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1997 DIGILAW 71 (GAU)

Thongkhojam Baite v. State of Manipur

1997-04-29

A.K.PATNAIK, P.K.SARKAR

body1997
A. K. Patnaik, J.— In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the impugned order dated 14.6.90 of the Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department, wherein the State Govt. of Manipur has cancelled the recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as a separate village and has further ordered that hill houses which formed T.Lailoiphai Village but originally belong either to Molzol "Village or Lungngil Village shall continue to pay hill house/ revenue taxes, etc through their respective chiefs to the Revenue Authority concerned. 2. The facts briefly are that the petitioner claims to be the Chief of T. Lailoiphai Village and filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, for allowing him to pay hill house taxes, etc of his village separately. The Sub Divisional Officer, Churachandpur Sub Division, then submitted a report stating therein mat the prayer of payment of hill house taxes, etc in the name of T. Lailoiphai may be considered on the ground of administrative and developmental convenience. On the basis of the said report, the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, allowed the petitioner to pay hill house taxes, etc in the name of T. Lailoiphai Village separately by his order dated 13.1.86 in Hill Misc Matter No.3/86. The respondent Nos.4 and 5, Chiefs of Molzol Village and Lungngil Village, respectively, however, made a complaint before the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, stating, inter alia, that T. Lailoiphai Village did not have any separate identity and the petitioner did not have twenty families which are required for payment of hill house taxes, etc separatetly and on the basis of the said complaint, the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, passed orders on 31.1.86 cancelling his earlier order 13.1.86. The said order dated 31.1.86 was thereafter revoked by the State Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department by order dated 20.2.86. But in order; dated 24.4.86, the Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department, stated mat until a 'final decision is taken on receipt of report from the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the order dated 20.2.86 was stayed. The Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department then by its order dated 29.5.86 cancelled the said order dated 24.4.86 but finally by the impugned order dated 14.6.90, the Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department, stated mat until a 'final decision is taken on receipt of report from the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the order dated 20.2.86 was stayed. The Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department then by its order dated 29.5.86 cancelled the said order dated 24.4.86 but finally by the impugned order dated 14.6.90, the Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department cancelled the recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as a separate village and ordered that hill houses which formed T. Lailoiphai Village but originally belonged either to Molzol Village or to Lungngil Village shall continue to pay hill house/revenue taxes, etc through their respective Chiefs to the concenred Revenue Authority. 3. Mr. TNK Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.6.90 is not a speaking order and does not contain any reasons and is, therefore, arbitrary. He cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of VV Saraf vs. New Educational Institute & others, AIR 1986 SC 2105 , and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yanglung & another vs. State of Manipur & another, AIR 1993 Gauhati 77 (1992 (2) GLJ 147), in support of his submissions that where an order does not contain reasons, it has to be quashed by the Court. He further contended that the impugned order dated 14.6.90 was violative of principles of natural justice and no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before the said order was passed affecting the right of the petitioner to pay separate hill house taxes, etc in respect of the houses located at T. Lailoiphai Village. He relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yanglung & others vs. State of Manipur (supra) for the proposition that an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice has to be quashed by the Court. Mr. INK Singh in particular pointed out that although the impugned order dated 14.6.90 was passed on the basis of an enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the Sub Divisional Officer. Churachandpur Sub Division and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot, a copy of the said enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner. Mr. INK Singh in particular pointed out that although the impugned order dated 14.6.90 was passed on the basis of an enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the Sub Divisional Officer. Churachandpur Sub Division and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot, a copy of the said enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL vs. K. Karunakaran, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , for his submission that if the copy of the enquiry report on which the authority takes an adverse decision against the party is not furnished to the party, it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. He contended that if a copy of the enquiry report had been furnished to the petitioner, the petitioner would have shown to the Govt. that the findings in the enquiry report were contrary to the evidence that had been collected in the course of the enquiry. Mr. TNK Singh urgued that the impugned order should be quashed by this Court for the aforesaid reasons and the matter be remanded back to the State Govt. of Manipur for giving due opportunity to the petitioner and for passing a fresh speaking order in accordance with law. 4. Mr. Y Imo Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No.4, however, submitted that in the case of Managing Director ECIL vs. K. Karunakaran (supra), the Supreme Court clarified that in every case where a grievance is made by the delinquent employee that the copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to him, the Court should ask the employee to show to the Court as to how non supply of the enquiry report to him as caused prejudice to him and only if prejudice has actually been caused to the delinquent employee for non supply of the enquiry report to him, the Court would hold that there was violation of the principles of natural justice. In the present case, therefore, the petitioner should have specifically pleaded in the writ petition as to how he has suffered prejudice for not being furnished a copy of the enquiry report but no such pleading has been specifically raised by the petitioner in the writ petition. Mr. In the present case, therefore, the petitioner should have specifically pleaded in the writ petition as to how he has suffered prejudice for not being furnished a copy of the enquiry report but no such pleading has been specifically raised by the petitioner in the writ petition. Mr. Y. Imo Singh then submitted that the impugned order being an administrative order need not state the reasons for which it has been passed and it is sufficient if the impugned order is supported by good reasons available in the records. He explained that the records would indicate that the impugned order has been passed on the basis of enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, Sub Divisional Officer. Churachandpur Sub Division and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot. The impugned order read with the said enquiry report would show that there were good reasons for cancelling the recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as a separate village and for ordering that the hill houses which formed the ,said village but originally belonged either to Molzol Village or to Lungngil Village shall continue to pay hill house/revenue taxes, etc through their respective Chiefs of the concerned Revenue Department. Mr.Y. Imo Singh finally argued that part of the area in respect of which the impugned order has been passed is surveyed area having individual owners who have not been impleaded as respondents to this writ petition and hence no order can be passed by this Court in the absence of necessary parties to the civil rule. 5. Mr. A. Nilamoni Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No.. 5, contended that the claim of the petitioner was that T. Lailoiphai Village is a separate village and that he should be allowed to pay hill houses taxes, etc in respect of the hill houses which belonged to the said village. The said claim of the petitioner had been once enquired into and rejected by the Sub Divisional Officer, Churachandpur and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot in a proceeding held on 2.10.85 a copy of which has been annexed to the counter-affidavit of the respondent No.5 as Annexure D/l. But the said claim of the petitioner was again allowed to the prejudice of the respondent No. 5 by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, in his order dated 13.1.86 in Hill Misc Matter No.3/86 without giving any opportunity of hearing or show cause to the respondent No.5. Thus the order dated 13.1.86 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, allowing the petitioner to pay separate hill house taxes, etc in the name of T. Lailoiphai Village was violative of principles of natural justice and null and void. He next submitted that the entire land of Village Lungngil which the petitioner claims as belonging to his Village T. Lailoiphai has been purchased by the respondent No.5 by a registered sale deed dated 14.12.84 from the then Kuki Chief of the said Lungngil Village. He relied on the judgments of this Court in the cases, of Ningom & others vs. Samjamang, Chief, (1990) 2 GLR 331 (1990 (2) GL J 298) and Vumsan and others vs. Nokam Vaiphei & others, 1995 (III) GLT 617, for his submission that the Kuki Chief is the owner of the entire village. Mr. Nilamoni Singh pointed out that this fact of purchase of land by the respondent No. 5 from the Kuki Chief on 14.12.84 by a registered sale deed has been admitted by the petitioner in his plaint filed in Original Suit No.6 of 1986 in the Court of the Munsiff. Churachandpur. He argued that the petitioner does not, therefore, own the land which the claims to be his village. He also relied on the findings in the enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the Sub Divisional Officer. Churachandpur and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot to the effect that the petitioner has not been able to establish the separate geographical boundary and identity of his village and submitted that this writ oetition should be dismissed. 6. We have carefully applied our mind to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The impugned order is an administrative order. We agree with the submission of Mr. TNK Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner that an administrative order cannot be arbitrary and has to be passed for some reasons but we do not agree with his further submission that an administrative order must itself indicate the reasons for which it has been passed. In our view, if from the records produced before the Court, it is clear that the order has been passed for good reasons, the Court will not quash such an administrative order on the ground that it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In our view, if from the records produced before the Court, it is clear that the order has been passed for good reasons, the Court will not quash such an administrative order on the ground that it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of W Saraf vs. New Educational Institution (supra) cited by Mr. TNK Singh lays down the cardinal principle of law that a Court of law includingthc writ Court is required to record reasons while disposing of a writ petition in order to enable the aggrieved party to know the reasons which weighed with the mind of the Court in deciding a case, but the said decision does not apply to an administrative order. In the case of Yanglung & another vs. State of Manipur (supra) on a perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court we find that the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the order was not founded on the material produced before the Court and held that the impugned order was vitiated. 7. In the present case, on a perusal of the records produced before us by Mr. Jagat Chandra Singh, learned Govt. Advocate, Manipur, we find that the impugned order dated 14.12.90 has been passed on the basis of the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the Sub Divisional Officer, Churachandpur and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot, for cancellation of the order giving recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as a separate village for various administrative reasons. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the reasons for the impugned order were contained in the said report of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District, the Sub Divisional Officer, Churachandpur and the Sub Deputy Collector, Sangaikot. On a perusal of the said report we find that the following reasons have been given for cancellation of recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as separate village. "The committee therefore concluded that though Shri Thangkhojam has performed the customary rituals in connection with transfer and recognition of Chiefship as per Baits custom from Shri Otkhesei of Lungngil Village, his claim of separate recognition of T. Lailoiphai village cannot be accepted on the following grounds: 1. "The committee therefore concluded that though Shri Thangkhojam has performed the customary rituals in connection with transfer and recognition of Chiefship as per Baits custom from Shri Otkhesei of Lungngil Village, his claim of separate recognition of T. Lailoiphai village cannot be accepted on the following grounds: 1. The basic and necessary conditions for recognition of a new and separate hill village are (a) a clear cut geographical boundary and (b) clearly established ownership or transfer of ownership of the lands enclosed by the respective boundary in favour of the claimant to Chiefship. In the instant case, the boundary mentioned by Shri Thangkhojam also happens to be the boundary of already existing villages of Molzol and Lungngil and is therefore, obviously unacceptable. Secondly, since the houses claimed by him to be under his Chiefship are situated not on lands not owned by him but on the respective patta lands of each family, the very basis of Chiefship does not exist. 2. A large number of houses claimed by Shri Thangkhojam to be loyal to him was found common to the list of houses loyal to the other two village Chiefs. Considering the fact that the two hill villages namely Molzol and Lungngil already exist in a closely enmeshed area, there is no administrative ground or reason for granting permission to creation and recognition of a third village in the same area. This is not only unnecessary as required by public policy but also illegal in view of the absence of clear boundary and ownership over lands of the vilalge. 1. (RR Rashai), Deputy Commissioner, Chairman, 2. (Barun Nitha) Sub Divisional Officer, Member, Churachandpur. 3. (S Khazalam) Sub Deputy Collector, Member, Sangaikot." A reading of the aforesaid reasons given by the Enquiry Committee comprising of the Deputy Commissioner. Sub Divisional Officer and Sub Deputy Collector would clearly show that the boundary of the village claimed by the petitioner happens to be also the boundary of the existing village Molzol belonging to respondent No.4 and the existing village Lungngil belonging to respondent No.5 and that a large number of houses claimed by the petitioner to be loyal to him are also found common in the list of houses loyal to respondent N«s.4 and 5 who are Chiefs of two existing villages, i.e., Molzol and Lungngil. In our opinion, the aforesaid reasons are good reasons for the State Govt. In our opinion, the aforesaid reasons are good reasons for the State Govt. of Manipur to cancel the recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as a separate village and not to allow the petitioner to pay hill house taxes, etc separately for the hill houses claimed to be loyal to him within his village T. Lailoiphai. We, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioner that the impugned order cancelling the recognition of the T. Lailoiphai "Village as a separate village and not allowing the petitioner to pay separate hill houses taxes, etc was arbitrary. 8. Coming now to the argument of Mr. TNK Singh that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, we find that the petitioner himself was present during the enquiry conducted by the aforesaid Enquiry Committee comprising of the Deputy Commissioner. Churachandpur District,|the Sub Divisional Officer, Churachandpur and the Sub Deputy Collector. Sangaikot. A copy of the enquiry report submitted by the said committee on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed, however, does not appear to have been furnished to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. A copy of the said enquiry report has been annexed to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Nos.4 and 5 and hence the petitioner and the counsel for the petitioner have had the opportunity to peruse the same. On a querry being made by the Court as to how the petitioner sufferred prejudice for non supply of a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner before passing of the impugned order. Mr. TNK Singh submitted that the petitioner would have shown to the State Govt. on the basis of evidence that was recorded during the enquiry that in fact the village T. Lailoiphai had a distinct boundary and separate identity of its own and that more than twenty houses were loyal to the petitioner and were willing to pay separate hill house taxes, etc to the Revenue Authorities through the petitioner. Even if the petitioner would have made an attempt to show to the Govt. that his village had separate boundary and identity of its own and that more than twenty houses were loyal to him and willing to pay hill taxes, etc separately through him to the Revenue Authority, the State Govt. Even if the petitioner would have made an attempt to show to the Govt. that his village had separate boundary and identity of its own and that more than twenty houses were loyal to him and willing to pay hill taxes, etc separately through him to the Revenue Authority, the State Govt. could not have taken a decision on this point considering the fact that the question of ownership, transfer and possession of land in question between the petitioner and the respondent No. 5, in so far as the Lungngil Village is concerned, are in dispute in Original Suit No.6/86 filed by the petitioner himself. Against the decree passed in the said suit by the learned Munsiff, Churachandpur, Civil Appeal Case No. 6 of 1989 was filed by the respondent No.5 in the Court of the District Judge, Manipur and the District Judge has decided the said appeal in favour of the respondent No.5. But against the said judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in the said Civil Appeal Case No.6 of 1989, a Second Appeal No.2 of 1990 has been preferred by the petitioner before this Court which we have disposed of today by remanding the suit for retrial by the learned Munsiff after framing proper issues on the basis of the pleadings between the parties. Until the said suit is finally decided, the State Govt. of Manipur cannot possibly take a final decision with regard to separate identity and geographical area of Village T. Lailoiphai to which the petitioner has made a claim and allow the house belonged to the said village to pay separate hill house taxes, etc through the petitioner to the concerned Revenue Authority. 9. For the reasons stated above, we decline to interfere with the impugned order dated 14.6.90 passed by the Govt. of Manipur in the Revenue Department. But we observe that in the event the petitioner finally succeeds in Original Suit No.6/86, it will be open for the petitioner to make a fresh application before the competent authority for recognition of T. Lailoiphai Village as a separate village and for payment of separate hill house taxes, etc for the house located in the said village. But considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.