BHAGABATI PROSAD BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal, being an appeal from original Order No. 557 if 1994, was taken up for hearing by this Division Bench and during the hearing of this appeal, an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act was presented for condonation of initial 103 days' delay in filing the memorandum of appeal. ( 2 ) ACCORDINGLY, a question arose whether the court can entertain this application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act in an appeal which is pending and which is, on the face if it, defective. ( 3 ) THE appeal was against the order dared May 20,1994, passed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice 'prabir Kumar Mazumdar, (as His Lordship then was), in Matter No. 165 1 of 1993. As per the usual and long standing practice prevailing in the Original Side of this Court, as a prevalent, acting under Chapter 31, Rule 29 (11) of the Original Side Rules, and having the force of law under Chapter 40, R. 3, the appellant was allowed to file the memorandum of appeal without certified copy of the order appealed from subject to the undertaking that the said certified copy would be flied within the period of limitation after excluding the time requited by the department concerned in make it ready for filing thereof within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. ( 4 ) IT is not in dispute that such an application for obtaining leave for preferring the memorandum of appeal with the aforesaid undertaking was filed before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Their Lordships Hon'ble Mr. Justice Gitesh Ranjan Bhattacharya and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Basudev Panigrahi, who were pleased to grant such leave to file the memorandum of appeal on usual terms and conditions, namely without certified copy, after granting leave to draw up and complete the order appealed against and to file the same within the period of limitation after excluding the time required by the department concerned to make it ready for filing thereof within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, that application was filed and leave was obtained by suppressing the fact before Their Lordships that by that time, the appeal had become barred by limitation and that there was delay of 103 days in preferring the appeal. ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, that application was filed and leave was obtained by suppressing the fact before Their Lordships that by that time, the appeal had become barred by limitation and that there was delay of 103 days in preferring the appeal. We have no, manner of doubt that if this fact was drawn to the notice of their Lordships, Their Lordships would not have entertained the application and would not have allowed the memo of appeal to be filed without certified copy on the basis of the aforesaid undertakings as a part of the long-standing practice of this Court. ( 6 ) IN the application for obtaining leave to prefer appeal without certified copy, the necessary particulars with regard to limitation were not disclosed, as in such application, it is necessary to disclose the date when the requisition has been filed for drawing up and complete the order, the date of filing the application for certified copy of the order and that in such a case, the court grants leave only being satisfied that within the period of limitation all steps at required to be taken in this behalf for obtaining the certified copy of the order have been taken and that, because of the delay on the part of the office, such a leave is granted and that on the basis of the undertaking if certified copy is obtained later on. and filed to the court, in that event the defect is cured and the appeal is treated to be valid. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, in the application for leave, it was not drawn to the notice of the Division Bench that the appeal was barred by limitation and that it is well settled principle that a memo of appeal could not be presented without certified copy after the period of limitation as held 1 by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State v. Biswanath Ghosh, reported in (1994) 2 Cal LJ 466. ( 8 ) IN this connection, the law is very clear inasmuch as under O. 41, R. I of the Code of civil Procedure, it is expressly provided that the "memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment. ( 8 ) IN this connection, the law is very clear inasmuch as under O. 41, R. I of the Code of civil Procedure, it is expressly provided that the "memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment. on which it is founded", and the Supreme Court of India in the case of Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari, reported in AIR 1969 SC 575 , held on consideration of the scope and ambit of-O. 41, R. I, that memorandum of appeal is not validly presented unless it is accompanied by certified copies of the decree and judgment. It was further held under O. 41, R. I, that the Appellate Court can dispense with the filing of the copy of the judgment, but it has no power to dispense with the filing of the copy of the decree. A decree and a judgment are public documents, and under S. 77 of the Indian Evidence Act, only a certified copy maybe produced in proof of their contents. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Shakuntala Devi's case, the Delhi High Court held in the case of Naraindas v. Daya Narain, AIR 1975 Delhi 9, that an appeal would be incompetent unless and until it is accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed from. In some urgent cases when the party is likely to suffer any serious injury by delaying the filing of the appeal and wants to obtain some interim relief, the appellate Court shows Indulgence of entertaining the appeal and granting interim relief on perusing the plain copy of the impugned order pending the receipt and filing of the certified copy. Omission to file a copy of the decree appealed against along with the memo of appeal it a fatal defect. Where, however a copy of the decree has been subsequently filed within the time allowed for appeal and accepted by the Judge, the irregularity will be cured. Where the Judgment is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, the appeal must be dismissed as time-barred unless just cause is shown for extending the period. Where, however a copy of the decree has been subsequently filed within the time allowed for appeal and accepted by the Judge, the irregularity will be cured. Where the Judgment is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, the appeal must be dismissed as time-barred unless just cause is shown for extending the period. ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal, reported in AIR 1961 SC 832 , held that the requirement that certified Copy of the decree should be filed along with the memorandum of appeal is mandatory, and in the absence of the decree the filing of the appeal would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. But the litigant deserves to be protected against the default committed or negligence shown by the court or its officers in discharge of their duties. This is because one is entitled to suffer because of any lapse or negligence committed by the officers of the court. ( 10 ) SECTION 3 of the Limitation Act creates a total bar in instituting any suit or preferring any appeal, if it is presented beyond the prescribed period and if an appeal is presented beyond the period of limitation without the delay being condoned expressly, the appeal is liable to be dismissed, Section 3 provides that the suit or appeal or application instituted after the prescribed period of limitation, must, ( subject to the provision of Ss. 4 to 24), be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. This only means that where the Court finds that a suit or other proceedings had been instituted after the period of limitation, it must be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. In other wards, the section merely makes such a question a material one for determination in every case whether or not the point has been raised by the parties. ( 11 ) AN appeal could only be presented beyond the period of limitation only after the delay is condoned by the court on the basis of an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act and on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within such period of limitation by exercising the discretion. ( 11 ) AN appeal could only be presented beyond the period of limitation only after the delay is condoned by the court on the basis of an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act and on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within such period of limitation by exercising the discretion. But mere proof of the existence of sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period does not, under be section, ipso facto compel the court to extend the time. The Court has a discretion to admit or refuse to admit the appeal even if sufficient cause it shown, as is made clear by the words "may be admitted. " Of course, the discretion in this case is a judicial discretion which should not be exercised arbitrarily. The practice and procedure for preferring the appeal, as envisaged under Chapter 31, Rule 19 (b) of the Original Side Rules of this Court, had been considered by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Srimati Annada Sundari Saha v. Monoharan Saha, reported in AIR 1981 SC 365 , where the Division Bench of this Court had considered this question in details with reference to the relevant rules, practice and procedures and the Case lawn, and held that a lung standing practice of the Calcutta High Court 2 acting under Chapter 31, R. 29 (b) of the Original Side Rules and having the force of law under Chapter 40; R. 3 is that the appellant is allowed to file the memorandum of appeal without the certified copy of the decree or order appealed from subject to the undertaking that the said certified copy shall be filed within the period of limitation after excluding the time required by the department concerned to make it ready for filing thereof within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. 1963. ( 12 ) NOW, when the written memorandum of appeal is filed and/or when the same is allowed to be filed with the leave of the court on the basis of the undertaking, the appeal is so filed but subject to the question or limitation and/or competency and/or maintainability thereof which are to be decided at a subsequent point of time. The question of limitation will arise because the appeal was allowed to be filed subject to the question of limitation. Thus when the condition or undertaking would be fulfilled the appeal would be properly filed otherwise the appeal would become incomplete and incompetent. In other words, if the order relating to the filing of an appeal requiring compliance of the procedure provided for filing of an appeal, is not complied with even though an undertaking is given to court to comply with the same, then there is no competent and complete appeal before the court. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, the entire proceedings before the Appeal Court would not become null and void nor would the interim and interlocutory orders passed in such appeal. The reasons are: first, that the memorandum of appeal was allowed to be filed with the leave of the court; secondly, though it was made conditional subject to the question of limitation yet it was not made a condition precedent, and thirdly, whether the time taken for obtaining the certified copy was the time requisite within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act might be dependent on various questions of facts the Appeal Court would come to the conclusion that such filing of the certified copy was beyond the period of limitation it could not be contended that any interlocutory orders made by it would at all the considered as non est. Under such circumstances, the appeal might be dismissed but the effect on the interim orders or interlocutory orders made therein would be the same as it happens when the appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation or as not maintainable or after contested hearing. 13a. In order to appreciate the point at controversy, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions for filing of appeal to the Division Bench on the Original Side of the Court as provided in Chapter XXXI of the Original Side Rules Rule 2 provides :"from the Memorandum. 2. 13a. In order to appreciate the point at controversy, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions for filing of appeal to the Division Bench on the Original Side of the Court as provided in Chapter XXXI of the Original Side Rules Rule 2 provides :"from the Memorandum. 2. Every memorandum of appeal from the Original Side shall be in Form No. 1 and shall be drawn up in the manner prescribed by O. XLI, R. I of the Code, and shall be presented to the Registrar, accompanied by a copy of the Decree or Order appealed from", Rules 3,4,5 and 29 (a) and (b) provide :"3 The Registrar shall accept and file a Memorandum of Appeal, if it is duly stamped and R. 2 has been complied with and if it appears to ] him to have been presented within the time allowed by the law of limitation. But such acceptance and filing shall not be a bar to any objection that may be taken in respect of any of such matters at the hearing of the appeal. ""4. When the Memorandum of Appeal is not accepted by the Registrar he shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return it to the party or attorney by whom it was tendered. Such Memorandum of Appeal may then be presented to the Appellate Court for admission. ""5. Application for the admission of a Memorandum of Appeal rejected by the Registrar shall be made to the Appellate Court at the earliest opportunity. The appellate Court on hearing such application may admit or reject the same with or without notice to the respondent. Where it is admitted without notice to the respondent such admission shall not be a bar to any objection that may be taken at the hearing of the appeal in respect of its admissibility. "29 (a ). The Appellate Court, or, if such courts be not sitting, a judge sitting on the original side of the High Court may, upon application and upon sufficient cause being shown, enlarge the time prescribed by these rules for doing any act to be done under these provisions. "29 (a ). The Appellate Court, or, if such courts be not sitting, a judge sitting on the original side of the High Court may, upon application and upon sufficient cause being shown, enlarge the time prescribed by these rules for doing any act to be done under these provisions. An application for enlargement of time must ordinarily be made before the expiration of the prescribed time and 3 must be supported by an affidavit, and also by a certificate of the Registrar; showing the dates on which any acts prescribed y these rules were done. " (b) The Appellate Court, or the Judge as aforesaid may also upon application and upon sufficient grounds verified by affidavit, exempt the parties or any of them from the operation of the whole or any part of these rules and may make such special order as shall appear desirable with regard to any matter with which these rules are concerned. " Vis-a-vis these rules we have now to consider the provisions of O. XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing of appeals from original decrees. The relevant part of R. 1 (1) is set out as follows :-"1 (1) Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the Judgment on which it is founded. " ( 14 ) THE Division Bench of this (Court) in Annada Sundari v. Monoharan ( AIR 1981 Cal 365 ) (supra), had held that :"there is a long standing practice of this court to grant such exemption but to a limited extent. It is granted conditionally upon the appellant's undertaking to court, inter alia, to file the certified copy of the decree or order appealed from, within the period of limitation. That time old practice has the force of law under Chapter 40, Rule 3 of the Original Side Rules as set out above. It is granted conditionally upon the appellant's undertaking to court, inter alia, to file the certified copy of the decree or order appealed from, within the period of limitation. That time old practice has the force of law under Chapter 40, Rule 3 of the Original Side Rules as set out above. In other words, the appellant is allowed to file the memorandum of appeal without the certified copy of the decree or order appealed from but if ultimately it is found at the hearing of the appeal or earlier that he has allowed the time to expire and has failed to file such certified copy of the decree or order appealed from within the period of limitation, after excluding the time required by the department concerned to make it ready for filing thereof within themeaning of S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, then the appeal would be incompetent. Under such circumstances, the question of limitation will arise, because it was allowed to be filed subject to the question of limitation. " ( 15 ) WE respectfully agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Annada Sundari's case ( AIR 1981 Cal. 365 ) (supra), as the same has correctly laid down the practice and procedure which is being followed in this court for a long time and which has the force of law. ( 16 ) ACCORDINGLY, the leave granted by the Division Bench of this Court on September 7, 1994, was on the face of it, void, as no appeal could be entertained violating the mandatory provisions of S. 3 of the Limitation Act. The court has no power to ignore the provisions of a statute governing the laws of the procedure which are mandatory and binding. Secondly, the undertaking which has been given, has not yet been complied with and it is needless to point out that breach of undertaking amounts to a clear case of contempt. Thereafter, if an appeal could not have been entertained, under the law, as aforesaid, it is not understood how the another Division Bench of this court could pass an order on 29. 9. 1994, giving leave to file an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. Thereafter, if an appeal could not have been entertained, under the law, as aforesaid, it is not understood how the another Division Bench of this court could pass an order on 29. 9. 1994, giving leave to file an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. Such a leave could not be granted in view of the provisions of S. 3 of the Limitation Act, as it is well settled principle that no one is entitled to present an appeal and no court can entertain or admit an appeal beyond the period of limitation without condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, or, in other words, beyond the period of limitation, the appeal could be entertained, as provided under S. 3 of the Limitation Act, if the case comes within the scope and ambit of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, and not otherwise. It is not understood how an appeal which was invalid, defective and incompetent, as held by the Supreme Court and in various other cases, could be regularised or revived by sub-sequent granting of leave to file an application for condonation of delay. The appeal could not be entertained without condoning the delay. That does not mean that an appeal which was filed out of time, which is non est in the eye of law, could be validated and/or regularised by subsequently entertaining an application for condonation of delay and when the condonation of delay is not a matter of course as mere proof of the existence of sufficient ground for not filing the proceeding within the prescribed period, does not, under the section, ipso facto compel the court to extend the time. In this connection, the Privy Council, in the 4 case of Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, reported in (1917) 44 Ind App 218 : (AIR 1917 PC 156) held,"all that the section requires in express terms as a condition for the exercise of the discretionary power of admission of an appeal presented after time is sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. If such can be shown, the court may in its discretion, which is, of course, a judicial and not an arbitrary discretion, admit the appeal. If such can be shown, the court may in its discretion, which is, of course, a judicial and not an arbitrary discretion, admit the appeal. " ( 17 ) AS such, the question of admitting an appeal would only arise in case of presenting an appeal out of time or beyond the prescribed limitation after the delay is condoned by exercising discretion by the court. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, in our view, the question of granting leave to file an application for condonation of delay in an appeal which is invalid, cannot be validated by any means. ( 19 ) FURTHER, in this connection, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee, sitting with Hon'ble Mr. Justice Barin Ghosh, passed an order on August 29, 1995, refusing to pass any interim order, but expedited the hearing of the appeal. But their Lordships, suo motu, have observed. "this order is, however, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respondents that the appeal, as framed, is not maintainable being barred by the laws of limitation. " Their Lordships correctly anticipated the defects in the appeal and in the order dated August 29, 1995, made the position clear and open to the respondents, and reserved the right of the respondents to contend that the appeal was barred by limitation. Before us, the correctness of the Division Bench decision of this Court in State v. Biswanath, reported in (1994) 2 Cal LJ 466, which was delivered by one of us (B. P. Banerjee, J.), was criticised. It is not necessary to make any comment on the criticism made, as it appears that the criticism of the said Division Bench judgment has been made on total ignorance of the various case laws, the statutory provisions and the regulations framed in this behalf. Order 41, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is certainly binding on the High Court and whereunder a memorandum of appeal could not be presented without the certified copy of the judgment or order. Only exception has been made in case of filing of decree, as held by the Supreme Court. ( 20 ) SECONDLY, in the Appellate Side of this court there was no provision and there was no long standing practice of presenting an appeal without certified copy within 30 days, as expressly provided in the Original Side Rules. Only exception has been made in case of filing of decree, as held by the Supreme Court. ( 20 ) SECONDLY, in the Appellate Side of this court there was no provision and there was no long standing practice of presenting an appeal without certified copy within 30 days, as expressly provided in the Original Side Rules. But, for the benefit of the litigants and in case of urgency, such procedure was extended by the Courts and that this was only done to mitigate the hardship. There may be cases where an order may be passed which may be prejudiced to the interest of a party and the party cannot be compelled to wait until certified copies are obtained, but certified copy must be applied and obtained without the period of limitation. ( 21 ) UNDER such circumstances, in order to mitigate the hardship, the practice in the Original Side was extended to the Appellate Side. But the requirement of filing certified copy of the judgment cannot be dispensed with as the same would be contrary to the Civil Procedure Code and/or the Appellate Side Rules insofar as the Appellate Side is concerned, and so far as the Original side is concerned, the Original Side Rules of this Court, as correctly interpreted by the Division Bench of this court consisting of Ramendra Mohan Dutta and C. K. Banerjee, JJ. , as Their Lordships then were, in Annada Sundari Saha v. Monoharan Saha, reported in AIR 1981 SC 365 . ( 22 ) THERE is a distinction between the cases where an appeal is filed within the period of limitation after obtaining leave of the Court on the basis of the undertaking and that failure to fulfil the undertaking and the cases where the appeal is filed out of time, where no such leave is contemplated under the rules. In the former case, non-fulfilment of the undertaking which amounts to a contempt and ultimately if it is found that the certified copy is not filed, in that event, the appeal should be dismissed after vacating of interim orders. But in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act which impose a statutory bar upon all Courts not to entertain any suit or appeal unless the delay is condoned in accordance with the provisions of law. But in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act which impose a statutory bar upon all Courts not to entertain any suit or appeal unless the delay is condoned in accordance with the provisions of law. The Court has no power, however, apart from the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (1) of the Limitation Act to relieve a litigant from the bar of limitation. The Court also cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. ( 23 ) THE Privy Council, in the case of Maqbul Ahmad. v. Pratap Narain Singh, reported in (1935 ) 62 Ind App 80 : (AIR 1935 PC 85) has rejected the argument that there was some sort of discretion which would enable the Court to relieve the appellants from the operation of the Limitation Act in the case of hardship, and observed:"it is enough to say that there is no authority to support the proposition contended for. In their Lordships' opinion it is impossible to hold that, in a matter which is governed by Act, an Act which in some limited respects gives the Court a statutory discretion, there can be implied in the Court, outside the limits of the Act, a general discretion to dispense with its provisions. It is to be noted that this view is supported by the fact that S. 3 of the Act is peremptory and that the duty of the Court is to notice the Act and give effect to it, even though it is not referred to in the pleadings," ( 24 ) IN the case of a writ after a judgment is delivered no formal decree is drawn up excepting that a writ is drawn up as directed by the Court and that for the purpose of drawing up of a writ, a formal request has to be made to the Registrar, for drawing up and complete of the writ inasmuch as the particular writ indicates what are the things are required to be done and/or steps to be taken by the respondents on the strength of the said writ. Under Order 41, Rule 1, the Court can dispense with the request of filing the judgment but not the decree at the time of presentation of the appeal but it does not exonerate the appellant to file the certified copy of the judgment which must be filed within the time. ( 25 ) ACCORDINGLY, the principles may be summarized as follows: (a) Appeal can be presented within the prescribed period of limitation in accordance with the long standing practice of this Court without certified copy of the judgment with specific undertaking or understanding that the application for certified copy has been made or will be made within the prescribed period of limitation and be filed to the Court so that the appeal may be treated to have been filed with the period of limitation as provided under the law. (b) No appeal can be preferred after the prescribed period without, being accompanied by the application for condonation of delay and also accompanied by the certified copy of the order and judgment appealed against, in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act read with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1, read with the rules framed by the Original Side of this Court in this behalf and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish v. Jawaharlal, AIR 1961 SC 832 , wherein the Supreme Court has laid down the requirement that certified copy of the decree should be filed along with the memorandum of appeal, is mandatory and in the absence of the decree for filing of the appeal, would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. In writ appeal, appeal is against the order or issue of the writ and accordingly the requirement of applying for the copy of the judgment and filing the same with the appeal cannot be dispensed with. The Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy where the language of the statute is clear and where there is no scope for any discretion or any inherent power conferred upon the Court to relax it, The inherent power can only be exercised where the field is not covered by any law and that too for the ends of justice, and accordingly, the Court have no inherent power to relax and/or make the provisions of any statute nugatory. (c) The procedure for the above two categories may not cover the cases where a third party who is aggrieved by any order and judgment, prefers an appeal after obtaining leave from the Court to prefer an Appeal. The parties who are not parties in the proceedings or a stranger can always prefer an appeal after obtaining leave in the Court. There the principle would be that the third party, affected by the order and judgment, deserves to be protected when an order is obtained against the third party who is affected by the order. No vested right is created in favour of the party who has obtained the order and there the construction to be preferred which preserves such remedy to one which bars or defeats it, a Court (sic) or to avoid an interpretation upon a statute of limitation by implication of inference as may have a penalising effect unless it is driven to do so by the irresistible force of the language employed by the legislation. ( 26 ) ACCORDINGLY, there is no scope for condoning the delay of 103 days when the appeal has already been presented and entertained and the application for condonation of delay has been presented several years after the appeal has been filed and the appeal has been filed by suppressing 6 the material fact that the appeal, at the relevant time. stood barred by limitation and this fact was not drawn to the notice of the learned Judges who granted leave. This is a very unfortunate state of affair and that the learned Advocate-on-Record is guilty of misrepresentation and suppression of the fact that the appeal was barred by delay and that by its gross suppression of material fact the appeal was allowed to be entertained by the Division Bench. Subsequent grant of leave to file condonation of delay by the order dated 29-9-1994, is, on the face of it, void and illegal. ( 27 ) ACCORDINGLY, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the filing of the appeal should be treated to be a void one and the same is accordingly dismissed as could not be presented on the day it was to be presented and at this, stage the application for Section 5 could not be entertained as a dead appeal could not be made alive by means of a subsequent application for condonation of delay. An appeal which is barred by limitation could only be entertained only after condoning the delay as provided under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court has no jurisdiction to ' ignore the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of the Limitation Act. Similarly, the Court is powerless to dispense with the requirement of Order 41. Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and / or the rules of the Original Side as well as the Appellate Side of this Court which are all statutory. No discretion has been left under the law or under the rules for the Court excepting the discretion to condone the delay that too on an application for condonation of delay if an appeal is presented out of time. and accordingly. the appeal is dismissed with cost assessed at 10 G. M. for the fault on the part of the lawyers. but the litigants could not be made to suffer as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. ( 28 ) ACCORDINGLY, this order is passed reserving the rights of the appellant to present the memorandum of appeal along with the certified copy of the order appealed against and accompanied by application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay and that the appellant would be entitled to take advantage of the extended meaning of "sufficient cause" as provided by an explanation to Section 4 of the Limitation Act. ( 29 ) VIDYANAND, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.