ORDER J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. M. Sanyal, counsel for the appellant. Mr. A. K. Sethi, counsel for the Respondent No. 1. Mr. S. M. Jain for Respondent No. 2. Perused the record. As the short point is involved, with the consent of parties, this appeal is being decided finally. 2. Mr. Sanyal, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was prevented from attending the court when the suit was being finally decided. He submitted that on account of illness of the appellant, he was prevented from attending the court and unfortunately, the ex parte decree has been passed against him. Mr. Sethi, counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 countering this submission, submitted that the trial Court has considered this aspect in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14. He pointed out that on 23-2-1993, it was ordered that the suit was to be heard against the appellant ex parte. He further submitted that appellant gave false information for the purpose of explaining his absence and, therefore, the court was right in passing the ex parte decree against him. 3. Mr. Sanyal further pointed out that the court initially fixed a date for hearing the interim applications and thereafter without giving opportunity to the appellant the suit was fixed for final hearing ex parte against the present appellant. Mr. Sethi opposed this argument. 4. Mr. Sanyal further submitted that the advocates who were appearing for the appellant did not inform the date of hearing to the appellant and on account of that also the appellant was prevented from attending the court, when the suit was to be heard. He submitted that on these grounds the appeal needs to be admitted. 5. It is the duty of the litigant who remained absent before court to explain as to how he was prevented from attending the court and that too in a satisfactory way. This aspect has been dealt with by the court in paragraphs 12, 13, 14. It has been pointed by the Court that on 23-2-1997 some order was passed against the appellant. It has been further pointed out by the court in paragraph 12, that the order of appointment of receiver was executed against the appellant by AARAKSHAN THANA KHUDEE and a report of that effect has been submitted on 23-2-1997. It has been pointed by the Court that on 23-2-1997 some order was passed against the appellant. It has been further pointed out by the court in paragraph 12, that the order of appointment of receiver was executed against the appellant by AARAKSHAN THANA KHUDEE and a report of that effect has been submitted on 23-2-1997. By mentioning this, court has held that the appellant had sufficient opportunity to appear before the court and to participate in the proceedings by moving necessary application. In further paragraphs the court pointed out that the at one time the appellant was contending that he was prevented from appearing before the court on account of damage to his bicycle and at other time he was contending that he was prevented from attending the court on account of illness. The court has pointed out that medical certificate which has been submitted for explaining his absence before the court is pertaining to the year 1995. 6. The appellant did not examine those two advocates who were appearing for him for the purpose of proving that they did not give him information in respect of hearing of the suit. Even their affidavits have not been produced. Had that been done, those advocates could have supplied some information whether on account of their default the appellant was prevented from attending the court or otherwise. It is not also the case that on the date of ex parte hearing of the suit those two advocates retired and withdrew from the hearing of the suit. Had that been the case, then submission of the appellant could have deserved a consideration. 7. When a litigant had sufficient opportunity to obtain the information of the hearing of the suit or proceeding but he remained absent on account of his own negligence, he cannot be permitted to make the capital of the argument of default of the advocates. The law does not help the indolents. In this case it is pertinent to note that an order was passed against the present appellant indicating that the suit was to be heard ex parte against him but that was set aside when sufficient cause was shown by him. 8. Mr. Sanyal further argued that there has been over writing so far as date of the judgment is concerned and further supporting his argument pointed out the frontal portion of the judgment of the trial Court. 8. Mr. Sanyal further argued that there has been over writing so far as date of the judgment is concerned and further supporting his argument pointed out the frontal portion of the judgment of the trial Court. It is true that there is over writing. What is important so far as judgment is concerned, is not that date but the date which is appearing below the signatures of the judge when he signs the judgment. The last page of the judgment shows that learned Judge has put his signatures on the judgment and just below it had put the date and that is the date which is clearly showing the date on which the impugned judgment has been pronounced. The frontal portion may have shown a typing mistake which judge might have corrected. That does not make it as an act of 'over writing' which is cognizable to the High Court. That cannot be treated to be a thing which vitiates the judgment and which invites the interference of the High Court. These things pertain to typing and clerical errors which are mere irregularities and do not invite any interference from the High Court. The core has to be seen and not immaterial, irrelevant outer surface. 9. Sufficient Cause' has to be seen by broader outlook, no doubt, but that cannot be totally unconnected with legal provisions. 'Sufficient cause' has to be satisfactory to the satisfaction of the Court and there has to be a rational process in coming to that conclusion. The conclusion has to be borne out by proper reasons. In the present case the order which has been passed by the trial Court and which has been assailed by this appeal, is satisfying all necessary requirements in this context. 10. Thus, the appeal stands dismissed. The record be despatched to trial Court at an early date.