JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C.J. (Oral) : There is no merit in this, revision petition. The petitioners petition for eviction under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 has been dismissed by the courts below on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant has not been admitted or proved to exist. The petitioner has been directed to establish his title before the Civil Court regularly. 2. The relevant facts for the purpose of disposal of this revision petition are as follows. 3. The property was admittedly owned by one Zeinab Bibi. According to the petitioner after her death, her brother Kamru Deen succeeded to the estate and he executed a Will by which one Mrs. Kailash Dutta became the owner of the property. The Will is dated 9.4.1974. Mrs. Kailash Dutta sold the property on 31.7.1979 to Vimlesh Lal, widow of Sunder Lal, Dasodh Lal wife of Puran Parkash and Smt. Susheel Lal. From those persons, the petitioner purchased the property under document dated 28.11.1985. As soon as the petitioner purchased the property, the petitioner issued a notice to the respondent calling upon him to attorn to the petitioner. The respondent sent promptly a reply denying the title of the petitioner to the property and refusing to attorn as required by the petitioner. 4. Then follow these proceedings for eviction under the provisions of Urban Rent Control Act. No doubt, the petitioner has produced the documents, referred to above, to establish his claim that he is a landlord but tie petitioner was the only witness in support of his claim. In order to establish his title the petitioner ought to have proved at least the Will said to have been executed by Kamru Deen in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. In the absence of any other witness having been examined by the petitioner, it cannot be taken that the petitioner has established his title to his property, as required under the provisions of the Act. 5. The Courts below have concurrently taken the view that the remedy of the petitioner is only to establish his title to the property by approaching the civil Court. 6. 5. The Courts below have concurrently taken the view that the remedy of the petitioner is only to establish his title to the property by approaching the civil Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is a landlord as defined by Section 2(d) and for the purpose of these proceedings it is sufficient if he makes out that he is a landlord within the said definition. According to the definition contained in Section 2(d), landlord means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person and includes a tenant who sublets a building or rented land in the manner authorised, a specified landlord, and every person from time to time deriving title under the landlord. I am unable to accept this contention of the petitioner in view of the fact that in order to show that the petitioner is a landlord being entitled to receive rent or that he is a person deriving title under a landlord, the petitioner must prove the documents on which he placed reliance. The mere fact that the documents are produced before the Court would not automatically prove the title of the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner refers to the mutation records, which according to him would prove the title of his predecessor -in-interest. Mere production of such record would not satisfy the requirement of law. As pointed out already, there is one Will on which reliance is placed. Unless that will is proved in accordance with law, the link in the title claimed by the petitioner cannot said to have been established. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the respondent is estopped from denying the title of the petitioner. I am unable to accept this contention. Section 116 of the Evidence Act limits the estopped only to the denial of the title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy to the said immoveable property. The question has been considered in several decisions. Suffice it to make a reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif & Ors AIR 1990 S.C.636. The question has been considered in several decisions. Suffice it to make a reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif & Ors AIR 1990 S.C.636. In paragraph 7, the law on the subject has been set out in detail, which reads as follows:- "It is true that the doctrine of estopped ordinarily applies where the tenant has been let into possession by the plaintiff. Where the landlord has not himself inducted the tenant in the disputed property and his rights are founded on a derivative title, for example, as an assignee, donee, vendee, heir etc., the position is a little different. A tenant already in possession can challenge the plaintiffs claim of derivative title showing that the real owner is somebody else, but this is subject to the rule enunciated by S.I 16 of the Evidence Act. The section does not permit the tenant, during the continuance of the tenancy, to deny that his landlord had at beginning of the tenancy a title to the property. The rule is not confirmed in its application to cases where the original landlord brings an action for eviction. A transferee from such a landlord also can claim the benefit, but that will be limited to the question of the title of the original landlord at the time when the tenant was let in. So far claim of having derived a good title from the original landlord is concerned, the same does not come under the protection of the doctrine of estoppal, and is vulnerable to a challenge. The tenant is entitled to show that the plaintiff has not as a matter of fact secured a transfer from the original landlord or that the alleged transfer is ineffective for some other valid reason, which renders the transfer to be non-existent in the eye of law. By way of an illustration one may refer to a case where the original landlord had the right of possession and was, therefore, entitled to induct a tenant in the property but did not have any power of disposition. The tenant in such a case can attack the derivative title of the transferee - plaintiff but not on the ground that the transferor -landlord who had initially inducted him in possession did not have the right to do so. The tenant in such a case can attack the derivative title of the transferee - plaintiff but not on the ground that the transferor -landlord who had initially inducted him in possession did not have the right to do so. Further since the impediment in the way of a tenant to challenge the rights of the landlord is confined to the stage when the tenancy commenced, he is not forbidden to plead that subsequently the landlord lost this right. These exceptions, however, do not relieve the tenant of his duty to respect the title of the original landlord at the time of the beginning of the tenancy." 8. In such circumstances, the petitioner has to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant for-the purpose of filing an application under Section 14 of the Act. The basic requirement of the Act is that there should be a relationship of landlord and tenant. The Rent Controller under the provisions of the Act is not expected or entitled to decide the question of title to immoveable property when it is in dispute. In this case, the title to the property was denied at the earliest point of time when the petitioner wanted the respondent to make an attornment to him 9. In such circumstances the conclusion of both the Courts that the petitioners remedy is to approach the Civil Court is correct. There is no merit in this revision petition and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.