Judgment :- Decree-holder in R.C.O.P. No.344 of 1986, on the file of District Munsif, Coimbatore, is the revision petitioner. 2. The schedule building which is non-residential is in the possession of the respondent herein and the same was let out to him on a monthly rent of Rs.300. At the time when the tenancy commenced, a sum of Rs.3,000 was paid as advance. In the eviction petition, it was alleged by the decree-holder, petitioner herein that she is running a business at Madras by name Anglo French Pest Control, and that she wanted to shift her business to Coimbatore in her own premises. It is said that she was requesting the respondent herein to vacate the premises and handover vacant possession. It was further alleged in the eviction petition that she is not running the business in her own premises, and she is not in occupation of any building of her own either at Coimbatore or at Madras. She therefore, requested the respondent to vacate the premises for her own occupation, for which a reply notice was sent by him on 15. 1986, agreeing to vacate the premises on 19. 1986, but he failed to do so. He was postponing the matter, and that is why eviction petition was filed. 3. The petition was filed on 111. 1986. Notice was ordered. An advocate by name Thiru Jagannathan filed Vakalath for the respondent herein, i.e.. the tenant who sought an adjournment to 2. 1987. On that day, the case was adjourned to 12. 1987 and further adjourned to 12. 1987. On 12. 1987, time was extended to 22. 1987. On 22. 1987, the Judge was on leave and, therefore, the matter was adjourned to 3. 1987. The matter could not be taken up on that day also, and was posted for evidence on 23. 1987. It is seen that the landlady again sought an adjournment and the case was posted to 23. 1987. On 23. 1987, the decree-holder/petitioner was examined. The letters written by the respondent herein dated 13. 1986 and 18. 1986 were marked as Exs.A-1 and A-2. The Rent Controller passed an Order to the following effect: “Petitioner is called and examined. Exs.A-1 and A-2 marked. Claim is proved. Petition is allowed. 1987. On 23. 1987, the decree-holder/petitioner was examined. The letters written by the respondent herein dated 13. 1986 and 18. 1986 were marked as Exs.A-1 and A-2. The Rent Controller passed an Order to the following effect: “Petitioner is called and examined. Exs.A-1 and A-2 marked. Claim is proved. Petition is allowed. Time for vacating is two years as per memo filed by respondent.” Ex.A-1 marked in the case is a letter written by the respondent himself agreeing to vacate the premises. After eviction order was passed, a stranger by name Selvanayagam Rajan filed a suit O.S. No. 1119 of 1988 against the landlady, her brothers and sisters and also the present respondent. In that suit, he alleged that he is a tenant in respect of the eastern half of the schedule premises and the present respondent is a tenant only in respect of the western portion. It was further alleged in that suit that the landlady and the present respondent herein have colluded together and have obtained a fraudulent order of eviction. The suit was to declare the order of eviction dated 23. 1987 as null and void. It was further stated in that suit that the present respondent, though remained ex parte, had knowledge of the eviction order, and, in spite of the same, he is remaining silent, submitting to the order of eviction. That suit was dismissed. An appeal was filed by Selvanayagam Rajan as A.S. No.76 of 1992, on the file of Additional District Judge, Coimbatore. In that appeal, the present respondent was also a party and he also entered appearance through a counsel Madhavan. The appeal was also dismissed. A second appeal was filed by the stranger as S.A. No.1585 of 1992. The same was dismissed at the admission stage. 4. Thereafter, the present execution petition was filed by the decree-holder to execute the rent control order as E.P. No.67 of 1992. At that time, the present respondent filed an application as E.A. No.109 of 1993 to declare that the decree passed by the Rent Controller is null and void and the same was obtained fraudulently. In support of the application, he said that the landlady’s brother wanted the co-operation of the tenant in getting an order of eviction against the plaintiff who filed the suit as O.S. No.1119 of 1988. The arrangement, according to him. In support of the application, he said that the landlady’s brother wanted the co-operation of the tenant in getting an order of eviction against the plaintiff who filed the suit as O.S. No.1119 of 1988. The arrangement, according to him. was that the stranger Selvanayagam being a Srilankan Tamil, must be forced to vacate the premises somehow or other, and for the said purpose, an idea was mooted by him, i.e., a petition will be filed that the entire building is in the possession of the respondent and an order of eviction has to be obtained against the present respondent. Even though the said request was turned down, due to much persuasion and promise that the present respondent will be allowed to continue in the premises as a tenant, he yielded to the request. Thereafter, the petitioner’s brother obtained the respondent’s signature in a blank sheet of paper. It is alleged that the landlady’s brother, by misusing the same, has obtained eviction order fraudulently. It was further said that the tenant will be moving the appropriate court to have the decree of the Rent Controller declared as null and void. Thereafter it was contended that the Rent Controller has not applied his mind in passing the order of eviction and, therefore, it is incapable of execution. The allegation is that the order of eviction has been passed only on the basis of the memo alleged to have been filed by him and the Rent Controller has not applied his mind whether there was a statutory ground for eviction. To support the same, a further contention was also raised that the landlady is not the absolute owner of the entire property, though she is a co-owner. For the reasons stated above, application under Sec.47, C.P.C. was filed to declare that the Order of the Rent Controller is voidable, and the same is ultra vires and, therefore, inexecutable. 5. The petition was seriously opposed by the decree-holder by filing a counter-statement. In the counter-statement, it is further said that eviction order has been passed with notice to the tenant, and he was also satisfied about the genuine ground of the landlady. It was further contended that the Rent Controller was also satisfied about the legal ground for eviction. The allegations made against the brother of the landlady were all denied. In the counter-statement, it is further said that eviction order has been passed with notice to the tenant, and he was also satisfied about the genuine ground of the landlady. It was further contended that the Rent Controller was also satisfied about the legal ground for eviction. The allegations made against the brother of the landlady were all denied. It is said that the tenant himself has engaged a counsel and he was willing to surrender vacant possession of the building. For the said purpose, an earlier letter written by the tenant and marked as Ex.A-1 in the case during trial was also relied on. It is said that the Order of eviction was passed by Rent Controller on proper application of mind, and the application under Sec.47, C.P.C. cannot be sustained. 6. On the above application, the executing court took oral and documentary evidence. On the side of respondent, who was petitioner in E.A., Exs.A-1 to A-19 were marked, and, on the side of respondent, Exs.B-1 to B-4 were marked. The tenant was examined as P.W. 1. The landlady and her brother were examined respectively as R.W.I and R.W.2. After evaluating the entire evidence, the executing court came to the conclusion that the Order is inexecutable, that no legal grounds have been made out for eviction. Landlady is not the absolute owner of the property, and she is only one of the co-owners. So holding, the execution petition filed by petitioner was dismissed, and E.A. No.109 of 1993 was allowed. It may be noted that the tenant has already filed a suit to declare the rent control proceeding as null and void, as O.S. No. 1513 of 1992, and the same is pending consideration by that court. 7. Before this Court, learned counsel on both sides argued only one point, namely, whether the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller is a nullity and, whether the same was passed in accordance with law after applying its mind, i.e., whether the order of eviction is passed on any of the grounds mentioned in the Rent Control Act, and whether there was proper application of mind by that court. Even though various allegations have been levelled against the fraudulent nature of obtaining order of eviction, no argument was put forward in that regard. Even though various allegations have been levelled against the fraudulent nature of obtaining order of eviction, no argument was put forward in that regard. Probably, the tenant did not want to take the risk of getting an adverse order in view of pendency of O.S. No.1534 of 1992. It may also be mentioned that in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of Application No. 109 of 1993, tenant himself has stated that he has filed a comprehensive suit for setting aside the fraudulent order of eviction obtained before the Rent Controller by false promise and inducement. In view of the reservation made in paragraph 6, no argument was put forward regarding the alleged fraudulent nature of the eviction order. 8. The only question that is urged before this Court is, whether the eviction order is liable to be executed. .9. I have already extracted the facts in the eviction petition. In fact, a copy of the eviction petition is also made available among the typed set of papers. From the eviction petition, it is clear that a legal ground has been made out by the landlady for seeking eviction, i.e., she needs the scheduled building for her own occupation for the purpose of her business which she is carrying on at Madras and that she is not occupying any other building of her own. She further said that she wanted to get a building of her own for doing the business. The statutory requirements are alleged in the eviction petition. The tenant also entered appearance through counsel The progress diary before the trial court does not say that the defendant filed any counter statement, but at the same time it is clear that he was never declared ex parte. Thereafter, the case was posted for evidence. About six or seven postings were given for evidence, and it was thereafter the petitioner was examined as P.W. 1. On the same date when the landlady was examined, Rent Controller passed an order stating that the claim is proved. At the same time, a memo was also filed on behalf of the tenant, seeking time to surrender possession of the premises. Landlady agreed for the same and, therefore, two years time was granted for surrounding vacant possession. 10. It has to be seen whether there was a legal ground for eviction. At the same time, a memo was also filed on behalf of the tenant, seeking time to surrender possession of the premises. Landlady agreed for the same and, therefore, two years time was granted for surrounding vacant possession. 10. It has to be seen whether there was a legal ground for eviction. Tenant was given notice, and he agreed before court to surrender possession. P.W.I (land-lady) was also examined to substantiate her case of own occupation. Even before the execution petition was filed, tenant has agreed to surrender vacant possession of the property. It is in this background, we have to consider whether the impugned order is executable or not. 11. The executing court has held that there is no explicit word by the Rent Controller in coming to the conclusion that the landlord requires bona fide the premises in question for her own occupation. The finding of the executing court is that since there is no express finding in that regard, it can only be stated that the order of eviction is based on a memo of compromise, and there is no application of mind by the Rent Controller. If there is no application of mind as contended by respondent, and the eviction order is passed only on the basis of memo of compromise, without satisfying the legal ground of eviction, it is settled law that such an order is illegal and inexecutable. But I feel that such a contention may not be available for the respondent in this case. The following circumstances also will have to be considered to decide whether such contention is to be accepted or not. The tenant is not disputing the order of eviction. Though he filed application under Sec.47, C.P.C., he pleads persuasion by landlords brother and the confirmed nature of eviction, I do not think such contention can be raised by him at this late stage. A stranger filed suit making the tenant also a party, to declare that the order of eviction is null and void. In that suit, he was also made a party in which there was an allegation that the order of eviction was obtained collusively and fraudulently. The suit failed. Appeal was filed. He entered appearance through counsel. There also, he did not have such a case as is now alleged. In that suit, he was also made a party in which there was an allegation that the order of eviction was obtained collusively and fraudulently. The suit failed. Appeal was filed. He entered appearance through counsel. There also, he did not have such a case as is now alleged. Only when the present execution petition was filed, a story of fraudulent nature of the order is alleged and sought to be proved. 12. What is the effect of the order of eviction? .13. The Rent Controller finds after examining P. W-1 that the claim is proved. What was the claim that was put forward by the Rent Controller. I have already extracted the relevant portion of the pleadings which reads that the landlady has made out a legal ground for eviction. 14. In one of the earlier decisions reported in R.M. Seshadri v. K.K. Chan, (1971)1 M.L.J. 90 . In that case, the order of eviction contained only the following words: “Compromise memo filed and recorded. By consent, eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till 5th June, 1969. No costs.” The said order was under challenge. While considering the same, this Court held that ‘the eviction order passed solely on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties and the Rent Controller did not apply his mind to the question whether the alleged bona fide requirement of the landlord had been established or not. The order on the face of it does not show that the Rent Controller applied his mind and was satisfied that there was a bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his personal occupation. Even if there is enough material before the court when it passed the order of eviction by consent as alleged by the respondent, so long as the Rent Controller has not applied his mind and given his decision in the matter as to whether the respondent was bona fide in requiring the premises for his own occupation, the eviction order cannot be held to be an order passed on merits under Sec. 10(3) of the Act. ‘In the later portion of the judgment, in paragraph 5 (at page 94) of the Reports, the learned Judge further went on to say thus: “....Even in a case where the tenant bona fide admits that the ground of eviction existed, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the Rent Controller must apply his mind and hold basing himself on such admission by the tenant, that the ground for eviction put forward by the landlord existed and that he is entitled to an eviction order, without solely relying on the eviction order...” [Italics supplied] The court held that the order of eviction based on the compromise is inexecutable. The decision was challenged before the Supreme Court and the decision is reported in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri, (1973)1 S.C.C. 761 . Their Lordships reversed the decision of this Court and allowed the Appeal. Their Lordships said that unless landlord satisfies any of the grounds under the Act, he is not entitled to get eviction order and the condition in the statute must be fully effected. Thereafter, their Lordships further went on to consider whether the court applied its mind while passing the order of eviction. It was held thus: “If a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a statutory condition, it may be held that it was so satisfied about the plea of the landlord. Again from other material on record, it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied.” [Italics supplied] It was further held that an order of eviction passed on consent of parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact, viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Sec.10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order. Satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt a pre-requi-site for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. “ [Italics supplied]. “ [Italics supplied]. Their Lordships further said that in case there is a dispute between landlord and tenant regarding legal grounds for eviction, the truth of the assertion has to be found out by the Rent Controller and satisfaction must be entered. But, if the tenant did not contest the proceeding and admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or more grounds, it is open to the court to take into account the admission also and make an order for possession without further enquiry. In the concurring judgment by Alagiriswami, J., in paragraph 40, the learned Judge said thus: ”...a compromise can be valid only if it is in accordance with the Act. But where the landlord specifically asks for possession on any one of the grounds of the basis of which he is entitled to ask for possession under the provisions of the Act there will be no objection to the tenant either submitting to an order of erection or entering into a compromise submitted to an order of eviction. There is no magic in the words if the Controller is satisfied in Sec. 10(3)(e). The section would have been as effective even if those words were not there." It was further held thus: "The fact the court had to satisfy itself does not prevent a consent order. A compromise or arrangement as long as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act would not be objectionable." 15.. The above decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal and another v. Madan Lal and others, (1975)2 S.C.C. 785 . The earlier decisions were reconsidered in that case and their Lordships reiterated the principle in R.M. Seshadri v. K.K. Chari, (1971)1 M.L.J. 90 . Their Lordships further said that the provisions of O.23, Rule 3, C.P.C. are also applicable to eviction suits governed by Special Statutes, and said that compromise in such suits is permissible under the said provision of law. In that case, their Lordships took into consideration the pleadings wherein the landlord alleged that he needs the building for his own occupation, and further pleaded that there is no alternate accommodation for starting him own business. The said allegation was accepted by the tenant, who filed a compromise petition. In that case, their Lordships took into consideration the pleadings wherein the landlord alleged that he needs the building for his own occupation, and further pleaded that there is no alternate accommodation for starting him own business. The said allegation was accepted by the tenant, who filed a compromise petition. In that case, the order regarding the compromise read thus: "On a perusal of the joint compromise it was found that the same is legal and is within the purview of the plaint. Therefore, plaint verification is accepted and the case is decreed in accordance with the conditions of the compromise as under: 1. That the defendants shall vacate the shop in dispute by December 31, 1970." In that case, their Lordships further held thus: "In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant whose tenancy is governed by any Rent Restriction or Eviction Control Act the suitor must make out a case for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When the suit is contested the issue goes to trial. The court passes a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirement of the statute has been established. Even when the trial proceeds ex parte, this is so, If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant’s eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law. " [Italics supplied] 16. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law. " [Italics supplied] 16. In Suleman Noormohamed and others v. Umarbhai Janubhai, (1978)2 S.C.C. 179 : A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 962, their Lordships said in paragraph 8 of the judgment (at page 183 of the Reports thus: "While recording the compromise under 0.23, Rule 3 of the Code, it is not necessary for the court to say in express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one. It will be presumed to have done so, unless the contrary is shown. But that apart, on examination of the plaint which certainly could be looked into and which must have been in the records of the court at the time of the passing of the compromise decree, it would be found that the landlords had claimed arrears of rent for two months at Rs. 17 per month and mesne profit also for one month upto the date of the suit at the same rate. They had also claimed light charges at Rs.2 per month. In the compromise petition, paragraph 2, the same amount of rent, mesne profit and electric charges are admitted by the tenants to be payable to the landlords....." In view of the said compromise, though there was no express wording that the landlord needs the building for his own occupation and that is a ground for eviction, their Lordships accepted the compromise and held that it is an executable order. It may be further noted that their Lordships stressed that the only requirement for recording a compromise is that there must be some material before court. For the said purpose, the pleadings and other materials have to be considered and, their Lordship further held that while recording the compromise, the Rent Controller should also be presumed to have taken into consideration those materials. 17. All the above decisions were again considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (dead) by L.Rs., (1993)2 S.C.C. 458. 17. All the above decisions were again considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (dead) by L.Rs., (1993)2 S.C.C. 458. wherein their Lordships held (in paragraphs 8 and 9) thus: "It may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. It appears, there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void." In the context which we are dealing, a decree is said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a court erroneously passes a decree or there is an error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree. It appears the question of validity of an eviction order based on a compromise was subject-matter or numerous decisions of various High Courts of this country. A study of Indian case-law on this subject does not disclose any uniformity of opinion of elucidation of any generally applicable principle. But the decisions of this Court in R.M. Seshadri v. K.K. Chari, (1971)1 M.L.J. 90 ; Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichcharam, (1974)1 S.C.C. 242 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471, Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, (1975)2 S.C.C. 785 and Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 962: (1978)2 S.C.C. 179 have resolved the conflict and clarified the matter." Their Lordships further held thus (in para 14): "There is no doubt that if there is a contest the court can pass a decree for eviction only if the court is satisfied about the existence of grounds mentioned in two sections quoted herein above. But the satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly. ..." Relevant portion of paragraph 14 and entire paragraphs 15 to 22 of the judgment may usefully be quoted: "...The admission contained in the compromise shows complete admission of the tenant about the arrears of rent read with the allegation of the landlord in the petition about the existence of arrears of rent after service of notice of demand. ..." Relevant portion of paragraph 14 and entire paragraphs 15 to 22 of the judgment may usefully be quoted: "...The admission contained in the compromise shows complete admission of the tenant about the arrears of rent read with the allegation of the landlord in the petition about the existence of arrears of rent after service of notice of demand. In the written statement the notice of demand had been admitted but the plea was of tender of rent. Even a reply was sent to the notice of demand. Thus in the absence of any material on the record of previous tender it can safely be assumed that there was sufficient material in the light of the agreed terms that ihe tenant had made himself liable to be evicted on the ground contained in Sec. 12(3)(a) of the Act. Even on the second ground of eviction, namely bona fide personal requirement of the landlord, the very fact that the tenant asked for accommodation of time shows that the claim of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement was impliedly admitted by the tenant. Again there is implied admission of comparative hardship as contemplated by Sec. 13 (2) of the Act by the tenant. O.23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to the proceedings. Rule 3 of O.23 reads as follows: "Compromise of suit: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the court, for reasons to he recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation: An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." It is clear that whenever there is any lawful agreement the court is bound to record the agreement or compromise. There is no provision in the Act which made Rule 3 of O.23 of the Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable to proceedings contemplated by the Act. Nor there is any provision in the Act which prohibits parties entering into a compromise in the suit for eviction filed under the Act. In K.K. Chari v. R.M. Sheshadri, (1971)1 M.L.J. 90 , this Court took the view that even if the satisfaction of the court as to the availability of the ground of eviction is not recorded in the eviction order it will not conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question. Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. Though Alagiriswamy, J. agreed with the proposed order but though it necessary to add a few words of his own. He observed: (S.C.C. 775 para. 36) “...The law on this subject has gone into a labyrinth and I think it is time we took a hard look at it and laid down the correct position.” He referred to English and Indian cases and was inclined to hold the there should be no objection to a compromise eviction order in rent control proceedings provided it is in accordance with the Act, i.e.. only the landlord has asked for possession of the premises on one of the grounds laid down in the Act. He agreed with the majority judgment on the grounds stated therein. He, however, thought that the matter would be considered in the light of what he has said when a proper occasion arises. Nagindas v. Dalpatram, (1974)1 S.C.C. 242 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471 was a case under Sec.28 of the Bombay Act (57 of 1947). The earlier cases were sought to be distinguished on the ground that they related to a different Act. Nagindas v. Dalpatram, (1974)1 S.C.C. 242 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471 was a case under Sec.28 of the Bombay Act (57 of 1947). The earlier cases were sought to be distinguished on the ground that they related to a different Act. That line of argument was rejected on the ground that object of all these Acts is the same and that policy element is involved in the enactments relating to rent control in general, both in England and India. There the suit for possession was brought on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as bona fide requirement of the landlord. In the memo of compromise, the tenant agree to pay certain sums as arrears of rent. The immediate delivery of possession was postponed for sometime till the plaintiffs were able to provide lease of other premises for the tenant. It appears that no evidence had been recorded before the compromise order was passed. When the time for execution came, the tenant raised objections under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There being no evidence recorded on the merits before the compromise order was passed, the court had to consider the nature and extent of material on which the court could be said to have satisfied itself about the existence of the grounds. The court inferred that there was implied admission in the compromise which provided for payment of arrears of rent by the tenant in respect of the first ground and that the satisfaction of the court in the matter may be based on an admission made by the tenant. The court observed: “From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the court, on the basis of which, the court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Sec.58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” [Italics supplied as in original reports]. The court also considered’ the extent to which the executing court could go into the matter. It was observed that if the decree on the face of it discloses some material, on the basis of which the controller could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it was not open to the court to go further and it must accept it and execute the decree as it stands. If. on the face of it. the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial court’s jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the rent court could have - as distinguished from must have - been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the executing court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the rent court. To allow the executing court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the rent court. In Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, (1975)2 S.C.C. 785 , the landlord had filed a suit against the tenant for eviction and for some other reliefs on grounds falling within Sec.12(l)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 i.e., bonafide personal requirement of non-residential premises. The tenant denied this assertion. Some evidence was adduced. Eventually a decree, on the basis of a compromise, was passed. The tenant agreed to vacate the shop by December 31, 1970. On his failure to do so the respondent took out execution. The tenant filed objection that the decree was a nullity. Paragraph 1 of the compromise petition stated “that due to the necessity of the plaintiffs for their own business of opening grocery shop decree may be granted to them against the defendants.” The plaint also mentioned that the landlord had no reasonable accommodation. The court implied an admission of that fact also, even though the compromise did not mention it. The court rejected the tenants’ contention, that there was admission of the positive aspect only and not of the negative aspect. The appeal was dismissed. The court also upheld the applicability of O.23, Rule 3 to suit governed by the special statutes. The court observed that: (S.C.C. 789, para. 6) “...If the agreement or compromise for eviction of the tenant is found, on the facts of a particular case, to be in violation of a particular Rent Restriction of Control Act, the court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be lawful agreement. If on the other hand, the court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise and, if necessary, by considering them in the context of the pleadings and other materials in the case, that the agreement is lawful, as if any other suit, so in an eviction suit, the court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith. Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 962: (1978)2 S.C.C. 179 was again a case in which suit was brought on the ground of non-payment of rent and bonafide personal necessity under the relevant provisions of the Act. Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 962: (1978)2 S.C.C. 179 was again a case in which suit was brought on the ground of non-payment of rent and bonafide personal necessity under the relevant provisions of the Act. The decree for possession was passed on the basis of a compromise under which the judgment-debtor was to handover possession by a future date. On his failure to do so. execution application was filed and the judgment-debtor challenged the validity of the decree. The order did not mention that the court was satisfied about the grounds for eviction. The court read pleadings and came to the conclusion that there was no serious dispute to be tried and if a decree for possession would have been passed in invitum the tenant would not have got three years’ time to vacate the premises; that he, therefore, agreed to suffer a decree by consent and gained three years’ time under it. The court also relied on the presumption that every compromise under O.23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be presumed to be lawful unless it is proved to the contrary. An admission by the tenant about the existence of a statutory ground, expressly or impliedly, will be sufficient and there need not be any evidence before the court on the merits of the grounds before the compromise order is passed. If there is an admission of the tenant it will not be open to him to challenge its correctness as the admission made in judicial proceedings arc absolutely binding on the parties. At any rate decree cannot be called a nullity to enable the executing court to go behind it.” 18. Our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in R.Raja Konar v. Andal Animal, A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 47. in that case, on various grounds eviction petition was filed by landlady, and the same were seriously disputed by the tenant, and the Rent Controller, after taking evidence, passed an order of eviction. The matter was taken in appeal. Before the appellate authority, tenant agreed that he will surrender possession of the building and time may be given for vacating the premises. 3 1/2 years’ time was requested. Appellate authority granted 1 1/2 years’ time. The matter was taken in revision. The matter was taken in appeal. Before the appellate authority, tenant agreed that he will surrender possession of the building and time may be given for vacating the premises. 3 1/2 years’ time was requested. Appellate authority granted 1 1/2 years’ time. The matter was taken in revision. The revisional court found that granting time is a matter of discretion of court and, therefore, the finding of the appellate authority is correct. An argument was taken before this Court that confirming an order of eviction on the joint compromise of landlord and tenant is against the provisions of statute. This Court held that even though ultimately the order of eviction is passed on the basis of compromise memo, in view of the earlier proceedings in the case, the court held that the appellate authority as well as the revisional court might have taken note of the said materials for recording the compromise and confirming the order of eviction. 19. In Gangadharan Pillai v. Chidamabara Iyer, 1979 K.L.T. 735 parties entered into a compromise after evidence was let in. An order of eviction was passed directing the tenant to vacate the premises within a period of six months. When the order was sought to be executed when the tenant failed to comply with the undertaking, similar contention was taken that the order is not executable. In that case, their Lordships took the wordings in the order recording the compromise, to hold that the compromise is valid and executable. The Rent Controller, in his order, observed that the grounds alleged in the petition stood proved. Therefore, accepting the compromise, he granted six months’ time to the tenant. 20. In Emmanuel v. Damodaran Achari, 1987 2 K.L.T. 831 K.T. Thomas. J., as he then was, said thus: “There cannot be any broad proposition that an order passed by a rent control court on compromise is necessarily a nullity. There is no provision in the Act which forbids the landlord and his tenant for entering into a compromise as between them in respect of the tenanted premises. If a landlord applies on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 11 for an order of eviction and if the tenant agrees that he would vacate on one or more of those grounds a compromise petition can be filed in court. If a landlord applies on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 11 for an order of eviction and if the tenant agrees that he would vacate on one or more of those grounds a compromise petition can be filed in court. It is for the rent control court to decide whether the compromise can he acted on. It is open to the court to reject the petition for the reason that the court is not satisfied of the grounds. But if the rent control court chooses to act on the compromise and pass an order on its basis, the order be deemed to be one passed on satisfaction of the rent control court that the ground exists. Merely because the rent control court did not say in so many words in the order, that the court is satisfied of the existence of the ground for eviction, no inference can be drawn that the court is not so satisfied. Satisfaction of the rent control court regarding the ground of eviction is implied in such an order. The order passed by the rent control court, on the compromise petition filed by the parties, cannot therefore be regarded as a nullity. On the other hand it is a valid order which is capable of enforcement.” [Italics supplied] .21. In Krishnan v. Gomathy Ammal, (1990)1 K.L.T. 143 , it was held thus: .“The executing court can find out from the compromise order itself whether circumstances existed warranting an order for eviction under the particular Rent Control Act. If on the face of the compromise order the existence of a ground under the Rent Control Act is not discernible them the executing court may look into the other records in the rent control court to ascertain whether any material or ground existed warranting an order for eviction under the Act. If on such examination prima facie it is found that materials are available for ordering eviction, the executing court has to execute the compromise order as such. ...” .22. On the basis of these decisions, I do not think the tenant can contend that the order of eviction is inexecutable. A reading of the eviction order in the case on hand says that de hors the compromise, the Rent Controller was satisfied about the grounds for eviction. That is why it is said that the ‘claim is proved. On the basis of these decisions, I do not think the tenant can contend that the order of eviction is inexecutable. A reading of the eviction order in the case on hand says that de hors the compromise, the Rent Controller was satisfied about the grounds for eviction. That is why it is said that the ‘claim is proved. ‘In fact, in the order of eviction, there is no statement that on the basis of the compromise, eviction is ordered. It is true at the same time, the tenant also filed a memo agreeing to surrender possession. There is admission on the part of the tenant that the claim of the landlady is genuine which the Rent Controller is entitled to take into consideration while passing the order of eviction. The admission is not taken at its face value. It is after the landlady adduced her evidence and marked documents and after taking into consideration the eviction petition Rent Controller says that the claim is proved. As stated in the earlier decisions, satisfaction of the rent control court need not be expressly stated. Law presumes that the court must have taken into consideration the grounds of eviction and it must also be presumed that the materials before it were also taken into consideration before entering the decision. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decisions reported in Khader Md.Rowther & Co. v. Sundaram, (1978)1 M.L.J. 79 and also G.Kuthabaksh v. A.P.Swamy, 93 L.W. 615 24. In Khader Md.Rowther & Co. v. Sundaram, (1978)1 M.L.J. 79 , it was held thus: “Under the wide sweep of its revisional jurisdiction the court has a dual role to fulfil. One, as a court of review examining the decisions of the appellate authority and the Rent Controller on merits; the other, as that of a superior court exercising the supervisory jurisdiction over the appellate authority and the Rent Controller. In the former role, the correctness and the legality of the Rent Controller is a special one, and it has to be discharged strictly in accordance with the statute. Besides any order that he passes has serious consequences for the parties before him. There can therefore be no question of his doing less than what he is capable of doing and less than what the statute expects him to do. Besides any order that he passes has serious consequences for the parties before him. There can therefore be no question of his doing less than what he is capable of doing and less than what the statute expects him to do. This means and implies that he cannot be adopting any labour-saving devices in composing his orders. He cannot shirk mental work. Nor can he skip his findings, driving the litigants and the superior courts alike to probe the unknown recesses of his mind and blunder their may into assigning some meaning, or any meaning, to his orders. Held that the order in the present case failed to live up to the strict requirements of Sec.10(3)(e) because the order did not show that the eviction had been ordered on the basis of the Rent Controller’s satisfaction that the landlord’s claim was bona fide The order was thus a nullity.” [Italics supplied] 25. In the later decision, i.e. G.Kuthabaksh v. A.P.Swamy, 93 L.W. 615, it was held thus: “....Unless the statutory authorities carry out such exercise and demonstrate in their order that they have exercised their minds and found out the bona fide of the requirement of the landlord, such orders cannot be sustained. It is precisely this that has been held in T.M.P.C. Ramachandra v. A.N.Batcha, 1978 T.L.N.J. 211.” In both these decisions, it was held that the order of eviction itself must show that the controller was satisfied about the claim. I do not think the said decisions are any longer good law, in view of the decision reported in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchoddas, (1993)2 S.C.C. 458 wherein their Lordships held that ‘satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly’ (see para 14 of the judgment). It is further clear from paragraph 20 of the judgment that if, on the face of the decree, satisfaction cannot be read into it, the executing court can look into other materials including the pleadings to come to the conclusion whether such satisfaction was impliedly inferred by the Rent Controller. Their Lordships further said that there need not be any express finding regarding the same. 26. In view of the above position of law, it cannot be doubted that the impugned order is illegal, and I am constrained to set aside the same. 27. In the result, I allow this revision, by setting aside the impugned order. Their Lordships further said that there need not be any express finding regarding the same. 26. In view of the above position of law, it cannot be doubted that the impugned order is illegal, and I am constrained to set aside the same. 27. In the result, I allow this revision, by setting aside the impugned order. E.P.No.67 of 1982 is allowed. E.A. No.119 of 1993 is dismissed. On receipt of a copy of this Order, the executing court shall implement the order of eviction and see that the decree-holder obtains possession of the buildings within a month thereafter. Petitioner is also entitled to her costs in this revision.