax. DF acceptance No. 3412/163 dated 5.8.95 against EIL Rfo No. 841200-Vz-4030/009 dated 14.9.94 and our further fax dated 10.8.95 advising hold action on above referred fax of acceptance we hereby advise you that due to techno Administrative reasons it has been decided to re-issue the enquiry/tender for the subject along with other bidders. Therefore, fax of acceptance No. 3412/163 dated 5.8.95 is to be treated as cancelled. Therefore, fax of acceptance No. 3412/163 dated 5.8.95 is to be treated as cancelled. While the inconvenience is regretted. We certainly look forward to your active participation in the bid. S.C. Kapoor/Eng. India for and on behalf of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. by its Constituted Attorney." Indian Oil Corporation is setting up a Refinery at Panipat in the State of Haryana for production and refining of petroleum products. It is stated to be project of high national importance and for effective marketing and distribution it was thought necessary to build a Terminal near the Panipat Refinery to receive, store and distribute such petroleum products by road and rail tankers. For loading facilities by rail, the project envisaged an automated system with the help of loading arms which are made on metallic flexible conduit used for transfer of petroleum products from pressurised piping to Rail Wagons. 4. The petitioner's case is that they had offered to supply the loading arms to be used in the said Petroleum Production Project under technical collaboration with M/s. Engineering System, USA. Their further case is that after due consideration of their technical and commercial bids and on the basis of deliberations and consultations at practically all levels, the appellants, on due application of mind, had issued fax of acceptance on 5.8.95 and the moment the respondents/writ petitioners endorsed and recorded their acceptance on the said fax of acceptance on 5.8.95, itself, a concluded contract had come into force, creating thereby rights and obligations between the contracting parties which were squarely governed and regulated by the terms and conditions of the contract and specific and express provisions of the Law of Contract governing the relationship between these two contracting parties. According to the writ petitioners/respondents, therefore, the act of the appellants in first issuing "hold action" on 10th August 1995 and thereafter by finally cancelling the contract by issuance of the impugned order dated 8th October 1995 was wholly illegal, contrary to the provisions of the Contract Law and patently violative of the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties. It was also urged by the writ petitioners that the appellant being an instrumentality of the State, an Authority coming within the purview and scope of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India was under an obligation to act fairly, equitably and objectively and, therefore, it could not be permitted to act whimsically and arbitrarily by cancelling the only concluded contract in the absence of any valid and cogent reasons to do so and further action was inserted by non observance of principles of natural justice. 5. The case of the appellants had been that after the fax of acceptance was sent by the appellants on 5th August 1995 it transpired that certain relevant issues and considerations had not been fully appreciated and explored in the decision making process relating to the issuance of fax of acceptance and the matter required some further study and enquiry and because certain discoveries were made on 10th August 1995 the appellant informed the writ petitioners to hold action till a further communication on the subject could be sent to them. The appellants, accordingly, undertook internal assessment which disclosed that there was a system failure and that serious errors had crept in decision-making process, particularly, in the technical bid analysis. It was also contended by the appellants that offer of one of the contending parties, namely, EMCO was not given due consideration both in so far as the technical aspect was concerned as well as with regard to its commercial bid. It was also urged by the appellants that the parties submitting the tenders for supply of loading arms had three options, namely, to supply fully imported and fully assembled abroad components, imported components but assembled in India and imported components and indigenous swivel joint but assembled in India. 6. Initially, the case of the appellants before us while assailing the judgment under appeal was that there was no concluded contract between the parties and on that ground alone apart from some other considerations, this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to hear the writ application filed by the respondent/writ petitioners. However, as the hearing of the case progressed the appellants did come around to admit that, in fact a concluded contract had come into existence by issuance of fax of acceptance dated 5th August 1995 and by its being accepted by the writ petitioners on the same day. However, as the hearing of the case progressed the appellants did come around to admit that, in fact a concluded contract had come into existence by issuance of fax of acceptance dated 5th August 1995 and by its being accepted by the writ petitioners on the same day. The objection about the lack of jurisdiction of this Court therefore, also was almost given up by the appellants during the course of hearing of the appeal. 7. This case was heard at great length by us and the hearing continued for a number of days. The learned Advocates for the parties urged a large number of points and addressed for the parties urged a large number of points and addressed arguments on some very important questions relating to the rights and obligations of the parties, covering almost the entire gamut of the controversy between the parties and the disputes and questions that had flung up between them because of the acts of omission and commission on the part of the parties. In fact the hearing of the appeal was so extensive and elaborate that the learned Advocates dealt at great length upon almost all the accepts of the disputes between the parties. For the view that we not ultimately propose to take however we feel it more advisable and desirable that we should not advert to any of the questions raised with regard to the subject matter of controversy between the parties since, any opinion expressed by us on the merits of the controversy is likely to prejudice the ultimate outcome and may adversely affect the interests of either of the parties. 8. The case of the appellants before the learned Single Judge as well as before us is that this Court ought to have declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to entertain the writ application and hear and decide the issues involved in this matter because of the existence of an Arbitration Agreement between the parties. As noticed at the outset of this judgment, General Purchase Conditions accompanied the Request for Quotation and clause 39 of these general purchase conditions is the Arbitration Agreement between the parties. As noticed at the outset of this judgment, General Purchase Conditions accompanied the Request for Quotation and clause 39 of these general purchase conditions is the Arbitration Agreement between the parties. Clause 39 of the General Purchase Conditions reads as follows : "All disputes arising out of the Purchase Order shall be referred in the sole arbitration of a person selected by the Vendor out of a Panel of three persons nominated by the Director Marketing/Project Manager/General Manager of the IOCL (Marketing Divn.)/Project and his decision/award shall be final and binding on the IOCL (Marketing Divn.)/Project and the Vendor. Subject to as aforesaid the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under the contract." Clause 13 of the FAX of acceptance dated 5th August, 1995 reads as under :- "13. OUR GENERAL PURCHASE CONDITIONS AND OTHER CONDITIONS ATTACHED WITH OUR ENQUIRY DOCUMENTS ARE TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE TO YOU WITHOUT ANY DEVIATION WHATSOEVER." 9. As noticed earlier, the writ petitioner had endorsed and recorded their acceptance of the fax of acceptance in its entirety. Since it is the admitted case of both the parties that a concluded contract had come into existence by issuance of the FAX of acceptance on 5th August, 1995 and its acceptance General Purchase Conditions which formed an integral, inseparable and non-severable part of the Contract also came into existence immediately simultaneosly on the contract having been concluded between the parties. The moment therefore the writ petitioner recorded and endorsed their acceptance of the FAX of acceptance in its entirety, they also in the process recorded and endorsed their acceptance of the General Purchase Conditions because undoubtedly, Clause 13 of the Fax of acceptance clearly provided that General Purchase Conditions would be totally acceptable to the writ petitioner without any deviation whatsoever. 10. Clause 39 of the General Purchase Conditions is no doubt a part of the contract concluded between the parties. If the parties admit that the contract stood concluded between them in all respects, they cannot but also have to abide by the application of each and every clause of the General Purchase Conditions, including clause 39 thereof. It is not therefore open, as was very strongly and vehemently contended by Mr. If the parties admit that the contract stood concluded between them in all respects, they cannot but also have to abide by the application of each and every clause of the General Purchase Conditions, including clause 39 thereof. It is not therefore open, as was very strongly and vehemently contended by Mr. Mitra, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner to disown or riggle out of clause 39 by contending that even though the contract had otherwise been concluded, the General Purchase Conditions could not be applicable to the writ petitioner since the purchase order had not been issued. A very careful reading though the various conditions contained in the FAX of acceptance the request for quotation dated 14th September, 1994 and all the conditions contained in the General. Purchase Conditions suggests without any doubt that once the FAX of acceptance was communicated on 5th August, 1995 and its acceptance recorded, each and every condition contained in the FAX of acceptance stood binding as far as the parties were concerned and the parties had no option but to abide by all such terms and conditions. Clause 13 of the FAX of acceptance was one of such conditions and it provided, clearly, unequivocally and categorically that the General Purchase Conditions would be applicable and binding upon the seller. 11. Where an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the High Court in exercise of the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution normally do not interfere in such cases. In the present case, the learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that the arbitration agreement was not applicable as it would come into existence only in the event of issuance of the purchase order. The learned Single Judge being of the opinion that there was a concluded contract between the parties, the issuance of the purchase order was a ministerial act of the concluded contract. Further we also fail to appreciate the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that the relief sought in the writ application could not be granted by the Arbitrator. The Parliament has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act with a view to provide speedy remedy by arbitration and to achieve this object, s. 5 of the Act plays complete bar for intervention of the courts in matters where there exist an arbitration clause. The Parliament has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act with a view to provide speedy remedy by arbitration and to achieve this object, s. 5 of the Act plays complete bar for intervention of the courts in matters where there exist an arbitration clause. It is relevant to mention that prior to coming into force of the Act, the Arbitration Act, 1940, was the law in force relating to arbitration and s. 34 of the repealed Arbitration Act being pari materia to s. 5 of the Act also provided that in respect to matters which are covered by arbitration, proceedings in a court were not maintainable. However, the language used in s. 5 of the Act is more stringent and unequivocal insofar as the bar to the jurisdiction of any judicial authority is concerned. Whereas in s. 34 of the 1940 Act only civil suits practically were barred as would be clear from the language used in s. 5 of the Act, every judicial authority has been barred from intervening in respect of a matter which is governed by Part 1 of the Act. Section 5 of the Act reads as follows :- “5. Extent of judicial intervention.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this part.” It therefore becomes manifestly clear that when an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, on a plain reading of s. 5 of 1996 Act, every judicial authority has been barred from intervening. 12. However, s. 5 of the Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. But it is settled principle of law that where there is an arbitration clause, High Court will not be justified in entertaining the writ petition. Emphasis has always been given that the remedy of arbitration normally should be pursued instead of availing the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Courts normally do not interfere in a dispute where there is adequate and specific remedy provided by arbitration. This is based on principle that a Writ of Certiorari followed by Mandamus is not made available by High Courts in the exercise of power under Art. 226 of the Constitution where an alternative, adequate and specific remedy provide relief upon the same subject. This is based on principle that a Writ of Certiorari followed by Mandamus is not made available by High Courts in the exercise of power under Art. 226 of the Constitution where an alternative, adequate and specific remedy provide relief upon the same subject. What we find here is that a commercial dispute has arisen between the patties and there is an arbitration clause for resolving the dispute. Under such circumstances, we do not think that it was a fit case where the writ petition ought to have been entertained and decided on merits. 13. It was then contended by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner respondents that since we have heard the arguments of the parties on merits, the court should decide the matter on merit. According to us this is not the correct view of understanding the real nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts by virtue of Art. 226 of the Constitution. If by some wrong interpretation, the learned Single Judge entertained the writ petition and heard the matter on merit, it does not mean that the matter under appeal has to be decided on merit irrespective of the fact that the appeal court finds that there is adequate specific alternative remedy available to the respondents. If such an argument is accepted it would lay down wrong precedent. We, therefore, reject the argument of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner respondents. 14. On going through the arbitration clause we found that it provides that all disputes are to be referred to the sole arbitration of a person selected by the Vendor out of a panel of three persons to be nominated by the Director of Marketing/Project Manager/General Manager etc. etc. Because of the very nature of disputes between the parties as was very elaborately projected before us and the extent of controversy between them, we thought that interests of justice would be better served if the disputes are adjudicated through arbitration by an arbitrator to be appointed by us, rather than in accordance with the arbitration agreement, i.e. clause 39. We, therefore, put it to Sri S. Pal, learned Advocate for the appellants as to whether the appellants would be agreeable to submit to arbitration of an Arbitrator to be nominated by us, outside the arbitration agreement. We, therefore, put it to Sri S. Pal, learned Advocate for the appellants as to whether the appellants would be agreeable to submit to arbitration of an Arbitrator to be nominated by us, outside the arbitration agreement. We wish to observe and record that Sri S. Pal agreed to our proposal and stated that his clients would have no objection if the disputes were referred to the arbitration of an Arbitrator to be appointed by us, rather than in the manner provided for in the arbitration agreement. We also wish to record and observe, to be fair to Sri Mitra, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner that he all along very strongly and vehemently contested the prayer of the appellants for reference of disputes to arbitration and maintained that this is a case where the arbitration was not applicable and that the matter should be heard and disposed of by us in exercise of our writ jurisdiction. However, for the reasons stated above, we have taken a different view and have come to a finding that the arbitration agreement is indeed and in fact applicable to the present disputes between the parties and that the disputes should be adjudicated upon by an arbitrator to be nominated and appointed by us. 15. We, therefore, while disposing of this appeal and setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge hereby refer all the disputes between the parties arising out of the contract in question to the arbitration of Sri Justice (Retd) R.C. Mathur, Former Chief Justice, J & K High Court, presently residing at Lucknow, whom we appoint as the sole arbitrator. We direct that the arbitrator appointed by us shall enter upon the reference immediately and pass the award within the statutory period. 16. We also wish to observe that nothing stated herein by us shall be construed as any expression of opinion upon the merits of the controversy between the parties and that the arbitrator shall adjudicate the disputes strictly on their merits and in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1996. The cross objection filed by writ petitioner respondents is rejected. There shall be no order as to cost. Visheshwar Nath Khare, C.J.: I agree. Cross-objection rejected. Arbitrator appointed.