Palitana Municipality v. Maharashtrabhuvan Jain — 1997 DIGILAW 75 (GUJ)

S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) IN all these Special Civil Applications, there are common facts and grounds of challenge to the action of respondent and as such the same are being disposed of by this common order. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made submissions in these matters with reference to the Special Civil Application No. 7055 of 1987 and as such, the facts of this case are to be briefly noticed. ( 2 ) THE petitioner, Palitana Municipality, Palitana, by this Special Civil Application challenges the order dated 17th March, 1983 of the respondent No. 2, State of Gujarat, whereby it has granted exemption to the respondent No. 1-Trust, Maharashtrabhuvan Jain dharmashala from payment of education cess under the provisions of the Gujarat education Cess Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). The respondent No. 1 is a trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the act 1950 ). The Trust owns the property at Palitana. The property is a dharmashala which consists of number of rooms. The petitioner has come up with the case that the rooms are of the size of 10 x 10 and have attached verandah having 5 feet width. The rooms have been provided with all modern facilities. Some of the rooms on the ground floor are used as office premises. The Dharmashala also contains a kitchen, store room, and dining hall. It is urged by the petitioner that all the rooms in the dharmashala are being utilised by the Trust for providing residential accommodation to the pilgrims and visitors to Palitana and the Trust is charging some rent, by whatever name it may be called, in lieu of providing residential accommodation therein and the said amount is nothing but a rent charged from them and the Trust does not provide any residential accommodation to anybody without charging anything. It is further case of the petitioner that there are number of such other Dharmashalas, owned by different Trusts, in the town of Palitana, out of which some are paying education cess regularly without raising any objection or protest. Some of the Trusts including the respondent No. 1-Trust however, had filed Special Civil Application No. 164 of 1986 before this Court challenging levy of education cess by the petitioner. Some of the Trusts including the respondent No. 1-Trust however, had filed Special Civil Application No. 164 of 1986 before this Court challenging levy of education cess by the petitioner. Those Special Civil Applications were disposed of by this Court under the common order dated 8th April, 1986, wherein the petitioners of those petitions were directed to make appropriate applications to the respondent, State of Gujarat, claiming exemption from payment of education cess under the relevant Notification. This Court has further directed the State of Gujarat to decide these applications of the petitioners, therein, on merits after giving them an opportunity of being heard. Pursuant to the said directions of this Court, the respondent-Trust had made an application to the State of Gujarat claiming exemption from payment of education cess. This application was submitted by the respondent-Trust on 19th April, 1986. The petitioner replied to that application on 1st September, 1986. The respondent No. 2, vide its order dated 17th March, 1987, annexure d granted exemption to the respondent-Trust from payment of education cess and hence this Special Civil application by the petitioner before this Court. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri A. J. Shastri contended that the notification of the grant of exemption from the payment of education cess to the respondent was not laid before the State Legislature within the time as stipulated under sec. 13 of the Act, and as such this Notification is of no effect and substance. It has next been contended that exemption from the payment of education cess could have been ordered, only where the State Government considers it necessary to do so in the public interest. There was no public interest in the matter, as well as nothing has been stated by the State Government in the order, impugned, how it was considered it to be in the public interest to grant exemption to the Trust from payment of education cess and as such, the order deserves to be set aside only on this ground. It is further urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the building or any portion thereof for which exemption is claimed by the respondent-Trust is not solely used for public purpose or for public charitable purpose. It is further urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the building or any portion thereof for which exemption is claimed by the respondent-Trust is not solely used for public purpose or for public charitable purpose. Here is a case where the trust is deriving rent for providing residential accommodation in Dharmashala to the pilgrims and visitors to Palitana and the amount which is received is not utilised solely for religious or charitable purposes. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 has not given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner of being heard in the matter. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-Trusts and the State government supported the order made by the State Government in favour of the Trusts. The learned counsel for the Trusts raised a preliminary objection that these Special Civil applications are not maintainable as the petitioner is not an aggrieved person. In sum and substance the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-Trust is that the petitioner has no locus-standi to file these petitions challenging exemption granted to the trusts by the State Government as it is merely a collection agency of the education cess under the Act. On merits the learned counsel for the Trusts contended that the government of Gujarat, under its Notification dated 24th December, 1963, exempted from payment of tax under Sec. 12 of the Act, class of lands and buildings or portion thereof, solely used for public worship or for a public charitable purpose and held by a public Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 or by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960. The case before the respondent state was only whether the respondent Trusts are entitled for the benefits as given by the state Government under its Resolution dated 24th December, 1963 or not. It has next been contended that the Notification dated 24th December, 1963, granting exemption to a class of the aforesaid land and building has been placed before the State Legislature within a stipulated period as provided under Sec. 13 of the Act and in respect thereof, a letter of the Joint Secretary, State Legislative Assembly dated 28th November, 1996 has been placed on record. Carrying further this contention it is urged that the order, impugned, in these Special Civil Applications was not required to be placed before the state Legislature as it was the order under which it has been decided that land and building of the Trusts are entitled for grant of benefits under the Government Notification dated 24th December 1963. It is a decision, in fact and substance, declaring that the respondent-Trust is entitled for exemption from the payment of education cess tax under the Notification/resolution dated 24th December, 1963 of the State of Gujarat. Lastly it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-Trusts that the petitioner was only a collecting agent of the amount of the cess (tax) which is levied by the State Government and for which it was getting some rebate. However, the State Government discontinued the petitioner from collecting the cess (tax) and the Mamlatdar of the area was specially empowered in this behalf to collect the cess (tax ). So, otherwise also, the petitioner cannot have any grievance in the matter. ( 5 ) I have given my thoughtful considerations to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 6 ) BEFORE dealing with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I consider it to be appropriate to make a reference to the earlier litigation taken by the Trust before this Court. In those Special Civil Applications, the respondents-Trust therein, have challenged the order passed by the Assistant Collector, Palitana, on 30th November, 1982, whereby he set aside the order of the Mamlatdar, who had granted exemption to the trusts under the Notification dated 24th December, 1963. The Notification dated 24th december, 1963 was not under challenge in those Special Civil Applications. It is necessary to mention here that the Notification dated 24th December, 1963 is also not under challenge in these Special Civil Applications, (emphasis provided ). The Palitana municipality, in those cases raised a grievance that the exemption granted to the petitioners in those petitions under the Notification dated 24th December, 1963 was neither justified nor legal under the circumstances of the case. The Palitana municipality, in those cases raised a grievance that the exemption granted to the petitioners in those petitions under the Notification dated 24th December, 1963 was neither justified nor legal under the circumstances of the case. The Assistant Collector has allowed the appeal of the Palitana Municipality on the ground that the Palitana municipality was not given any opportunity of hearing before granting exemption to the petitioners in those Special Civil Application, from payment of cess (tax) and secondly that the Mamlatdar did not have the authority to decide the question of giving exemption to the Trusts. The Court has observed that the question of jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar can be and is required to be avoided in order to put an expeditious termination to the litigation between the parties which is going on for quite a number of years past and in view of the fact that the Palitana Municipality claims a sizeable amount of over Rs. 3 lacs by way of arrears of education cess from the petitioners. A reference has been made by the Court while, disposing of those Special Civil Application to the Division Bench decision in Letters Patent Appeal No. 172 of 1977, which reads as under:"therefore, such a question cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this petition. It will be open to the petitioners to make an application to the state Government if they so think fit, requesting the Government to decide whether the three Dharmashalas are exempt from payment of education cess. If such an application is made to the Government, the Government shall decide it within a reasonable time after hearing the concerned parties Subject to the observations which we have made, the letters patent appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. "those Special Civil Applications were disposed of by the Court by giving direction on the same lines as given by the Division Bench in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal. The operative part of the judgment of this Court in the previous litigation reads as under :"i propose to pass the order in these Special Civil Applications on the same lines. The petitioners herein in these Special Civil Applications before me shall make appropriate applications to the State Government, requesting the government to decide whether they are exempt from payment of education cess under the Notification. The petitioners herein in these Special Civil Applications before me shall make appropriate applications to the State Government, requesting the government to decide whether they are exempt from payment of education cess under the Notification. The petitioner will make these applications, if they so choose, within 30 days hereof, and the State Government shall decide the said applications within 90 days of the receipt of the applications I may point out that the State Government may issue a proper notice to the Palitana municipality which is likely to be affected by the decision in the application. " ( 7 ) FROM reading of the judgment given in the previous Special Civil Applications, two things are clear, namely, (i) general exemption has been granted by the State government under Notification dated 24th December, 1963 to the lands and buildings of the category and character as mentioned therein and (ii) this Court has given direction to the State Government to decide whether the petitioners in those Special Civil Applications are exempted from payment of education cess under the aforesaid Notification (emphasis provided ). ( 8 ) THE petitioners in those Special Civil Applications, who are respondents in these present Special Civil Applications, accordingly submitted an application to the State government and under the order impugned, the State Government has decided that they are entitled for exemption from payment of the cess under the Notification dated 24th december, 1963. As stated earlier, this Notification was not challenged by the petitioners in these Special Civil Applications. So the only question before the Government was to decide whether the case of the respondents-Trusts fall within four corners of the notification dated 24th December, 1963 or not, and what exactly the State Government did under the impugned order. ( 9 ) THE first question which calls for consideration of this Court in these Special Civil applications is whether this order required to be placed before the State Legislature, as required under Sec. 13 of the Act or not. Sec. 13 of the Act has been reproduced by the petitioners in this Special Civil Application at para No. 8 of the petitions. Sec. 13 of the Act has been reproduced by the petitioners in this Special Civil Application at para No. 8 of the petitions. Proviso to Sec. 13 of the Act provides that every such notification shall be laid for not less than thirty days before the State Legislature, as soon as possible, after it is published, and shall be subject to rescission by the State Legislature, or to such modification as the State legislature may make, during the session in which it is so laid of the session immediately following. So, the Notification of exemption from payment of tax under Sec. 12 has to be laid before the State Legislature. The Notification under Sec. 12 has been made by the state Government on 24th December, 1963 and there is no dispute in the case that notification has been laid before the State Legislature. The document has also been produced on record in this respect in the form of a letter dated 28th November, 1996 of the Joint Secretary, State Legislative Assembly, wherefrom it is clear that the aforesaid notification was laid before the State Legislature. This document has been produced by the Government Advocate as on the last occasion this Court has directed the State government to let this Court know whether the Notification dated 24th December, 1963 was laid before the State Legislature or not. The State Government, under the order impugned, has only, as stated earlier, decided that the respondent-Trust, herein, is entitled for the benefit of the Notification dated 24th December, 1963 and as such, this decision was not a decision under Sec. 13 of the Act as tried to be projected by the petitioner and as such, it was not required to be laid before the State Legislature as per the provisions of sec. 13 of the Act. ( 10 ) SECTION 12 of the Act is charging Section which provides that subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be levied and collected with effect from the first day of april 1970, tax on lands and buildings situated in an urban area at the rates prescribed therein. Sec. 13 of the Act grants exemption to certain lands and buildings from payment of tax. Sec. 13 of the Act grants exemption to certain lands and buildings from payment of tax. Exemption has been made out for buildings and lands vesting in the Central government, buildings and lands vesting in the State Government or belonging to local authority, local Board, Taluka Panchayat, District Panchayat or a Cantonment Board and used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for purposes of profit. Another category of exemption to lands and buildings are buildings or lands or class of buildings or lands which the State Government, if it consider it necessary to do so in the public interest, payment of tax under Sec. 12 of the Act. Proviso to Sec. 13 of the Act is relevant and material for decision of this case which reads as under :"provided that. (i) every such notification shall be laid for not less than thirty days before the state Legislature as soon as possible after it is published, and shall be subject to recession by the State Legislature, or to such modification as the State legislature may make, during the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following; and (ii) any recession or modification so made shall be published in the Official Gaz. ( 11 ) THE question which does fall for consideration of this Court is whether the requirement of laying of the Notification for exemption of buildings or lands from payment of tax under the Act before the Legislature is mandatory or not. The proviso to sec. 13 requires that Notification made under Sec. 13 of the Act shall be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly for the period prescribed therein and shall be subject to recession by the State Legislature or to such notification as the State Legislature may make, during the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following. If recession or modification was made shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall thereupon take effect. This is one form of Legislative control over the subordinate legislature. If recession or modification was made shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall thereupon take effect. This is one form of Legislative control over the subordinate legislature. The requirement of laying of the Notification on the table of Legislative assembly under proviso to Sec. 13 of the Act is a case of "simple laying" in contradistinction to "laying subject to negative resolution" and "laying subject to affirmative resolution", is not mandatory though the expression shall has been used by the Legislation in the said proviso. In the case of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1979 (2) SCC 196 , the Honble Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The requirement as to laying the order made under the said provision before appropriate legislature couched in the language akin to proviso to Sec. 13 of the Act. The Honble supreme Court in the case aforesaid, held the provisions of Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 3 of the essential Commodities Act, 1955 as to laying therein to be a "simple laying" and held that the same is directory and not mandatory. The Honble Supreme Court has further held that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance of the requirement of laying, as envisaged by Sec. 3 (6) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, should render the order void. Before the Honble Supreme Court, the point was whether non laying of Iron and steel Control Order, 1956, made under Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Notification made under clause 15 (3) of the order, fixing maximum selling price of various categories of iron and steel before both the Houses of the Parliament can result in nullification of the Notification or not. Dealing with the aforesaid question, the Honble Supreme Court has held that there is no provision in Sec. 3 (6) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 to the making of the orders without approval of both the Houses of Parliament; neither it provides that it shall be subject to negative or affirmative resolution by either House of the Parliament, nor that it shall be open to the Parliament to approve or disapprove the order made under Sec. 3 of the Act, nor that it shall be subject to order made under any modification which either house of the Parliament may at its wisdom think it necessary to provide. It does not even specify the period for which the order is to be laid before both the Houses of the parliament, nor does it provide any penalty for non observance or nor compliance with the directions as to laying of the order before both the Houses of the Parliament. Further the requirement to laying of the order before both the Houses of the Parliament is not a condition precedent but subsequent to making of the order. A reference may have to another decision of Honble Supreme Court in the case of I. T. C. Bhadrachalam paperboards vs. Mandal Revenue Officer, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 634 . There the provisions of Sec. 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Non Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963 were in consideration. Sec. 11 of the said Act confers upon the Government, the power to exempt any class of non agricultural lands from the levy. Sub-sec. (2) of the Sec. 11 of the said Act provides that every order made under Sub-sec. (1) shall immediately after it is made, be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly if it is in session, and if it is not in session, in the session immediately following, for a total preiod of 14 days, session or two successive sessions and if, before the expiration of session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, the Assembly agrees in making any modification in the order or in the annulment of the order, the order shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the case may be, so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that order. The language used in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 of the aforesaid Act which was under consideration before the Honble supreme Court, in the case of I. T. C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards (supra) is akin to the language used in proviso to Sec. 13 of this Act. In para 29 of the Judgment the Honble supreme Court thus held as under :"the next question is whether the requirement of laying before the legislature is mandatory? Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 of the Act requires that an order made under Sec. 11 (1) shall be laid on the table of the Legislative assembly for the period prescribed therein and shall be subject to such modifications as may be made by the legislature. The legislature is also entitled to annul the said order. This is one form of legislative control over subordinate legislation. Shri Sorabjee cited the decision of this Court in Atlas cycle Industries Ltd. vs. State of Naryana 1979 (2) SCC 196 ) holding that the requirement of laying couched in the language akin to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 a case of "simple laying" in contradistinction to "laying subject to negative resolution" and "laying subject to affirmative resolution" - is not mandatory notwithstanding the use of the expression shall in the relevant provision. The court was dealing with Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities act, 1955 which provides for laying the orders made under the Act before the appropriate legislature, an instance of simple laying" or "laying without further procedure". The said decision appears to be consistent with the authorities on the subject, both in India and in United Kingdom, and is binding upon us. It is brought to our notice that as early as 1956, Subba Rao, c. J. had taken the same view in Andhara Pradesh High Court vide D. K. Krishanan vs. Secy. , Regional Transport Authority (AIR 1956 AP 129 ). Accordingly, we hold that the requirement of laying prescribed by sub-section (2) of Sec. 11 of not mandatory and an order of exemption under sec. , Regional Transport Authority (AIR 1956 AP 129 ). Accordingly, we hold that the requirement of laying prescribed by sub-section (2) of Sec. 11 of not mandatory and an order of exemption under sec. 11 cannot be said to be ineffective or unenforceable for the reason of non-laying as required by ( 12 ) OTHERWISE also, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any merits as the provision as contained for laying of Notification of exemption under Sec. 13 of the Act on the table of legislature are only directory and non compliance thereof will not nullify the order impugned in these Special Civil application. ( 13 ) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also devoid of any substance. The learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that the State government has been conferred with the powers to grant exemption to certain lands and buildings from payment of tax under Sec. 12 of the Act. The grievance made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the exemption could have been granted to a land or building from payment of tax under the Act where the State Government considered it necessary to do so in the public interest and not otherwise. In the case of grant of exemption to the respondents in these Special Civil Applications, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended, that there was nothing on record to show that it is considered necessary in the public interest. This contention has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the factual matrix that as per petitioners case the dharmshalas, the respondents herein were charging rent for providing residential accommodation to the pilgrims and visitors to Palitana. However, it is not the case of the petitioner that respondents are making out any profit by providing residential accommodation to pilgrims and visitors to Palitana. On being asked by the Court to the learned counsel for the petitioner, he has failed to refer any documents from the record of these cases wherefrom it could have come out that these Dharmshalas are charging rent from the pilgrims and visitors to Palitana. Even from the documents which have been produced on record of these Special Civil Application, also it does not follow that these dharmshalas are charging any rent from the pilgrims and visitors to Palitana. Even from the documents which have been produced on record of these Special Civil Application, also it does not follow that these dharmshalas are charging any rent from the pilgrims and visitors to Palitana. The documents on record reveal that the pilgrims and visitors who stay at the Dharmshalas have donated something by way of donations for different purposes and under different heads. Nothing has been brought on record in support of the contentions which have been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the amount which is received by the respondents is not utilised solely on religious or charitable purposes. The tax is levied by the State Government and not by the local authorities. It is for the legislature to decide to which class of lands and buildings, the exemption should be granted the from payment of tax. Clause 3 of Sec. 13 of the Act nowhere provides that only the buildings which are solely used for religious or charitable purposes can be granted the exemption from payment of tax under the Act. Clause 3 of Sec. 13 of the Act empowers the State government to exempt any building or land or class of buildings or lands which it consider it necessary to do so in the public interest. ( 14 ) SO it is for consideration of the State Government which building or land or class of buildings or lands is or are to be exempted from payment of tax under Sec. 13 of the act, in the public interest. Public interest has not been defined in the Act, but it is for the state Government to consider while deciding a question of grant of exemption under clause 3 of Sec. 13 of the Act, whether it is in the public interest or not. Reverting back, under the Notification of the State Government dated 24th December, 1963, a general decision has been taken that the lands and buildings or portions thereof, solely used for public worship or for a public charitable purposes and held for a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 or for a Society registered under the Societies registration Act, are granted exemption. So the lands and buildings which are being used solely for the public charitable purposes and held for bublic Trust or Society, as the case may be, are granted exemption from payment of tax under the Act. So the lands and buildings which are being used solely for the public charitable purposes and held for bublic Trust or Society, as the case may be, are granted exemption from payment of tax under the Act. This Notification has clarified that the buildings or lands or portions thereof shall not be deemed to be solely occupied and used for public charitable purposes within the meaning of the aforesaid clause, namely, buildings and lands or portions thereof in which trade or business is carried on and the buildings or lands or portions thereof in respect of which rent is derived, whether such rent is not applied solely to religious or charitable purposes. The petitioner has picked out a ground from this Notification and made out a case, that as the dharmshalas are receiving rent and the amount so received is not applied solely to religious or charitable purpose, the exemption from payment of education cess should not have been granted to these Dharmshalas. But the petitioner has altogether ignored one important aspect that it is essentially a question of fact and essentially a question for consideration of the State Government. It is for the State Government to consider whether the buildings belonging to respondents fall within the four corners of the notification dated 24th December, 1963 or not. Once a decision has been taken that the building fulfills the essential requirement of the aforesaid Notification, then a decision taken by the Court in the matter does not call for interference by this Court. The order has been passed after the notice to the petitioners and the plea which has been taken that it was not in the public interest to exempt these buildings from payment of education cess, is difficult to accept, moreso when nothing has been produced on record by the petitioner in support of the contention that the respondents are charging rent from the pilgrims or visitors to Palitana and the amount is not used solely for religious or charitable purposes. These are the questions of fact which have to be established by the petitioner by producing cogent and satisfactory evidence, but I do not find anything on record. These are the questions of fact which have to be established by the petitioner by producing cogent and satisfactory evidence, but I do not find anything on record. In the absence of any evidence and further as the decision has to be taken by the State government, sitting under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not desirable and advisable to interfere with the order impugned. It is a tax to be levied inder the Act by the State Government and in case a particular land or building is granted exemption from payment of education cess, considering it in public interest, then in such matters, this Court has very very limited power of judical review. Moreover, the petitioner is not really an aggrieved person. The petitioner is a local authority and whatever decision is taken by the State Government has to be accepted by it. I find sufficient merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has no locus-standi to challenge the order of the State Government. The petitioner is not concerned with this tax and otherwise also the decision of State government has to be accepted by it. It is difficult to say and accept that the petitioner is an aggrieved person by the decision given in these matters in favour of respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Resolution of the Government dated 15th october, 1992 and contended that the petitioners are beneficiaries thereunder. Sec. 15 of the Act provides the authorities competent to collect the tax. The tax under Sec. 12 shall be collected, in the urban areas other than cantonments, by the respective local authorities concerned. Proviso to Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15 of the Act provides that "where a local authority is not for the time being levying a property tax or where a local authority has made a default in the collection of the tax or payment thereof to the State Government, the state Government may, by order direct that the tax shall be collected by the Collector". Sub sec. 4 of Sec. 15 of the Act provides that "the local authority shall, in respect of the cost of collection of the tax, be entitled to such rebate as may be prescribed, and different rates of rebate may be provided for different urban areas". Sub sec. 4 of Sec. 15 of the Act provides that "the local authority shall, in respect of the cost of collection of the tax, be entitled to such rebate as may be prescribed, and different rates of rebate may be provided for different urban areas". ( 15 ) IN reply to the Special Civil Application, and particularly para-10 thereof, the respondents have come up with the case that the petitioner municipality has not been empowered to collect the education cess as the petitioner-Municipality, in the beginning of the implementation of the Act, failed to collect the Education cess and the cess was therefore collected by the Mamlatdar specially empowered in this behalf by collect. The averments made by respondents in para-10 of their reply petitioner has not produced anything on the record to show that it is competent authority to collect tax under the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act. The Resolution dated 15th October, 1992 provides that 5% of the total recovery of education cess are to be given to the Nagar Palika or Nagar panchayat, as the case may be towards the expenses. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the aforessaid Notification dated 15. 10. 92, urged that the petitioner is entitled for grant at the rate as stated petitioner is entitled for grant at the rate as stated therein from education cess collected and in case the amount of education cess is collected less, because of exemption of many lands and buildings from payment thereof, it will suffer. Relevant portion of the Resolution dated 15. 10. 92 reads as under: 1. The Corporation/nagarpalika and Corporations who are shouldering the responsibility of the primary education, the grant is paid as follows : in the case of all the Nagarpalikas of all classes : total collection of the educn. cess which is deposited grantable amount from education cess income. 1. 70% more than 100% 2. 60% to 70% 95% 3. Less than 60% 90% ( 17 ) I do not find any substance in this contention. In case this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then what this Court will do is that it will nullify or render the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act nugatory. The Resolution is to be read in the form and for the purpose it is made. In case this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then what this Court will do is that it will nullify or render the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act nugatory. The Resolution is to be read in the form and for the purpose it is made. Something cannot be read in the resolution which otherwise is not there or takes away the right of the State Government, as conferred by legislature under Sec. 13 of the Act. Whatever education cess is collected, out of which the grant is to be made at the rate as given thereunder to Nagarpalikas who are shouldering responsibility of primary education. The manner in which this Resolution is sought to be read and is read accordingly, then certainly there will be inconsistency between this Regusolution and the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act. the provisions of the legislative Act cannot be nullified or superseded by the administrative Resolutions. Much Emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is shouldering the responsibility of primary education and as such, it is entitled for grant at the rate as provided under the aforesaid Notification. I do not find anything on record of this case that the petitioner is shouldering the responsibility of primary education in the area. In the writ petition, nothing has been stated in this respect by the petitioner. But only because there may be some shortfall in the collection of education cess because of grant of exemption to certain lands and buildings by the Government under Sec. 13 of the Act, the petitioner will not fall under the category of aggrieved person. If any deficit remains in shouldering the responsibility of primary education, then they may have some other ways to deal with the matter with the Government but only on this ground, it is difficult to accept that they have any locus-standi to challenge the decision of the Government taken under Sec. 13 of the Act, granting exemption to the buildings of the respondents. ( 18 ) THE last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also equally without any merits. ( 18 ) THE last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also equally without any merits. It is not in dispute that on remand of the matter by this Court in the earlier proceedings, the petitioner has been given a notice and it has filed reply to the application filed by the respondents-Trusts for grant of exemption to it from payment of education cess. The grievance of the petitioner is that after filing of the reply to the application of the respondents-Trusts, it has also made a representation dated 11. 11. 86 to the respondent-State requesting it to furnish further details of representation made by the respondent, which has not been done. There is a fallacy in this contention. The factual foundation for this contention is altogether missing from the record of the case. It cannot be assumed and presumed that the respondents have filed further representation to the State. The petitioner has not given out what for further representation has been filed by the respondent-Trusts. It is also not the case of the petitioner that some additional material has been produced by the respondents-Trusts before the State Government then what it has been submitted alongwith the application. The grievance of the nature which has been made by the petitioner on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice is without any substance. I fail to see how, from the facts which have been stated by the petitioner, the principles of natural justice have been violated in the present case by the respondents or that the petitioner has not been given sufficient opportunity of being heard. Earlier this Court has ordered that the State government may issue appropriate notice to the Palitana Municipality which admittedly has been given in the present case to the petitioner. ( 19 ) IN the result, all these Special Civil Applications fail and the same are dismissed. Rule is discharged in all Special Civil Applications. No order as to costs. .