M. A. MURTHY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1997 DIGILAW 735 (KAR)

TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition the petitioner calls in question the validity of the provisions of the Karnataka State Financial corporation Cadre and Recruitment Rules insofar as the same prescribe 100 marks out of a total of 250 for viva-voce. Selection and appointment of respondents 4 and 5 as Managers (Finance and Accounts) in the Corporation has also been assailed. ( 2 ) THE petitioner as also respondents 4 and 5 were working as Deputy Managers in the respondent-Corporation. In July 1995 two posts of Managers (Finance and Accounts) were advertised by the Corporation for direct recruitment. One of these posts was reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates while the other was to be filled up in the General Merit Category. The qualification prescribed for selection was AGA, Grad. , CWA, CFA, MBA or pgdm from Indian Institute of Managements with specialisation in finance and 2 to 4 years experience in a reputed organisation. The last date prescribed for receipt of the applications was 29th of July, 1995. Apart from the petitioner, respondents 4 and 5, a large number of other candidates also applied of which 16 were from the Scheduled Caste category while the remaining 59 were General Merit candidates. The candidates were called for a competitive test on 1st of October, 1995, which was taken by three scheduled caste and 26 General merit candidates. Out of the General Merit candidates, the first five, in the order of merit, were invited for interview besides the three scheduled caste candidates who had appeared in the test. The Selection Committee headed by the Managing Director of the Corporation, recommended Sri N. Venkatesh, respondent 4, for appointment against the scheduled caste vacancy, whereas one Sri Uday Kumar Shetty was appointed in the General Merit category. The committee also recommended the 5th respondent who was a scheduled caste to be placed in the waiting list besides one other candidate in the General Merit category. Appointment orders, were then issued in favour of respondent 4, and Sri Udaya Kumar Shetty. Out of the waiting list, the corporation appointed the 5th respondent, against a post, that fell vacant in the mean time and was as per the roster to go to a scheduled Caste candidate. Appointment orders, were then issued in favour of respondent 4, and Sri Udaya Kumar Shetty. Out of the waiting list, the corporation appointed the 5th respondent, against a post, that fell vacant in the mean time and was as per the roster to go to a scheduled Caste candidate. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition assailing the selection and the appointment of the respondents 4 and 5 besides challenging the validity of the cadre and recruitment rules, insofar as the same prescribe a viva-voce weightage of 100 marks out of a total of 250 for such recruitments. ( 3 ) MRS. Nagarathna, Counsel appearing for the petitione rargued that the weightage given to the viva-voce was on the higher side. She urged on the authority of a decision of the supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav and Others v State of haryana and Others, that allocation of 40% of the total marks for purposes of interview was excessive and would therefore vitiate any selection made on the basis thereof. She also placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Madhukar bakru Pingal v Rajendra D. Gaikwad and Others, in which case marks reserved for viva-voce was according to her fixed by the supreme Court at 15% leaving the remaining 85% to be allocated on the basis of a written examination. ( 4 ) THE decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in regard to the fixation of marks for interview fall in two categories namely: (i) relating to selection for admission to educational institutions and the other (ii) relating to selection for appointment in service. The decisions in R. Chitralekha v State of Mysore , Miss Nishi Maghu and Others v State of Jammu and kashmir and Others, A. Pariakaruppan v State of Tamil nadu, Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others and koshal Kumar Gupta and Others v State of Jammu and kashmir and Others, relate to admissions to educational institutions in which the view taken by the Apex Court is that if selections are made on the basis of the written test followed by interview, allocation for purposes of interview beyond 15% would be arbitrary and unreasonable. ( 5 ) INSOFAR as the cases dealing with appointment of public services are concerned, the question was first considered by the supreme Court in Lila Dhar v State of Rajasthan and Others, where the rules regulating selection provided for a written examination carrying 300 marks and viva-voce with 100 marks. There was therefore an allocation of 25% of the total marks for viva-voce examination. Making a distinction between selections for purposes of admission to colleges and those made for purposes of public service, the Court speaking through chinnappa Reddy, J. , observed thus. "if both written examination and interview test are to be essential features of proper selection, the question may arise as to the weight to be attached respectively to them. In the case of admission to a college, for instance, where the candidate's personality is yet to develop and it is too early to identify the personal qualities for which greater importance may have to be attached in later life, greater weight has per force to be given to performance in the written examination. The importance to be attached to the interview test must be minimal. That was what was decided by this Court in the case of Periakaruppan and Ajay hasia, supra and other cases. On the other hand in the case of services to which recruitment has necessarily to be made from persons of mature personality, interview test may be requirements being satisfied. To subject such persons to a written examination may yield unfruitful and negative results, apart from its being an act of cruelty to those persons". (at page 1780 of AIR 1981) ( 6 ) IN Ashok Kumar Yadav's case, supra, reliance whereupon was placed by Mrs. Nagaratna, selection under challenge was to the Haryana Civil Services (Executive) and Allied Services, made on the basis of a written examination and interview. The allocation of marks for interview was 33. 3% in the case of ex-Servicemen and 25% in the case of other candidates. After noticing the observations made in Lila Dhar's case, supra, the court summed up the legal position as under:"the competitive examination may be based exclusively on written examination or it may be exclusively on interview or it may be mixture of both. It is entirely for the Government to decide what kind of competitive examination would be appropriate in a given case. . . . . It is entirely for the Government to decide what kind of competitive examination would be appropriate in a given case. . . . . It is not for the court to lay down whether interview test should be held at all or how many marks should be allowed for the interview test. Of course the marks must be minimal so as to avoid charges of arbitrariness, but not necessarily always. There may be posts and appointments where the only proper method of selection may be by a viva-voce test". (page 473 of AIR 1987)"now if both written examination and viva-voce test are accepted as essential features of proper selection in a given case, the question may arise as to the weight to be attached respectively to them. . . . There cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the precise weight to be given to the viva-voce test as against the written examination. It must vary from service to service according to the requirement of the service, the minimum qualification prescribed, the age group from which the selection is to be made, the body to which the task of holding the viva-voce test is proposed to be entrusted and a host of other factors. It is essentially a matter for determination by experts. The Court does not possess the necessary equipment and it would not be right for the Court to pronounce upon it, unless to use the words of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Lila Dhar's case "exaggerated weight has been given with proven or obvious oblique motives". (at page 474 of AIR 1987) ( 7 ) IT would appear from the above that the question of weightage to be attached to the interview vis-a-vis marks reserved for written examination arises only where written examination as well as viva-voce test are accepted as essential features of a proper selection. It is also evident from the observations extracted above that no hard and fast rule can be prescribed for the weightage to be given to the viva-voce test as against written examination and that such weightage shall have to vary from service to service. ( 8 ) THE issue once again fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Anzar Ahmed v State of Bihar and Others. ( 8 ) THE issue once again fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Anzar Ahmed v State of Bihar and Others. Their lordships after noticing the earlier decisions including that in the case of Lila Dhar, supra and Ashok Yadav, supra, held that the selection in that case could have been made entirely on the basis of interview as per the letter received by the Public Service commission from the State Government. The Commission had however made the selection on the basis of interview while keeping the academic performance of the candidate in view. It had allocated 50% marks for academic performance while reserving the remaining 50% for interview. Reiterating the observations made in Lila Dhar's case, supra, the Court declared that the question of weightage of marks to be awarded at the interview vis-a-vis marks for written examination arises only when written examination as well as viva-voce test are both accepted as an essential feature of selection. The Court declared that there was no hard and fast rule regarding the precise weightage to be given to viva-voce test as against written examination. The weightage must vary according to the requirements of the service. An allocation of 50% marks, for viva-voce for purposes of making selection of Unani Medical officers was held to be reasonable and the procedure adopted by the Commission to be proper. 8-A. The above view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in subhash Chandra Verma v State of Bihar and Others, where the Court was considering a challenge to the allocation of 50% marks for the interview. It was held that in public service the recruitment had to be made from persons of matured personality and that allocation of 50% marks for interview could not therefore be deemed to have vitiated the selection. ( 9 ) IN the instant case the selection was made on the basis of a written test and viva-voce, besides giving 20% weightage to the marks secured by the candidates in their qualifying examination. The marks reserved for interview, written test and academic performance worked out to 40%, 40% and 20% respectively. ( 9 ) IN the instant case the selection was made on the basis of a written test and viva-voce, besides giving 20% weightage to the marks secured by the candidates in their qualifying examination. The marks reserved for interview, written test and academic performance worked out to 40%, 40% and 20% respectively. Having regard to the fact that the persons applying for the posts were not freshers from the colleges but were persons with work experience and fairly high academic qualifications, reservation of 40% marks for purposes of viva-voce could not be said to be excessive so as to invalidate the entire process of selection made on the basis thereof. Reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhukar Bakru pingal's case, supra, by the learned Counsel, is of no assistance for that decision is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the appointments under challenge was to the post of a Police Patil in the State of Maharashtra. The Administrative Tribunal had set aside the appointment on the ground that 50% marks reserved for viva-voce were in excess of the permissible weightage. In appeal before the Supreme Court, it was contended that even assuming that an allocation of 50% marks for viva-voce was invalid, the appropriate course for the Tribunal would have been to issue a direction to the respondents to prescribe a lesser marks for viva-voce and higher allocation for the written examination and to direct the conduct of a fresh examination. The direction given by the Tribunal, however, was for the appointment of the petitioner which was not justified. The supreme Court accordingly set aside the direction for the appointment of the writ petitioner and disposed of the matter with a direction to the respondents to conduct a written examination and viva-voce allocating 85% marks for the former and 15% for the latter. The said decision is therefore not an authority for the proposition that allocation of more than 15 marks for a post equivalant to that of a Manager in the respondent/corporation could be considered to be excessive. As observed by their Lordships in Lila Dhar's case, supra, in case of services to which recruitment has necessarily to be made from persons of matured personality an interview test may be the only mode subject to basic and essential academic and professional requirement, of a proper selection. As observed by their Lordships in Lila Dhar's case, supra, in case of services to which recruitment has necessarily to be made from persons of matured personality an interview test may be the only mode subject to basic and essential academic and professional requirement, of a proper selection. Besides the supreme Court had in Madhukar Bakur Pingal's case, supra, proceed on the assumption that 50% marks reserved for viva-voce were excessive and then decided as to what would have been a proper direction from the Tribunal. The Court did not actually lay down any hard and fast rule prescribing a standard different from the one that has been laid down in the previous decisions rendered by it. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting the challenge to the selection made by the respondents on that ground. Counsel appearing for the petitioner next argued that the rules did not provide for preparation of a waiting list and that the appointment of respondent 5, to the vacancy that had occurred after the advertisement notice had been issued was unjustified. Reliance was in this regard placed by the learned counsel upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal and Others v State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others , where their Lordships were considering the question whether the government could fill up vacancies that had not been advertised by appointing candidates out of the panel submitted by the public Service Commission. The said decision is however clearly distinguishable. In that case, the Government had in the letter addressed to the Public Service Commission in specific terms stated that no waiting list was required to be drawn up. The public Service Commission had drawn up a list of 20 candidates for filling up 11 existing vacancies of Munsiffs. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the requisition of a list of 20 candidates clearly meant that the Government had asked for a larger number of candidates to cater for the anticipated vacancies during the course of one year next following the submissions of the list. The Court rejected the submission on the ground that the wordings of the letter addressed by the State government did not support the same. The requisition, it was held was for holding a selection test for only 11 clear vacancies and nothing more. The Court rejected the submission on the ground that the wordings of the letter addressed by the State government did not support the same. The requisition, it was held was for holding a selection test for only 11 clear vacancies and nothing more. The Government did not propose to fill up the anticipated vacancies on the basis of the selection so made. The position in the instant case is totally different. Here the rules that govern the selection provide for preparation of a reserve list for appointment of suitable candidates out of the same against future vacancies. The relevant portion of General Note No. 7, under cadre and recruitment rules, in this regard is relevant and reads as follows:"7. In addition, the Selection Committee may recommend to the appropriate appointing authorities, names of candidates to be kept in reserve and to be appointed/promoted against future vacancies in relevant categories and/or disciplines. But the number of candidates to be kept in the reserve list should not be more than 50% of the clear vacancies in that category and/or discipline (rounded off to the nearest figure ). Ordinarily, the period of validity of such reserve lists will be 12 months. However, in exceptional cases the managing Director is empowered to extend the period of validity of such reserve lists by six more months and the board of Directors are empowered to extend the period of validity of the reserve lists by any period as necessary". ( 10 ) IN the circumstances the Selection Committee was justified in recommending the names of respondent 5 and Sri v. V. Hadimani, in the waiting list. A vacancy having occurred during the period for which the list was valid, the appointment of respondent 5, against the said vacancy cannot be found fault with. ( 11 ) IT was lastly contended by Mrs. Nagarathna, that respondent 4, was not eligible to apply or be selected for appointment. She relied upon Para 2 of the general conditions of the advertisement notice issued by the Corporation, according to which age and other qualifications of the general candidates were to be reckoned as on 31st of July, 1995. One of the essential qualification required for the post was a Masters Degree in business Administration. She relied upon Para 2 of the general conditions of the advertisement notice issued by the Corporation, according to which age and other qualifications of the general candidates were to be reckoned as on 31st of July, 1995. One of the essential qualification required for the post was a Masters Degree in business Administration. She urged that said respondent 4, did not possess the said qualification as on 31st of July, 1995 for even, though he had appeared in his M. B. A. Examination, he had not been declared successsful till as late as September, 1995. He was therefore not eligible for either making an application or for appearing in the test conducted by the respondent. Reliance was in support placed by her upon a decision of the Supreme court in Rekha Chaturvedi v University of Rajasthan and others, where their Lordships have held that in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the relevant date will be the last date for making the applications. The following passage from the decision succinctly declares the legal position. "the contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz. , even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. , even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the Selection Committee in the present case, as argued by Shri Manoj Swarup, took into consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date of selection rater than on the last date of preferring applications, it acted with patent illegality, and on this ground itself the selections in question are liable to be quashed. Reference in this connection may also be made to two recent decisions of this Court in A. P. Public Service commission, Hyderabad v B. Sarat Chandra and District collector 7 Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare residential School Society, Vizianagaram v M. Tripura Sundari Devi". ( 12 ) THE material facts are not in dispute. It is not disputed that the Post Graduate Degree in the Business Administration was an essential qualification for appointment. It is also not disputed that age and other qualifications of the candidates were to be reckoned as on 31st of July 1995. The written test was conducted by the respondent/corporation on the 1st of October, 1995, by which time the respondent's M. B. A. result had been declared. The viva-voce was conducted on 25th of November, 1995 and the recommendation for appointment made by the selection Committee on the same date. The respondent was thereafter appointed as a Deputy Manager against a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Caste candidates. Strictly speaking therefore the respondent was as on 31st of July, 1995, not eligible for either making the application or taking the test pursuant to the Notification issued by the Corporation. His application was all the same entertained and the respondent permitted to take the test. By the time, the test was conducted he had already qualified in the M. B. A. examination. His application was all the same entertained and the respondent permitted to take the test. By the time, the test was conducted he had already qualified in the M. B. A. examination. Mr. Hegde, learned Counsel appearing for respondent 4, made a two-fold submission to support the procedure adopted and its end result. He urged that since the petitioner had already appeared in the qualifying examination as on the date fixed for determination of the qualifications the declaration of his result made subsequently must relate back to the date of his taking examination in which event he should be deemed to be qualified on the crucial date fixed in the notice inviting the applications. Alternatively, he contended that the petitioner has been adjudged as the best candidate in the Scheduled Caste category and that his selection made in the best interest of the corporation should not be interfered with at this distant point of time when he has already put in more than two years of service as manager. It is also urged that the 4th respondent was senior to the petitioner in the cadre of Deputy Managers (F and A) and that there is no injustice caused to the petitioner by his selection and appointment. ( 13 ) MR. Bhat, appearing for the Corporation placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar sharma and Another v Chander Shekar and Another, and urged that on the analogy of the said decision this Court need not interfere with the selection of the 4th respondent who had been found to be the most meritorious candidate in the scheduled Caste category. ( 14 ) IN Ashok Kumar Sharma's case, supra, the controversy related to selection of Junior Engineers. The advertisement notice issued by the Government prescribed the qualifications for the post and required the applications to be accompanied by the certificates including the certificate showing the prescribed academic/technical qualifications of the candidates. Incomplete applications or those not accompanied by the requisite certificates were not to be entertained and candidates who did not fulfil the qualifications prescribed were advised not to apply. In response to the Notice, even those who had on the date of the making of the application not acquired the requisite qualification of a Degree in an Engineering, also applied. These candidates had appeared in the qualifying examination but their results had not been announced. In response to the Notice, even those who had on the date of the making of the application not acquired the requisite qualification of a Degree in an Engineering, also applied. These candidates had appeared in the qualifying examination but their results had not been announced. The applications were even then entertained and selections made on the basis thereof in which it eventually transpired that those who were not qualified as on the date of the making of the applications had secured better marks and had been placed above others, who were admittedly qualified and eligible. The selection of these candidates who were not qualified was challenged in the High Court. Two Single judges who dealt with these petitions separately dismissed the same. In appeal the Division Bench of the High Court balanced the equities among the two categories of candidates and directed that those who were qualified as on the date of the receipt of the applications should be placed above those who had only appeared in the examination and were therefore not qualified to apply or be selected. In a further appeal, before the Supreme court, T. K. Thommen, J. , as his Lordship then was overruled the view taken by the High Court. It was held that the appellants had passed the qualifying examination prior to the date of the interview and that by allowing them to sit for the interview and making a selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting agency was able to get the best talent available. It was held that consideration of better candidates who were fully qualified on the date of the selection was not in any way legally bad. The Division Bench decision of the High Court was accordingly set aside and that of the Single judge restored. The following passage from the judgment is in this connection relevant. "the fact is that the appellants did pass the examination and were fully qualified for being selected prior to the date of interview. By allowing the appellants to sit for the interview and by their selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available. It was certainly in the public interest that the interview was made as broad based as was possible on the basis of qualification. By allowing the appellants to sit for the interview and by their selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available. It was certainly in the public interest that the interview was made as broad based as was possible on the basis of qualification. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge was thus based on sound principle with reference to comparatively superior merits. It was in the public interest that better candidates who were fully qualified on the dates of selection were not rejected, notwithstanding that the results of the examination in which they had appeared had been delayed for no fault of theirs". ( 15 ) SAHAI, J. , who agreed with the final order proposed by Thommen, J. , chose to write a separate opinion. His Lordship held that the appeals filed before them must succeed not as a matter of law, but on equitable considerations. The provisions contained in the advertisement notice regulating the requisite academic qualifications as on the date of the making of the applications was declared to be mandatory in character. The court held that the candidate must not only have been qualified but should have been possessed of it on the date the applications were made and the contention that the candidates should have been eligible for the post on the date of interview and not on the last date for submission of the application forms, was rejected. The Court observed that the language of the notification must have prevented a large number of candidates, who must have appeared in the B. E. Examination, from applying as they were not qualified in terms of the same. On the above reasoning the court declared that the appellants being ineligible on the date of the making of the applications, they could not have been called for interview. On the above reasoning the court declared that the appellants being ineligible on the date of the making of the applications, they could not have been called for interview. Despite the illegality noticed by the Court in calling ineligible candidates for interview the appeals filed against the judgments of the High Court were allowed for reasons that were summed up in the following passage:"what has persuaded me, however, to allow the appeals, is not that there was no illegality in calling the appellants for interview or that the Board was justified in taking the decision to follow the practice of Commission but similar claim of the respondents had been rejected earlier by the high Court and by the time it was allowed more than ten years had elapsed since the examination was held and selection was made. The High Court for this very reason did not enter into the question of eligibility and tried to adjust the equities between the parties by directing that all those candidates, namely, the appellants who were not qualified on the date of application should be placed as junior to respondents who had applied earlier and were qualified. The order of the High Court, in my opinion, is manifestly unjust. Once the eligibility bar was lifted by the high Court, for whatever reason may be as said by it due to passage of time or because of erroneous application of rule 37 of the Public Service Commission Rules, the appellants who were subjected to same interview as the respondents and were found better qualified and secured higher marks, could not be placed junior to others. The equity does not know the half way. Once the appellants were held to be eligible may be not strictly under law but on equitable consideration, then it was wholly unjust to place them junior and under those who in the same". ( 16 ) IT is therefore evident that even though the ultimate order passed by the Court is unanimous the process of reasoning by which the Court arrived at that specifying for himself and ramaswami, J. , conclusion is different. ( 16 ) IT is therefore evident that even though the ultimate order passed by the Court is unanimous the process of reasoning by which the Court arrived at that specifying for himself and ramaswami, J. , conclusion is different. While Thommen, J's order proceeds on the basis that the recruiting authority had by inviting ineligible candidates also for interview picked up the best talent from a larger number of candidates and thus served public interest, the view taken by His Lordship Justice Sahai, proceeds entirely on the ground of equity, in the process negativing the contention that the consideration of the ineligible candidates was in any manner justified. ( 17 ) IF the test evolved in the two judgments were applied to the instant case, the same would provide an excellent ground for refusing interference with the selection of the 4th respondent. In the instant case also as was the position in Ashok Kumar sharma's case, supra, the 4th respondent even though ineligible on a strict and legalistic view was allowed to submit his application, on which date he did not possess the requisite m. B. A. qualification. The said qualification had been acquired by him before he took the prescribed written test as the first step in the aid of selection and the Interview Examination of the record produced by Mr. Bhat further shows that on 21st of September, 1995, the 4th respondent had brought to the notice of the corporation that his result had been announced in which he had been declared successful and requesting for consideration of his application and permission to appear in the written examination. The endorsement recorded on the application reveals that he had been provisionally admitted to the examination subject to production of the original marks card by him in due course. This implies that a conscious decision was taken by the authorities to permit the said respondent to compete obviously with a view to select the best out of the available lot. Even this feature is to an extent analogous to the facts in Ashok Kumar's case, where the Government was said to have taken a decision to allow even such of the candidates as had appeared in the examination but whose results had not been announced by the last date fixed for receipt of the applications. Even this feature is to an extent analogous to the facts in Ashok Kumar's case, where the Government was said to have taken a decision to allow even such of the candidates as had appeared in the examination but whose results had not been announced by the last date fixed for receipt of the applications. The result of the written examination and the interview further show that the 4th respondent had a clear edge over the other two Scheduled Caste candidates namely the petitioner and respondent 5, not only in terms of the merit on the basis of qualifying examination but even in the written test and viva-voce performance. As against the petitioner who had secured in all an agregate of 147. 95 marks in all the three components, 4th respondent was way ahead of him at 189. 38 with the 5th respondent falling in between the two at 166. 14 marks. The 4th respondent was in these circumstances decidedly the best Scheduled Caste candidate available, out of the three who had taken the test and appeared for interview. The legal defect in the entertainment of application notwithstanding the selection was in these circumstances clearly in public interest. The third and an equally weighty reasons why interference with the said selection would be inequitable and unfair is that the 4th respondent has based on the selection in question already served for over two years as Manager (F and A ). Last but not the least is the fact that the said respondent was admittedly four years senior to the petitioner even in the lower cadre of Deputy managers so that his selection and consequent appointment as manager based on his superior merit cannot be said to have caused any grave injustice of the kind that may require rectification at the hands of this Court. The writ jursidiction of this Court it is fairly well-settled is not only discretionary but equitable as well and it is open to this Court to decline interference in cases where it is found that the equity of the situation does not warrant such interference. The writ jursidiction of this Court it is fairly well-settled is not only discretionary but equitable as well and it is open to this Court to decline interference in cases where it is found that the equity of the situation does not warrant such interference. Even when the entertainment of the application of the 4th respondent, may not have been perfectly valid in law, the subsequent events have shown that the error in entertainment of the application has instead of causing prejudice providentially resulted in the selection of a candidate who was best out of the lot. The object of all competitive tests and processes leading to the making of the selection ultimately is to identify and appoint the best. So long as that object has been served well, defect of procedure or a technical and sometime hyper-technical view, as to the rules regulating such selections should give way to the predominant object and the substance of the matter. That is particularly so when the breach of proceedure or the rules regulating the selection is not for any mala fide or extraneous considerations. In the circumstances therefore I see no reason to interfere. This writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .