JUDGMENT : S.K. PHAUJDAR, J. 1. This civil revision u/s 25 of the Provincial of S.C.C. Act is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.4.86 recorded by the Judge of Small Causes of Kanpur Nagar in S.C.C. Suit No. 25 of 1984. Eviction of the present Petitioner was ordered on the grounds of default in payment of rent and denial of the landlord's title. 2. The suit was filed by the present Respondents alleging therein that they purchased the suit property from the erstwhile owner through a registered deed. The Defendants had been a tenant in the suit premises under the erstwhile owner. After purchase, notices were given to the tenant by the earlier landlord as also by the purchasers about the transfer intimating him the right of the purchasers to receive rent after the sale. No rent was paid. Rather a suit for an injunction was filed by the Defendants wherein the ownership of the purchasers was denied. Accordingly, the suit was filed for default and for renunciation of the character of the tenant by the Defendants. 3. In the defence several pleas were taken. It was stated that the tenancy was never attorned and a relationship of landlord and tenant was never established between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. It was further stated that the Defendant had paid the rent through a bank-draft to Plaintiff No. 2 which was accepted. These, according to the Defendants, not only waive the right of the Plaintiffs to claim eviction on the ground of default but also waive their right to seek remedy on the ground of denial of title as it amounted to condonation the act of the tenant. 4. The learned trial Judge framed several issues. On points of fact he was of the view that the notice was proper and was properly served, that there was default on the part of the Defendants to pay rent and that the suit was not liable to be stayed u/s 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, due to pendency of the earlier injunction suit. The trial court also found that the Plaintiff was entitled to seek eviction on the ground of denial of title by the tenant. 5. In the present revisional application, the following points were pressed before this Court. The trial court also found that the Plaintiff was entitled to seek eviction on the ground of denial of title by the tenant. 5. In the present revisional application, the following points were pressed before this Court. It was urged that there was no legal attornment as it could have been done only on payment of rent. It was further urged that payment was made by bank-draft and there was no denial of this payment by the persons to whom it was paid. It was further urged that the suit for eviction on the ground of denial of title could have been filed simply on the averments of denial and there should have been an averment and proof that the action of the tenant was not condoned. 6. That the suit is covered by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (U.P. Act XIII of 1972) was not disputed in the course of the arguments. The provisions of Transfer of Property Act which could have otherwise regulated the relationship between the landlord and the tenant must, therefore, give way to the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972. Section 109 of the T.P. Act deals with the right of a lesser's transferee. This section gives by the right of the lesser to his transferee as to the property transferred so long as the transferee remains the owner of such property. The transferee, however, is not entitled to arrears of rent and if the lessee not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lesser, he shall not be liable to pay such rent again to the transferee. The Act XIII of 1972 in Section 38 provides that provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything in contrary therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act or in the Code of Civil Procedure. In this Act, the term landlord in relation to a building has been defined to mean a person to whom its rent is payable. The term also means to include such person to whom rent would have been payable if the building were let out. It clearly suggests that the landlord must be deemed to be the owner of the land or as per this definition the agent or attorney of such person. The term also means to include such person to whom rent would have been payable if the building were let out. It clearly suggests that the landlord must be deemed to be the owner of the land or as per this definition the agent or attorney of such person. By dint of the transfer from the original lessor under this definition of term landlord has also u/s 109 of the T.P. Act the Plaintiffs were entitled to receive rent as, undoubtedly, notices were sent to the tenant intimating the transfer. The fact of notice from the original lessor was not denied. Rather a story was introduced that subsequently the original lessor had intimated the tenant orally that the sale was not complete and a plea was taken that payment was made to the original landlord. This was not substantiated. Moreover, the plea that rent was paid through bank-draft in favour of one of the Plaintiffs is sufficient to infer attornment and the decree may not, therefore, be challenged on that ground. On the question of this payment, it is the plea, as stated above, that a bank-draft was given to Jeyanti Goel, Plaintiff No. 2, and it was argued that this fact was not denied on oath by Jeyanti Goel. The record, however, clearly indicates that Jeyanti Goel was examined as P.W. 2 before trial court and she made a categorical denial that any bank-draft was ever madeover to her. There being no other proof of payment, the finding of the trial Judge on the question of default may not be disturbed. 7. On the question of denial of title, reference may be made to Section 20(2)(f) of the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972. This sub-section required that a suit for eviction of tenant could be instituted on the ground that the tenant had renounced his character as such or had denied the title of the landlord and the latter had not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. It was urged on behalf of the present Petitioner that when it was a suit for eviction on the ground as mentioned in Section 20(2)(f), all its ingredients should have been pleaded. Undoubtedly, there was no pleadings of absence of waiver of the right of re-entry or absence of condonation of the conduct of the tenant. It was urged on behalf of the present Petitioner that when it was a suit for eviction on the ground as mentioned in Section 20(2)(f), all its ingredients should have been pleaded. Undoubtedly, there was no pleadings of absence of waiver of the right of re-entry or absence of condonation of the conduct of the tenant. On this point, the learned Counsel took me through several case laws. 8. On behalf of the Petitioner, reliance was placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court as in Pradeep Gautam and Anr. v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, (Judge S.C.C.) Allahabad and Anr. 1993 (1) ARC 44. The court found herein that two conditions were necessary u/s 20(2)(f). Firstly, there should be a denial of landlord's title by the tenant and, secondly, the right of re-entry arising from such denial should neither be waived nor the conduct of the tenant be condoned. As there was no findings on the second aspect, the decree was set aside and the case was remanded for re-trial. 9. The Petitioner also relied on another decision of the Allahabad High Court as in Mohd. Arif v. IVth Additional District Judge, Aligarh and Ors. 1984 (2) ARC 255, where also only the first aspect of Section 20(2)(f) was considered and the suit was remanded to the trial court. Some other case laws reporting the same view were also placed to highlight this point. 10. On behalf of the Respondents, it was urged that when a legislation indicates certain grounds for enforcement of certain right, the pleadings must indicate the positive actions stated in the grounds and the: negative ones need not be pleaded and ought be left for being asserted by the defence. It was argued that on technicalities, substantive justice may not be denied. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1242 . A question was raised before the Supreme Court about lack of pleadings and it was observed that it was not desirable to place undue emphasis on form. Instead, substance of pleadings was directed to be considered. Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1242 . A question was raised before the Supreme Court about lack of pleadings and it was observed that it was not desirable to place undue emphasis on form. Instead, substance of pleadings was directed to be considered. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal relating to a suit for possession of the property in dispute and the Supreme Court observed that it was the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question at dispute. It was observed that if it was found that inspite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded trial on these issues by producing evidence, it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. 11. The dictum of the Supreme Court suggests that if not in form, the plea should be there in substance. A second reading of Section 20(2) indicates that a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determination of a tenancy may be instituted on any one or more of the grounds as enumerated thereunder. The section requires that the suit should be based on any one of those grounds. The only inference is that the grounds as required thereunder must be pleaded as the opening lines of Section 20 clearly bars any suit save as provided in Sub-section (2). The condition as enumerated as Section 20(2)(f) speaks of a positive assertion of the renouncement of character as such by the tenant and denial of the title of the landlord and also of a negative assertion that the landlord had not waived his right of re-entry and had not condoned the conduct of the tenant. The landlord instituted the suit with the knowledge if he had waived the right of re-entry or had condoned the conduct of the tenant and it was, therefore, necessary for him to indicate in the plaint that he had neither waived such right nor had condoned such conduct of the tenant. 12. Further reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Udhav Singh Vs. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744 , to say that in construing a pleading it is to be read as a whole. 12. Further reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Udhav Singh Vs. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744 , to say that in construing a pleading it is to be read as a whole. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered, primarily, from the tenor and terms of his pleading taken as a whole. This may not, however, be interpreted to mean that even a legal requirement may not be pleaded and still a right upon that ground could be enforced. 13. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Raghubir Prasad v. Rajendra Kumar Gurudev and Ors. 1993 (2) ARC 52 . It was a suit for eviction of a tenant u/s 20(2)(a) of Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972, the necessary facts required to construe the right as spoken of under this sub-section were there in the pleadings and no prejudice was caused could to the tenant in taking his defence. The suit was held maintainable. The Court observed that the Act did not require that the plaint must reproduce verbatim what contained in Section 20(2)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972. Again we are confronted with the question of form and substance. If the averments are present in substance, the form need not be demanded. But if the necessary averments as required under this are not present even in substance, the pleadings on that point may not be accepted. Further elaboration on this point is not necessary as the suit was decreed on the ground of default as well and that point has been decided against the tenant and the decision of the trial Judge has been upheld in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. It was urged on behalf of the revisionist that he was ailing and had been under treatment in the Escorts Hospital at Delhi and in case his legal contentions were not accepted and the decree be upheld, he might be given some reasonable time to vacate the premises. The judgment of eviction was recorded in 1986 and the Defendants by dint of an order from this Court had stayed in the premises for long 10 years or more. However, keeping in view of ailment of the revisionist his prayer seems to be worth consideration. 14. The revision application stands dismissed. The judgment of eviction was recorded in 1986 and the Defendants by dint of an order from this Court had stayed in the premises for long 10 years or more. However, keeping in view of ailment of the revisionist his prayer seems to be worth consideration. 14. The revision application stands dismissed. The judgment and decree of the trial Judge on the point of default in payment of rent is confirmed. The revisionist-Defendant is to vacate the suit premises within four months from today failing which execution for eviction may be instituted.