JUDGMENT J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Both the counsel have been heard in reference to evidence on record. 2. Mr. Garg counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Judge has committed the error in appreciating the evidence and, therefore, landed in error in recording the finding against the appellant and finally passing a decree dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. Mr. R.C. Chazed, counsel appearing for respondent submitted that the learned trial Judge has appreciated the evidence correctly and the finding recorded by him is consistent with evidence on record. He made reference to the evidence which has been adduced by the plaintiff and the evidence adduced by the respondent. 3. The dispute arose between the appellant and the respondent on account of alleged averments of the appellant that the suit room which has been discribed by letters A.B.C.D. in the map, annexed to the plaint, from the house situated at ward No. 9, Mukerjee Marg, Biora, Dist: Rajgarh was agreed to be sold by Resp. No. 1 to him by executing an agreement to that effect in the month of February, 1982 in presence of one Amichand goldsmith PW-3. The dispute also arose on account of the allegations of the appellant that instead of such agreement and expenditure incurred by the appellant in respect of the said room, Resp. 1 did not sell that room to him and instead sold it to Resp. 2. With such averments and allegations the appellant had filed a suit for specific performance and injunction against the respondent in the court of Addl. District Judge Rajgarh Biora, being No. 2-A/83. 4. The said suit was resisted by the respondent by contending that no such agreement was ever executed by Resp. No. 1 in favour of the appellant. If has been averred by Resp. 1 that said room was gifted to her by her father Ghisalal, the original owner of the said house alongwith remaining portion of the said house and on account of that she was the owner of the entire house and was entitled to sell the said room to anybody whomsoever she liked. 5. Learned trial Judge after appreciating the evidence on record dismissed the averments and allegations made by the appellant and dismissed the suit. He passed the decree in consequence of that and that is being assailed in this appeal. 6. 5. Learned trial Judge after appreciating the evidence on record dismissed the averments and allegations made by the appellant and dismissed the suit. He passed the decree in consequence of that and that is being assailed in this appeal. 6. The appellant examined himself as PW4 and stated that in the month of Feb 82, respondent No.1, Rampiyaribai had agreed to sell the said room to him instead of Amichand goldsmith and to that effect a document was written on stamp paper which was retained by said Amichand goldsmith. He further stated that at the same time his brother, and one or two persons were present alongwith Rampiyaribai, her husband and Ram Narayan. Ram Narayan, as per evidence of appellant, had expired in the meanwhile and, therefore, was not available for giving the evidence in the court. Amichand has been examined as PW3. Amichand categorically denied that such an agreement was ever made by Resp. No. 1. Rampiyaribai and appellant in his presence. He further denied that any such agreement was reduced into writing in his presence on stamp paper. He further denied that he retained the said stamp paper with him. PW2 the scribe, Shiv Narayan was also examined by appellant in support of his contention. Shiv Narayan also denied to have written such an agreement as averred by appellant. He further stated that there was no entry to that effect in his register. Thus, these two witnesses who were mentioned by the appellant did not support him. Very strangly the appellant did not disown these two witnesses by declaring them to as hostile to him. He did not seek the permission from the court to ask the question to them in the nature of cross examination after disowning and declaring them hostile to him. No attempts were made by the appellant to demonstrate that these two witnesses were suppressing the truth and with some ulterior motive they were supporting the case of the respondents. 7. When the witness examined by the party are deposing against his case, it is necessary for him to disown such witness and declare such witness hostile to him and impeach his credit. It is necessary for him to put the questions in the nature of cross-examination to such witness by seeking permission of the court in view of provisions of S. 154 and S. 155 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is necessary for him to put the questions in the nature of cross-examination to such witness by seeking permission of the court in view of provisions of S. 154 and S. 155 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. If this is not done, such party cannot contend that the evidence of such witness should not be considered against such party at the time of deciding the suit. The law is very clear that the evidence of a witness cannot be discarded only because he is speaking against the party who examined him. The party has to bring such material before the court to enable the court to come to a conclusion that on account of some ulterior motive the witness is suppressing the truth and speaking something else and which is against the case of the party examining him. The law does not even contemplated that the evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile, should be totally discarded though he has been declared hostile and questioned in the nature of cross-examination for impeaching his credit in view of the provisions of S. 154 and S. 155 of Indian Evidence Act. Therefore the evidence of witness No. 2 & 3 examined by the appellant, the original plaintiff, would be definitely available for the purpose of finding out the truth, for deciding the suit. If the evidence of those two witnesses is considered, it definitely disproves the case of the appellant. 8. Shri Garg further argued that the learned trial Judge has disbelieved witnesses No. 5 and 6, examined by the plaintiff-appellant on the ground that they have been examined without summoning them to give evidence in the court. For the purpose of supporting his contention in this context Mr. Garg placed reliance on O.XVI Rule 1-A of C.P.C. Shri Chazed did not dispute the provisions of O.XVI R. 1-A, however he submitted that even after appreciating the evidence of those two witnesses, the appellant could not get any advantage for the purpose of getting a decree against the respondent. 9. O.XVI R. 1-A provides: Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, any party to the suit may, without applying for summons under Rule 1, bring any witness to give evidence or to produce documents. It is pertinent to note that Rule 1-A is co-related with sub-rule 3 of Rule 1 of O.XVI. 9. O.XVI R. 1-A provides: Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, any party to the suit may, without applying for summons under Rule 1, bring any witness to give evidence or to produce documents. It is pertinent to note that Rule 1-A is co-related with sub-rule 3 of Rule 1 of O.XVI. Both the provisions will have to be read together. R. 1 of sub-rule 3 of O.XVI provides that - The court may, for reasons to be recorded, permit a party to call, whether by summoning through Court or otherwise, any witness, other than those whose names appear in the list referred to in sub-rule (1), if such party shows sufficient cause for the omission to mention the name of such witness in the said list. 10. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant complied with provisions of Sub. Rule 3 of R. 1 of O.XVI. In the present case inspires of that the court has permitted the appellant to examine those witnesses. For giving a consideration to his argument, advanced by Mr. Garg for appellant, this Court, in the interest of justice considered their evidence also. The evidence of witness No. 5 Devdhar Mewade is totally vague, though he stated that he was present with appellant, Rampiyaribai and her husband in the shop of Amichand Soni. He was not in position to point out necessary details of said transaction. Keeping in view this aspect of the matter in addition to that this witness had stated in his evidence that at that time in that context nothing was reduced into writing. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that it is the case of the appellant himself that an agreement was reduced into writing on a stamp paper by witness No. 2 Shiv Narayan and the said stamp paper was retained by Amichand Goldsmith, who happens to be witness No. 3 for the appellant. His name was never disclosed by the appellant when appellant gave evidence in the court in support of his case. Witness No. 6 is Vijay Babu. His evidence is also vague. He has not mentioned in his evidence about the details of the said transaction. His name was never disclosed by the appellant when appellant gave evidence in the court in support of his case. Witness No. 6 is Vijay Babu. His evidence is also vague. He has not mentioned in his evidence about the details of the said transaction. He has not said anything in his evidence to show that the said agreement was written by witness No. 2 Shiv Narayan and the said stamp paper was retained by witness No. 3 Amichand himself. Further more, he was a person who was serving with the appellant prior to the date of giving evidence in his favour by coming to the court at his instance. 11. The evidence of witnesses who have been brought by the party in the court without getting them summoned and examined, cannot be discarded only on that count. The trial court has not discarded their evidence on that count only. It has been pointed out by the trial court in paragraph 8 of the judgment that by implication, the evidence of those two witnesses nullifies the effect of the evidence of witnesses examined by the appellant in support of his case. 12. Thus after appreciating the evidence on record the judgment and decree which has been assailed by this appeal, I do not find that the learned trial court has committed any error in appreciating the evidence. I do not find that learned trial court has committed error in recording the finding against the appellant and dismissing the suit. I hold that the impugned judgment and decree is correct, proper and legal and therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed