N. SOMASHEKAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1997 DIGILAW 737 (KAR)

TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) COMMON questions of law fall for consideration in these writ petitions, which shall stand disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) THE controversy here relates to acquisition of different parcels of land in mysore, nanjangud, devanahalli, anekal and ramanagaram taluks of the state, under the Karnataka industrial areas development Act, 1966. By notifications dated 25th and 29th of october, 1996, the state government gave notice of its intention to acquire a total extent of 263 acres of land in three villages of Mysore and nanjangud taluks in terms of Section 28 (1) of the act. Objections raised by the land owners were considered and overruled culminating in the issue of declarations under Section 28 (4) in respect of an area measuring 255 acres and 18 guntas only. Writ petition nos. 8431, 8643 to 8647, 11974 to 11981, 6220 and 6260 all of the year 1997 challenge the said notifications insofar as the same pertain to an area measuring approximately 40 acres in different survey numbers of bythahalli and thandavapura village. ( 3 ) BY a similar notification, an extent of 315 acres and 20 guntas was notified by the government under Section 28 (1) in four different villages of devanahalli taluk, which included 105 acres and 27 guntas of government land also. Final notification issued under Section 28 (4) is however confined only to 122 acres and 12 guntas of land out of which acquisition of only 3 acres and 3 guntas is under challenge in writ petition nos. 12558 and 25717 of 1995. ( 4 ) IN anekal taluk, by a notification dated 15th of july, 1994, 599 acres of land situate in three villages including 67 acres belonging to the state government was notified for acquisition. Final declaration dated 29th september, 1995 and 22nd of july, 1996 under Section 28 (4) were however made in respect of only 311 acres and 26 guntas of land. The challenge to the said notification in writ petition nos. 38329 and 38330 and 38325 and 38326 of 1995 is limited to an extent of 26 acres of land approximately lying in different survey numbers of yerandanahalli village. The challenge to the said notification in writ petition nos. 38329 and 38330 and 38325 and 38326 of 1995 is limited to an extent of 26 acres of land approximately lying in different survey numbers of yerandanahalli village. ( 5 ) SIMILARLY, in ramanagar taluk, preliminary notifications dated 11th of april, 1996 and 30th of may, 1996 related to 162 acres and 25 guntas of land situate in two villages, but the final declaration under Section 28 (4) was meant only for an extent of 149 acres and 30 guntas. The challenge to the said notifications in writ petition No. 34209 of 1996 is limited to 5 acres and 3 guntas of land situate in three survey numbers of village billakempanahally. It is thus evident that although the notifications in question have acquired vast extents of land in all the taluks mentioned above, the challenge to the said acquisitions is in terms of the area acquired limited to around seventy-five acres only. ( 6 ) COUNSEL appearing for the petitioners have raised several contentions in support of their respective petitions reference whereto shall be made in the course of this judgment. Suffice it to say that the contentions urged broadly speaking raise the following questions for determination leaving apart individual peculiarities in some of the cases, to which I shall make a reference in the course of this judgment. Suffice it to say that the contentions urged broadly speaking raise the following questions for determination leaving apart individual peculiarities in some of the cases, to which I shall make a reference in the course of this judgment. (I) whether an acquisition under the Karnataka industrial areas development act is permissible if such acquisition is meant to or otherwise benefits only a single industrial company or unit; (II) whether acquisitions pursuant to the preliminary notifications issued by the government are without jurisdiction and void for want of proper delegation of authority in favour of the special land acquisition officers concerned; (III) whether final notifications issued by the government under Section 29 (4) are bad for want of satisfaction of the state government as regards the need for acquiring the land mentioned in such notifications; (IV) whether any portion of the lands sought to be acquired falls within the green belt areas identified in the comprehensive development plans and if so whether the same could be utilised without securing orders permitting conversion of such land under the town and country planning act; (V) whether the acquisitions could be declared to be bad in law as the proposed industrial areas and estates for which the same have been made would cause environmental pollution; (VI) whether simultaneous issue of notifications under sections 1 (3), 3 (1) and 28 of the kiad act would have the effect of invalidating the acquisition proceedings. (VII) whether the objections raised by the petitioner land owners have been properly considered and in particular whether each one of such objections was required to be separately dealt with by the special land acquisition officer; (VIII) whether the exclusion of certain areas initially notified for acquisition from the final declaration would have the effect of rendering the acquisition proceedings illegal and mala fide in law. ( 7 ) I propose to deal with the questions ad seriatim. ( 8 ) RE: question No. 1:mr. T. s. ramachandra, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, strenuously argued that the Provisions of the industrial areas development act could not be invoked by the respondents if the purpose underlying the proposed acquisition was to benefit any individual company. He contended that acquisitions for companies were generally governed by the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and were permissible only in certain situations. He contended that acquisitions for companies were generally governed by the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and were permissible only in certain situations. The authorities could not, according to the learned counsel, circumvent the Provisions of the said act and resort to acquisitions for the benefit of companies under the industrial areas development act. Any such acquisition under the latter act would tantamount to a fraud on the power available to the respondents under the same. ( 9 ) IN order to properly appreciate the submission, it is necessary to briefly refer to the scheme underlying the industrial areas development act. The act as is evident from its preamble is aimed at making special Provisions for securing establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein. The expression 'industrial area' has been defined under Section 2 (6) of the act to be an area declared as an industrial area by the state government by a notification, where industries are to be accommodated and includes an industrial estate. The term "industrial estate" means any site selected by the state government where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries or class of industries. Section 28 of the act regulates acquisition of land and inter alia provides that if at any time in the opinion of the state government any land is required for the purpose of development by the board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the state government may, by a notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. It would therefore appear that the act permits acquisition of lands for the purpose of development by the board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects underlying the same. Development of industrial areas is one of the objects that the act aims at achieving. The expression industrial area by reason of the very definition given under Section 2 (6) includes an industrial estate, where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industry or class of industries. It is not therefore possible to hold that acquisitions under the act in order to be good and proper must necessarily relate to more than one industrial estates or benefit more than one industries. It is not therefore possible to hold that acquisitions under the act in order to be good and proper must necessarily relate to more than one industrial estates or benefit more than one industries. It would be sufficient even if in a particular place a single industry is established for the same would answer the definition of the expression industrial estate as given in Section 2 (7) of the act. It must be remembered that industrial areas development act is a special enactment brought to achieve a special purpose namely an orderly and planned development and promotion of industries in the State of karnataka. While the Land Acquisition Act deals with the acquisition of lands generally, the Provisions of the industrial areas development Act, are exceptions to the general law dealing with the formation and development of industrial areas and industrial estates aimed at encouraging an organised and planned development of industries in the state. So long as the acquisition under the act is meant to encourage setting up of an industrial unit within an area declared by the state government as an industrial area, the very fact that the acquisition would eventually benefit only one industrial company or unit may not be enough for the court to declare that the power of acquisition vested in the respondents under the act has been fraudulently invoked. It is not the case of the petitioners that the acquisitions in question have been resorted to without declaring the areas as industrial areas or that the real purpose underlying the same is to benefit a company, which does not propose to set up any industry. It is therefore difficult to appreciate how an acquisition of a parcel of land situate within a declared industrial area can be said to be a fraud on the power vested in the government just because the beneficiary of such acquisition happens to be a single industrial unit as against a class or group of such units. The scheme and the Provisions of the act do not, in my opinion, suggest that an area can be deemed to be an industrial area or an industrial estate only if more than one industrial units are established within the same. It is possible in my opinion for even a single industrial unit to constitute an industrial estate. The scheme and the Provisions of the act do not, in my opinion, suggest that an area can be deemed to be an industrial area or an industrial estate only if more than one industrial units are established within the same. It is possible in my opinion for even a single industrial unit to constitute an industrial estate. That is because the definition of the term 'industrial area', is wide enough to include an industrial estate also. To the same effect is the view taken by malimath, j. , In Heggappanavara Markhandappa and others v State of Mysore and others, where his lordship has observed as under:"as long as the acquisition of the land is for the purpose of the Act, that negotiations were made with individuals concerned before taking steps for acquisition under the act cannot, by itself be regarded as a circumstance justifying an inference that there has been a fraud on power. The essential question to be determined is, as to whether the acquisition is really for the purpose of the act or it is only a camouflage for achieving some other object. As already mentioned a notification was issued by the state government declaring the area in question as an industrial area. The lands were acquired for the purpose of establishing an industry. The expression "industrial estate" means any site selected by the state government where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries or class of industries. Even if in particular place, a single industry is established, the same would answer the definition of the expression 'industrial estate' as defined in Section 2 (7) of the act. The preamble itself clearly states that one of the objects of the act is to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries in industrial areas. If, therefore, the lands in question were acquired for the purpose of establishing an industry by M/s. Harihar polyfibres with a view to secure a planned and orderly development of industries in that particular area, it cannot be said that the action taken for acquisition of the lands amount to fraud on power". Question No. (i) is accordingly answered in the affirmative. Question No. (i) is accordingly answered in the affirmative. ( 10 ) RE: question No. (ii):in terms of Section 28 of the industrial areas development Act, the power to notify the government's intention to acquire land, the obligation to issue notices to owners and/or occupiers of the land sought to be acquired, the duty to consider the objections raised by the owners or other interested persons against the proposed acquisition and to pass orders on the same as also the power to issue a final declaration for acquisition of the land are all vested in the state government. Section 31 of the act however empowers the state government to delegate any of its powers under chapter viii to any of its officers by rules made in that behalf. Rule 14 of the Karnataka industrial areas development Rule 1966 deals with delegation of powers of the state government and has been the subject-matter of a longish debate at the bar. The Rule runs thus:"rule 14. the powers of the state government under sub-sections (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) and sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 29 hereby delegated to the assistant commissioners in charge of revenue sub-divisions within their respective jurisdiction. Or to the special land acquisition officers or the additional special land acquisition officers in the Karnataka industrial areas development board with such jurisdiction as the state government may specify from time to time: provided that where such powers are delegated to the special land acquisition officer, the assistant commissioner in charge of the revenue sub-division shall cease to exercise the powers in the areas within the jurisdiction of the special land acquisition officer or the additional special land acquisition officer, as the case may be". ( 11 ) IT is evident from the above that the power vested in the state government under sub-sections (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) of Section 28 viz. ( 11 ) IT is evident from the above that the power vested in the state government under sub-sections (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) of Section 28 viz. , the power to issue notices, consider objections filed in response thereto demand delivery of possession of the land vested in the state under Section 28 (5) use such force as may be necessary to take over the possession in the event of failure of the person in occupation to surrender the same and transfer possession of the acquired land to the board have been delegated to the assistant commissioner in charge of the revenue divisions within their respective jurisdiction or to the special land acquisition officers or the additional special land acquisition officers in the Karnataka industrial areas development board. Counsel for the petitioners however contended that the proceedings conducted by the special land acquisition officers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 28 were incompetent, which in turn affected the validity of the final declaration issued by the state government under Section 28 (4 ). Two reasons were identified for why that was so according to them. Firstly, it was argued that the delegation of powers was clear only insofar as assistant commissioners in charge of the revenue sub-divisions were concerned. The delegation, it was argued, insofar as special land acquisition officers or the additional special land acquisition officers were concerned was incomplete, inasmuch as Rule 14 did not proprio vigors delegate to the said officers the jurisdiction to exercise powers under Section 28 (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) without issue of a further notification by the state government specifying the territorial jurisdiction in regard to which such power could be exercised. The contention was that in order to be a valid delegation under Section 31 of the act the same must be by rules made in that behalf and since Rule 14 was incomplete, in that it left the identification of the jurisdiction to the state government, the delegation could not be considered effective, by reason of the framing of the Rule alone. Alternatively, it was urged that Section 31 envisaged a delegation of powers to the officers of the state government. Rule 14, it was contended purported to delegate the powers under Section 28 to the special or the additional special land acquisition officers of the Karnataka industrial areas development board. Alternatively, it was urged that Section 31 envisaged a delegation of powers to the officers of the state government. Rule 14, it was contended purported to delegate the powers under Section 28 to the special or the additional special land acquisition officers of the Karnataka industrial areas development board. These officers were, according to the petitioners, employees of the board to whom a delegation under section 31 could not be validly made. ( 12 ) RULE 14, supra, as it originally existed delegated the powers exercisable by the government under Section 28 (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) to the assistant commissioners in charge of the revenue sub- divisions alone. The Rule was however amended by a notification, dated 10th of october, 1983 to provide for a delegation in favour of the special land acquisition officers in the Karnataka industrial areas development board. The proviso to the Rule so amended makes it clear that where the powers are delegated to the special land acquisition officers or the additional special land acquisition officers, the assistant commissioner in charge of the revenue sub-division shall cease to exercise the powers in the areas falling within the jurisdiction of such officers. The scheme of the Rule therefore is that wherever the powers and the functions vested in the state government under Section 28 are exercisable by the special land acquisition officers in the Karnataka industrial areas development board, the assistant commissioners concerned shall cease to exercise such jurisdiction. What is clear from a careful reading of the Rule is that the power exercisable by the state government under Section 28 has been delegated to the special land acquisition officers or the additional special land acquisition officers in the board. The mere fact that the Rule has left the determination of the territorial jurisdiction of such officers to the state government would not be enough for this court to declare the delegation to be imperfect or ineffective. All that is required under Section 31 of the act is that the delegation of the powers must be by rules made in that behalf. Rule 14 satisfies that requirement for it delegates the powers exercisable by the government under Section 28 to the special land acquisition officers in the board in no uncertain terms. All that is required under Section 31 of the act is that the delegation of the powers must be by rules made in that behalf. Rule 14 satisfies that requirement for it delegates the powers exercisable by the government under Section 28 to the special land acquisition officers in the board in no uncertain terms. The determination of the territorial jurisdiction of such officers by the government is in no way inconsistent with the scheme underlying the act generally or that of Section 31 in particular. It may no doubt have been possible for the state government to provide in Rule 14 itself the territorial jurisdiction of the special land acquisition officers, but merely because the Rule making authority has not done so and has reserved that function for itself would not mean that such a course was not open nor does the same introduce a fatal defect either in the delegation or the exercise of powers so delegated by the officers concerned. ( 13 ) I may at this stage deal with another facet of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners. It was contended that notification, dated 8th of november, 1993, by which the government have allocated jurisdiction to the special land acquisition officers was defective in that the same does not do so accurately. A perusal of the said notification does not however support this submission. The notification not only identifies the location of the headquarters of the special land acquisition officers but their respective territorial jurisdictions also. It is evident from the notification that special land acquisition officer, kiadb, Bangalore has jurisdiction over the districts of mangalore, tumkur, chitradurga, shimoga and kolar. Similarly, the special land acquisition officer, Mysore is in terms of the notification to exercise his territorial jurisdiction over areas that fall in the districts of mysore, mandya, chitradurga, kodagu and hassan. So also is the position with other land acquisition officers whose jurisdiction is mentioned in the column under the heading 'jurisdiction'. The argument on behalf of the petitioners was that in the column relating to jurisdiction of these officers, the notification does not use the word districts after the names of the district headquarters which according to them made it vague. I do not however see any merit in that submission. The argument on behalf of the petitioners was that in the column relating to jurisdiction of these officers, the notification does not use the word districts after the names of the district headquarters which according to them made it vague. I do not however see any merit in that submission. That is because while it may have been more appropriate if the word district or districts had been mentioned in the column pertaining to jurisdiction yet the very fact that it has not been so mentioned would not mean that the jurisdiction is not conferred by reference to the districts. This is apparent from the fact that in the column under the heading jurisdiction the notification mentions dakshina kannada and uttara kannada as the jurisdictional areas of the special land acquisition officer, dharwad and mangalore respectively. Now it is common knowledge that there is no place by the name dakshina kannada or uttara kannada in the State of karnataka. These are areas, that fall in those districts, which clearly indicate that the names mentioned in the column relating to jurisdiction of the officers are the names of the districts and not the cities or towns. There is therefore no ambiguity in the notification fixing the jurisdiction of the special land acquisition officers so as to affect the competence of the said officers to deal with acquisition cases relating to the areas that fall within their respective territorial jurisdiction. ( 14 ) COMING then to the second limb of the argument advancedon be half of the petitioners, it was contended that the delegation of authority could under Section 31 of the act be only in favour of the officers of the state government. Special land acquisition officers in the board, it was argued were employees of the board and not that of the government, so that any delegation in their favour was contrary to the Provisions of Section 31. On behalf of the board, it was contended and in my opinion rightly so that the special land acquisition officers are all officers of the state government taken on deputation in the board and therefore even when their services have been lent to the board, they continue to be officers of the state government. It is in this regard pertinent to refer to the Provisions of the cadre and recruitment rules prevalent in the respondent-board. It is in this regard pertinent to refer to the Provisions of the cadre and recruitment rules prevalent in the respondent-board. A perusal of the schedule to the said rules shows that insofar as special land acquisition officers are concerned, the method of appointment prescribed is by deputation of suitable officers taken from the state government. It is not in dispute that the persons presently holding the position of special land acquisition officers have all been appointed by deputation from the state government. These officers continue to be government officers even when their services have been lent to the respondent-board. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Jaijai Ram and others v Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport corporation and others, where their lordships have held that a government servant on foreign service continues to be a government servant for all intents and purposes. Question No. (ii) is therefore answered in the negative. ( 15 ) RE: question No. (iii):mr. Ramachandra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, strenuously argued that a final declaration under Section 28 (4) of the act was not a mechanical act and that any such declaration could be validly issued only if the government was satisfied that the land in question should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued by it under sub-section (1) of Section 28. It was urged that satisfaction implied application of mind and an independent order to demonstrate that the government had taken the decision to acquire and issued a final notification after a conscious and objective assessment of all the relevant considerations. Mr. Hinchigeri appearing for the board on the other hand argued that there was no scope for issue of any independent order under Section 28 (4) of the Act, once the objections raised by the land owners and interested persons had been considered and disposed of under Section 28 (3) by either the government or its delegate. Alternatively, it was contended that the government had applied its mind and issued the declaration on being satisfied that the land in question was needed for the public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification. He drew sustenance in this regard from the recitals contained in the final notification which records the satisfaction of the government as regards the need to acquire the land covered by the same. He drew sustenance in this regard from the recitals contained in the final notification which records the satisfaction of the government as regards the need to acquire the land covered by the same. He also placed reliance upon the official record produced by the government Advocate in support of his submission that the government had before the issue of the final declaration considered all the relevant material and taken a conscious decision on the subject. ( 16 ) TWO questions arise for consideration viz. , (a) whether the scheme underlying Section 28 of the act envisages the satisfaction of the state government over and above the orders passed by its delegate under Section 28 (3) and (b) whether any such satisfaction was recorded by the state government in the instant case. Insofar as the first question is concerned, section 28 (4) itself provides a complete answer. According to that provision, after orders under sub-section (3) of Section 28 are passed, a declaration shall be notified in the official gazette be made about the acquisition of the land for the purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification if the government is satisfied that such land is required for the specified purpose. The expressions "after orders are passed under sub-section (3)" and "where the state government is satisfied" clearly show that the Provisions of sub-section (4) do not envisage the issue of a final declaration by the government as an inevitable consequence flowing from the rejection of the objections raised by the land owners by either itself or its delegate under Section 28. The satisfaction of the government is a requirement independent of the need and the power to consider and dispose of the objections filed by the interested persons. 'any other interpretation would render the Provisions of sub-section (4) a superfluity. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation that the Provisions contained in a statute should be so construed as not to render any part thereof redundant. The expressions noticed above appearing in sub-section (4) have therefore to be interpreted to mean that the government must be independently satisfied of the need to acquire the notified land for the purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification, for otherwise the requirement of the government being 'satisfied' before the issue of any such declaration' would be rendered wholly meaningless. The submission made by Mr. The submission made by Mr. Ramachandra, that the issue of a declaration under sub-section (4) of Section 28 is not a mechanical act and that any such declaration can be validly made only if the government have considered and been satisfied that the issue of any such declaration is necessary for the public purpose notified in the preliminary notification is accordingly upheld. ( 17 ) THAT brings me to the other aspect viz. , whether the government have in the instant case recorded their satisfaction before issuing the declarations. Two circumstances are in this regard relevant. The first and the foremost is that the declarations issued by the state government themselves record the satisfaction of the government that the lands mentioned therein are needed for the public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification. There is a presumption of correctness in favour of the statement made in these declarations. The Supreme Court has in bajirao T. Kote (Dead) by L. Rs and another v State of Maharashtra and others, held that once the purpose is a public purpose, the satisfaction of the state government as regards the need to acquire the land for satisfaction of that purpose cannot be questioned. ( 18 ) THE 2nd and an equally important reason is that the official records produced by the government Advocate amply demonstrate that the government had in each case leading to the issue of a final declaration applied its mind and directed issue of declaration on being satisfied that the land covered by the same was needed for a public purpose. The notes on the files that were put up for the orders of the Hon'ble minister sufficiently show that the declarations came in consequence of a conscious decision and to issue the same and not as a matter of routine or mechanical exercise. Both these circumstances sufficiently demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Section 28 (4) of the act. Question No. (iii) is also answered in the negative. ( 19 ) RE: question No. (iv):mr. Hosmath, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, argued that the lands acquired in the Mysore and nanjangud taluks fell within a green belt identified in the comprehensive development plan sanctioned by the authorities under the Provisions of the Karnataka town and country planning Act, 1961. ( 19 ) RE: question No. (iv):mr. Hosmath, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, argued that the lands acquired in the Mysore and nanjangud taluks fell within a green belt identified in the comprehensive development plan sanctioned by the authorities under the Provisions of the Karnataka town and country planning Act, 1961. It was urged that the use of the said lands could not be altered even by resort to compulsory acquisition proceedings except after obtaining permission of the authorities under the act. In the absence of any such permission, argued the learned counsel, the acquisition of the lands that fell within the green belt area for purposes of establishing industrial areas by the board was rendered illegal. There are two reasons why this contention must fail. Firstly, because there is nothing before me on record to conclusively establish that the lands belonging to the petitioner or any portion of the same actually fall within any green belt area identified under the comprehensive development plan prepared under the act aforementioned. Mr. Kasturi, learned counsel appearing for one of the respondents, rightly argued that in the absence of any clinching evidence to show that the lands belonging to the petitioner were a part of the green belt area duly identified under the Act, the question of examining any conflict did not arise. ( 20 ) THAT apart, the Provisions of Section 47 of the Karnataka industrial areas development act give an overriding effect to the said act vis-a-vis other enactments that may be inconsistent with its Provisions. Assuming therefore that there is any conflict between the Provisions contained in the town and country planning Act, 1961 and those contained in the Karnataka industrial areas development Act, 1966, the inconsistency notwithstanding the Provisions of the later act will take effect. To the same effect is the view taken by a division bench of this court in Kulkarni H. G. v Assistant Commissioner, belgaum and others, which was reiterated in M. S. Moses v State of Karnataka. In the latter case the court went a step ahead and declared that there was no real conflict between Provisions of Karnataka town and country planning act and the industrial areas development Act, which operated in two different fields. In the latter case the court went a step ahead and declared that there was no real conflict between Provisions of Karnataka town and country planning act and the industrial areas development Act, which operated in two different fields. The consistent view taken by this court therefore is that the Provisions of the Karnataka industrial areas development act will have overriding effect over the Provisions of the town and country planning act. It follows that once an acquisition is found to be necessary for the purpose of development by the industrial areas development board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the industrial areas development Act, such acquisitions cannot be questioned on the ground that the same is in any way opposed to or impermissible under the Karnataka town and country planning act. I have therefore no difficulty in holding that even if the lands owned by the petitioners or any portion thereof fell in any green belt area, the acquisition thereof under the latter of the two acts mentioned above cannot be questioned. Question No. (iv) is answered accordingly. ( 21 ) RE: question No. (v):it was argued by Mr. Hosmath that the proposed industrial areas in Mysore are located very close to the residential areas of the city, which was, according to the learned counsel, bound to adversely affect the quality of life of the inhabitants on account of air, water and environmental pollution that was bound to be caused on account of large scale industrial activity that would in due course be carried on in those areas. Any acquisition, which was likely to affect the citizens in terms of creating an ecological imbalance was, according to the learned counsel, not only improper, but legally impermissible. The location of the industrial areas, it was contended ought to have been so chosen as to reduce the potential of such areas creating health and other hazards for the people living in the cities, nearby. ( 22 ) ENVIRONMENTAL awareness and protection is a global phenomenon. The movement started in a big way with highly developed and industrialized countries realising the hazards of not protecting environment. In the Indian peninsula worship of the elements and love for mother nature has been a matter of faith with the people. ( 22 ) ENVIRONMENTAL awareness and protection is a global phenomenon. The movement started in a big way with highly developed and industrialized countries realising the hazards of not protecting environment. In the Indian peninsula worship of the elements and love for mother nature has been a matter of faith with the people. It is not therefore surprising to find that the need to protect environment and to reduce hazards that come as necessary concomitants of the process of industrialisation has been felt and is a matter of concern for everyone including a vast majority of the population that lives in rural india. That does not however mean that the country must halt its March towards progress or develop a different attitude towards industrial growth for fear of disturbing environment or causing ecological imbalance. Like other challenges posed by crippling poverty and unemployment, illiteracy and ever increasing population, the country faces the challenge of how to draw a perfect balance between industrial progress and environmental protection. That is no doubt a delicate job, in which even the courts have made their notable contribution. The question however is whether there is any justification for taking an obstructionist attitude only on the basis of vague apprehensions and a project, which has the potential of generating employment for hundreds and which is eventually going to add to the prosperity of the nation scuttled only on the ground that the hazards of pollution, which it may generate would affect the lives of those around. My answer would be in the negative, for precisely speaking two reasons. Firstly, because the location of an industry by reference to the availability of man power, roads, water, electricity and the like is a matter, which can more appropriately be determined by those formulating state policies and implementing the same. If the agencies charged with the formulation of such policies and their implementation, assisted by experts on the subject have identified the areas declared by the government as suitable for being developed as industrial areas, this court would be reluctant to sit in appeal over their decisions and interfere with the same unless something so grossly irrational is demonstrated as would render the exercise of the discretion vested in such agencies irrational, discriminatory or so patently absurd as to be incapable of being countenanced. There is no such material in these cases as could possibly show that the decision to locate the industrial areas at the places selected for them is in defiance of logic. ( 23 ) THE second reason why the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners must fail is that the field on the subject of pollution, its control and elimination is covered by comprehensive enactments of the parliament. The Provisions of AIR pollution control Act, water pollution control act and environmental pollution control act sufficiently take care of the need to maintain a pollution free environment and empower the agencies charged with implementing the said Provisions to enforce the statutory standards. As a matter of fact, no industry can be commissioned unless the unit secures clearance from the agencies under the relevant Provisions of the laws aforementioned. The legal Provisions thus take care of a possible situation, in which an industrial unit established in any one of these industrial areas may be found to be violating the laws of the land. The units can even be directed to be shut down if they do not comply with the statutory requirements relating to control and elimination of pollution. Suffice it to say that just because there is a possibility of the industries set up in the notified industrial areas creating any pollution is no reason why the acquisition of land for establishing such industrial areas can or should be declared illegal. Establishment of industrial areas by itself does not cause any hazards of pollution. All the industries established in such areas may also not be hazardous to environment. If any one of the units established in any one of these areas has the potential of causing problems of pollution, the authorities under the environment laws are well equipped to take remedial action against them. Even those living in the vicinity of such industrial areas and affected by any such polluting industry can approach the authorities for suitable action and seek redress in appropriate proceedings. All these safeguards are, in my opinion, sufficient to allay the apprehension expressed by the petitioner land owners on behalf of the residents of the areas, where the industries are coming up. My answer to question No. (v) is therefore in the negative. ( 24 ) RE: question No. (vi):mr. All these safeguards are, in my opinion, sufficient to allay the apprehension expressed by the petitioner land owners on behalf of the residents of the areas, where the industries are coming up. My answer to question No. (v) is therefore in the negative. ( 24 ) RE: question No. (vi):mr. Amar kumar, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, argued that notifications under sections 1 (3), 3 (1) and 28 (1) of the industrial areas development act having been all issued on 29th october, 1996 and gazetted on 30th of october, 1996, the acquisition proceedings were on that ground alone liable to be declared invalid. He contended that for the government to form an opinion that any land is required for the purpose of development of the area or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, it was essential that the land qua, which such opinion was formulated was located within the areas to which the Provisions of chapter vii were made applicable. It was according to the learned counsel essential that the land in respect of which the state government had formulated its opinion fell within an area, which was previously notified for purposes of application of the Provisions of chapter vii. He urged that the scheme of the act envisaged a necessary interval between the extension of the Provisions of chapter vii to the areas declaration of the area as an industrial area under Section 3 (1) of the Act, and formulation by the state government of an opinion that any land situate in any such area was needed for purposes of development or furtherance of the objects underlying the act. Inasmuch as the notifications were simultaneous, the acquisition was, according to the learned counsel, invalid and could even be dubbed as a fraud upon the power exercisable by the state government under the act. ( 25 ) SECTION 1 of the act gives the short title, extent and commencement of the Provisions of the act. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 stipulates that the act shall come into force at once, except chapter vii, which shall, come into force in such areas and from such date as the state government may by notification specify in that behalf. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 stipulates that the act shall come into force at once, except chapter vii, which shall, come into force in such areas and from such date as the state government may by notification specify in that behalf. Section 27 of chapter vii literally reproduces the said Provisions and states that the Provisions of the said chapter shall apply to such areas and from such dates as may be notified by the state government under sub-section (3) of Section 1. Section 3 relates to declaration of industrial areas and empowers the state government to declare any area in the state to be an industrial area for purposes of the act. Section 28 (1) on the other hand, empowers the state government to give notice of its intention to acquire such land as may in its opinion be required for the purpose of development by the board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the act. The notification issued by the state government under sections 1 (3) and 27 of the act was made on 29th october, 1996 and published on 30th of october, 1996. On the same date by a notification issued under Section 3 (1 ). The government had declared the area in question to be an industrial area. Even this notification was published in the government gazette on 30th of october, 1996 together with a notification under Section 28 (1), whereby the government gave notice of its intention to acquire the land falling within the said area for the purposes of acquisition. Although according to Mr. Hinchigeri, the notification applying the Provisions of the act under sections 1 (3) and 27 was chronologically earlier followed by notification under Section 3 (1) of the act and later by a notification issued under Section 28 (1), yet the question is whether the making and the publication of all these notifications on the same date would in any manner invalidate the acquisition proceedings. Now there is nothing in the act to suggest that there must necessarily be an interregnum between the issue of the notification under sections 1 (3) and 27 and those issued under Section 28 (1 ). Now there is nothing in the act to suggest that there must necessarily be an interregnum between the issue of the notification under sections 1 (3) and 27 and those issued under Section 28 (1 ). While it is true that an occasion for the government to apply its mind may generally arise after an area has been notified as an industrial area, yet the scheme underlying the act does not exclude a situation, in which the government may perform all the three functions simultaneously. If the government is on the basis of material, survey and study conducted by its agencies of the opinion that a given area is suitable for acquisition and for purposes of furtherance of the objects of the Act, it can extend the Provisions of the act to the said area, constitute the same as an industrial area under Section 3 (1) and notify its intention to acquire under Section 28. There may also be situations that a much larger area is notified as industrial area by the government under Section 3, out of which smaller portions are acquired from time to time in furtherance of the objects underlying the Act, in which event there is bound to be an interval between the notification of the area as an industrial area and the notification of the intention of the government to acquire the entire or a portion of the said area. That does not however mean that in no situation can the government for an opinion about the need to acquire a certain extent of land by simultaneously extending the Provisions of the act to the area where the land is situate and constituting that area as an industrial area under Section 3. The position may have been different if in the process of forming an opinion under Section 28 (1), it was essential for the state government to hear the persons likely to be affected by any such declaration. In that event, it could perhaps be argued that the power to notify being subject to the right of the affected persons to be heard, such a hearing could be given and a notification pursuant thereto issued only after the Provisions of the act had been extended and the area in question declared as an industrial area. In that event, it could perhaps be argued that the power to notify being subject to the right of the affected persons to be heard, such a hearing could be given and a notification pursuant thereto issued only after the Provisions of the act had been extended and the area in question declared as an industrial area. Section 28 however does not require any such hearing to be afforded to any person before the government can notify its intention to acquire the land considered suitable in its opinion. As to whether or not the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for purposes of acquisition is a matter, which the government decides on its subjective satisfaction and without any obligation to invite objections or hear the persons likely to be affected by such acquisition. In the circumstances, there can be no legal objection in all the three process being accomplished together. The simultaneous issue of the three notifications therefore does not constitute a flaw much less one, which can render the acquisition proceedings legally bad. I have therefore no hesitation in answering question No. (vi) also in the negative. ( 26 ) RE: question No. (vii):the common refrain of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners was that the land acquisition officers are bound to consider each objections raised by the land owners. Heavy reliance was in this regard placed upon a division bench of this court in K. S. Chandrashekhar and others v The Special Land Acquisition officer, Karnataka industrial areas development board, Bangalore and others. ( 27 ) IT cannot be disputed that each objection raised by a land owner or person interested in the land sought to be acquired must be considered and disposed of by the land acquisition officer fairly and objectively, but then that proposition of law is subject to an all important caveat viz. , that the. Objection must be one of substance and must be stated with sufficient clarity and supportive material. The requirement of consideration of all the objections raised before the land acquisition officer is not ritualistic nor would the court interfere just because each objection raised before the officer concerned has not been considered by him howsoever irrelevant funny or even foolish the objection may be. The requirement of consideration of all the objections raised before the land acquisition officer is not ritualistic nor would the court interfere just because each objection raised before the officer concerned has not been considered by him howsoever irrelevant funny or even foolish the objection may be. It is only when the court finds that a fair and proper consideration of the objection raised may have changed the course of events that the court may view non- consideration with concern. Where the objections are just for the sake of objections without any substance or wholly irrelevant or insufficient to outweigh the compulsions of compulsory acquisition meant to satisfy a public purpose, the failure to deal with or consider ad seriatum each objection raised would make no difference. The decision of this court in k. s. chandrashekhar's case, supra, relied upon by counsel for the petitioners does not, in my opinion, lay down a different proposition of law. That was a case where the objection raised was that the proposed acquisition was unnecessary having regard to the fact that a vast extent of the government land was available which was suited for satisfying the public purpose in view. Non-consideration of the said aspect by the land acquisition officer was considered by this court to be improper. Reference may also be made to a division bench decision of this court in writ petition nos. 1808 to 1822 of 1996, dated 31-5-1996, where this court held that in order that an objection on the ground of availability of government land is considered, it is essential for the objector to identify the government land that is available, indicate the extent thereof and provide such other details to enable the land acquisition officer to consider the objections by reference to the same. ( 28 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners have in an endeavour to identify objections, which according to them were objections of substance but not considered by the land acquisition officers concerned, made their submissions to which I shall presently advert. The record reveals that the land acquisition officers have passed independent orders in each case and dealt with the objections raised broadly even if the treatment has not been meticulous as is customary in orders passed on the judicial side. The record reveals that the land acquisition officers have passed independent orders in each case and dealt with the objections raised broadly even if the treatment has not been meticulous as is customary in orders passed on the judicial side. What is important is that orders passed by the special land acquisition officer do demonstrate application of mind and do not in my opinion suffer from any grave error of the kind that could vitiate the same, or render the acquisition proceedings void. The objections, which have according to the counsel for the petitioners, not been considered may now be examined in some detail. ( 29 ) MR. Shekar shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner in writ petition No. 25177 of 1995, strenuously contended that the special land acquisition officer had failed to properly consider the petitioner's objections and erred in rejecting the same only on the ground that the deletion of the land notified would affect the itc for whose benefit the acquisition was being made. According to Mr. Shetty, this reasoning given by the special land acquisition officer was indicative of two things viz. , (1) that the acquisition was meant for the benefit of a company and not for the board and (2) that the objections were not considered on their merits. I however find it difficult to subscribe to that view. As held by me in answer to question No. (i), acquisition of land under the act is permissible even if such acquisition may eventually benefit only one industrial unit. It is permissible for the board to establish an industrial estate where only one industry may be carried on. It is also permissible to make an acquisition in contemplation of an allotment to a single individual unit, subject to the area being declared as an industrial area under Section 3 (1) of the act. The acquisition proceedings cannot in any such situation be dubbed as a fraud on the power reserved to the state government under the act. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting the first limb of the argument advanced by Mr. Shetty. ( 30 ) EQUALLY untenable appears to be the second facet of Mr. Shetty's submission. The only reason why the petitioner wanted the land notified for acquisition to be deleted was that the petitioner had acquired the said for purposes of establishing and extending its own industry. Shetty. ( 30 ) EQUALLY untenable appears to be the second facet of Mr. Shetty's submission. The only reason why the petitioner wanted the land notified for acquisition to be deleted was that the petitioner had acquired the said for purposes of establishing and extending its own industry. The land acquisition officer was, in these circumstances, entitled to consider whether deletion would in any manner defeat the object for which the acquisition was being made. It was open to the special land acquisition officer to consider whether the deletion would affect the needs of an industrial house, which was to set up its industry in the proposed industrial estate. In having declined deletion of the notified lands on the ground that the same may adversely affect the needs of the itc for establishing its industrial units, the special land acquisition officer did not so misdirect himself as to render the order passed by him to be nullity or the subsequent proceedings taken on the basis of the said order void. Just because the owner of a parcel of land, which is notified for acquisition has in his mind a certain use for the land is no reason for the land acquisition officer to necessarily delete the said land. It is indeed not uncommon for owners of lands to have identified the uses for the same according to their own requirements and plans for the future. Such proposed uses and requirements of the owner cannot outweigh the right of eminent domain, which the state enforces for achieving a public purpose. It is not as though only such lands can be acquired as do not have any use for the land owners. Once therefore the state decides in its wisdom to establish an industrial area for which it needs the lands located within such area, it is entitled to do so notwithstanding the fact that the land owner has identified a specific use for the said land. The rejection of the objections by the land acquisition officer cannot therefore be said to be unjustified or irrational to warrant interference. ( 31 ) MR. Hosmath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petition nos. 11864 to 11881 of 1997, raised two distinct contentions in support of his challenge to the orders passed by the special land acquisition officer. ( 31 ) MR. Hosmath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petition nos. 11864 to 11881 of 1997, raised two distinct contentions in support of his challenge to the orders passed by the special land acquisition officer. Firstly, it was contended that the land acquisition officer had failed to take note of the fact that the board had with it 3000 acres of land in nanjangud and Mysore industrial areas, which could have been utilised by it for establishing the proposed industrial estates. Secondly, it was contended that the officer had not considered the objections of the petitioners that they were entirely dependent upon the land under acquisition for their livelihood. Non-consideration of both these objections, it was argued, rendered the orders made by the officer illegal. ( 32 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-board, it was pointed out that only 130 acres of land in nanjangud and Mysore industrial areas was available and that the same was insufficient for satisfying the needs of the proposed industrial units. It is not the case of the petitioners that 3000 acres of land allegedly available with the respondent was in a compact form capable of being used for the purpose for which the present acquisitions are made or that the same was established by production of material before the land acquisition officers. A vague and uncorroborated statement on a question like the availability of land was not, in my opinion, sufficient for the land acquisition officer to hold a roving enquiry before passing a final order. It was essential that the petitioner precisely identified the land and its location besides proving that the same was sufficient to satisfy the needs of the board before it could insist on a detailed treatment to that objection in the order passed by the land acquisition officer. This the petitioners had manifestly failed to do. Except raising an objection, there was nothing further to support the same nor have the petitioners substantiated that objection even in the present proceedings to prima facie show that there was any substance in the objection raised by them. ( 33 ) I find no substance even in the alternative submission based on the compulsions of the petitioners and the alleged deprivation of the right to livelihood. ( 33 ) I find no substance even in the alternative submission based on the compulsions of the petitioners and the alleged deprivation of the right to livelihood. It is fairly well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chameli Singh and others v State of Uttar Pradesh and another, that in every acquisition for public purpose by its very compulsory nature, the owner may be deprived of the land, the means of his livelihood. But so long as the exercise of the power is for a public purpose, the individual's right of ownership must yield place to the larger public purpose. Such a deprivation would not therefore amount to a deprivation of the right to livelihood, particularly when the owner is paid compensation for the land acquired at the prices prevailing on the date of the publication of the preliminary notification besides solatium. To the Same effect is a Decision of the Supreme Court in new reviera Co-Operative Housing Society Limited and another v Special Land Acquisition Officer and others. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting both the contentions urged by Mr. Hosmath. ( 34 ) MR. Narayana rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in writ petition No. 12558 of 1995, argued that the land acquisition officer had while considering objections raised by the owners adopted double standards for purposes of excluding or retaining the lands for acquisition. He placed reliance upon a single bench Decision of this Court in Basappa v State of Mysore, where this court has held that the authority had not erred in applying the test of existence of an industry while excluding such lands from acquisition for the purpose of the Act, but its failure to apply such tests to others, who are similarly situated would amount to hostile discrimination against persons belonging to the latter category. It was argued that certain extent of land had been excluded from acquisition by the special land acquisition officer on grounds which were not made applicable to the land belonging to the petitioner, although on those considerations even the petitioner's lands ought to have been excluded to avoid any discriminatory treatment. ( 35 ) MR. It was argued that certain extent of land had been excluded from acquisition by the special land acquisition officer on grounds which were not made applicable to the land belonging to the petitioner, although on those considerations even the petitioner's lands ought to have been excluded to avoid any discriminatory treatment. ( 35 ) MR. Hinchigiri, appearing for the board, on the other hand, argued that certain lands had no doubt been deleted by the special land acquisition officer on certain grounds which were found by the government to be totally untenable and that the government had by issuing a fresh preliminary notification renotified the acquisition of the said lands. This position has not been disputed by the petitioners. That being so, it is difficult to see how the petitioner can be said to have been treated differently. Even otherwise, the question whether there is or is not any discriminatory application of the norms adopted by the special land acquisition officer for purposes of deletion of the lands from acquisition would vary from case to case and would be a question of fact, which may not be possible to be determined satisfactorily in writ proceedings, unless the similarities pleaded by the petitioner are admitted by the respondents and the only question is whether despite such similarities in the nature, location, advantages or disadvantages enjoyed by the land, one could be treated differently from the other. That exercise of comparing the land covered in writ petition No. 12558 of 1995 with the one directed to be deleted by the special land acquisition officer is rendered unnecessary in view of the fact that the deleted lands have been renotified by the government. ( 36 ) MR. Shastry, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petition nos. 6220 and 6260 of 1997, contended that the land acquisition officer had not considered the objections raised by the petitioners to the proposed acquisition properly, in that he had ignored the fact that the lands in question were fertile agricultural lands and that the proposed units did not require the entire extent notified for the construction of a pump house or the proposed road. I find no merit in any one of these submissions. I find no merit in any one of these submissions. Just because the land falling within the limits of the area notified as an industrial area happens to be fertile agricultural lands would be no reason for the land acquisition officer to delete such lands, if they were otherwise needed for the notified public purpose. So also the question as to how much land is needed for satisfying the public purpose is a matter, which is better left to the authorities executing the scheme. The owners cannot argue that the extent of land is not actually required for the purpose for which the acquisition is being made. In any event, there is no material to show that the extent notified for the purpose of construction of pump house on the kabini river and the construction of a road is more than what could be said to be reasonably required for the purpose. No fault can therefore be found in the acquisition of the land on that account. ( 37 ) COUNSEL appearing for the petitioner in writ petition No. 27759 of 1996 argued that the special land acquisition officer had not considered the objection raised by the petitioner that lands utilised for growing a nursery could not be compulsorily acquired for satisfaction of any public purpose. There is however nothing before me to suggest that any such objection based on the government instructions relied upon by the government counsel was raised before the special land acquisition officer. In any event, compulsory acquisition of land admittedly needed for a public purpose could not be declared to be illegal or impermissible only because of certain administrative instructions issued by the government to its officers. Even if the government have notified necessary lands in derogation of the instructions issued by it, it is not open to the owner to question the validity of such acquisition proceedings on that ground. As between administrative instructions and the statutory power to acquire the latter would take precedence. Administrative instructions have in order to be valid to be compatible with statutory exercises, and not the vice versa. ( 38 ) MR. Amarkumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petition nos. 8431 and 8643 to 8647 of 1997. Argued that the government was adopting a totally arbitrary and irrational approach in developing industrial areas. Administrative instructions have in order to be valid to be compatible with statutory exercises, and not the vice versa. ( 38 ) MR. Amarkumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petition nos. 8431 and 8643 to 8647 of 1997. Argued that the government was adopting a totally arbitrary and irrational approach in developing industrial areas. The industrial areas notified under Section 3, argued the learned counsel, were not compact areas, chosen by reference to any long term industrial policy formulated by the state government but on the basis of the requirements of big industrial houses, who approach the government for grant of land and indicated their preferences as to the areas where they would like their industries to be set up. This process of notifying industrial areas was, according to the learned counsel, neither helping orderly development of industries nor their promotion in a planned manner. Areas were being notified and developed according to the convenience of industrialists, who propose to set up industrial units and depending upon whether the land sought to be acquired for the purpose is owned by those, who are politically influential or others who are helpless small holders unable to resist the onslaught of industrial giants and the might of the state. ( 39 ) IT is no doubt true that the act aims at promoting industrial development in the State of Karnataka in an orderly and planned manner which implies that the state has to formulate a long term industrial policy and identify potential areas where industrial growth can be permitted and promoted. In the ordinary course, one would expect the state to carry out an extensive study of all such areas as would qualify for being declared as industrial areas, assess the anticipated land requirement of such areas, notify such areas under Section 3 of the act and in due course develop them as industrial areas through the instrumentality of the statutory board under the act. No such study has however been conducted nor have the respondents produced any material to show that the state has any long term industrial policy at least in regard to development of industrial areas. What is happening then is that the respondents are identifying areas depending upon the requirement of the industrial houses that propose to set up their industrial ventures in the State of karnataka. What is happening then is that the respondents are identifying areas depending upon the requirement of the industrial houses that propose to set up their industrial ventures in the State of karnataka. That is not a happy situation from being an ideal one. Apart from the fact that it does not promote the objects underlying the Act, it creates a widespread impression among the owners, who are losing the lands that their lands have been taken over not because the same were needed for any public purpose on the basis of any study conducted in that regard, but only to satisfy the needs of the affluent industrial house. ( 40 ) MR. Hinchigeri, counsel appearing for the board, however made a valiant attempt to show that identification of the land was not entirely left to the industrial houses but was by the reference to the norms fixed for the purpose. He referred to the 'quality system procedure' for evaluation of the land formulated by the board in this regard and urged that for a rapid industrial growth, it was necessary for the state to extend attractive incentives to the industrial houses to induce them to choose the State of Karnataka for making their investments. He tried to demonstrate that potential industrial entrepreneurs were being lured by other states for making their investments and unless the Karnataka also offered equally if not more attractive conditions for the making of such investments, the state was bound to lose in terms industrial growth. There is substance in those submissions. There is in the country today a healthy and competitive climate for industrial investment, in which the states are vying with each other to attract more and more industrial investment within their respective territories. In the process, the state may have to offer attractive terms on which such investment can be attracted within karnataka. The question however is whether the making of such investment is made in an orderly and planned manner can be said to be proper. The object underlying the act is not only to encourage industrial growth, but doing so to ensure that such growth is in an orderly and planned manner. The question however is whether the making of such investment is made in an orderly and planned manner can be said to be proper. The object underlying the act is not only to encourage industrial growth, but doing so to ensure that such growth is in an orderly and planned manner. It is high time therefore for those charged with the formulation of the industrial policies and development of industrial areas in the state to seriously consider whether the present system of identifying an area by reference to the requirement of an industrial house and declaring the same as an industrial area under the act requires review. These are matters relating to policy, on which this court cannot pronounce authoritatively. It has to be left to the experts in the field, who have the wisdom, the vision and the wherewithal to decide what should be the shape of industrial growth in the years to come and how should such growth be promoted and to what extent. Suffice it to say that while the method by which the industrial areas are chosen and notified under Section 3, may not be perfect the acquisition proceedings initiated in regard to any such area duly notified cannot be interfered with just because the policy followed by the state government needs review to bring it in tune with the purpose underlying the act. The notifications issued by the government identifying the industrial areas have not been questioned by the petitioners. The wisdom behind those notifications is not therefore under challenge nor have the bona fides of the government been assailed. In the circumstances, acquisitions made to materialise the industrial areas so notified cannot be challenged on the ground that the same are not in accordance with what would have been an ideal method of implementing the Provisions of the act. ( 41 ) RE: question No. (viii): it was argued that large chunks of land were left out in the final notifications issued by the government. This according to the learned counsel for the petitioner rendered the acquisition of the remaining extent also illegal. The question whether deletion of certain land forming part of the preliminary notification can affect the validity of the proceedings qua the remaining is no longer res integra having been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Kandenkutty and others v State of Kerala and others. The question whether deletion of certain land forming part of the preliminary notification can affect the validity of the proceedings qua the remaining is no longer res integra having been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Kandenkutty and others v State of Kerala and others. Reference may also be made to a division bench decision of this court in Bangalore Development Authority v H. S. Hanumanthappa. That was a case where the release of a certain extent of land originally forming part of the scheme formulated under the Bangalore development authority act was set up as a ground to show that the authority and the government were not serious in implementing the scheme, so that the acquisition proceedings for the remaining land were rendered illegal. Repelling the contention, the court held that the release of certain lands earlier notified as a part of the scheme did not constitute a fraud on the power of acquisition vested in the government nor could the scheme be said to have lapsed on that account. Following the above decisions I have no difficulty in holding that the deletion of certain areas earlier included from the final declaration under Section 28 (4) of the act does not have the effect of rendering the acquisition of the remaining land illegal. My answer to question No. (viii) is accordingly in negative. ( 42 ) IN the circumstances, there is no merit in these writ petitions, which fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 1,000/- in each petition. 50% of the cost shall upon recovery be deposited in the advocate's welfare fund while the remaining 50% shall go to the state legal authority. --- *** --- .