C. K. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) IN all these petitions, common questions of fact and law arise for our consideration and hence, it would be appropriate to deal with all the petitions and decide them by a common judgment. ( 2 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 1499 of 1987 (hereinaftter referred to as the main petition) is filed by Gujarat State District Panchayat Adult Education Project Employees union, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as the Union) against the State of Gujarat and its Officers for a Writ of Mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, direction or order for a declaration that the members of the petitioner Union are entitled to the same benefits as being given to regularly appointed employees performing similar functions and discharging similar duties in other departments of the Government and for a direction to the respondents to treat members of the petitioner Union as permanent employees by regularising their services and by restraining the respondent authorities from terminating their services. A prayer was also made to direct the respondent authorities to implement resolution dated December 31, 1984 to the members of the petitioner Union and by paying them all benefits flowing from the said Resolution. Interim relief was prayed against termination of services of the employees as also by issuing direction to pay equal pay for equal work as being paid to other regularly appointed employees of the State government. ( 3 ) THE case of the petitioner Union was that it consisted of members who were employed under the respondent authorities to teach adults in pursuance of Adult education Scheme sponsored by the Central Government and implemented by the State government. According to the Union, its members were working in different cadres and were getting fixed amount per month. Project Officer was drawing Rs. 700/-, Assistant project Officer Rs. 600-/-, Inspector Rs. 500/-, Clerk, Driver Rs. 400/- and Peon Rs. 200/- per month. It was the case of the Union that though the employees were working since more than five years, artificial breaks were given for a day or more every year. That action was taken, according to the petitioner, only with a view to deprive the members of the Union from getting the status of regular employees and from paying regular pay-scales which were available to other Government employees.
That action was taken, according to the petitioner, only with a view to deprive the members of the Union from getting the status of regular employees and from paying regular pay-scales which were available to other Government employees. ( 4 ) IT was the case of the Union that with a view to achieve the object of removing illiteracy and/or promoting education to weaker sections of the society, in fulfilment of the object set out in Art. 46 of the Constitution, Central Government took several steps and introduced certain Schemes and Programmes, "adult Education" being one of them. To achieve that object, the Central Government issued directions to various State governments and indicated measures to be taken by them in the direction of imparting education to adults. For that, the Central Government created Rural Functional Literacy project consisting of more than 300 centres in different Districts in the State of Gujarat. Each such centre consisted of 30 adult learners. In order to impart primary and basic education to illiterate adults, services of Instructors and Teachers were required. In order to implement and supervise different programmes successfully, services of Supervisors were necessary. For co-ordinating the work at 300 centres, posts of Project Officers and assistant Project Officers were created. The State Government with a view to carry out the directive of Central Government, issued a resolution dated 23rd January, 1979 establishing Adult Education Centre at various places in Gujarat. It also created different posts which were to be filed in for implementation of Adult Education Scheme. ( 5 ) THE State Government thereafter issued another resolution dated March 27, 1979 introducing Rural Functional Literacy Project mentioning therein that the Central government had decided to terminate various Schemes including Agriculturists Literacy project and intended to start Rural Functional Literacy Project covering all illiterate persons in the age group of 15 to 35 years. Members of the petitioner Union were working at different places on different posts, such as, Project Officer, Assistant Project Officer, inspector, Clerk, Driver, Peon, etc. The day on which the petition was instituted, they were in services since more than five years. They were performing functions and discharging duties honestly, faithfully and to the utmost satisfaction of the department. They were doing work as being done by regular employees employed by the Government in other departments.
The day on which the petition was instituted, they were in services since more than five years. They were performing functions and discharging duties honestly, faithfully and to the utmost satisfaction of the department. They were doing work as being done by regular employees employed by the Government in other departments. Though they were appointed on equivalent cadre and doing all works done by other employees of the State, a step-motherly treatment was shown towards them in the matter of giving benefits of regular pay-scales, allowances, seniority, promotions, leave benefits, etc. Those benefits were not extended to members of the petitioner Union which were available to regularly appointed employees. Such action was illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable. Some of the employees, therefore, approached this court by filing Special Civil Application No. 3757 of 1985 for a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent authorities to treat the petitioners as permanent and regular employees and to grant all benefits as given to regularly appointed employees. The matter came up for hearing before a Single Judge, who passed the following order :"some of the petitioners have resigned and the remainder thereof have been absorbed in view of the fact that the Scheme has been continued. The petitioners who wanted absorption having been absorbed, the petition does not survive. Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent states that as the present Scheme continues, the respondents have no desire to terminate the services of the petitioners. Regarding other relief Mr. Thakkar, learned advocate states that the petitioners will make necessary representation before the concerned authorities. In view of the statement made by Mr. Thakkar, the petition is allowed to be withdrawn. Notice is discharged. "pursuant to said order, representations were made by the petitioners. Neither the benefits were given to the petitioners nor even reply was sent to them. According to the union, before few days of filing the petition, they apprehended termination of services of its members and, hence, the Union was constrained to approach this Court by filing this petition for reliefs prayed in paragraph 14 thereof. Initially notice was issued and ad- interim relief against termination of services was granted on 14th April, 1987 which was continued from time to time. On July 10, 1987, the learned Single Judge passed the following order:"rule. Ad-interim relief granted earlier to continue till further orders. Notice as to other interim relief returnable on 24. 7. 1987.
Initially notice was issued and ad- interim relief against termination of services was granted on 14th April, 1987 which was continued from time to time. On July 10, 1987, the learned Single Judge passed the following order:"rule. Ad-interim relief granted earlier to continue till further orders. Notice as to other interim relief returnable on 24. 7. 1987. Direct service permitted. " ( 6 ) ON October 18, 1988 the learned Single Judge observed :"further interim relief cannot be granted. Hence, further interim relief refused. However, ad-interim relief granted earlier by order dated 14. 4. 1987 and continued as per order dated 10. 7. 1987 shall continue till further orders. " ( 7 ) IT appears that the matters were thereafter placed before a Division Bench. After the State Government filed an affidavit, the Division Bench in light of a decision of the supreme Court in Bhagwan Das and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. , AIR 1987 SC 2049 passed an interim order making certain recommendations that it would be just fair and reasonable if the Government framed an appropriate scheme for absorption of the petitioners. Few suggestions were also made for framing suitable Scheme for absorption of employees. That order was passed on September 25, 1992. It appears that pursuant to said recommendation, a scheme was framed but all the recommendations were not accepted. The Division Bench, therefore, directed the office to place the matter for final hearing. The matter was then placed for final hearing. ( 8 ) WE have heard at considerable length M/s G. M. Joshi, R. D. Raval, G. H. Bhatt, k. S. Acharya, P. C. Master and Mrs. S. N. Pahwa for the petitioners. We have also heard mr. M. G. Doshit (in Special Civil Application No. 1499 of 1987) and Mr. P. G. Desai, learned Government Pleader in the remaining matters for the respondents. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners raised the following contentions : (1) The petitioners were appointed on regular posts. Their appointments were substantive and permanent which could not be terminated; (2) The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" would apply. When the petitioners were performing similar functions and discharging similar duties like other Government servants serving in different departments, it was not open to the respondents to deprive them of regular pay-scales which were being given to other employees.
When the petitioners were performing similar functions and discharging similar duties like other Government servants serving in different departments, it was not open to the respondents to deprive them of regular pay-scales which were being given to other employees. The action of paying less amount to the petitioners was arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and violative of Arts. 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. The petitioners were full-time employees and in that capacity, they are entitled to full-time salary in accordance with rules and regulations of the Government; (3) The scheme introduced by the Central Government and implemented by the state Government for Adult Education has not come to an end. Even today the Scheme is continued; (4) Even if appointment of the petitioners were made for a particular Scheme (Adult Education Scheme) and the said Scheme has come to an end, there is still illiteracy amongst adults in the State and in one or the other form, the work of imparting education to illiterate adult has not ceased. Their services, therefore, cannot be discontinued; (5) All the petitioners are in services of the respondents since last ten years without any interruption. They are educationally qualified. They have been appointed through proper channel, i. e. through Employment Exchange after taking interview and selected by the authorities. As on today most of them are over age and would not be able to get employment in any Government or semi-Government service. Hence, even if this Court is of the view that the petitioners have no right to continue in service, an appropriate direction may be issued to the authorities so that eligible and qualified persons can be accommodated in other departments by the respondents. ( 10 ) MR. Doshit and Mr. Desai, on the other hand, supported the action of the authorities. According to them, petitions filed by the petitioners are ill-conceived and not maintainable at law and deserve to be dismissed. They mainly raised the following contentions: (1) The petitions are premature and not competent as they were filed only on apprehension of termination of services and no order of termination was passed; (2) Appointments of all the petitioners were made only for a particular Scheme sponsored by the Central Government and implemented by the State government.
They mainly raised the following contentions: (1) The petitions are premature and not competent as they were filed only on apprehension of termination of services and no order of termination was passed; (2) Appointments of all the petitioners were made only for a particular Scheme sponsored by the Central Government and implemented by the State government. Such appointments would automatically come to an end on completion of the scheme; (3) All the petitioners were aware that they were to be appointed for a particular scheme for a particular period. In the appointment orders themselves it was stated that the appointments were in pursuance of Adult Education Scheme. The appointments were of a temporary nature and even the period was also mentioned. The petitioners, therefore, have no right to get permanent employment; (4) Once the petitioners have accepted the employment under the respondents which was temporary in nature with an open eye, it was not open to them to contend that the action of termination of their services was improper or illegal. The petitioners are estopped from raising such a plea; (5) The appointment of petitioners were part-time and not full-time or whole time. The Scheme itself suggested that it was Adult Education Scheme and such persons could be imparted education only for about two hours after the work of the day was over; (6) The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" cannot be pressed in service by the petitioners inasmuch as the petitioners were neither appointed on regular basis nor for full-time. It was specifically stated in the appointment orders that they would be entitled to a fixed amount in aggregate and not on pay-scale basis; (7) The Scheme for which appointments were made has come to an end. The petitioners, thereafter had no right to remain in service. Hence, even if any other Scheme is introduced and/or implemented by the State, the petitioners cannot get right to continue in that Scheme; (8) Adult Education Scheme was initially upto February 28, 1979 but it was continued for some time. The petitioners have not been continued under the same Scheme for ten years as asserted by them. Their continuance in service is due to interim orders passed by this Court from time to time. Those orders cannot come in the way of respondents in taking an action in accordance with law nor the petitioners can claim regularisation.
The petitioners have not been continued under the same Scheme for ten years as asserted by them. Their continuance in service is due to interim orders passed by this Court from time to time. Those orders cannot come in the way of respondents in taking an action in accordance with law nor the petitioners can claim regularisation. ( 11 ) SO far as preliminary contention of Mr. Doshit is concerned, we are not much impressed. It is true that at the time when Special Civil Application No. 1499 of 1987 was filed, no termination order was passed by the authority and the petitioner had approached this Court on the basis of apprehended termination. We are, however, not inclined to dismiss the petition upholding that contention as even according to Mr. Doshit, though when the petition was filed, no termination order was passed, the State Government had decided to terminate the services of the members of the petitioner on the ground that the scheme had come to an end and thereafter, there was no work. ( 12 ) ON merits, however, in our view, the contention of the respondent authorities is well founded that as there was no substantive right in favour of the petitioners and the scheme for which they were appointed was over, the action could not be held to be arbitrary, unlawful or unreasonable. ( 13 ) HAVING considered the matters in their entirety, we are of the opinion that the action taken by the authorities cannot be termed as arbitrary, unreasonable, unlawful or improper. Our attention was invited to various documents which are placed on the record of Special Civil Application No. 1499 of 1987 (main petition ). Though it is the case of the petitioner Union in that petition that the members of the petitioner Union were appointed regularly and their appointments were substantive in nature, looking to the entire record in the light of various affidavits filed on behalf of the authorities, it is clear that the appointments were not made on substantive basis on permanent posts but they were for a particular Scheme and Project. From Resolution dated January 23, 1979 Annexure "b", it is obvious that pursuant to the Adult Education Scheme sponsored by the Central government, it was decided by the State Government to extend benefit of the said scheme initially to eight Districts, viz.
From Resolution dated January 23, 1979 Annexure "b", it is obvious that pursuant to the Adult Education Scheme sponsored by the Central government, it was decided by the State Government to extend benefit of the said scheme initially to eight Districts, viz. Jamnagar, Valsad, Kheda, Junagadh, Mehsana, kachchh, Surat and Bharuch. For that, 60 centres were decided to be opened for first six months of 1978-79 and 300 centres in additional two Talukas for the remaining six months. For that Project, an amount of Rs. 16. 40 lakhs was sanctioned and it was allotted to Director of Adult Education, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad. It was further decided, pursuant to a letter by the Central Government dated January 30, 1978, to create necessary posts on temporary basis, in eight districts referred to above, initially for a period ending on February 28, 1979 on consolidated salary as mentioned in the resolution. Posts of Project Officer were to be filled in by deputation from the Officers holding posts in Class II in Education Department of the State of Gujarat by giving them additional emoluments not exceeding Rs. 1,000/-, but without deputation allowance. Similarly, posts of Assistant Project Officers were to be filled in on deputation without deputation allowance by giving them additional amount not exceeding Rs. 750/ -. The said resolution was issued with the concurrence of Finance Department. After the Scheme was implemented and posts were created, appointment orders were issued in favour of members of the petitioner Union as also other persons who were appointed for the Project. Looking to the appointment orders, to which our attention was invited and which were produced in some petitions, it appears that the appointments were purely of a temporary nature and that it was specifically mentioned that their services could be terminated at any time without assigning any reason whatsoever. It was neither a substantive appointment nor appointment to a permanent posts. ( 14 ) IF one looks at the affidavit filed of Shri M. S. Chauhan, Deputy Director in the office of Directorate of Adult Education, it is clear that the Scheme for which all the appointment were made was of a transitory character. It was financed by the Central government for Adult Education whereas in case of Non-Formal Education Scheme, 50% amount was to be paid by the Central Government and remaining expenditure was to be borne by the State Government.
It was financed by the Central government for Adult Education whereas in case of Non-Formal Education Scheme, 50% amount was to be paid by the Central Government and remaining expenditure was to be borne by the State Government. It was for a specific period. It was enacted for eradicating illiteracy and as soon as the object was achieved, the Scheme would come to an end. It was further stated that the appointments were not regular as full-timers and the employees were entitled only to a fixed honorarium. The employees were to work for 2 to 3 hours a day during evening time. The quantum and nature of work to be done by the employees appointed under the Scheme were totally different from the work done by regular employees working in other departments of the Government. It was, therefore, stated by the deponent that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" would not apply in case of petitioners who were not doing full-time job. It was then mentioned that after a particular level of literacy was reached, the Scheme came to an end. It was done after one year. There was, therefore, no occasion for regularising those employees who were appointed for that Scheme nor there was question of application of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work". The terms and conditions of their appointments were mentioned in the appointment orders themselves and the employees also executed necessary bonds in that regard. As the petitioners accepted the terms and conditions of service and were appointed under the said Scheme which was over, they had no right to continue. The State cannot be forced to continue the scheme after the purpose and object of the Scheme had been achieved and if it is not continued, no compulsion can be made on the State authorities to continue the Scheme in order to continue services of the petitioners. ( 15 ) IN affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the one Bharatbhai I. Prajapati, President of petitioner Union, the contentions raised on behalf of the State Government were negatived and it was reiterated that though the Scheme was continued, only with a view to deprive the members of the petitioner Union of their legitimate benefits, artificial break was given and that members of the Union were denied regularisation, permanency benefits and equal pay for equal work.
It was also stated that it was not true as contended by the respondents that they were working as part-timers. On the contrary, they were specifically informed and written orders were issued, to which the attention of the Court was drawn at the time of hearing by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Union, that members of the petitioner Union were to make themselves available for the whole day. Further affidavits were also filed. ( 16 ) NOW it appears that almost in similar circumstances, a question came to be considered by the Honble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das referred to earlier, which was also a case relating to Adult Education Scheme. In that case, appointments of petitioners were made under the Scheme and their services were sought to be terminated. They approached the Apex Court by invoking Art. 32 of the Constitution. Similar prayers were made as made in the present petition. The Honble Supreme Court, considering the pleadings and contentions of the parties, held that the appointments of the petitioners in education Department were made for a temporary period as the Scheme itself was of a temporary nature. They were, therefore, not entitled to absorb as regular employees on a permanent basis from the date of their initial appointment. In paragraph 15, the Court stated:"we are now faced with the problem arising in the context of the fact that appointments of the petitioners were initially made for six months and after giving a break of a day or two they were reappointed to the same posts by fresh order. The counter-affidavit filed on 23rd November, 1985 By the State of haryana and the documents placed on record go to show that the petitioners contention that this is done deliberately with a view to deny to them the benefits enjoyed by the employees similarly situated and discharging similar duties and functions as Supervisors in the regular cadres. We find it difficult to accept the contention of the petitioners that this is being done deliberately and with mala fides attributed to the respondent-State. The petitioners have Been appointed in the context of a Scheme which is by the very nature of things transient and temporary. Annexure R-l to the aforesaid counter-affidavit shows that the scheme was expected to function for ten months. No doubt, it has been extended from year to year.
The petitioners have Been appointed in the context of a Scheme which is by the very nature of things transient and temporary. Annexure R-l to the aforesaid counter-affidavit shows that the scheme was expected to function for ten months. No doubt, it has been extended from year to year. But by the very nature arid scope of the Scheme, once the objective of Adult Education is accomplished in the sense that the illiterate adults of the cluster of villages become literate pursuant to the education imparted at the centres, the need for adult education would diminish progressively and ultimately cease. As disclosed in paras 16 and 17 of the aforesaid counter-affidavit die targets were expected to be achieved latest by 1990. It was in this background that the posts were sanctioned on year to year basis (para 11 of the counter-affidavit ). Having regard to these facts and circumstances, we do not think that the respondent-State can be accused of making appointments on a temporary six months basis with any ulterior or oblique motive. In our opinion, therefore, the prayer of the petitioners to absorb them as regular employees on a permanent basis from the date of their initial appointment has no justification. " ( 17 ) REGARDING equal pay for equal work, however, the Court considered the Scheme in its entirety and particularly Clause (c) (Supervision) and held that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" would apply as the petitioners appointed under the Scheme were also doing same of similar work as being done by other regular employees employed by the Government. According to the Court, it could not be successfully argued that since the appointments were temporary under a Scheme which was not permanent, the petitioners would also not be paid pay-scales to which they were otherwise entitled. The court observed that even if the Scheme was temporary and appointments were not of a substantive nature, since the work done by the petitioners was similar to the work done by other employees of the State, it was open to State to deny the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" and to that extent, the petitioners were held entitled to the benefit. Accordingly, the Honble Supreme Court granted limited benefit to the extent of "equal pay for equal work".
Accordingly, the Honble Supreme Court granted limited benefit to the extent of "equal pay for equal work". In paragraph 13, their Lordships observed :"lastly we have to deal with the contention that the Scheme is a temporary scheme and the posts are sanctioned on an year to year basis having regard to the temporary nature of the Scheme. We are unable to comprehend how this factor can be invoked for violating equal pay for equal work doctrine. Whether appointments are for temporary periods and the Schemes are temporary in nature is irrelevant once it is shown that the nature of the duties and functions discharged and the work done is similar and the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is attracted. As regards the effect of the breaks given at the end of every six months, we will deal with this aspect shortly hereafter. That, however, is no ground for refusing the equal pay for equal work doctrine. Be it realized that we are concerned with the equal work for equal pay doctrine only within the parameters of the four grounds and the fact situation discussed hereinabove. We are not called upon, and we have no need or occasion to consider the applicability or otherwise of the said doctrine outside these parameters. For instance, we are not required to express any opinion in the context of employment of similar nature under different employers, or in different cadres under the same or different employers. Nor are we concerned with questions required to be dealt with authorities like the pay Commissions such as equation of cadres or determination of parity-differential between different cadres or making assessment of work loads or qualitative differential based on relevant considerations and such other matters. We are concerned in the present matter with employees of the same employer doing same work of same nature discharged in the same department but appointed on a temporary basis instead of in a regular cadre on a regular basis. We have, therefore, decided the questions raised before us in the backdrop of facts of the present case. On the other dimensions of the doctrine we remain silent as there is no need or occasion to speak.
We have, therefore, decided the questions raised before us in the backdrop of facts of the present case. On the other dimensions of the doctrine we remain silent as there is no need or occasion to speak. " ( 18 ) THOUGH the Apex Court did not find favour with the petitioners on the question of regularisation, considering the facts and circumstances, following directions were issued:"i The petitioners shall be fixed in the same pay scale as that of respondents 2 to 6. II The pay of each of the petitioner shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service arising in the context of the fact that the initial appointment orders were for 6 months and fresh appointment orders were issued after giving a break of a day of two. III The fixation shall be made as per the general principles adopted whenever pay revisions are made. In case upward revision has been effected in respect of the supervisors in the regular cadre such revision should be taken into account in refixing the pay of the petitioners. IV The amount representing the difference in pay of the petitioners computed as per the present order shall be paid to each petitioner preferably latest by mahatma Gandhijis birthday which falls on 2nd October, 1987 or latest by november 1, 1987. The petitioners will be entitled to increments in the pay-scale in accordance with law notwithstanding the break in service that might have been given. V We hope and trust that the State of Haryana will not show displeasure at the petitioners who have approached this Court in order to vindicate their right to claim equal pay and that service of no petitioner would be terminated except on reaching the age of superannuation or by way of appropriate disciplinary action, or on abandonment of the Scheme. For the sake of abundant caution we direct accordingly. VI Fresh appointment orders will have to be issued reappointing the petitioners who have continued in service on the expiry of the six months period from time to time in order to give effect to the direction contained in Clause V hereinabove.
For the sake of abundant caution we direct accordingly. VI Fresh appointment orders will have to be issued reappointing the petitioners who have continued in service on the expiry of the six months period from time to time in order to give effect to the direction contained in Clause V hereinabove. VII In case the amounts of difference in pay cannot be computed within the time-limit granted by this order, provisional and approximate calculations should be made, and payment should be made on such basis subject to final adjustment within the time granted. " ( 19 ) AGAIN, a similar matter came up for consideration before the Apex Court in C. A. Shankar Prasad and Ors. vs. Karnataka State Adult Education Council and Ors. , AIR 1994 sc 216 , on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the petitioners. In that case too, a prayer was made to issue a direction for regularisation of services by employees of Rural Functional Literacy Project Centre in the State of karnataka. Though during the pendency of the petitions, the Scheme was completely closed and the employees were held to be surplus, certain directions were issued in paragraph 3 of the decision. The Court observed :"we are, however, of the view that the petitioners having served the Adult education Council for over a decade the Council which is still operating must utilise the services of these petitioners if and when some vacancies are made available. We, therefore, direct that all the vacancies after the closure of the central Sector Scheme which have become available or will arise in future under the control of the Adult Education Council be offered to the petitioners keeping in view their eligibility and experience. We further hope that the State of karnataka shall keep in view the useful services rendered by the petitioners for more than ten years and will try to absorb the petitioners in vacancies which may arise in the Education department or any other department of the State government where the petitioners can be absorbed in accordance with law keeping in view their qualifications and experience. The age bar shall not come in the way of the petitioners for a period of three years from today.
The age bar shall not come in the way of the petitioners for a period of three years from today. " ( 20 ) IT was contended by the petitioners that it is not true that the Scheme was over and that there was no work. It was submitted that if the Scheme was continued and there was work, obviously the contention raised by the respondents must be negatived and a writ of Mandamus be issued against the respondents to make all the employees regular and permanent. But even if it is assumed that the Scheme has come to an end and under the Scheme which was operativethen, the petitioners had no right to hold posts, then also, appropriate directions can be issued and/or observations be made as done in Bhagwan das and in C. A. Shankar Prasad. Regarding "equal pay for equal work", the counsel contended that the point is finally concluded in Bhagwan Das and it is not open to the respondent authorities to content that the petitioners were not entitled to pay-scales which have been given to other employees serving in other departments of the Government. Our attention was also invited to an interim order passed on September 25, 1992 wherein after considering the directions and observations in Bhagwan Das, the Division Bench thought it just, fair and reasonable if the Government would frame an appropriate Scheme for absorption of the petitioners. Few suggestions were, therefore, made for framing of appropriate Scheme. Those suggestions were as under:"1. Those petitioners who are eligible to be absorbed as primary school teachers, that is, having qualification of PTC, may be absorbed as primary school teachers. 2. Those petitioners, who are graduates with B. Ed, and who cannot be absorbed as primary school teachers, may be absorbed in the following posts: (i) Assistant Teacher in the Government PTC colleges (ii) Assistant Teacher in Govt. Board Schools (iii) Assistant Teacher in Govt. Secondary Schools (iv) Assistant Project Officer or Project Officer3. Clerks (i) They may be absorbed as primary school teacher if they are eligible and qualified. (ii) Rest of them may be absorbed as clerk as and when vacancies arise in the districts where they are working. 4. Drivers and Peons (i) They may be absorbed in the post of driver, peon cum driver, or peons in the districts where they are working as and when vacancies arise. " .
(ii) Rest of them may be absorbed as clerk as and when vacancies arise in the districts where they are working. 4. Drivers and Peons (i) They may be absorbed in the post of driver, peon cum driver, or peons in the districts where they are working as and when vacancies arise. " . ( 21 ) THE Government was directed to consider the suggestions with a view to irame a scheme for absorption of petitioners. ( 22 ) IT appears that pursuant to ad-interim order passed by a Division Bench, the government considered the matter for framing a Scheme for absorption of petitioners. The question was considered in the light of Recruitment Rules and provisions relating to relaxation thereof. It was stated that the posts of Clerks, Clerks-cum-Typists and Typists in Non-Secretariat Department were brought within the purview of Gujarat Subordinate services Selection Board constituted by the Government and recruitments was to be made under the Gujarat Non-Secretariat Clerks, Clerks-cum-Typists and Typists (Direct recruitment Procedure) Rules, 1990 on the basis of record and competitive examination held by the Board. As the High Court had ordered to relaxe age, that question did not survive. In respect of other matters, the question was considered but it was observed that the employees were part-time employees who were not appointed in regular pay-scales. In the fixed consolidated pay having part-time work of hardly two hours at night time, absorption of petitioners on regular establishment, according to the Government, would establish a bad precedent opening floodgate for litigation. It was also stated that the recommendations of the High Court were considered at the highest level by General administrations Department and Finance Department. The recommendations, according to the Government, could be implemented subject to certain conditions. Those conditions were mentioned in a nothing under the title "scheme for absorption of part-time employees of the Adult Education Scheme. " It reads as under :" (I) The Director of Adult Education will ensure that these employees were appointed through Employment Exchange etc.
The recommendations, according to the Government, could be implemented subject to certain conditions. Those conditions were mentioned in a nothing under the title "scheme for absorption of part-time employees of the Adult Education Scheme. " It reads as under :" (I) The Director of Adult Education will ensure that these employees were appointed through Employment Exchange etc. and by proper selection after holding interviews; (ii) The Director of Adult Education will ensure that their service records are satisfactory and that they are eligible for appointment on regular establishment in accordance with the recruitment rules laid down for the respective posts; (iii) The absorption of clerks will be subject to the selection and recommendation by the Gujarat Subordinate Services Selection Board for which they will have to apply when the vacancies are advertised and appear in the competitive examination held by the Board. However, they will be given relaxation in upper age limit. Only two chances will be given for appearing in the competitive examination held by the Board and if they are not selected and recommended by the Board within two chances, their services would be liable to be terminated; (iv) Only those part time employees who have rendered atleast two years continuous service on the date of filing the S. C. A. in Gujarat High Court will be eligible for consideration for absorption on the regular establishment. (v) As regards the Peons and Drivers, upper age limit and the procedure of recruitment will be relaxable but educational qualification will not be relaxable. (vi) The absorption will be considered as and when vacancies would be available; in their respective Districts. (vii) The orders of Government in regard to maintenance of reservation for various reserved categories of candidates will have to be strictly followed and no reserved categories of candidates will be appointed against the backlog vacancies of reserved categories of candidates. (viii) Their absorption will be subject to completing of two years probationary period successfully. (ix) Their past service will not be considered and they will not claim for seniority. (x) The absorption will be implemented only after the ban on fresh recruitment imposed by the Finance Department ils lifted. 4. With regard to other categories of employees, i. e. Supervisors, Asstt. Project officer, their absorption cannot be considered on the following posts on regular establishment. (1) Primary School Teacher; (2) Asstt. Teachers in Govt.
(x) The absorption will be implemented only after the ban on fresh recruitment imposed by the Finance Department ils lifted. 4. With regard to other categories of employees, i. e. Supervisors, Asstt. Project officer, their absorption cannot be considered on the following posts on regular establishment. (1) Primary School Teacher; (2) Asstt. Teachers in Govt. P. T. C. Colleges; (3) Asstt. Teachers in Govt. Schools; (4) Govt. Secondary Schools; (5) Asstt. Project Officer or Project Officer. " ( 23 ) A grievance was made by the petitioners that once this Court directed the government to consider the matter, to frame a Scheme for regularisation and to take appropriate decision, it was not open to the State Government to flout those directions. Alternatively, it was argued that even if the observations can be said to be of a recommendatory nature and/or suggestions, it was expected of the State to consider them in their proper perspective and to implement them when the State claims itself to be a democratic and a welfare State wedded to Socialism and acting in larger public interest. ( 24 ) WE are, however, unable to uphold the contention of the petitioners that the respondents have either flouted the order of this Court or have acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. We could not persuade ourselves that as the action of the Government is illegal and ultra vires, a writ of Mandamus must be issued by directing it to comply with the orders passed earlier. ( 25 ) AS already discussed, in Bhagwan Das, a similar contention was raised and the apex Court held in no uncertain terms that when appointments were made under a temporary Scheme, the appointees were not entitled to be absorbed as regular employees on permanent basis from the date of their initial appointment. In our view, the ratio laid down in Bhagwan Das would apply with equal force in the instant case also. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioners have any subsisting right which can be enforced through Mandamus seeking direction from this Court against the respondent authorities to absorb them in Government employment. ( 26 ) IT was then argued that the petitioners were appointed way back in 1978-79 and if after about two decades, their services will be terminated, great prejudice will be caused to them.
( 26 ) IT was then argued that the petitioners were appointed way back in 1978-79 and if after about two decades, their services will be terminated, great prejudice will be caused to them. They will be adversely affected inasmuch as by this time, almost all of them Have crossed the age prescribed for employment in State Government and/or Semi-Government department and their service career will come to an end. A prayer was, therefore, made that in the line indicated by a Division Bench of this Court in an interim order referred to above, directions may be issued and/or recommendations be made to the State government to absorb them or to consider their cases afresh for appointment in any other department irrespective of age bar. ( 27 ) FROM the record, it clearly appears to us that all the petitioners were aware and conscious that the Scheme was transitory in nature. With an open eye, they entered the service. They were informed in writing that their appointments were temporary and the scheme under which they were appointed, was itself a temporary Scheme. It, therefore, cannot be said to be an act of the respondent authorities to deprive the petitioners of their legitimate rights. The petitioners had no right to continue in service after the period specified in appointment orders was over or after the Scheme was completed. Their services were liable to be terminated and when that action was about to be taken, some of the petitioners approached this Court and obtained interim relief. That fact, therefore, cannot come in the way of the respondent authorities in terminating the services if the Scheme is not continued. On the contrary, the case of the respondents is that though scheme was over and now the State Government is not getting any financial assistance from the Central Government, and the Government has no money for that Scheme, in view of interim orders made by this Court and operative till today, it has to make payment of honorarium from other sources. This is not a case wherein the authorities intend to take undue advantage of their own wrong. The facts are to the contrary. Though services of the petitioners were liable to be terminated, before the action was taken, they approached this court and obtained interim relief. It is under the interim order that they were continued till today.
This is not a case wherein the authorities intend to take undue advantage of their own wrong. The facts are to the contrary. Though services of the petitioners were liable to be terminated, before the action was taken, they approached this court and obtained interim relief. It is under the interim order that they were continued till today. Though the Scheme has come to an end and according to the respondent authorities, now there is no work whatsoever and the petitioners are not doing any work (though said statement was disputed by learned Counsel for the petitioners), they are to be paid honorarium. In any case, it cannot be said that the petitioners have worked for two decades as contended by them under the Scheme. Hence, said fact cannot be construed in favour of the petitioners. ( 28 ) IT also cannot be ignored that the petitioners have invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. They were aware at the time when they entered in service that their tenure was temporary and the Scheme under which they were appointed was also temporary in nature. In the light of these circumstances, this Court has to exercise powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It has to take into account the Scheme as also affidavit-in-reply filed by the authorities. The ambit and scope of powers under Art. 226 are limited and circumscribed by various considerations pointed out in Dinesh Shivubha Parmar vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. , 1992 33 (1) GLR 608. A Single Judge (C. K. Thakkar, J.) considered the jurisdiction of a High court when extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution are invoked. While dealing with such cases, it was observed, that the Court must keep in mind relevant considerations. In the instant case, the following considerations would be relevant and material:1. Persons who came to be appointed were aware of the fact that their appointments were irregular such as ad-hoc, temporary, officiating, part-time etc. In spite of that, they accepted the service and terms and conditions of such appointment. 2. If, with an open eye, irregularly appointed candidates accepted services and if their services came to be terminated in accordance with terms and conditions of appointment, they have no right to make grievance. 3.
In spite of that, they accepted the service and terms and conditions of such appointment. 2. If, with an open eye, irregularly appointed candidates accepted services and if their services came to be terminated in accordance with terms and conditions of appointment, they have no right to make grievance. 3. By issuing a writ, making an order of giving a direction of regularisation of services of an employee who is irregularly recruited, the Court not only regularises such appointment but also deprives several eligible, qualified and deserving candidates from competing for that post. Such a step not only offends and violates sacrosanct provisions of Arts. 14, 16 and 19 of the constitution but, makes those provisions nugatory and otiose by frustrating the laudable object and purpose for which, they have been included in Part III of the Constitution of India. 4. There may be certain projects of a temporary nature or vacancies may arise due to work of an urgent nature, such as election, scarcity, drought, flood, census operations, etc. State cannot be forced to continue such projects or schemes even after they are over by indiscriminate exercise of prerogative powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. A High Court also cannot direct the authority to make persons appointed for such scheme or project as permanent and regular. 5. These principles apply to writ petitions filed under Art. 226 of the constitution of India which are normally decided on the basis of pleadings and affidavits of parties and not on the basis of oral evidence and examination and cross-examination of witnesses. ( 29 ) IN our opinion, therefore, the doctrine of "equitable estoppel" on which reliance is sought to be placed by the petitioners would be of no assistance to them. On the contrary, to us, the submission of Mr. Doshit is well founded that if the said doctrine is to apply, it will go against the petitioners rather than in their favour. ( 30 ) IN Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union vs. Delhi Administration, delhi and Ors. , AIR 1992 SC 789 , the petitioners were given appointment under a scheme which was evolved to provide income to those who were below poverty line and who were without any source of livelihood.
( 30 ) IN Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union vs. Delhi Administration, delhi and Ors. , AIR 1992 SC 789 , the petitioners were given appointment under a scheme which was evolved to provide income to those who were below poverty line and who were without any source of livelihood. Considering the underlying object of the Scheme, the Supreme Court held that the object was not to provide right to work as such and the persons appointed under the said Scheme had no right to claim regularisation. ( 31 ) APART from the fact that the ratio laid down in Delhi Development Horticulture employees Union helps the respondent authorities, their case is on a stronger footing. When appointments were made under a Scheme, the object of which was to provide income to rural poors and yet it was held that the persons appointed under that Scheme had no right to get permanency benefits or regularisation or absorption, it cannot be said that the appointments which were made under present Scheme, object of which was not to provide employment but to eradicate illiteracy, the appointees under the said Scheme can claim permanency benefits. ( 32 ) FOR all these reasons, we are of the view that there was no right in favour of the petitioners nor a corresponding duty on the part of the respondent authorities which can be directed to be complied with by issuing a Mandamus. The petitioners could not claim continuation in service nor the respondent authorities be compelled to continue them and action taken by the authorities cannot be termed as arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable or violative of any right of the petitioners. ( 33 ) THE question then remains about "equal pay for equal work". In this connection, reliance was placed by the petitioners on certain orders issued by the authorities wherein it was mentioned that their service hours were from morning to evening. They were also informed that they had to work for the whole day. On the other hand, according to Mr. Doshit, the petitioners had to work only for two hours a day in the evening. He also submitted that the Scheme was for adults. It was Adult Education Scheme and, therefore, there was no question of full-time employment as only after the adult members return home completing their agriculture and/or other work, they can be given primary education.
Doshit, the petitioners had to work only for two hours a day in the evening. He also submitted that the Scheme was for adults. It was Adult Education Scheme and, therefore, there was no question of full-time employment as only after the adult members return home completing their agriculture and/or other work, they can be given primary education. He also submitted that it was in real sense primary education by which a person may be able to identify vernacular letters and can put their signature. It was not a "thorough education" dealing with various subjects as being done in schools. According to him, therefore, the contention that the petitioners were similarly situated with other employees working in Primary Education Department or in Primary schools is not well founded. We have already referred to an interim order passed by a division Bench earlier, wherein it was observed that looking to the record in its entirety, the petitioners were entitled to and could claim "equal pay for equal work". For that, the division Bench relied upon Bhagwan Das. ( 34 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" cannot be invoked by the petitioners. But when that benefit was given to the petitioners under ah interim order, we are of the view that whatever payment has been made in pursuance of interim order, the petitioners can retain the amount and no recovery should now be made from them. ( 35 ) AN additional argument was advanced by Mr. Raval in Special Civil Application no. 4050 of 1992. That petition was filed on June 10, 1992 praying for an appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondent authorities to treat the petitioners as regular employees and to grant consequential benefits. Initially, notice was issued on June 16, 1992. The matter was thereafter admitted. An affidavit-in-reply was also filed. In affidavit-in-rejoinder which was filed on September 7, 1992, it was alleged that though the petitioners were regularly appointed, artificial breaks were given to them. The orders were made in favour of the petitioners, but they were not issued as illegal demands made by the Officers of the State were not complied with. It was also alleged that some amounts were paid and reliance was placed on a communication addressed by Mr. Machhi, annexed to the affidavit-in-rejoinder.
The orders were made in favour of the petitioners, but they were not issued as illegal demands made by the Officers of the State were not complied with. It was also alleged that some amounts were paid and reliance was placed on a communication addressed by Mr. Machhi, annexed to the affidavit-in-rejoinder. Now, apart from the fact that no material whatsoever has been placed on record to satisfy the conscience of the Court, the persons against whom allegations were made about illegal demand from the petitioners have not been made party to the petition. Moreover, though the first letter said to have been addressed by Mr. Machhi to Mr. Chaudhary was of 5th June, 1992, and the petition was filed immediately thereafter on 10th June, 1992 (after five days), that fact was not mentioned in the petition. Similarly, the other letter was said to have been written on 4th july, 1992 but the fact of such demand came on record only in affidavit-in-rejoinder filed on 7th September, 1992. In these circumstances, it appears to have been afterthought. In any case, this Court, in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the constitution will not undertake resolution of disputed questions of fact. Again, the appointment orders were passed in June, 1991. If the case of the petitioners was that illegal demands were made and appointment orders were not issued, it was expected of them to have invited attention of higher authority immediately, but it was not done. We, are, therefore, not impressed by the said contention and negative it. ( 36 ) THE question then remains regarding direction to be issued and/or observations to be made in the light of the reasons recorded by us. Though strenuous efforts were made by learned Counsel for the petitioners for regular appointment and/or absorption in service, in our view, no such direction can be issued in absence of any legal right on the part of the petitioners and corresponding duty upon the respondents. Since the Scheme was temporary in nature and appointments of the petitioners were under that Scheme, the petitioners had no right to hold the posts permanently. It also cannot be said that from the date of their appointments, all the petitioners have continued uninterruptedly without break in service.
Since the Scheme was temporary in nature and appointments of the petitioners were under that Scheme, the petitioners had no right to hold the posts permanently. It also cannot be said that from the date of their appointments, all the petitioners have continued uninterruptedly without break in service. From the record, it clearly appears that the Scheme has come to an end but the petitioners were continued under interim orders passed by this Court from time to time. That fact, therefore, cannot be considered against the respondent authorities. At the same time, the fact remains that till today, they are in service. In our opinion, therefore, ends of justice would be met if we grant liberty to the petitioners to make applications/ representations to the respondent authorities to continue them in service and/or to make fresh appointments in any department of the Government under any Scheme if they are otherwise eligible and qualified. It is, however, made clear that this is neither a direction nor an order of this Court and that it is open to the petitioners to make such applications and/or representations. We have no doubt that the authorities will consider the same in the light of the facts and circumstances and take an appropriate decision thereon. Regarding educational qualifications, Mr. Doshit submitted that some of the petitioners are not even eligible and qualified. Obviously, that is a material fact which cannot be ignored by the respondent authorities. Regarding age, however, as observed by the Honble Supreme court in C. A. Shankar Prasad, the respondent authorities will consider relevant rules in the light of the ratio laid down in the above decision and will pass appropriate orders. ( 37 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 14355 of 1993, Mr. Master, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the petitioner was similarly situated with other employees who were protected by the Court, her services were terminated. When the petitioner came to know about the orders passed by this Court granting interim relief in favour of other employees, she made a representation to the authorities. She believed that in her case, relief would be granted by the authorities, but it was not done. She, therefore, filed the above petition.
When the petitioner came to know about the orders passed by this Court granting interim relief in favour of other employees, she made a representation to the authorities. She believed that in her case, relief would be granted by the authorities, but it was not done. She, therefore, filed the above petition. Initially, notice was issued and after hearing the parties, by an order dated October 16, 1994, a mandatory direction was issued by a Single Judge pursuant to which, she was taken back in service. Mr. Master submitted that in her case, as she was deprived of benefits which were granted to other similarly situated persons, the action of the respondent authorities was discriminatory and she may be granted benefit of back wages for the intervening period. ( 38 ) IN our opinion, no such relief can be granted. It is true that after services of various persons were terminated, they approached this Court and interim relief was granted in their favour. It was the case of the respondent authorities that though there was no work and the Scheme was over, services of those employees could not be terminated and they were continued because of interim order of this Court. If in the light of these facts, the petitioner was not paid salary, it cannot be said that the action can be termed as arbitrary or irrational. Moreover, after mandatory order was passed, she is continued in service though again, according to the authorities, without any work. Hence, relying on the doctrine of "no work no pay" and also that others were continued in service under interim order passed by this Court, the prayer of Mr. Master cannot be upheld and is hereby rejected. ( 39 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, all the petitions are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Though we have held that the petitioners were not entitled to "equal pay for equal work" as the employment was not whole-time or full-time employment, any payment made till today under interim orders passed by this Court from time to time, will not be recovered from them. The petitioners are at liberty to make applications/representations as observed in the body of the judgment. The authorities will consider them in thek proper perspective and to pass appropriate orders. Rule is discharged. Ad interim relief is hereby vacated.
The petitioners are at liberty to make applications/representations as observed in the body of the judgment. The authorities will consider them in thek proper perspective and to pass appropriate orders. Rule is discharged. Ad interim relief is hereby vacated. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. ( 40 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners state that the petitioners intend to approach higher forum. They, therefore, prayed that ad interim relief granted earlier and operative till today may be continued for some time so as to enable them to approach the honble Supreme Court. In our opinion, the prayer is reasonable. In the facts and circumstances, ad interim relief operative till today should be continued upto February 28, 1998. We may clarify that we are continuing the interim relief so as to enable the petitioners to approach the Honble Supreme Court. Order accordingly. .