Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the Association of the Bihar State Civil Courts Employees (hereinafter called the said Association)and also by the Secretary of the said Association. The prayer in this writ petition is for quashing of Annexure-5, the order dated 14-1-1994 by which the prayer of the Clerks of the Civil Courts employees for grant of higher scale of pay on the basis of graduate qualification has been turned down, inter alia, on the ground that the Finance Department of the State Government does not agree with the recommendation of the high Court in this matter. 2. The relevant facts of the case are as follows:- Prior to 1985 the minimum qualification for appointment of Clerks in the Civil Courts in Bihar was matriculation and in the year 1985 this court by its letter dated 18-10-1985 raised the minimum qualification for appointment on the post of Clerk in the civil Courts from Matriculation level to graduation level and this decision of the High Court was communicated to the State Government and the same was also approved by the State Government. In the context of the aforesaid upgradation of the qualification for appointment to the post of Clerks, the grievances of the petitioners are that even though the qualification has been up. graded, the petitioners are still getting the pay scale and other facilities which were available to the Mufassil establishment for the State Government for whom the required minimum educational qualification is still matriculation. As such, the grievances are that the petitioners are still placed in the pay scale of Rs.1200-30-1800 and their prayer is that they should be placed in the pay scale of Rs.1500-2750. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition, the petitioners have given the particulars of the work performed by them and they have stated that in so far as the nature of the work is concerned, they are performing the same nature of work as the work of the Assistants of the Secretariat and of the High Court. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition, the petitioners have given the particulars of the work performed by them and they have stated that in so far as the nature of the work is concerned, they are performing the same nature of work as the work of the Assistants of the Secretariat and of the High Court. In the year 1991 the petitioner Association filed a memorandum of demand on behalf of the Civil Courts employees before the high Court and one such demand was that they should be allowed the pay scale of graduate standard similar to the assistants of the Secretariat and of the high Court as they are performing the work of similar nature. The said memorandum came up for consideration before the Standing Committee of this Court and ultimately the Standing committee of this Court in its meeting held on 21st, 22nd and 23rd August, 1991 gave the recommendation to the effect that the suggestion relating to the pay structure given by the Petitioner Association is recommended to the State government. After the said decision was taken by the Standing Committee of this Court, the same was communicated to the Secretary Law (Judicial) Department, Government of Bihar, Patna vide letter dated 31-8-1991. The matter was kept pending by the Government for quite some time. Thereafter the government has taken a decision which has been communicated by memo dated 14-1-1994 whereby it has been expressed that the higher pay scale recommended for the employees of the Civil Courts has not been accepted by the Finance department. The said communication is at Annexure-5 and the prayer in this writ petition is for quashing of the same. The said decision which is at Annexure-5 was again placed before the Standing committee of this Court on 10-5-1994 and on that date the Hon ble Members of the Standing Committee decided to leave the matter to the Hon ble the chief Justice for taking appropriate decision. Thereafter on the basis of the minutes of the Hon ble the Chief Justice dated 18-5-1994, the matter has been directed to be decided on the judicial side and since then the matter has been posted on the judicial side. Thereafter on the basis of the minutes of the Hon ble the Chief Justice dated 18-5-1994, the matter has been directed to be decided on the judicial side and since then the matter has been posted on the judicial side. 3 In the counter-affidavit which has been filed in this matter by one baiju Basant Tigga, who is working as the Section Officer in the office of respondent No.2, the stand which has been taken is that the educational qualification alone is not sufficient for applying the principles of "equal pay for equal work". As such, the recommendation for higher pay scale in favour of the employees of the Civil Courts of bihar by the Standing Committee of this court has not been accepted by the finance Department. 4. Learned Counsel for the High court has, however, supported the case of the petitioner and supported the recommendation which has been given by the High Court in favour of enhancement of the pay scale of the Civil Courts employees for making it at par with the assistants of the Secretariat. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted, mainly, that (i) the recommendation of the High court is done by the High Court in exercise of its power of control vested on it under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. As such, the recommendation of the High Court is binding on the state Government and the State government cannot make a departure from the same; (ii) Having regard to the expression control under Article 235 of the Constitution of India being conferred upon the High Court over the district Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto, this control which extends not only to the Judicial Officers but also to the employees of the Civil courts who assist the Judicial Officers. Therefore, the recommendation of the high Court about the upgradation of the pay scale of the employees of the subordinate Courts is within its power of control under Article 235 of the Constitution of India; (iii) In any event the authorities of the State Government cannot disregard the recommendation of the High Court without disclosing adequate reasons. 6. Therefore, the recommendation of the high Court about the upgradation of the pay scale of the employees of the subordinate Courts is within its power of control under Article 235 of the Constitution of India; (iii) In any event the authorities of the State Government cannot disregard the recommendation of the High Court without disclosing adequate reasons. 6. Learned Advocate General appearing for the State Government refuted the aforesaid contentions and raised the following contentions: (a) The recommendation about the pay scale of the employees of the District courts or even the recommendation of pay-scales of the Judges of the District courts does not come within the High courts power of control under Article 235 of the Constitution of India; (b) Apart from that the prayer of the employees of the Civil Courts for equal pay at par with the Assistants in the secretariat cannot be granted in view of the fact that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract one but in order to ensure its effective implementation, merely parity in educational qualification is not enough. The main question is one of parity in the nature of work and the duty involved in the work having regard to the parity in qualification and so on and these questions are essentially factual and it is an admitted position that there are fundamental differences between the nature of work of the Civil Courts employees and that of the Assistants in the Secretariat; (c) The recommendation of the Standing Committee of the high Court is a recommendation on the administrative side and not a recommendation on the judicial side and the same is not binding on a Court and this court on the judicial side can very well quash the same. 7. Judging the rival contentions of the parties, this Court is of the view that (i) it is open to this Court to quash and set aside an order passed by the high Court on the administrative side and there is no dispute about the same; (ii) This Court is also of the view that parity in educational qualification alone cannot entitle a particular set of employees to demand similar pay scale which is available to another set of employees. Various judgments which have been cited by the learned Advocate general on the doctrine of equal pay for equal work would show the correctness of the aforesaid proposition and it cannot be disputed that there are certain vital dis-similarity in the nature of work performed by the Civil Court employees and that performed by the assistants in the Secretariat. This Court is also aware of the position that in the matters of fixation of pay scale the court should be very slow to make a recommendation for grant of a particular pay scale inasmuch as these questions are to be decided by expert bodies like the Pay Commission. Even in spite of the aforesaid position which is acceptable by this Court, there are certain aspects of the case which require some consideration. 8. The bold assertion made by the learned Advocate General relying on a decision in the case of Dayaram asanand Gursahani V/s. State of maharashtra and others reported in AIR 1984 SC page 850 that the control vested on this Court under Article 235 of the Constitution does not extend to the matter of pay scale is a proposition which cannot be approved by this Court. Before considering the correctness of the said submission, this Court wants to make it clear that in view of the decision of the Full Bench of Gujarat high Court in the case of R. M. Gajjar V/s. State of Gujarat and others reported in air 1978 Gujarat page 102, one thing is clear that the control vested in the High court under Article 235 of the Constitution is exercisable not only over the members of the judicial service of the state, but also upon the Ministerial Officers and Servants who work in the establishment of the Subordinate Courts and assist the members of the judicial service in the discharge of their duties. 9. Therefore, in view of the said decision in R. M. Gajjar (supra) this court is of the view that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution of India can exercise control over the Ministerial staff and employees of the Civil Courts, but the main question is whether such control extends also on the question of pay scale of the employees concerned. 10. 10. For a proper appreciation of this question, Article 235 of the Constitution is set out below:- "control over subordinate Courts -The control over district Courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. " 11. It is clear that Article 235 of the Constitution has two parts. The first part makes it clear that the control over the district Courts and the subordinate courts, which will also include control over its employees, is extended in matters of posting, promotion and grant of leave etc. It is obvious that these items are not exhaustive but are merely illustrative of the different heads which come under the sweep of the expression control. The second part of Article 235 of the Constitution enjoins that in the name of control, it cannot be construed that any right of a person, namely, right of appeal or any other right which is given under the law regulating the conditions of service or any law which authorises the High Court to deal with it otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of service prescribed under such law will be taken away. If the second part of Article 235 of the Constitution is properly appreciated, the same leads to the following con-ciusion:- Iri the name of control if the Judicial Officers and the employees of the civil Courts have any right under the law which authorises the High Court to regulate their conditions of services, that right cannot be taken away. It is in that context the decision in dayaram Asanand Gursahani (supra)should be read. From a perusal of the said judgment it is clear that if certain pay scale is given to the Judicial Officers under any existing Circular or law, the High Court cannot withhold the same in exercise of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. From a perusal of the said judgment it is clear that if certain pay scale is given to the Judicial Officers under any existing Circular or law, the High Court cannot withhold the same in exercise of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. In other words in paragraph 17 of the judgment in Dayaram Asanand Gursahani (supra) the Hon ble Supreme Court makes it clear that the pay scale to which a Judicial Officer is entitled as a condition of service which can be regulated by a statute or rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or by executive instructions issued under Article 162 of the constitution of India, the same cannot be interfered with under the High courts power of control vested in it under Article 235 of the Constitution of india and in the aid of such proposition the Constitution Bench judgment of the supreme Court in the case of B. S. Yadav V/s. State of Haryana reported in air 1981 SC page 561 has been referred. The relevant passage in B. S. Yadav (supra) occurs in paragraph 40 at page 576 of the report and the relevant portion whereof is set out below: "the first part of Article 235 vests the control over district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto in the High Court. But the second part of that article says that nothing in the article shall be construed as taking away from any person belonging to the judicial service of the State any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. Thus, Article 235 itself defines the outer limits of the High Courts pov/er of control over the district Courts and courts subordinate thereto. In the first place, in the exercise of its control over the district Courts and subordinate Courts, it is not open to the High Court to deny to a member of the subordinate judicial service of the State the right of appeal given to him by the law which regulates the conditions of his service. In the first place, in the exercise of its control over the district Courts and subordinate Courts, it is not open to the High Court to deny to a member of the subordinate judicial service of the State the right of appeal given to him by the law which regulates the conditions of his service. Secondly, the High court cannot, in the exercise of its power of control, deal with such person otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service which are prescribed by such law. " 12. It is in that context that the ratio in Dayaram Asanand Gursahani (supra) is to be understood. In Dayaram asanand Gursahani (supra) there was already an order by which the District judge was granted a particular pay scale and the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under Article 235 of the constitution deprive him of the same. The following lines in paragraph 17 of the judgment in Dayaram (supra) make the position clear which are set out below:- "it is only where there is such a law, rule or executive instruction, the High court may act under Article 235 of the constitution to sanction it or to refuse to sanction it. " 13. In the instant case, there is already a pay-scale which is to be made available to the Assistants in the secretariat and the High Court has made a recommendation to the State government to make the said pay scale available to the employees of the Civil courts. Therefore, this Court is of the view that by making the said recommendation, the High Court has not acted beyond its power of Control under article 235 of the Constitution of India. It is obviously true that the decision which the learned Advocate General cited on the doctrine of equal pay for equal work are not on the question of the impact of Article 235 of the constitution and the same was not made in the context of the employees over which the High Court can exercise control under the said Article and in respect of whom the High Court has made a recommendation. So this is a very vital distinguishing feature. 14. Apart from that, this court is distressed to find the manner in which the High Courts recommendation has been treated by the Executive Government. So this is a very vital distinguishing feature. 14. Apart from that, this court is distressed to find the manner in which the High Courts recommendation has been treated by the Executive Government. If a recommendation is made by the Standing Committee, it means the recommendation of the entire High court because the Standing Committee acts normally as a delegate of the Full court. So it is nothing less, but the collective wisdom of the learned Judges of this Court. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioners has cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and another V/s. Union of India reported in AIR 1994 SC page 268. Though the said decision was concerned with the question of appointment of Judges but it was emphasised by the nine Judges Bench decision that the collective wisdom of the High Court in making recommendation for the High court cannot be easily departed from. In a rather different context the other decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association V/s. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1990 SC page 334 is of greater relevance. Though the said decision was rendered while construing the provisions of Article 146 (2)of the Constitution of India under which the Chief Justice is competent to make rules relating to the salaries, allowances etc. in respect of the Supreme court employees, it is said that even though the rules framed by the Chief justice of India require approval by the president of India, such approval by the president should invariably be granted, and, if in a case where the approval cannot be granted the refusal cannot be made straightway, but before such refusal, there must be exchange of thoughts between the President of India and the Chief Justice of India. 15. This Court is in respectful agreement with the ratio in the case of the Supreme Court Employees Welfare association (supra) and holds that in the manner in which the impugned order at Annexure-5 has been passed shows that there is straightway refusal by the Executive Government of the recommendation of the Standing Committee of the High Court without any thought ful exchange of view prior to such rejection and without disclosure of reasons. This Court cannot appreciate this brazen attitude of the State government in rejecting the recommendation sent by the Standing Committee of the High Court. 16. For the discussions made above, the impugned order at Annexure-5 is hereby quashed. This Court directs respondent Nos.2 and 3, namely, the Secretary Law (Judicial) Department and Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Bihar, Patna to consider the recommendation of the high Court in its correct perspective and communicate to the High Court its reasoned decision in the matter within a period of three months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order and in the light of the observation made in this judgment. This writ petition is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to cost. Order Accordingly.